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The  experts  expressed  their  views  in  a  personal  capacity  without  committing  their 
institutions. FOREWORD 
The  report  of  the  experts'  group,  which  the  Commission  asked  me  to  chair,  stems  from 
the  Council  resolution of  8th  November  1976,  which  agreed  to "seek,  on  the basis of 
Commission  proposals,  an  overall  view  of  the  reciprocal  implications  between,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  internal  and  external  policies of  the  Community  and,  on  the other  hand, 
development  cooperation policy". 
In  a  follow-up  to this  resolution,  the  Commission  submitted  to the  Council  in  1977  a 
staff  working  document  which  was  discussed  in  detail  within  the  Council  by  those  res-
ponsible  for  preparing  the discussions  of  the Ministers for  development  cooperation  (*). 
Discussions  based  on  this  document  started  up  between  the  Commission  and  Member  States 
and  it  was  soon  apparent  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  issues  at  stake  needed  to be  better 
defined,  i.e.  the  supposed  changes  in  the  international  division of  labour,  and  that, 
on  the other  hand,  it  would  be  necessary  to  go  more  thoroughly  into the  reasons  behind 
the political orientations  which  might  be  adopted. 
This  is  why  the  Commission~ in  order  to  clarify  its diagnosis  and  help  put  together  its 
position, called upon  a  group  of  independant  experts  who  were  all,  in  one  way  or  another, 
at  the  center  of  work  undertake~ often  through  political  impulses) in  their  respective 
countries  to gauge  the effects on  the national  economy  of  changes  taking  place  in  the  in-
ternational  division  of  Labour. 
This  group  of  experts met  6  times  between  October  1977  and  July  1978  at  the  Commission's 
headquarters. 
(*)  Reciprocal  implications  of  development  cooperation policy  and  of  other  Community 
policies. -2-
In  the  course  of  its meetings  the  group  worked  on  the  basis of  papers presented  by 
each  of  its members.  The  resulting  report  fall  into two  parts 
- the first  part  devoted  to  the  analysis  of  the  new  international  division  of  labour 
and  its consequences  for  the  EEC  was  drawn  up  to  a  large extent  by  the  secretariat 
on  the  basis  of  the  papers  presented  and  of  the  discussions  which  stemmed  from  them. 
These  different  papers  are  annexed  to the  report  in  the order  in  which  they  are  re-
ferred  to  in  the  main  body  of  its text  ; 
-the second  part  is devoted  to  the political  orientations  ;  its different  sections 
were  drawn  up  by  members  of  the  expert  group  on  the  basis  of  working  notes  submitted 
to the group  and  which  in  the  majority of  cases  were  reworked  in  order  to  take  account 
of  the  remarks  which  they  generated. 
The  main  thrusts of  the  report  can  be  summarized  as  follows 
a)  the  analytical  aspects 
- For  an  economic  entity  such  as  the  Community,  at grips  with  profound  changes  in 
its international  environment,  industrial  policies  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  simple 
adjustment  to  the  demands  of  the  international  division  of  labour  Ci.d.l.).  Chan-
ges  in  the  i.d.l.  constitute  a  process  in  which  the  Community  is a  participant  and 
on  which  its  internal  and  external  policies  can  have  an  effect  CFirst  part,  Chap-
ter I,  sections  I,  II, III). 
The  EEC  is still  in  a  privileged position  regarding  the  i.d.l.  :  as  the  main  ex-
porter  of  manufactured  goods  to  developing  countries it has  not  yet  suffered the 
same  sort  of  pressure of  competition  as  the  USA  or  even  Japan.  Nevertheless this 
situation  is  changing  rapidly  :  it is  now  the  EEC's  turn  to enter  into the  new 
i.d.l.  The  Community  could  react  by  putting  a  brake  on  access  to  its market  of 
competitive  products  from  developing  countries,  but  this  solution  is probably  not 
viable over  a  period of  time  and  in  any  case  is dangerous  for  Europe  (Chapter  I, 
section  IV). -3-
-Two of  the  factors  in  changes  in  the  i.d.t.  are  the  action of  transnational  firms 
and  the  development  strategies of  various  categories  of  developing  countries. 
There  is, perhaps  too  often,  a  tendency  to  overestimate  the  former  whereas  the 
latter  is  fundamental.  This  means  that  for  Europe  the  broad  tines of  its  indus-
trial policies  must  systematically  be  confronted  with  those of  its third-world 
partners  (Chapter  I, section  V). 
-The  impact  of  changes  in  the  i.d.l. on  the  EEC's  industrial  structures  is  not 
confined  to  sectors  which  are  labour  intensive  ;  it  can  not  be  disassociated  from 
other  pressures  for  structural  adjustments  (demand,  technology,  etc ••• )  (Chapter  II, 
section I). 
- The  overall  effects on  employment  of  competitive  imports  from  developing  countries 
are  relatively  small  compared  with  other  variables  which  affect  employment  levels 
in  the  EEC.  However,  problems  do  arise from  the  fact  that  the  negative effect  on 
employment  caused  by  changes  underway  in  the  i.d.t.  is  concentrated  on  certain  ca-
tegories  of  workers,  firms  and  regions,  whereas  the positive effects  <in  terms  of 
employment  and  consumers'  revenue)  are  spread  more  widely  (Chapter  II, sections 
II, III  and  IV). 
b)  In  terms  of  political orientations, the  accent  is put  successively  on  trade policies 
in  respect  of  developing  countries,  on  internal  adjustment  policies,  and  on  a  few 
basic  methods  of  linking  the  future  growth  of  industrial  countries  with  that  of  de-
veloping  countries. 
The  trade policy orientations  in  respect  of  developing  countries  are  based  on  several 
fundamental  ideas  (Second  part,  Chapter  I)  : 
•  A mercantilist  approach  must  be  substituted  by  an  approach  which  emphasises  cohe-
rence  in  attaining  multiple objectives,  the  chief  of  which  is  cooperation  for  the 
development  of  third-world  countries. - 4-
•  Trade  policy must  go  beyond  the  sphere  of  the quantitative organisation of  pro-
duct  flows  to  embrace  the  regulation of  relations  between  partners  <which  parti-
cularly  implies that  it  dea~explicitty with  the  sharing  of  the  benefits  drawn 
from  international  trade) • 
•  Trade  policy  must  contribute towards  facilitating  the  adaptations  that  are  needed 
rather  than  acting  as  a  brake  on  structural  change.  An  exclusively  commercial 
approach  must  therefore  be  replaced  by  an  approach  in  terms  of  organising  and 
adapting  the  structures of  complementary  activities. 
Generalised  interdependence  requires  the  replacement  of  traditional  approaches  by 
product  or  by  sector  by  a  multi-sectoral  approach  to  trade policy. 
It  is  in  this spirit that  are  tackled  the  questions  relating  to  the  modalities  of  free 
trade  (information,  selectivity,  reciprocity),  to  its organisation  (transition,  rate 
of  liberalisation,  product  agreements,  MFA  style), to  its policing  (safeguard  rules, 
standards pertaining  to  working  conditions,  export  policy),  and  to  its differentia-
tion on  a  regional  basis. 
As  for  adjustment  policies  conceived  as  an  alternative to protectionism,  the  report 
provides  for  (Chapter  II)  : 
•  the  establishment  of  an  institutional  Link  between  the  implementation  of  trade 
policies and  that  of  adjustment  policies  ; 
an  anticipatory  adjustment  policy  touched  off  by  an  "early  warning  system"  using 
the means  of  a  "second  window"  of  the Social  Fund  enlarged  for  this purpose,  as 
well  as  those of  the  Regional  Fund  ; 
the  exploitation of  information  received  through  the  "early  warning  system"  and 
in  the  implementation  of  the  instruments of  Community  adjustment  policy  both  in-
ternally  (information  from  companies  and  from  workers)  and  externally  <in  the 
framework  of  industrial  cooperation  with  LDCs,  for  example  the  ACP). -5-
- The  third  level  of  policy orientation proposed  by  the  report  is that  of  the  organisa-
tion of  interdependence  between  the  EEC  and  its third  world  partners.  This  issue  is 
taken  up  under  three  headings  : 
that  of  industrial  cooperation  considered  in  the perspective of  the  industrial  de-
velopment  of  the  LDCs  but  also  in  that of  the  gearing  of  EEC  industrial  policies 
to the growth  of  countries  in  the  process  of  industrialising  (Chapter  III,  section  I)  ; 
that  of  the  Community's  dependence  on  mining  and  of  its own  policies designed  to 
guarantee  in  time  the diversification of  its sources of  supply  through  Community 
policy of ffiining  cooperation  with  LDCs  (Chapter  III,  section  II)  ; 
that of  cooperation  in  the domain  of  the transfer  of  technology  by  proposing  own 
resources  to  increase  the  volume  of  transfers  and  by  modifying  their  nature  (Chapter 
III,  section III). 
* 
*  * 
t  is not  up  to  me  to portray the merits of  this  report  but  I  am  bound  to  underline  its 
imits  and  acknowledge  its shortcomings. 
irst of  all  limits  :  they  are of  two  sorts and  they  are  inherent  in  the nature  of  the 
ask  given  to the expert  group  and  in  the  composition  of  the  group  itself. 
The  report  is devoted  to the  consequences of  the  new  international  division  of  labour 
for  that  group  of  industrialised  countries that  makes  up  the  EEC  and  to the  policy 
that  the  Community  could  adopt  to  influence this i.d.l;  and  adapt  itself to it.  As 
it was  conceived  from  the  viewpoint  and  the  situation of  industrialised countries 
this  report  does  not  directly deal  with  the  major  options  facing  the  developing  coun-
tries themselves  in  their  agricultural  and  industrial  development  policies. -6-
One  should  not  therefore  in  this  report  seek  to  find  the  viewpoint  of  the third  world, 
even  though  the policy orientations proposed  by  the different  members  of  the  group 
deliberately  give  primacy  to  the  requirements  of  international  cooperation  as  opposed 
to the  temptations  of  protectionism. 
The  report  is naturally  flavoured  by  the  shades  of  opinion  indeed  divergencies  which 
appeared  within  the  group.  One  of  its members  said that  three  types  of  poisitions 
were  expressed  concerning  the  new  i.d.l.  While  putting  himself  in  the first  category 
he  describes  ~aricatures ?)  them  as  follows  : 
i)  a  conventional  neoclassical  approach  of  "mutual  in1;erests"  which  considers  the 
concept  of  comparative  advantages  as  having  a  normative  as  well  as  a  positive 
value  in  dealing  with  trade  between  developing  and  developed  countries  ; 
ii)  an  approach  inspired  by  the theories of  dependence  according  to  which  develo-
ping  countries,  in  their exports of  manufactures  just  as  much  as  in  their  ex-
ports  of  commodities  are  inevitably exploited  by  the  capitalist 1nterest of 
the  rich  countries  and  which  must  therefore  untie  themselves  from  these  rela-
tionships  of  unequal  exchange  ; 
iii)  a  protectionist  approach  of  rich  countries  aware  of  the damaging  consequences 
for  themselves  of  trade  with  those  countries  that  have  recently  embarked  upon 
industrialisation and  which  holds  therefore that  rich  countries  should  untie 
themselves  from  international  trade. 
In  actual  fact  the  members  of  the group  who  would  not  associate  themselves  with  the 
first  approach  would  no  doubt  energetically  refuse to  be  classified  in  the  two  other 
categories  and  the third  category  in  any  case  found  little echo  in  this  report.  There 
remains  the  fact  the differences  between  the  members  of  the  group  in  their theoretical 
and  political  approach  to  the problems  was  without  any  doubt  an  inevitable phenomenon 
which  it would  have  been  vain  to try  and  disguise. -7-
The  main  divergencies  are  to  be  found  perhaps  more  at  the  Level  of  analysis  than  at that 
of  the orientations proposed  ;  these divergencies  centered  in  particular  around  the 
concept  of  "structure preferences"  proposed  by  J.  De  Bandt  (see part  I, pages  4  and  35) 
and  on  the negative verdirits  pronounced  by  some  against  the extraverted  forms  of  indus-
trialisation adopted  by  Formosa  and  Hong-Kong  for  example  (see  the  note of  V.  Cable 
concerning  pages  8  and  9  of  the part  I). 
Instead of  seeking  the  superficial  unanimity  that goes  with  compromise  motions  we  pre-
ferred  to  refer  back  systematically  to  the documents  and  notes  ~hich express  the  indi-
vidual  point  of  view  of  the different  members  of  the group. 
If these  Limits  may  be  excusable,  the  shortcomings  are  a  matter  for  confession.  Per-
sonally  I  regret  two  shortcomings  which  seem  to  me  important  :  the  non-treatment  of 
agricultural  problems  and  the  inadequate  treatment  of  employment  problems. 
- The  thrust  of  the  group  both  as  concerns  the  experts  and  the  secretariat  (implemented 
by  the  staff of  the  Directorate  General  for  Development)  operated  in  such  a  way  that 
discussions  centered  on  the  industrial  international  division of  labour.  An  exhaustive 
examination  and  exchange  of  views  on  the  reciprocal  implications  between  internalpolicies 
and  external  policies  towards  the  LDCs  should  have  led  us  to  call  into question  the 
coherence  of  the  common  agricultural  policy  with  a  commercial  policy open  to develo-
ping  countries'  production. 
This  is an  important  question  which  the group  was  unable  to  cover  adequately  and  which 
should  be  taken  up  again  soon,  all  the  more  given the fact  that  for  the  southern  Me-
diterranean  LDCs  it  is at  the  heart  of  the  issues of  enlargement  of  the  EEC. -8-
- Another  shortcoming  regretted  by  the  group  was  the  fact  that  the  chapter  devoted 
to  the  consequences  of  the  new  i.d.L.  on  employment  in  the  Commun1ty  did  not  Link 
up,  in  the part  devoted  to political orientations,  with  a  consideration of  employ-
ment  policies,  in  particular  where  the possible  conflicts  between  internal  policies 
and  external  policies  show  up  directly, that  is the policies of  Community  Member 
States  concerning  access  of  migrant  workers  from  third  countries  to the  Labour  market. 
* 
*  * 
Despite  all  these  Limits  and  shortcomings  I  feel  that  the  group  fullfilled to  a  Large 
extent  the  mandate  which  the  Commission  gave  it.  I  would  Like  to  thank  each  one  of 
the members  of  the group  for  the  quality of  their participation  and  the  secretariat 
for  the  role it played  in  finalizing  the  report. 
The  Chairman 
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THE  NEW  INTERNATIONAL  DIVISION  OF  LABOUR  (I.D.L.) 
AND  ITS  CONSmUENCES  FOR  THE  EEC 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-CHAPTER  I  - CHANGES  IN  THE  I.  D. L. 
I.  TOWARDS  A NEW  I.D.L.  ? 
During the three post-war decades the main trends of international economic 
development  have  been  : 
- the acceleration of the growth of industrial production,  in both 
industrialized and developing countries  (between 1950  and 1972  the 
average  annual  growth rates for industrial production were  : 
4.0 %  in the United States 
7.1% in Europe 
7.9% in the other industrialized countries 
6.8 %  in the  developing countries 
5.9 %  as the world average). 
- the growing homogeneity of production and  consumption structures in the 
most  advanced industrialized countries,  favouring  an unprecedented 
intensification of interdependence  between those  countries'  economies 
- the acceleration of the process of capital  concentration,  leading to the 
internationalization of production under the aegis of a  small number  of 
transnational firms  and to growth in trade between their subsidiaries 
(Michalet  estimates that inter-firm trade accounts  for 45 %  of world 
trade  (1))  ; 
a  notable  change  in the relative importance of the major groups  of 
countries participating in world industrial activity :  between 1950  and 
1970  respective  shares of world industrial production changed as 
follows  : 
45  to 33  %  for the United States 
39  to 48 %  for Europe 
7 to  9 %  for the other developed countries 
9  to 10 %  for the  developing countries 
(Source  UN  Economic  Survey of Europe  - 1971). 
(1)  C.A.  Michalet,  Les  firmes  multinationales et la nouvelle  division inter-
nationale  du  travail  (Multinational firms  and the new  international 
division of labour),  International Labour Office,  Geneva,  1975,  p.  32. -2-
In the early seventies,  two  attendant  factors indicated that this tendency, 
after operating in favour of the growth of European industry's relative 
weight  in the ·world,  could by the  end of the  century be  reflected in the 
emergence  of a  number  of third world countries as industrial powers. 
These  factors  were  : 
- the desire shown  by  the  developing countries to  change  the international 
division of labour in their own  favour  (Lima  objective  :  to increase the 
developing countries'  share of world industrial production to 25  % by 
the year 2000,  and 
- the growing role played by  Western  capital in the  developing countries' 
industrialization process,  which  has the effect  of diminishing one  of 
the major  obstacles preventing them from  becoming internationally compe-
titive - namely,  inadequate technological  and entrepreneurial  capacity. 
The  relative importance of these two  factors  (collective self-development 
of the  developing  countries and the role of the transnationals)  in the 
process,  which  could lead to a  new  i.d.l., has still to be  determined  (see 
below),  especially as they are perhaps  in opposition to each other to some 
extent.  The  fact  remains that the prospect  of a  profound change  in the 
international  division of labour became  plausible in the early seventies 
with the acceleration in the growth rate of developing countries'  exports 
of manufactured products  compared  with those  of the rest  of the world. 
Between  1970  and 1976  the  21  main  industrialized countries'  imports  of 
manufactures  (1)  from the  developing countries grew  one  and  a  half times 
faster than their imports  of such products from  all sources  (26  % per annum 
from  developing  countries  ;  18% per annum  from  all sources  {world)). 
The  developing  countries'  market  share for the products in question in 
these industrialized countries accordingly rose  from  4.9 % in 1970  to 
7.3% in 1976  (2). 
(1) Not  including petroleum products  and unworked non-ferrous metals. 
(2)  Source  :  UNCTAD  TD/BC2/190. -3-
While  the trend was  clear-cut  and rapid,  the  importance  of this phenomenon 
is not  commensurate  with the  emotions it aroused in most  of the 
industrialized countries and the protectionist tendencies which rapidly 
materialized nearly everywhere. 
There  are probably two  basic reasons for the hostile reactions to the 
consequences  of the industrialization of the developing countries 
- the first  has to do  with prevailing circumstances  :  these  changes  in the 
geography of world production and trade are taking place against  a  back-
ground of sluggish growth and underemployment.  It was  therefore inevitable 
that these substantial  changes in the market  share  of the  developing 
countries  should be  held responsible for  aggravating the  economic 
situation of the industrialized countries,  despite the modest  nature of 
this market  share  and its minor  role  compared  with all the other 
determinants  of the  world economic  crisis ; 
- the  second reason is more  fundamental  :  it has to do  with the fear that 
intensification of the i.d.l.  among  countries with different  development 
levels and  often very different  socio-economic systems will  lead to 
sectoral specialization based on  comparative  advantages,  which  might  be 
reflected in the industrialized countries by  the  disappearance  of whole 
branches of industry,  progressively transferred to the  developing countries. 
In other words,  while the intensification of trade between industrialized 
countries with relatively homogeneous  production and  consumption 
structures entailed merely a  process of intra-sectoral specialization 
without  significantly changing the geographical  location of sectors of 
activity, it is to be  feared that this time the  requirements  of the  new 
i.d.l.  will  cause upheavals in the industrialized countries structures 
of activity which  are incompatible with their economic  and social 
objectives  (1). 
(1)  Gruber  and Lloyd have  shown  that for  n9  industrialized countries and 
Australia",  intrasectoral trade accounted for 38 %  of total trade in 
1950t  45 %  in 1964  and 50 %  in 1967  (Intra-Industry Trade,  New-York, 
1975). -4-
II.  I.  D. L.  AND  INTERNAL  INIXJSTRIAL  STRUCTURES 
Completely free trade would  mean  that the definition of a  country's internal 
industrial structure would  be  made  entirely subordinate to the demands  of' 
the i.d.l.  alone. 
In Lima  China,  however,  rejected the i.d.l.  concept,  thereby refusing to 
have  the organization of its economic  structures subjected to external 
constraints  (1). 
It may  be  noted,  without  subscribing to these extreme positions,  that the 
internal industrial structures of an economic entity (country or Community) 
can  never be  purely and  simply the  product  of the i.d.l. 
This is firstly because  of the existence of important  sectors of the 
national economy  which  are  sheltered from  competition  (non-traded goods 
e.g.  construction),  but the prime reason why  the  analysis is not  so simple 
stems  from  the fact that all societies allow limits  (of varying explicit-· 
ness  and width) to the  constraints of free trade. 
Where  the  organization of the  economic  structures of an economic entity 
such  as the  EEC  or its Member  States is the  subject  of a  policy  (e.g.  CAP 
or sectoral policy),  that  policy always  raises the problem of how  to 
reconcile two  different kinds  of requirement  : 
-that of the i.d.l., for which the liberalization of international trade 
is paving the  way  ; 
- that  of the  "structure preferences",  determined by reference to the 
pursuit of a  complex  system of economic  and social objectives  (2). 
It is clear,  for instance,  that the rationality of the agricultural policies 
practised by  both the United States and the EEC,  rather then meeting the 
requirements of the i.  d.l., fits in with the  "structure preferences" of the 
national or Community  authority. 
(1)  This  was  at the UNIDO  Conference held in Lima  in 1975,  which set the target 
of 25  ~ of world industrial production in the developing countries by  the 
year 2000. 
(2)  See the  memo  by J.  DE  BANDT  on  (National) Structure Preferences,  in the 
annex.,  and  that  of  Mr  THARAKAN,  Some  reservations  on  the  "Structure 
Preferences  Approach". -5-
I 
This being the  case,  for an open economy  which  does  not  ~ntend to forgo 
the advantages of international trade  (or which  cannot  afford to do  so 
because  of its dependence  on  external  souces of supply),  the internal 
structural policies can be  analyzed in terms  of degrees of convergence 
and compatibility between the two  orders of rationality and requirement 
rather than in terms  of submission to one  or the other. 
One  of the major  dimensions  of the crisis which  advanced industrial 
societies,  particularly the  EEC,  are at  present  going through is precisely 
the  awareness  of an increased divergence and a  lesser degree  of compatibility 
between,  on  the one  hand,  the requirements  of an i.d.l.  in which  new  partners 
are inserted and,  on  the other, their national  (or regional) "structure 
preferences". 
The  problem is complicated by the fact  that it is not  simply a  matter of 
analysing in static terms the compatibility of the two  types of requirement 
governing the structural policies of economic  operators  ;  it is also and 
above  all a  matter of assessing dynamically their degrees  of convergence. 
Let  us  take  some  examples  of various kinds.  The  first is provided by  the 
policy at  present  followed by  the  Community  in the steel sector  :  a 
temporary withdrawal  from  the constraints of the i.d.l.  may  be  justified 
in the  case  of the European steel industry,  for without  such a  move  it might 
be  feared that unbridled price competition would  put  out  of business 
industrial entities whose  viability,  at  the  end of the present  market  crisis, 
could,  however,  be  assured.  In this example  the  difference between 
protectionism pure  and  simple and a  policy which  does  not  lose  sight  of the 
requirements of the i.  d.l.  lies in the intensity and quality of the 
restructuring efforts which the industry has to make  in order to secure 
its reinsertion in a  trade system subject to the imperatives of international 
competitiveness. 
Policies for the protection of infant  industry,  policies for subsidizing 
the technological research effort and policies for public contracts fall 
into this category where  they are  aimed at  modifying the structure of 
comparative  advantages  and  consequently promoting a  new  i.d.l.  rather than -6-
adapting to the present  one.  Their  success ultimately depends  on  a  subjectiv-e 
factor  :  the assessment  made  by those  who  are to determine the medium-term 
trend of the i.d.l.,  and an objective factor  :  the  capacity of an economic 
entity to modify for its own  benefit the  structure of comparative 
advantages,  which in the last resort  determines the  forms  of the  L d.l. 
(On  this last point it should be  noted right  away  that this  capacity is 
not  unconnected with the scale of the  economic entity in question in 
relation to that  of the world economy  (see below)). 
On  the  other hand,  policies which,  out  of a  desire to preserve economic 
structures or out  of concern for national  independence  (or even prestige), 
run  counter to the trend of the i.  d.l.  and  are thus  doomed  never to be 
ratified by it. They  will give rise to formidable  problems  of coherence 
between internal and external policies if one  intends  not  to forgo  an open 
door  policy towards international trade.  At  any rate, they imply a  social 
cost  which  must  be  set  against the advantages arising from  attainment  of 
the objectives  (political,  social,  cultural,  etc.) pursued. 
III.  FACTORS  DEI'ERMINING  THE  I.  D. L. 
Contrary to the naive view of the i.d.l.  as  a  categorical  imperative 
applying to the industrial structures of each  country open to international 
trade the aim  of the analysis has  so far been to assess to what  extent 
internal policies are free from  restriction (whatever the level  of 
application :  regional,  national or Community). 
- First  degree of freedom  :  that of the interplay between the requirements 
of the i.  d.l.  and the rationality of "structure preferences"  despite 
their inevitable  convergence in the medium-term. 
- Second degree of freedom  :  that  connected with the  capacity to act  on 
the determinants of the i.  d.l.  and  consequently t'o  influence the  forms 
a.  "new i. d.l." will take. -7-
The  concept  of i.d.l. -if  the definition given by  J.  De  Bandt  (1)  is 
followed - involves three types of configuration of international  economic 
relations  : 
- the international distribution of production activities (i.d.p. ),  as 
dictated by the structure of comparative  advantages at  international 
level and by the structure preferences at the internal level  ; 
- the ability to act  on the structure of  comparative  advantages  and, 
consequently,  to modify one  of the essential  determinants  of the i.d.p. 
- the international distribution of the profits derived from  production and 
international trade,  which in turn influences the process  of capital 
accumulation at  world level and therefore constitutes one  of the factors 
making it possible to act  on  comparative  advantages. 
The  i.d.l.  is therefore invariably the resultant  of a  complex  set  of economic 
factors  and power  relationships acting on  the worldwide  structure of compa-
rative advantages.  How  these factors  link up  with one  another  can be traced 
on  the basis of the main  lines followed in explaining the structure of 
comparative advantages. 
a)  The  theory of international economic  relations provides two  major  lines 
of reasoning for explaining comparative  advantages  : 
-the first  links each  country's  comparative  advantages to the factors 
it possesses  (capital,  natural resources,  skilled and unskilled labour), 
as  revealed by the structure of relative prices,  which reflects 
(possibly in a  distorted manner)  the structure of relative scarcity ; 
- according to the second line of reasoning the  comparative  advantages 
of the parties to an exchange  are based on the size of the internal 
market  which they control and with which they are familiar. 
This explanation accounts for the pattern of trade between economic 
entities of the  same  level of development  and therefore with a  fairly 
similar relative price structure. 
(1)  J.  De  Bandt,  Specialisation internationale et structures d'activite 
industrielle (International specialization and structures of industrial 
activity),  Cahier  IREP  n° 12,  Paris,  November  1975. -8-
b)  The  ability to act  on the comparative  advantages is the second level of 
analysis of the i.d.l. 
It in turn has two  aspects  : 
- the ability to control the links between R &  D activity and the 
production process.  As  a  factor making  for specialization within the 
i.d.l., technological  advance is provisionally of greater importance 
than the production factors which a  country possesses. 
Here it is obvious that the ability of countries,  industries and firms 
to act  upon their comparative  advantages varies widely  ; 
- the ability to act upon the size of the internal market  and to control 
that  market. 
In this sense the attainment of the  common  market  is a  decisive factor 
in modifying  comparative  advantages in favour  of European firms.  The 
other side of this is illustrated by the  example  of civil aeronautics, 
where  the superiority of US  firms  is not  attributable to greater resources 
as regards primary factors  of production ;  more  convincing is the 
explanation that it is due to the mastery of a  vast  domestic market. 
Therefore,  it is hardly paradoxical to assert that the  competitiveness 
of European industry at  world level  can also be  achieved through the 
conquest  (or reconquest)  of its internal market  ; 
c)  The  international distribution of the profits of the i.d.l.  is the 
third level of analysis  and the most  decisive for understanding the 
dynamics  of the  phenomenon. 
The  mere  fact that  changes  are noted in the international location of 
certain production activities is not  yet  reason enough to talk in terms 
of a  "new i.  d.l. ". 
Where,  for instance,  developing countries attract to their territory 
industrial subcontracting activities,  by appealing to the traditional 
centres of industry to supply the strategic factors  (capital,  markets, 
technology,  perhaps  even skilled labour),  this is not  a  profound -9-
modification of the i.d.l.  but  quite  simply the old colonial division 
of labour under a  new  guise,  the exploitation of an abundant  and  cheap 
factor  (labour) having replaced that  of an exotic natural resource in 
the traditional set-up. 
Under the colonial system as  in the  contemporary set-up,  gains under the 
i.  d.l.  go  back to the sources of capital and technology  (in the  form  of 
profits and royalties)  and to consumers  in the importing countries via 
the deterioration in the exporting country's terms of trade  (1). 
The  only difference between these two  traditional forms  of the i.d.l. 
- and it is a  big one  - is the fact that,  as  opposed to the  colonial 
arrangement  (manufactured products in return for raw  materials),  the 
contemporary set-up  (manufactured products incorporating a  high value- • 
enhancing labour input  in return for manufactured products  incorporating 
cheap  labour)  leaves  no  room  for the unskilled worker  in the  country 
where  the process  originated. 
This having been said,  contemporary phenomena  cannot  be  reduced to such 
examples.  The  harbingers of the  emergence  of a  "new i.  d.l." are multi-
plying.  In a  number  of developing countries the acceleration of an 
endogenous  industrialization process,  increasingly linked up  with all 
the  sectors of the economy,  has  been observed.  Foreign capital and 
technology are  involved in these developments,  but their involvement 
is such as to guarantee that the  control of capital accumulation (see 
Krupp-Iran agreements)  is shared,  and the some  applies to control  of 
the links between R & D and production  (hence the insistence on the 
terms under which transfers of technology are take place). 
(1) The  deterioration in the barter terms of trade of developing 
countries specializing in the  export  of textile products is at 
least  equivalent to that  of raw  material exporting developing 
countries  ;  the causes are,  moreover,  of a  similar nature. -- l 0 -
The  new  i.d.l.  cannot  therefore be  interpreted by the old industrialized 
countries as  a  process foisted upon them  from  outside,  to which they 
have  no  alternative but to adjust.  It is also a  process which they are 
underwriting by  changing their investment  habits abroad and by parti-
cipating in the internationalization of capital and production. 
* 
*  * 
For an economic  entity such as the  Community,  which is grappling with 
profond changes  in its international environment  and in its conditions 
of competitiveness,  industrial policy  cannot  therefore be reduced to a 
mere  adjustment to the requirements  of the i.d.l. 
Apart  from the interplay already referred to between these requirements 
and the rationality of the "structure preferencestt,  the ways  in which 
the  Community's  internal and external policies can influence the deter-
minants  of the i.d.l. itself must  be  brought  into play. 
The  main  requirements are  : 
- for the  Community  to exploit its comparative  advantages in the new 
i.d.l.  which is taking shape 
for the  Community  to win  new  comparative  advantages  by  dominating its 
potential internal market  (which presupposes  completion of the  common 
market  and monetary union)  and through technological  advance  ; 
- for European firms to participate in internationalizing capital and 
production under  conditions which effectively contribute to the inter-
national distribution of income  and know-how  throughout  the world and 
therefore increase effective  demand  at  world level  (this being something 
that the contemporary forms  of the colonial i.d.l.  do  very badly)  ; -II-
- for the  Community's  external policies to encourage  sectoral diversifica-
tion and the spread of social progress in the developing countries,  these 
being factors that  are likely to intensify intra-sectoral trade  (based 
on differentiation between products of the  same  kind)  between industria-
lized and developing countries rather than sectoral specialization, 
which  is sometimes  incompatible with the  "structure preferences"  of the 
Member  States and is invariably costly in social terms. 
IV.  THE  EEC  AND  CHANGES  IN  THE  I.  D. L. 
The  major  change  in the i.d.l., which has  been taking shape  for  some  years, 
is the growing role  played by a  number  of developing countries in the 
production of manu:f'actures  and trade in such products. 
Even though exports of products manufactured by the developing countries 
accounted for  only 8 %  of world trade in such products in 1974,  their 
growth rate has  been  considerably more  rapid than that of other sources 
and has  been accelerating compared with the trend of the preceding decades 
(see table below). 
Imports of manufactures by  developed market-economy  countries  (*) 
Annual  average  growth rate 
1962-1973 
Annual  average  growth rate 
1970-1976 
From  developing countries 
17 
26 
(*) Excluding petroleum products  and non-ferrous metals. 
Source  :  UNCTAD 
World 
14 
18 
While  the competitive pressure of the developing countries on the  economies 
o:f'  the advanced industrial societies was  increas~ng in this manner the 
developing countries'  market  were  assuming greater importance for the 
latter because of dwindling demand  on the industrialized countries'  markets. - 12-
In this connection it is interesting to  compare  the relative positions of 
the EEC,  the United States and Japan in their trade relations with the 
developing countries  (a distinction being made  between non-oil  developing 
countries and Opec  countries). 
The  tables given below show that,  for the period 1972-1976  : 
- the  EEC  was  the  main exporter to the non-oil  developing countries  (in 
1976  EEC  = 100,  USA  ""  88,  Japan = 58)  but the growth rate of its exports 
to those countries during the period 1972-1976  was  well  below that  of 
its major industrialized competitors  (table 1)  ; 
- the EEC  was  also the leading exporter of manufactures to the non-oil 
developing  countries  (EEC  =  100,  USA=  72,  Japan= 63)  but the general 
trend towards  a  weakening of its relative position was  confirmed at this 
level too,  though it is too early to say whether this was  an "accident 11 
confined to the subperiod 1972-1974 or a  more  durable phenomenon 
(table  2)  ; 
- the  EEC  was  far and away  the leading exporter of manufactures to the 
Opec  countries  (EEC  = 100,  USA=  45,  Japan= 35)  and the growth rate for 
its exports to those countries is of the  same  order of magnitude as that 
of the United States and Japan  (table 3)  ; 
- the  EEC  was,  and is tending to remain,  the leading customer of the non-
oil developing  countries  (EEC  =  100,  USA  = 89,  Japan =  45)  (table 4)  ; 
- the EEC  imports,  on the  other hand,  less manufactures  from the developing 
countries than the United States  (EEC  = 100,  USA  = 145,  Japan = 32)  but 
the growth rate for European imports is much  higher than that  of the 
United States and,  since 1974,  than that of Japan  (table 5). 
It will also be noted that  while the developing countries  broadly speaking 
occupy the  same  place as regards the major industrialized countries' 
exports of manufactures the developing countries'  share of the EEC's total 
imports  of manufactures is well  below its share of the United States'  and 
Japan's  imports  (see below). - 13-
Developing  countries'  share of trade in manufactures in 1976 
(as %  of total exports/imports of manufactures) 
Exports to 
Countries of  non-oil  all  Imports  from  origin  or  developing  OPEC  developing  developing countries  destination  countries  countries 
EEC  19  18  37  13.9 
USA  24  13  37  20.7 
Japan  25  14  39  24.2 
Lastly,  if the value  of imports  of manufactures  from the developing countries 
for 1976  is related to the population of the  countries in question it will 
be  found that the  EEC  imports  t 41  of manufactures  per head 
the USA  ¢ 50  of manufactures  per head 
Japan  ¢ 20  of manufactures  per head. 
Within the  EEC  itself the differences  are considerable 
Netherlands  t  68 
Germany  ¢ 61 
Denmark  t  56 
United Kingdom  ¢ 45 
Belgium/Luxembourg  ¢ 43 
France  ¢ 31 
Ireland  ¢ 25 
Italy  ¢ 19 
From this set of findings the following  conclusions  may  be  drawn  : 
- the EEC  still occupies  a  privileged position in the international distri-
bution of labour  :  as the leading exporter of manufactures to the develop-
ing countries it is not  yet  feeling the  competitive pressure from  them 
to the same  extent  as the United States or even Japan.  This is due  in 
particular to the foothold which the EEC  has  managed to gain on the -- 14-
markets of countries which are not  yet  very industrialized (ACP,  but  also 
and above  all,  Opec  countries),  while the United States and Japan are 
more  involved in. trade with Latin America and Asia  ; 
- the EEC's  relatively comfortable situation here is unstable  :  the growth 
rate of Community  exports to the non-oil  developing countries is lower 
than that of other major industrialized countries,  while  European imports 
of manufactures from the developing countries are increasing more  rapidly. 
It is therefore likely that there will be  a  growing tendency for the 
developing countries'  share of the Community  market  for manufactures to 
approach the level recorded in the United States.  Furthermore,  since the 
differences between the EEC  countries in imports per head exceed the 
differences in the respective per capita GDP  figures,  it has to be 
anticipated that  increased liberalization of trade with the  developing 
countries will affect  certain Member  States much  more  than others. 
* 
*  * 
Consequently the  EEC  too is being drawn  into the new  i.  d.l.  Initially, 
it is possible that there will be  a  gradual tendency to curb access to 
the  Community  markets for  competitive products from the developing countries 
and at the very least to confine that access to products from  countries 
which fall within its gao-economic  sphere of influence,  namely Africa,  the 
Mediterranean and the Arab  world. 
Such  a  solution is probably unworkable  in the long term and in any  case 
it would be  dangerous  for Europe. 
The  EEC  would  be  seriously  jeapardizing its competitiveness vis-a-vis the 
other major industrialized countries if it were to cut itself off from 
cheap  sources of supply of manufactures  and semi-manufactures  from  countries 
outside its traditional sphere of influence while its competitors are 
making  considerable use of those sources. - 15-
Furthermore,  it would  run the risk of closure to it of the more  ~amic 
third world markets  (except  those of the Opec  countries). 
Lastly,  its traditional export  markets will also be  subject  to growing 
competition because  : 
- of the industrialization of the countries in question themselves  ; 
- the  developing countries  which  are becoming industrialized are  channel-
ling a  growing share of their exports of manufactures to other developing 
countries  (31 %  of these exports  went  to other developing countries in 
1974-1975)  and this share will grow  all the more  quickly as  access to 
the industrialized countries'  market  is restricted ; 
- because of their growing  dependence  on  raw materials  and  energy products, 
Japan and,  to a  lesser extent,  the United States are having to diversify 
their sources of supply in the third world and,  as  a  result,  the geogra-
phical spread of their exports. 
As  Ben  Evers  puts it, the developing world will be the principal arena for 
the competitive  confrontation between the major central zones (EEC,  Japan, 
USA)  (1 ). 
(1)  Ben  Evers,  International Industrial Relocation some  Factors  of Change, 
Tilburg,  November  1977. Table 1  - The  industrialized countries'  exports to the non-oil  developing  countries 
(in ~ 'OOO  million fob) 
~--- --1 
Average  annual  Index  I  1972  1973  1974  1975  I  1976  I incr0%e  in I  1970 =  100  1 
i  I  i USA  11.02  16.46  24.78  26.80  26.32  24.4  239 
I 
I  Japan  7·69  10.94  16.35  15.49  17.40  22.7  226 
!  EEC  14.83 
I  19.10  27.41  30.49  29.77  19.0  200 
: Other industrialized 
: countries  3.23  4.29  6.21  6.34  6.51 
I  19.1  201 
i  (EFTA  +  Canada)  I 
I 
I 
I 
I  to the oil-exporting developing countries  I 
I 
! 
:USA  2.57  3.41  6.23  9.93  11.70  46.0  455 
i Japan  1.86  2.72  5.45  8.42  9· 26  49.5  497 
I  EEC  5·73  8.03  13.50  22.88  26.20  46.5  457 
• Other industrialized 
countries  0.81  1.09  1.93 
( EFl' A +  Canada) 
3.09  4.12  50.0  508 
------~  ---- j 
Source  :  GATT,  Report  on  international trade in 1976  and 1977. Table  2  - The  industrialized countries'  exports to the non-oil  developing countries for three groups  of products 
(in %  1000  million fob) 
I 
Average  annual  Index  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  increase  in 
I  % 
1972  =  base 100 
i 
USA 
- foodStuffs  2.22  4.11  5-72  5.90  5.16  23.5  232 
- raw materials  o. 73  1.31  1.86  I  1.85  1.86  26.3  254 
i  - manufactures  7.51  10.34  16.10  17.75  18.25  24.9  243  I  ; 
• Japan 
i 
I  - foodstuffs  0.18 
',  0.28  0.30  0.29  0.30  13.7  167  ; 
i  - raw  materials  0.37 
i  0.53  0.76  0.61 
I  0.78  20.5  210 
- manufactures  7.01  9-93  14.90  14.26  16.04 
'  23.0  229 
' 
'  I  EEC 
' 
'  - foodstuffs  1.48  2.19  2.82  3.15  2.87  18.0  194 
- raw  materials  0.35  0.44  0.83  0.66  0.69  18.5  197 
- manufactures  12.61  16.01  23.03  25.81  25.37  19.1  201 
Other industrialized countries 
- foodstuffs  0.42  0.71  1.09  '  1.00  0.95  22.7  226 
- raw  materials  0.27  0.42  0.66  0.47  0.60  22.1  222 
- manufactures  2.49  3.15  I  4.40  4-79  4.89  18.4  196 
Re~rks :  See  table 3 Table 3 - The  industrialized countries'  exports to the  oil-exporting developing  countries for three groups  of products 
(in ¢ 'OOO  million fob) 
! 
I 
Average  annual  Index 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  increase  in  1972  =  base  100  I  % 
I 
I  I  I  I  '----
-~-- -- ---
I 
!USA  !  I  I  II  I  II  I 
I  I  I 
I  - foodstuffs  I  0. 46  0.17  1  l.  57  l.  48  l.  40  32. 1  304 
I  - raw materials  0.11  0.13  j  0. 26  0. 25  0. 24  21.6  I  218 
I  -manufactures  i  1.95  2.43  I  4.28  8.00  9.90  50.0  1  507 
I Japan  i  I 
I 
.  I 
.  -foodstuffs  !  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.10  35.1  ' 
I  -raw materials  I  0.05  0.06  0.17  0.15  0.16  33.8  J 
/  - manufactures  )  1.77  2. 57  5.16  8.12  8. 93  50.0  j 
I  i  I 
IEEC  - 1  ~  I 
1  - foodstuffs  0.50  0. 70  1.05  1.66  1.67  35.<:: 
1  -raw materials  0.12  0.17  0.31  0.39  ,  0.35  30.7 
\  -manufactures  4.97  7.00  11.63  20.00  i 23.10  47.0 
I 
i Other industrialized countries 
I  - foodstuffs 
- raw materials 
- manufactures 
0.07 
0.07 
0.64 
0.09 
0.09 
0.86 
Remarks  :  raw materials  include ores  and non-ferrous metals 
manufactures  do  not  include non-ferrous metals 
0.24 
0.17 
1.50 
0.28 
0.22 
2.54 
0.23  34.6 
0.25  37.5 
3.56  51.0 
_l 
333 
320 
504 
334 
291 
465 
328 
357 
556 : 
I 
Table 4 - The  industrialized countries'  imports  from the non-oil  developing countries 
(in ~ 'OOO  million cif  t. except  for the USA  and Canada) 
1. 
,. 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
USA  11.65  15.70  23.83  22.14  27.60 
Japan  5.21  9.19  13.14  11.48  13.95 
EEC  13.75  20.02  25.96  26.11  30.93 
Other industrialized  2.96  l 
3.85  5.35  5.24  6.36  countries 
from the oil-exporting developing countries 
USA  2.69  4.59  15.65  17.08  25.01 
Japan  4·57  7.00  19.96  19.42  21.85 
EEC  13.23  18.82  45.62  40.87  46.27 
; Other industrialized  1.45  2.12  5·73  6.47  7.01  countries 
Average  annual  Index  increase  in  1972  = 100  % 
24.0  236 
27.9  268 
22.4  !  225 
!  21.1  215 
r 
- 929 
48.0  478 
36.8  350  I 
' 
48.5  483  I Table  5 - The  industrialized countries'  imports  from the non-oil  developing countries for three groups  of products 
(in~ •ooo  million cif) 
Index  1972  1973  1974 
-~ 
I 
1975  1976 
Average  annual 
increase  in 
%  1972  = base 100 
I USA 
- foodstuffs 
- raw  materials 
- manufactures 
Japan 
- foodstuffs 
- raw  materials 
- manufactures 
EEC 
- foodstuffs 
- raw  materials 
- manufactures 
Other industrialized countries 
- foodstuffs 
- raw materials 
- manufactures 
3.86 
1. 25 
5-34 
1.18 
2.77 
0.76 
6.03 
4-24 
2.88 
1.19 
o. 56 
0.91 
Remarks  :  the imports into the USA  and Canada  are fob 
4.70 
1.68 
7-33 
1.86 
4.31 
2.21 
8.35 
6.34 
4.68 
1.48 
0.76 
1. 27 
6.30 
2.52 
9.74 
2.77 
5.40 
2.52 
9-69 
8.63 
5.82 
1.93 
1.00 
1.  78 
manufactures  =  CST  5 - 6  - 7 - 8  (- 68  non-ferrous metals) 
raw materials  =  CST  2 - 22  + 68 
foodstuffs  =  0  +  1  +  22  +  4 
i 
5.81 
2.06 
8.89 
3.35 
3.75 
2.00 
10.17 
6.72 
6.85 
2.01 
0.86 
1.95 
6. 79 
2.52 
12.95 
3.27 
4.71 
2.88 
11.54 
7.71 
8.91 
2.28 
0.97 
2.59 
I 
15.1 
19.1 
24.8 
29.1 
14.2 
39-5 
17.6 
16.1 
32.6 
17-7 
14.8 
29-9 
I  l 
176 
201 
242 
277 
170 
379 
191 
181 
309 
192 
173 
285 - 16-
CHAPTER  II- FACTORS  LEADING  TO  CHANGE  IN  THE  I.D.L.  :  THE  TRANSNATIONALS 
AND  THE  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES'  DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGIES 
The  question of whether the  increase in the  competitiveness  of the  developing 
countries that are in the process of becoming  industrialized is mainly the 
result  of factors that  are internal to their development  process or whether 
it is essentially the  result  of outside forces  is not  easy to answer. 
There  may  be  a  temptation to overestimate  the role of the multinationals, 
and  it should be  noted that  out  of total foreign private  investment  in the 
developing countries in 1972  only 10 %  was  geared to the use  of cheap  labour 
for export  production  (for Asia alone,  however,  this proportion rises to 
34  %). 
To  assess the relative importance of the various  factors  involved,  it is 
necessary to draw  a  distinction between various  groups  of developing countries 
on the  basis  of the  form taken by their industrialization process. 
The  following groups  can be  distinguished : 
a) the  countries that  are  endeavouring to begin the industrialization process 
by  developing their commodities  and energy resources.  This  is the  road 
being followed by  certain oil-producing countries in particular.  In this 
type of industrialization that is highly geared to the outside world,  it 
is the States involved that take the initiative and financing decisions 
much  more  than the transnationals even if the  collaboration of the trans-
nationals is required given the fact  that they have  the technological  and 
commercial  know-how 
b) the  countries whose  industrialization is based on  production for the  mass 
consumption markets  of the industrialized countries.  Up  to now,  this type 
of industrialization has  been the preserve of a  small number  of South-
East  Asian countries  (or port-cities)  and its main driving force  has been 
the widespread Chinese population in this region of the world - 17-
The  role of the transnationals in the origin of this type  of industria-
lization has  not  been a  determining one  except  at the  commercial  level  (1). 
c)  The  countries that  specialize in industrial sub-contracting activities. 
With this type  of dependent  industrialization,  integration in the  world 
market  is mainly guaranteed by  large  or small transnational firms  (see 
below).  A number  of Southern Mediterranean countries have  seen this as 
a  way  of challenging the export  ~~nclaves of South-East  Asia. 
d)  The  countries with a,  sometimes  long,  tradition of industrialization for 
import  substitution purposes that  are now  ~being increasingly obliged by 
external balance  constraints to turn to foreign markets.  This  is the 
case  with  India and Brazil.  In this type  of industrialization,  the  role 
of the transnai;ionals  can  be  important  but  it is not  clear whether there 
is any  link here with the  extent to  which these countries'  industrial 
economy  is geared to the  outside world.  The  proportion of production 
intended for  export  is not  on average  any higher in the  case  of the 
transnationals than in the  case  of local firms. 
* 
*  * 
This picture of the  forms  of industrialization in the third world sketched 
above  is bound to  change  under the  combined influence of the transnationals 
and the  strategies that  will be  adopted by the  developing countries under 
the pressure of the internal and external  constraints operating on them. 
(1)  These are often the large traditional trading houses that  arose  during 
the  colonial  period. - 18  -
1.  The  transnationals  (1) 
The  increasing role of private capital in financial  flows  between industria-
lized and  developing countries goes hand in hand with the  expansion of the 
transnationals.  Nor  are the  companies  involved exclusively the major  multi-
nationals that  control  one  or more  entire sectors  ;  at the  present  time, 
there is a  trend towards the internationalization of the operations  of 
relatively small firms  which  are involved with only one  product  but  are 
seeking to optimize their size  and the distribution of their activities at 
both the  production and marketing levels. 
According to the neo-classical viewpoint,  the expansion of the transnationals 
is explained by the fact  that they bridge the gap  between the factors that 
the  countries involved can supply and the factors that  are required for the 
given lines of production.  Foreign private  investment  makes  it possible to 
combine  the two  types of input,  the  countries'  and the  firms',  and  should 
therefore be  concentrated in those industries that  use natural resources 
and  labour  (the  developing  countries'  input)  and advanced technology- whether 
for production or marketing  (the firms'  input). 
According to the unequal  exchange theories,  however,  the  driving force  behind 
the expansion of the multinationals is the positive balance resulting from 
a  comparison of productivity levels and relative salary levels in the 
industrialized and developing  countries.  Rather than entering into the 
details of this controversy,  however,  we  should analyse  how  the transnationals 
actually establish themselves  in the developing countries. 
In 1972  direct  external  investment  in the  developing countries was  still 
geared to highly  capital-intensive industries  : 
42  %  in mining and quarrying and agri-industry 
48 %  in protected industries 
- 10 %  (but  34 %  in Asia)  in labour intensive sectors. 
(1)  See  annex  :  P.K.M.  Tharakan,  An  appraisal  of the role of the multinational 
companies  in a  new  international division of labour. -- 19-
In recent  years,  however,  there have  been signs  of a  change towards labour-
intensive  and export-geared sectors.  Subcontracting,  which  was  first  used 
by American.  (electronics) firms  (1),  was  then taken up  by Japanese  and 
European firms  (textiles,  clothing,  leather). 
The  countries whishing to play host  to these subcontracting activities 
- which  seem to be the answer to their employment  and balance of payments 
problems  - vie with one  another in granting terms that  are likely to attract 
foreign investment  :  tax advantages,  indirect  subsidies,  "favourable"  social 
legislation.  The  competing States,  which  have  the raw materials  and labour, 
are thus  confronted with an oligopolitical organization of the transnationals, 
which  control  capital,  technology and distribution (2). 
2.  The  developing countries'  strategies  (3) 
a)  Increasing integration in the new  i.  d. L 
The  growth in the developing countries'  exports of manufactures  reflects 
some  success  in this type  of strategy,  which is helped by the intensification 
of worldwide  intra·-firm trade.  The  question is whether this type  of develop-
ment  can spread out  beyond those  countries that  have  practised it up to now 
with the greatest  success. 
Conventional  wisdom  in the  early seventies systematically recommended this 
outward-geared type  of industrial  development  as  the only one that  could 
help ensure the utilization of the  comparative  advantages  of the  developing 
countries  and a  better allocation of their resources. 
(1)  Aided in particular by  customs tariffs based on the value  added to 
components  of US  origin. 
(2)  See UNCTAD  - document  TD/B/C. 2/197  of 16  March  1978 
The  role of the transnationals in the marketing and distribution of the 
developing countries'  imports  and exports. 
(3)  See annex  :  B.  Van  Arkadie,  EEC  policies  and the medium-sized semi-
industrialized developing economy  :  alternative scenarios. - 20-
The  attention of an increasing number  of,developing countries has  been drawn 
to this approach by the success it has  achieved as  much  as  by  the influence 
of the international bodies  (IMF,  IBRD)  which have  recommended this approach 
and helped in its implementation. 
One  might  have  thought  that the  success of this strategy,  being linked with 
the rapid expansion of international trade,  would  have  been undermined by 
the appreciable  slowing down  in growth in the industrialized countries after 
1974.  This  did not  happen,  however,  since the countries in the process  of 
industrialization found  an additional reason for trade aggressiveness in 
world markets  in the worsening of their external balance  problems  following 
the increase in oil prices and the repercussions of world inflation on the 
price of the products supplied to them  by the industrialized countries. 
Nevertheless,  a  strategy of increased integration in the international division 
of labour faces the developing countries with numerous  risks  : 
Although those  countries that  followed this strategy experienced rapid growth 
up to 1974,  they were  hard hit by the crisis in 1975  and are very vulnerable 
to the  chaos  in the international economic  system,  to the restrictive policies 
of the industrialized countries  and to the  ever-present  possibility of a 
relocation of the  operations  of the transnationals.  This  latter threat is a 
real  one  for those developing countries that  have  not  yet  been able to create 
a  domestic base for industrial expansion. 
The  risks are not  only of an external nature  :  domestically,  the forms  of 
outward-looking industrialization have  resulted in increasing inequality in 
the distribution of income  (between town  and  country,  between social  cate-
gories),  which  generates political and social tensions that  can be  contained 
only by  "strong" regimes. 
Despite the risks it involves  and its fundamental  instability, the  progressive 
development  of growth strategies based on the export  of manufactures  cannot 
be  ruled out  :  a  number  of developing countries that  had adopted a  different - 21-
model  - that of import  substitution - are now  acqu~r~ng an industrial infra-
structure that goes  well  beyond the requirements  of their domestic markets 
the most  advanced of these  countrief~ are responding to the restrictive 
practices of the industrialized couzrtries  by offering increasingly tough 
competition on third country markets,  that is on the markets  of other develop·-
ing countries  ;  i:n  the new i.  d. 1.,  certain countries in the process  of 
industrialization which have  a  diversified and relatively integrated domestic: 
industrial base  (India and Brazil) are,  in terms of power,  in a  different 
league to the export  enclaves of South-East  Asia. 
This  scenario,  which in practical  tE~rms involves  an increased role for the 
transnationals and increasing involvement  with the  developed economies,  is 
not  the  only one,  however. 
b)  Development  based more  on self-reliance 
An  alternative scenario gives  greatt~r place to the  emergence in the developing 
countries of development  strategies based on individual or collective self-
reliance. 
In reality,  such policies,  instead of stemming  from  a  strategy in the  proper 
sense  of the term1 .  are more  a  response to the rise of protectionism in the 
industrialized countries and to the lack of dynamism  in international trade 
resulting from thEl  extended world economic  crisis. 
In this scenario,  which  would see the resurgence  of import  substitution 
policies and the reaffirmation of the trend towards  self-sufficiency in the 
name  of national  (or collective)  independence,  there might  well  be  increasing:-
ly marked tensionfl  between industrialized and developing countries  concerning 
in particular the policies pursued in the field of raw materials and vis-a-vis 
foreign investment. 
Assuming little growth in international trade,  the trade confrontation of the! 
major  groups  of industrialized countries  on the markets  of the third world 
could soon become  a  real battle,  with official aid,  protection for national 
capital invested abroad and other ways  of exerting influence being used more 
energetically to d.efend trade positions. - 22-
* 
*  * 
In the final analysis,  neither of these two  extreme hypotheses  in particularly 
satisfactory from the viewpoint  of the developing countries themselves.  The 
risks of conflict  are particularly high if the  developing  countries'  indus-
trialization effort  has to be  conducted in a  depressed international economic 
context,  with a  persistently high level of unemployment  in the industrialized 
countries.  On  the other hand,  outward-looking growth in the countries that 
are in the process of industrialization may  be  easier for the industrialized 
countries to bear in a  context  of sustained expansion of international trade, 
despite  (or thanks to) the  enormous  adjustment  efforts it would require of 
them,  but  this outward-looking growth is likely to accentuate the differences 
between  and  within the developing countries  :  a  few  industrializing countries 
and  a  fraction of their population being increasingly integrated in the 
dynamic  centre  of the world economy,  particularly via the transnationals, 
while there would  be  no  or little improvement  in the lot of the  poor  masses 
of the third world. 
A middle road,  which  would  require the industrialized countries to accept  the 
adjustment  constraints resulting from  industrialization in the developing 
countries and would  require the latter to pursue  development  based on the 
trend of their own  domestic demand  - particularly that  of the rural masses  -
rather than on external  demand,  would  be  possible only if there is a 
considerably increased aid effort  on the part  of the rich countries.  This 
middle road also presupposes  a  concerted effort to seek for points  of 
complementarity in the industrial development  of the  developing countries 
and the new  forms  of expansion in the industrialized world. 
For Europe  in particular, this means  that the major objectives of its 
industrial policies must  be  systematically viewed in conjunction with those 
of its third world partners,  particularly in the  context  of group-to-group 
sectoral  consultations  (Lome,  Southern Mediterrane~, Arab  World,  etc.). - 23-
CHAPTER  III - IMPACT  ON  THE  EEC  OF  CHANGES  IN  THE  I.  D. L. 
I.  ON  INDUSTRIAL  STRUCTURES 
It is clear that the increase in the developing countries  1  exports is not 
due  solely to the  success of their industrialization policies but  is also 
dependent  to a  large  extent  on the trend of the  economic situation and 
policieG  pursued in the industrialized countries. 
As  a  result,  there is concern regarding potential  conflicts between the 
objectives of development  co-operation policy and  of interna.l equili  bri  urn 
within the  EEC,  insofar as  any  co-operation policy aiming to integrate  the~ 
developing  countries in the  t-vorld  economy  will  eventually  change the i. d.l. 
and require a  corresponding process  of adjustment. 
The  generalized system of preferences  (GSP),  an  instrument  of trade liberal-
ization that is non-discriminatory and  covers all manufactured products, 
may  represent  a  source of potential  conflict here  :  the list of sensitive 
and semi-sensitive products in the GSP  gives an initial indication of the 
potential areas of conflict. 
It is also true that the preferences granted to the associated countries 
(ACP  and Mediterranean countries)  are much  more  considerable  (unlimited 
market  access)  and are likely in the long term to have  a  much  greater 
influence on trade flows  ;  in the short  and medium  term,  however,  these 
countries will not  be  competitors to be  feared. 
On  the other hand,  and despite a  very restrictive system of ceilings  and 
maximum  country quotas  (2),  any  improvement  in the GSP  prompts the fear 
(1)  See  annex  :  D.  Kebschull,  Some  thoughts  on the identification of confliet 
potentials. 
(2)  It is estimated that the EEC' s  preferential trade  does  not  exceed 5 %  of 
extra-Community trade. - 24-
that the arrival of additional  cheap  products  will aggravate the problems 
of unemployment  in the threatened industries or regions.  It is significant 
that there were  no  substantial improvements  in the 1977  GSP 
An  analysis  of the  repercussions  of the GSP  on productive industry enables 
an initial list to be  drawn up of sensitive sectors that  are threatened 
by  competition from the developing countries,  assuming  an  increase in the 
proportion of products  imported under the GSP. 
This  analysis  shows  that the structural  changes  resulting from  an intens-
ification of relations  with the third world are  concentrated in the 
following areas of activity : 
- the manufacture  of electrical and electronic goods 
- the manufacture  of precision,  optical  and similar instruments 
- the textile industry 
- the leather industry 
- the  footwear  and clothing industry 
- the  wood  and wooden  furniture industry 
- the paper and paper products  industry 
- the rubber  and plastics industries, 
to which  can be  added certain subsectors  of the following branches 
- oil refining 
- the non-metallic mineral  products industry 
- the  chemical  industry 
- the metal  products  manufacturing industry 
- the  construction of machinery and mechanical  equipment  (1). 
{1)  The  identification of potential areas of conflict  on the basis of an 
analysis of the GSP  is  just  one  of the possible methods.  To  give 
another example,  the work  of the Kiel  Institute has  identified the 
following activities  : 
- wood  working 
- electrical equipment 
- musical  instruments 
- sports articles and toys 
- leather production and processing 
- footwear 
- textiles and clothing. -- 25  -
The  analysis of the repercussions of the GSP  and of the potential conflicts 
that  might  be  caused by a  liberalization of trade flows  in sensitive and 
semi-sensitive .products from the moe:t  competitive  countries is interesting 
for  a  number  of reasons 
- it underlines the fact  that  no entire sector is threatened,  but that the 
pressure is being felt  at the  sube~ector level and particularly in 
respect  of specific: products  ;  consequently,  it is not  unreasonable to 
think that the  conversion of an industry within the  same  branch of 
activity should not  present  any  insurmountable difficulties,  even if 
competition beca.me  very keen in rE~spect of a  specific article  ; 
- it underlines the fact that it is wrong to make  a  blanket  assertion 
attributing the difficulties being experienced by  certain sectors to 
massive  inflows  of products originating in those countries to which 
the  Community  has granted preferential treatment  ;  in fact,  the GSP 
has  not  had an influence  on trade flows  up to now  and,  as  a  rule,  the 
increase in the  developing countries'  exports is not  due to the pre-
ferential treatment  granted to them  (apart  from the question of whether 
certain benefid.ary countries are favoured more  than others) 
- it also throws light  on the role of product  differentiation in the 
dynamics  of trade and in a  great  many  instances  confirms the trend 
towards  intra-industry specializa-tion. 
Nevertheless,  thiB type  of analysis has  many  limitations 
- the statistical data permit  only a  static analysis  of sensitive branches 
(over  and above the exhaustive GSP  list),  and do  not  enable us to trace 
the dynamic effects of the  developing  countries'  increasing competitive-
ness  across the whole  spectrum of industry,  particularly as the EEC's 
preferential trade under the GSP  accounts  for only 5 %  of total - 26-
extra-Community imports  of sensitive products  (16  %  of imports  from the 
beneficiary countries in 1976  and 27%  in 1975)  (1). 
Furthermore, this preferential trade is increased each year by  a  fixed 
amount  that is lower  (except  in 1975)  than the increase in total trade 
and,  as  a  result,  tends to represent  a  decreasing proportion of total 
imports  from the beneficiary countries. 
- the analysis of the potential conflict  does  not  allow for the possible 
substitution effects of trade  ;  the granting of an annual  preferential 
fixed amount  could lead to a  situation where  the imports  from the 
developing countries  increasingly represented substitution rather than 
trade creation ; 
- lastly, it must  be  added that the fact that the GSP  has  a  limited scope 
does  not underestimate the difficulties that  certain European industries 
might  encounter on their traditional export  markets  as  a  result  of 
competition from  the  developing countries or the catalyst  effect  created 
in a  firm or region when  a  subsector or branch is threatened (loss of 
markets,  technical effects,  regional effects,  etc.) 
In addition to the analysis of the sensitive sectors that  are subject to 
increasing competitive pressure from  the developing countries,  an  examin-
ation should be  made  of the dynamic  process underlying the distribution 
of activities at  world level in the years to  come  ;  this examination 
should also show  whether  we  should anticipate a  consolidation of the trend 
towards  a transfer of productive activities to the developing countries. 
(1)  Imports of sensitive textile products under the GSP  accounted for 
approximately 3 %  of total extra-Community imports  of those products 
in 1975  and 1976. 
(2)  See  annex  :  B.  Evers,  International  Industrial Relocation,  Some 
Factors  of Change. -·  27-
In an initial analysis,  we  can assess  and differentiate between the trends 
towards the relocation of activities on the  basis of the nature  of the 
production process  ..  Accordingly,  four  categories of industry are  disting-
uished  :  processi~~ industries,  semi-finals  industries,  specialized capital 
goods  industries,  assembling industries. 
This  classification does  not  necessarily apply to single  corporations  but 
traverses the structure of firms.  It  seems to get  closer to the reality 
of the situation than a  sectoral Glassification insofar as it appears that 
what  is happening :in  most  cases is that  there is no  relocation of firms 
but  rather a  transfer of certain parts of the  production processes of 
firms.  In particular, this classification makes it possible to underline 
the  measure to whi,bh  productive activities have  been internationalized and 
the role of  merchru~t  capital in relative  competitiveness. 
Pr~5:~~~~.!:~-~.!:9:-~~!.E;l  (extraction of metals  from  ore,  chemical  processes, 
electricity generation,  sugar manufacturing,  .•• ). 
Production and  distribution in heavy  manufacturing industry are  dominated 
by the  multin;..-:;!.  ~~)f:.als  i  these indllstries  a:re  subject to  a  continuous 
process  of centra.lization,  particularly in view of the  important  role  of 
economies  of scale  and  the  considerable  level  of investment. 
Despite the  ca.Pi tal  and t cchnological  intensiveness  of these industries, 
vw  believe there will  be to  a  certain extent  a  relocation towards  developing-
countries. 
This  corresponds  moreover to the industrialization strategy of a  growing 
number  of developing  countries,  while  a  number  of developing countries 
that  are  advanced  further in establishing import  substituting industries 
have  a  fairly large  domestic  market.  It is difficult  at this stage to 
calculate the repercussions  on Europe  since  import  substitution will 
reduce  export  possibilities while the beginning of industrialization in 
other developing countries  may  increase those possibilities. - 28-
In addition,  there is a  growing pressure from  raw materials  producing 
countries to have their exports processed locally :  in the  long run,  and 
in view of the growing scarcity of raw materials in the industrialized 
countries,  this may  lead to an increase in relative prices and increase 
the developing countries'  possibilities of developing  an export-oriented 
production capacity.  This industrialization is already developing rapidly 
in certain developing countries,  in co-operation with Western firms,  in 
the fields of petrochemicals,  fertilizers,  man-made  fibres,  and  iron and 
steel. 
There is reason to think,  however,  that this relocation of activities will 
not  be  very rapid over the next  fifteen years and will be  confined to the 
margin  (i.e.  new  investment  projects will increasingly be  sited in the 
developing countries). 
Even if the  slowing down  of the growth rate in the European Community 
threatens to aggravate the problems  of overcapacity and to necessitate 
some  restructuring and the  elimination of certain production units, 
certain factors  will at the  same  time  help to  check  the relocation process. 
Firstly,  the  scale of the investment  in question necessitates very great 
selectivity in relocation operations  because  of the political and  economic 
risks  ;  secondly,  it is to be  anticipated that  Europe  will  aim  not  to 
become  overdependent  on outside  sources  of supply and will use  certain 
forms  of  co-operation to protect its markets  or to encourage  relocation 
in countries falling within the European  sphere  of influence. 
The  situation in light  manufacturing industry  (such as the  food  industry, 
the paint  industry,  etc.) is not  altogether  comparable.  Economies  of 
scale play a  less decisive role here  and the  scale of the technology is 
smaller  ;  however,  merchant  capital forms  a  more  independent  factor. -- 29-
With this type  of :industry it is mainly  a  c:ruestion of import  substitution 
in the  developing  countries,  although in certain branches possibilities 
do  exist  for exporting to the  industrialized countries.  In such cases 
(particularly the :rood industries),  merchant  capital is actively involved. 
These industries are  very numerous  and it is only possible to make  some 
general  remarks  ;  they are neither highly labour-intensive  (in contrast 
to the assembly industries) nor highly capital-intensive  (in contrast to 
manufacturing industry),  nor highly technology-intensive  (in contrast to 
the specialist  capital goods  industries). 
In the future,  we  can expect  a  relocation of certain branches  of these 
industries 
- firstly,  of those activities that  can quickly be  satisfied by local 
production in the  developing  countries that  are pursuing a  strategy of 
import  substitution ;  above  all, this will have  an impact  on the EEC's 
export  possibilities  ; 
- secondly,  of the intermediate production activities that  - while not 
highly  concentrated themselves  - are  clenched in between highly 
concentrated sectors  (1)  and are unable to pass  on  down  the line 
increases in their own  costs.  Where  the  low  cost  of labour in the 
developing  countries  can  compensate  for the disadvantages  of relocation, 
part  of the intermediate  foods  industry may  move  to those  countries 
and thence  aim  a.t  the  export  markets. 
Given the wide  range  of activities covered by intermediate industry,  it 
is probable that the  substitution effect  will be  quantitatively greater 
than the relocation effect  and it iB  possible to anticipate  a  gradual  but 
limited shift in the structure of trade  and production over the next  ten 
to fifteen years. 
(1)  "in between monopolistic input  and output  industries". - 30-
~~~~pecieli~~-~~Pi!al_~£ods_indu~!El (machine  tools,  shipbuilding, 
assembly machines,  etc.) 
Above  all, this industry utilizes capital and research,  although  certain 
branches also use  a  great  deal  of labour  (in construction for  example). 
The  developing countries'  involvement  in the  production of capital goods 
has  been very limited up  to now  and can  make  only very moderate  progress, 
through import  substitution,  in those  countries that  already have  a  very 
large domestic market  and whose  industrialization process  is already 
fairly well  advanced  (textile machinery,  for  example). 
In view of the  enormous  technological  lead of the Western  economies,  we 
must  not  expect  fundamental  changes  in the  international structure of 
production and trade in these types of goods.  In fact,  the  most  important 
changes  will take  place in the European  Community  itself,  if slower 
growth and higher research and  development  costs  accelerate the process 
of concentration and aggravate the  problems  of overcapacity. 
Since all the Member  States give priority to these sectors,  the  difficulties 
here  can be  resolved only at  European level. 
This industry uses  intermediate products  and  components  for the  production 
of finished goods,  essentially consumer  goods  (cars,  television and radio 
sets,  beverages,  ready-made  clothing,  etc.),  although  certain capital goods 
(lorries,  simple  standardized machines)  can also be  included in this 
category.  This  industry is highly labour-intensive  and uses little capital 
or research. -- 31  -
There are branches with a  low degree  of concentration,  in which merchant 
capital plays  an important  role  (clothing,  furniture),  along with branches 
dominated by the t:ransnationals  (electronics,  cars,  etc.).  In the branches 
in the first  category  (the very numerous  family firms),  the increase in 
productivity is very small,  labour is essentially unqualified and wages 
are  below the  average  industrial wage,  which  makes  it very difficult to 
recruit  s~fficient suitable workers. 
In addition,  these firms  have to  cope  with purchasing and distribution 
channels that  are highly  concentrated and monopolized and where  price is 
the main essential  criterion in selecting supplies  on an international 
scale.  The  structure of international trade in these products  has  been 
modified considerably by  direct  investment  (including  joint ventures)  and 
by  commercial  subcontracting,  leaving the  surviving firms  no  alternative 
but  to internationalize their own  production either by subcontracting part 
of their work  to foreign firms  or by transferring some  of their activities 
to  a  1 ow-v;age  country. 
The  main  change  in the i.  d.l.  between the industrialized countries  and the 
developing  countries has  therefore occurred in this type  of assembling 
industry and it is likely that this trend will  continue,  particularly in 
respect  of those products that  are  not  subject to important  delivery date 
or fashion  constraints. 
*  * 
Analysis  of the re:location trends by reference to the nature of the 
production process therefore  makes  :it  easier to assess  and identify the 
pressures being exerted on  product:~  lfe  aGt. i ·.rities in the industrialized 
countries 
the transfer of activities is not  confined to the  labour-intensive 
sectors  ; (1) 
- 32-
- in addition,  pressures are exerted not  only by  rising imports  but  also 
by  export  market  losses,  the  concentration of activities within the 
industrialized countries  and the existence of surplus  capacity.  These 
different  types of pressure call for different kinds  of adjustment. 
However,  it is important  not  to examine  the prospects  for the  relocation 
of activities in isolation,  without  taking into account  the  factors  of 
international  competitiveness  and  the  momentum  of international trade. 
The  trend of internal  demand  worldwide  and the  growth of specialization 
in certain types  of differentiated products  are  also  factors  which, 
within one  and  the same  sector,  may  limit  or aggravate the repercussions 
of the transfer of activities on international trade. 
Deterioration of the  employment  situation 
The  rapid growth of imports  from the  developing countries is often 
considered to be  the principal  cause  of the  deterioration of the  employment 
situation in the industrialized countries.  Hence  the desire to protect 
employment  is generally invoked as  justification for  import  restrictions 
and,  similarly,  the sensitivity of a  sector is often assessed solely on 
the basis of the  employment  criterion. 
However,  this phenomenon  cannot  be  considered in isolation,  that is with-
out  taking into account  the overall trend of employment  over a  number  of 
years  and the  structural  changes  influencing employment. 
See  annex  :  Prof.  Dr.  V.  Van  Rompuy,  L'extension des  echanges p.i./p.v.d. 
et  l'emploi  dans  les p.i.  (The  expansion of trade between industrialized 
and developing countries and  employment  in the industrialized countries). - 33-
It is a  fact that since the  end of the sixties both the volume  and the 
structure of  emploJ~ent have undergone radical  changes.  These  have 
resulted in an increase in unemployment  during the period in question, 
despite the growth of trade and economic expansion. 
In the  EEC,  employment  in industry has  tended to stagnate  since 1965 
and has  even declined since 1973,  whereas  previously industry was  the 
chief source of  jobs. 
- Since 1973,  moreover,  the very marked  slow  down  in the rate of creation 
of new  jobs  in the  services  seci;or has  meant  that  job losses  in the 
industrial sector - the pace of which has  qu:ickened since the onset 
of the recession - can no  longer be offset. 
Employment  problems  have been aggravated by  a  number  of structural factors, 
including the following  : 
- the substitution of capital for  labour as  a  result  of the relative price 
trend of these  t1~o production factors 
- the concentration of production  ; 
- the  increase in the supply of labour  (young people,  women)  ; 
- the increase in the segmentation of the  labour marked  (leading to a 
decline in mobility)  ; 
- changes in the composition of demand. 
Since 1975  these factors have  been  joined "by  the  slow-dov.'n in growth  and 
the decline in inv1astment  - the  main feature  of that  slo\'1-down. 
It is quite  clear that the growth of trade with the developing countries 
is only  one  of a  ru~mber of factors  contributing to the deterioration of 
employment,  partia~larly since  external  demand  - notably demand  in the 
developing countries - has  played an important  role in supporting industrial 
activity and has  helped to limit the  decline in employment  (see below). - 34-
It is therefore extremely difficult to assess the relative importance  of 
the  consequences  of internal structural pressures  and the recession,  and 
the  consequences  of  changes in trade flows. 
Lastly,  it should be  pointed out  that there are other factors  which  limit 
the part  played by  international trade in the recent  deterioration of 
employment  : 
Thus,  in industries not  exposed to international  competition,  the stagnation 
of demand  and  of internal activity has resulted in an appreciable  slow-
down  in the growth of the  numbers  employed  (tertiary sector)  and  even in 
a  decline in the construction industry  :  here the 500,000  jobs  lost  since 
1973  represent  20  %  of total  job losses. 
In addition,  employment  has fallen for the first time  in the most  dynamic 
industries,  which  derive the greatest benefit  from the trend of inter-
national trade  (capital goods,  machinery,  electrical equipment,  etc.). 
The  growth of external  demand  (developing countries)  is not  enough  to 
make  up  for the effects of the  drop  in investment  in the  EEC.  As  a  result 
of the  low  rate of growth,  moreover,  firms  are  reluctant to take  on  new 
workers  and  prefer more  flexible solutions  i  such as  more  overtime  and 
temporary  jobs  (a situation which  adds to the instability of employment). 
The  same  applies in the  case  of the textile and  clothing industries,  where 
the numbers  employed  continue to dwindle  although exports to the  developing 
countries have  risen steeply since 1977. 
Lastly,  it should be  recalled that the sectors traditionally affected by 
competition from  the  developing countries  (footwear,  textiles,  ~jute, 
clothing)  have  enjoyed constant tariff protection since the  si~~ies, 
although this has  not  prevented employment  from  falling.  Moreove,r,  trade 
protection has  helped to encourage the use of capital at the  expense  of 
labour. - 35-
Studies undertaken in the  Community 
The  question of tho  extent to which the liberalization of trade has 
contributed to a  worsening of the  employment  situation continues never-
theless to be  wide1y  debated and has  been the  subject  of a  number  of 
evaluation studies,  notably in Germany  but  also in Belgium,  France  and 
the United Kingdom  (1). 
United Kingdom 
One  of the aims  of the  study carried out  in the United Kingdom  (2)  was 
to evaluate the effect  on employment  of the growth of imports  from the 
developing countri,es in the period 1970-1975,  in four  sectors  chosen on 
account  of the substantial share  accounted for  by imports  from the 
developing countri·es  :  footwear,  clothing,  cotton fabrics  and textile 
yarns. 
It  would appear that  over the  five-year period,  taking all the factors 
into account  (growth of productivity,  change  in consumption patterns and 
net  import  penetration),  the  annual  decline in employment  was  6.1 %  in 
textiles,  4.5 %  in footwear  and cotton fabrics  and 2.4 %  in clothing. 
The  study shows  that  employment  losses as  a  result of imports  from the 
develoning  countries amounted to only 0.05% in textiles  (yarns),  0.4 ~ 
in footwear.  0. 8  rfo  in the  case  of cotton fabrics  and 1.7% in the  case 
of  clothin&:• 
It is also clear that  job losses  duH  to productivity growth are twice 
those resulting from higher imports  ..  Furthermore,  it would appear that 
although imports  are  an important  factor in the  decline of  employment 
in textile and footwear,  the  chief exporters were  not  the  developing 
countries but the state-trading countries  and the industrialized countries. 
(1)  The results  of'  these studies - for  some  of which very different  methods 
were used - are not  comparable  em  an international basis. 
(2)  V.  Cable,  Source of Employment  Displacement  in U.K.  Industries  competing 
with LDC  Imports,  April 1978. - 36-
France  (1) 
The  French study examines  the effects on  employment  of trade  'lvith  the 
developing  countries  (imports  and  ~Hl'oc·~s)  from  1970  to 1976,  and  evaluo,tes 
employment  prospects  for the period 1978-1985  on  the  basis of projected 
exports  and imports. 
This  study shows  that 
- trade in industrial products resulted in the net  creation of 100,000  jobs 
bebreen 1970  and 1976.  HovJever  this overall assessment  should be  qualified 
as  follotvs 
- trade with the  developing  coutrlries resulted in substantial inter-sectoral 
conversion.  Trade  with the  developing countries resulted in the net 
creation of employment  in mechanical  and electrical engineering  (+  13,000 ), 
shipbuilding,  aerospace,  armaments  (+  33,000),  chemicals  (+  30,000)  and 
first-stage  metal  processing  (+  25,000)  ;  however,  trade pressures resulted 
in a  reduction of employment  in the textile and clothing industries 
(- 8,ooo),  leather,  footwear  (- 4,000),  wood,  furniture  and other 
industries  (- 6,500) 
- the  decline in traditional activities,  even though offset  by the  develop-
ment  of exports of capital goods,  causes  serious regional imbalances  as 
a  result  of the regional specialization of industry  :  in certain areas, 
the threatened activities account  for nearly 40%  of industrial employment, 
whereas the industries exporting to the developing countries  are generally 
more  evenly distributed over the  country 
- the  average  level of skill and wages  in the threatened industries is 
lower than in the industries exporting to the third world. 
On  the  basis  of extreme hypotheses  of imports  and exports,  it would 
appear that  between now  and 1985  : 
•  the growth of trade with the  developing countries  could affect  industrial 
employment  in France within a  range of +  1 %  to - 5 %  (that is, 
(1) 
+ 50,000  to - 250,000) 
Commissariat  General  du  Plan,  Effets du  commerce  avec les p.v.d.  sur 
11emploi  en France  (Extrait  du  Rapport  sur l'evolution du  tiers monde 
et l'appareil productif frangais). 
Commissariat  General  du  Plan,  Employment  effects in France of trade 
with the developing countries  (Extract  from  the report  on third world 
development  and French industry). - 37-
•  the total number  of  jobs that  could be threatened,  forcing workers to 
seek another  job in the  same  industry or in a  different  industry,  could 
amount  to between 3 %  and 7 %  of the total employed in 1976  (that  is, 
25,000  - 55,000  jobs  per year,  two-thirds  of which would have  to be 
replaced by  jo'bs  in other industries)  :  the trend would be  particularly 
unfavourable  in the textiles and  clothing sector but  could also be 
significant  in the leather and footwear,  wood  and furniture,  "other 
industries"  and glassware  sectors 
•  jobs  created could amount  to between  2  fa  and 8 %  of the total employed 
by industry in 1976,  equivalent  to a  ra,te  of  job creation of  between 
15,000  and 60,000  per year. 
Belgium  (l) 
The  study carried out  in Belgium  measures the  impact  of increased trade 
with the  developing countries on  employment  and  income  assuming that  imports 
and exports  increase  by the  same  amount  (BF  1,000 million). 
On  the basis of this hypothesis the number  of  jobs  lost  and created per 
year  would be  2,084 and 1, 750  respectively,  assuming that the  structure 
of exports remained constant  :  the  job losses would be  mainly in the 
textile and clothing industries  (- 560),  footwear  (- 119)  and "other 
industries",  including toys  (- 112)  and wood  (- 39).  Jobs  would also  be 
lost in the office machinery industry  (- 25)  and the  chemical  industry 
(- 20).  On  the other hand,  employment  would increase in the machinery 
construction industry  (+  172),  metal  products manufacturing  (+  108)  and 
the  electronic manufacturing industry  (+  101). 
As  regards GNP,  the growth of trade with the  developing countries means 
an increase in GNP  despite the negative balance of employment  by virtue 
of the switchover ·to  activities where  wages  and productivity are higher. 
(1)  Paper by Prof.  V.  Van  Rompuy  on the effects  on the Belgian economy of 
erlernal trade with the developl.ng countries,  Leuven,  1978. - 38-
Italy (1) 
The  particular problem in Italy's case is that the main  repercussions 
of trade with the developing countries  might  be  felt  \-lhere  the regional 
imbalances are already most  marked  :  the North-West  (Lombardy,  Piedmont, 
Liguria),  which  is highly industrialized,  the North-East  and the  Centre 
(down  to Tuscany)  and the South will be  affected very differently. 
The  Centre and North-East,  though possessing industries where  the 
competition from  the  developing countries will be  stiff (light  mechanical 
engineering and other labour-intensive industries),  have  the  advantage  of 
a  fairly flexible industrial fabric of very dynamic  small  and medium-
sized firms. 
Overall,  the  North-~vest should also adapt  despite the  concentration of 
certain activities  (the traditional textile industry)  in a  number  of 
towns. 
In the South,  on the  other hand,  the shift towards  a  more  capital-intensive 
type  of industry (plastics,  fibres,  refineries)  has  been  concentrated in 
sectors that  are in difficulties and are not  widespread geographically 
(often a  single large factory is the only employer  in the region).  This 
will  make  the readjustment  all the  more  difficult. 
German,y  (2) 
The  employment  effects of the adjustment  to allow for the trade with the 
developing  countries have  been estimated by the  DIW  (3)  up  to 1980  and 
by  the Kiel  Institute  (4)  up  to 1985. 
(1)  Paper  by  Prof.  C.  Secchi,  June  1978. 
See  also  :  Some  (approximate  and  preliminary)  calculations on  the 
employment  effects  in  Italy of  increased  competitive  imports  from 
ldcs  (annexed). 
(2)  Paper  by  F.  Wolter,  Estimates  of  Employment  Effects  of  an  Increasing 
Division of  Labour  with  Developing  Countries,  FRG,  Kiel,  February  1978. 
(3)  Deutsche  Institut  fur  Wirtschaftsforschung,  Berlin. 
(4)  Institut  fur  Weltwirtschaft,  Kiel. - 39-
The  effects of external trade  on industry as  a  whole  up to 1985  (excluding 
oil,  shipbuilding,  aircraft manufacture  and data processing)  are likely 
to  be  the net  loss  of 692,000  jobs,  two-thirds of this loss being as  a 
result  of trade with the  developing countries.  These  figures  represent 
8.8 ~and 5.7  ~respectively of the  number  of persons  employed in 1974. 
The  DIW  study,  whieh  was  restricted to the  sectors of industry subject 
to the greatest  competition  (manufacture  of precision optical  instruments, 
textiles-clothing,  leather goods),  estimates at  almost  100,000 the gross 
loss of  jobs in these sectors between now  and  1980.  To  this figure  must 
be  added 50,000  jobs  lost  as  a  result  of indirect effects.  The  clothing 
industry is by far the hardest  hit  (1). 
* 
*  * 
The  principal  conclusions that  may  be  drawn  from these studies  on the 
impact  of trade with the  developing  countries  on  employment  are  as  follows 
- employment  in the industrialized countries  depends  on  a  number  of 
variables  among  whi.ch  the influence of imports  from the  developing 
countries is by  no  means  the  most  significant  ; 
- the impact  of the  growth of imports  from the  developing  countries  on 
the overall  level  of employment  has  so far been slight.  In the  coming 
years the effects on  employment  of the growth of trade with  developing 
countries will  probably be  adverse  but  not  disastrous. 
However,  the real  problem arises from the  concentration of the  adverse 
effects  on  certain groups  of workers  and on certain firms  or regions, 
whereas  the positive effects are  more  widely  distributed and require 
workers to switoh to a  different  sector of activity and sometimes to a 
different kind of work. 
(1)  These latter  E~stimates do  not  allow for the indirect  creation of  jobs 
as  a  result  of the increase in exports of other goods  made  possible 
by trade liberalization. - 40-
These  methods  of evaluation are still very approximate,  however,  and are 
strongly criticised by  certain experts  : 
- to begin with,  the  methods  of evaluation are purely static and rest  on 
simplified working hypotheses  :  unchanged relative prices,  homogeneity 
of products,  stable structure and composition of trade,  unchanged 
employment  coefficient,  etc.  They  do  not  take  account  of the  momentum 
of the trend of trade and international  competitiveness  ; 
- h. G.d.:iition,  the statistical information is not  sufficiently refined to 
provide  a  basis for  a  practical study of restructuring problems  :  the 
employment  situation may  be  very different  at  the  sub-sector or product 
level  ; 
- lastly,  the  examination  does  not  take account  in most  cases  of the 
operation of the labour market  itself (mobility,  level  of skill,  etc.), 
the structure and trend of the market,  the trend of productivity,  etc. 
It is therefore essential that  work  be  continued so that  we  have  a  better 
idea of the net  impact  in employment  terms  of the  liberalization of trade 
with the  developing  countries,  particularly on  a  regional  basis. 
III.  ON  CONSUI1~S  (1) 
The  strength of protectionist tendencies  can be  accounted for fairly well 
by the  fact  that the negative  effects are  concentrated in certain industries 
and in the regions  where  those  industries are located,  which  means  that the 
reactions  of the industrial and trade union organizations  concerned and of 
the  local political authorities overlap.  Inversely,  the positive effects 
of an  increased or  improved i.d.l.  are more  diffused in time  and geogra-
phically  ;  herein lies there weakness,  for governments  are  eager for 
short-term results,  and people in general  have neither the  awareness  nor 
the  organization to  defend their interests as  consumers. 
(1)  See  annex  :  V.  Cable,  Consumer  Benefits and Trade Liberalization. -- 41  -
1.  The  effects of trade liberalization on  consumers  can be  summarized 
as  follows  :  a  consumer  surplus effect,  the possible repercussions  on 
prices of  economies  of scale,  an effect  on the general  development 
level of the  developing  countrief3,  and a  reldistribution effect  : 
- in static terms,  the  consumer  fmrplus,  apart  from  its fault  of being 
a  psychological and theoretical  concept,  is appreciable  only if the 
drop  in price:  due to the  opening-up of  customs  barriers is very 
considerable,  in other words,  :Lf  highly protected products are  involved 
(clothing,  agricultural prod.uce) 
- in dynamic terms,  consumers  should benefit  from the  economies  of 
scale made  possible  by  product  :Lon  at  world level,  provided that this 
production does  not  take  on  a  monopolistic form  as  a  result  of the 
concentration of economic power.  Conversely,  the  competition from 
external trade  can take the place  of anti-trust policies in numerous 
European industrial sectors that  are  already highly  concentrated and 
thus  inclined to  restrictivE~ practices  ; 
the widespread practice of proportional  margins  amplifies the price 
movements  of imported products at  final  eonsumption level.  Those 
who  believe in cost-push inflation lay particular stress on this 
danger  since the repercussion of prices  on  wages  is asymmetrical 
- the distribution effects boil  down  to a  transfer from the producers 
to the  consumers  :  the domestic industries exposed to the  competition 
from  importers  would  be  obliged to reduce the remuneration of their 
factors  of production.  In respect  of final  products  such  as  agricultur-
al  produce,  clothing and footwear,  which represent  an  important  item 
for  low-income  households,  the  effect  would,  in the fiscal  sense,  be 
progressive rather than regressive.  As  regards  intermediate products, 
it is clear that  part  of the  cost  of protecting manufactures  of steel 
or yarn falls  on the industries that use those products. - 42-
2.  Certain people  maintain that  commercial  policy should not  attach too 
much  importance to  consumers'  interests since  any  resulting benefits 
would in any case  either be  "confiscated" by the  importers  or unjustified 
in times  of high unemployment  ;  they also maintain that  in any  case it 
is more  realistic politically to give preference to  defending producers' 
interests  : 
the  importers'  margins  are probably larger than those  applied to 
domestic lines of production.  It is nevertheless  a  fact  that the 
increase in demand  for  imported products,  which is what  actually 
triggers protectionist  measures,  is due  to the  fact  that  the  price 
differences are  absorbed only partially by the importers'  larger 
margins  and are in fact  passed on to the  consumers.  Moreover, 
importers  are  able to allow themselves  these large margins  because 
of the  existence of restrictive measures  (GSP  quotas  for example) 
and not  because  of the lack of them.  Lastly,  as  is happening with 
textiles,  competition from  imported products  would  oblige  European 
producers to  lower their prices.  If this effect is maked  by  semi-
monopolistic practices at  the  import  and marketing stages,  this  means 
that there is a  need for  a  firmer anti-trust  policy and  not  for  more 
protectionism 
- on the  pretext  of defending employment,  less  importance is given to 
the  consumers'  interests.  The  main  cause  of unemployment  is probably 
inflation (or the restrictive monetary policies provoked by  inflation 
(FRG,  United Kingdom,  France)),  which is fed by trade restrictions. 
There  would therefore be  a  contradiction between external and  internal 
macro-economic policies.  Any  attempt  to plead balance of payments 
constraints is suspect  since,  particularly in Germany,  the policy 
pursued here  amounts  to subsidizing imports  and taxing exports  ; 
- government  policies are probably dictated more  by  electoral  concerns 
and producer pressure groups.  Rare  are the  cases  where the possible 
reactions of consumers  are taken into account  - one  example  being 
food prices. -·  43-
The  proliferation of "special  cases",  for  which the public authorities 
are asked to allow derogations  or protection,  and the fact  that these 
sectors represent  an increasing proportion of total production 
(agriculture,  textiles,  clothing and footwear,  steel,  automobiles), 
represents  a  real  danger to any overall  policy and dilu-tes the 
advantages that  certain sectors  do  derive1  from protectionism. 
3.  The  major  weakness  of  consumer  benefits is the fact  that they are 
difficult to demonstrate.  Nevertheless,  even if these benefits are 
restricted to the  single and static case  of consumer  surplus,  it is 
seen -that  they exceed the redeployment  costs  (losses of production, and 
thus  of income,  throughout  the transitional period leading up to  a  new 
allocation of the  productive resources).  The  quantification of these 
benefits and costs,  even if relying on  many  assumptions  (elasticities 
in relation to prices,  customs  duties  equivalent  to quotas,  attribution 
of a  given proportion of the permanent  unemployment  to trade liberal-
ization,  etc.)  1 ,  does  however  lead to  convergent  conclusions  : 
- from the cost-benefit  view-point,  the balance of trade liberalization 
is indeed positive 
- the  advantag,~s are all the greater where the liberalization affects 
highly proteeted sectors,  or sectors  (e. g.  textiles) that  pay  low 
wages. 
Conversely,  benefits  may  not  balance the costs  in sectors that  have 
little protection and have  a  well-paid labour  force  (stee,  automobiles). 
Except  in highly protected sectors,  the  net  benefits  of liberalization 
are less than the benefits of the resultant  redistribution between 
consumers,  producer  and government. - 44-
IV.  ON  THE  REGIONAL  UNBALANCES  IN  THE  EEC  (1) 
We  have  to  distinguish  between  the  problems  posed  by  the  really  backward 
regions- which  need  a  $pecific  regional  policy- and  those  posed  by  the 
regions  going  through  a  process  of  restructuring  - which  need  an  adjustment 
programme. 
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ThRDe  areas,  conr>equently,  present  a  set  of  constraints for the  working 
of the European Regional  Development  Fund  (ERW).  As  it is knovm,  ERDF 
priority areas  are mainly the  follo~ring regions  :  southern Italy  ; 
Ireland  ;  Northern  Ireland,  and the  special  de~velopment  and  development 
a..rer..,,s  in the United Kingdom  ;  the  v;e~~t  and the  South-Hest  of France  ;  the 
regions  on  the  eastern frontier of the Federal  Republi~ of Germany  ;  the 
minint; ["reas  and  farming  areas  cf BE·lgiurn  and  Luxembourg  ;  the north of 
the Net.herl.tulds  ;  Greenle.nd. 
Other  ~:SC  inteTvention instruments  s,lso tend  (or  shou1d tend) to  ~ivt~ 
rn·iorits to these  areai3.  This  e.ppliEs to the  IDuropean Social Fund  (1::i~F), 
the 11\J.r'ope:::.n  Agricultural  Guidance  :;~nd  Gua.rantee Fund  (EAGGF),  the  Euro-
pean  Investment  13.ank  (EIB),  ete.  (1}.  Also  other interventicm  schemer~ 
(1 ike  th<::.~  r.:editerro..Dec=;.,n  pad::;:::,g~;:  under  discuDGion)  are  mainly set  up  fo:r 
c) e~::.d_y  r3t:d ct.ly  co:1ncct.erl.  rPhe  Cornmu.nity'G  rec;ional  policy is  among the 
he&-vi1s  or.  thr:;  CO!il.trnn-.d ty'  ~3  leus  devElopec1  recion;e::  : 
(1)  ~)ee  C~  ~-)ecchj ':-;  noLf~  on  11In1plice.tion::...;  of tt.e  Community's  regional 
policy  (and related  policies)~  J5  Novembr~r 1977  (annexed). - 
l) The  SURGXFWLRQ VWUXFWXUH of  OHVV GHYHORSHG UHJLRQV LV OLNHO\ WR FRUUH.. V
SRQG more  WR WKH SURGXFWLRQ VWUXFWXUH of  GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV WK ..  DQ WKDW
VXEVWLWXWLQJUHJLRQDO DLGfor  WUDGH SURWHFWLRQ ,PSOLFLWO\ this calls 
for  VLJQLILFDQW FKDQJHV in UHJLRQDO SURGXFWLRQVWUXFWXUHVPART  T~~O 
POLICY  GUIDELINES 
-=-=-=-=--- 48-
CHAPTER  I  - GUIDELINES  FOR  COM1v1ERGI.AL  POLICY  VIS-A-VIS  THE  DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES  (1) 
INTRODUCTION 
The  suggestions  made  below  \vith regard to commercial  policies are based on 
a  number  of basic ideas  which  should be  briefly defined  : 
1.  The first  idea,  which underlies this  whole  report,  stems  from  a  serious 
concern for  coherence as  regards  the  objectives,  means  and instruments 
of the various policies.  This  means  in particular that  commercial  policy 
must  of necesBity take  account  of the industrialization and  development 
targets of third world countries. 
The  mercantilist  approach  - centred on the  achievement  of equilibrium or 
surpluses in trade - must  give  way  to an approach which  layB  stress on 
coherence in the achievement  of rnany  different  objectives. 
2.  The  second idea is based on the fact  that  eommercial  policy governs  a 
country's relations with its partners  :  thE3  somewhat  narrow  concept  of 
commercial  policy as  a  body of unilateral measures  governing inflows 
(mainly of products)  must  now,  i·t  would  se~3m,  give  way  to a  broader  concept 
of bilateral or multilateral arrangements  for ordering mutual  relations. 
Commercial  policy must  transce~nd the quantitative organization of product 
flows  and apply itself explicitly to sharing the benefits derived from 
international trade. 
The  policing of'  product  flows  mu:st  be  replaced by the regulation of 
relations betwHen  partners. 
(1)  Drawn up by J ..  De  Bandt  (excE~pt  for the last  section of this  chapter). -~-
3.  The  third idea is based on the fact that  although international trade is 
to a  great  extent  a  necessity which  offers a  number  of advantages in terms 
of resource allocation,  it also involves  a  number  of distortions  or 
irregularities - unfair  competition,  unequal  terms of trade - and is 
liable to entail  considerable  economic  and social  costs  which  in certain 
circumstances  may  even be unacceptable.  In aiming to maximize  the  advantages 
of trade and  ensure that they are fairly spread,  commercial  policy must 
endeavour to take  into consideration the  short-term constraints that exist. 
But  there  can be  no  question of sacrificing long-term advantages to short-
term benefits.  In other words,  commercial  policy must  help bring about 
the required adaptations rather than hold back  structural  change. 
An  approach geared exclusively to trade must  give  way  to  an approach based 
on the  adjustment  of complementary structures. 
4.  The  fourth idea stems  from practical findings  with regard to the application 
of commercial  policies and international trade agreements  :  in practice 
there is a  constant  tendency for these policies and agreements to be 
biased towards  protectionism.  For this reason it seems  essential to replace 
the confusion that  exists between the various types  with clear distinctions 
between different  categories of objectives and instruments.  By  way  of 
example  the following must  be  placed in separate  categories 
a)  the problems  of choosing between protection and free trade,  given that 
in practice the  choices made  are more  often than not  a  matter of degree. 
What  is involved here is basically a  comparison of the requirements  of 
the international system with a  number  of internal requirements  or 
objectives. 
b)  The  problems  of structural transition or adjustment,  seen in the light 
of new  facts  or requirements.  Here the  constraints are  more  short-term, 
and it is a  question of facilitating the adaptations  and reducing their 
cost.  Unless they are obligatorily transitional,  measures taken in this 
respect  can  call into question all or part  of the  choices  made  under a). -- 50-
c)  The  problems  of regulating international trade flows  :  it is a  matter 
here of facili  ta:ting traffic, preventing unfair  competition and avoiding 
disruption. 
By  clearly distinguishing the various  categories of problems,  a  situation 
should be  avoided where the solution of short-term problems  prejudices the 
fundamental,  longer-term options. 
5.  The  fifth and last idea stems  from the  concept  that there is generalized 
interdependence within the variouE:  economic  systems  in the  same  way  as 
there is interdependence between i;;he  economic  systems themselves.  Insofar 
as this interdependence affects u:;::,  it must  be  integrated as  such in the 
very  concept  of  corrm1ercia.l  policy,  as  opposed to more  traditional approaches 
based on individual  commodities  or sectors which  obstruct  attempts to take 
into account  all the  constraints  and interests involved,  at the  same  time 
hiding from  view the overall effects of some  event  or measure,  and  also 
prevent  divergences between specific interests from  being overcome,  for 
this is only possible if they are balanced against  other lines of divergence 
in an overall framework  (1). 
A product-by-product  approach must  be  replaeed by  a  multisectoral approach  .. 
* 
*  * 
The  implementation of these ideas  calls for the definition of a  number  of 
guidelines for action  (see below).  They are  grouped under three headings 
which deal  successively with  : 
(1)  "Given the  conflict of interests, it is not  very realistic to  consider 
that  an agreement  could be  reached on  one of the  elements  of the  "packag,e" 
taken in isolation ;  on the  contrary,  each of the partners will have to 
consider all the advantages  and concessions  in the various areas". 
Statement  by Mr  Haferkamp to the  Council  (I/236/78-F). -51-
the mechanics  of free trade,  i.e.  the substantive issues in international 
trade  ; 
-the organization of free trade,  i.e.  the problems  of adjustment  and 
adaptation ; 
the regulation of international trade,  i.e. the rules and procedures 
designed to ensure  smooth trade flows. 
The  list of problems  dealt  with below is a  selective one.  Some  problems  are 
not  dealt  with here,  or are  covered elsewhere in this report. 
However,  it is perhaps useful to mention the  following borderline problems 
- the treatment  of multinationals,  which  obviously goes  beyond the framework 
of  commercial  policy,  is likely to be  the subject  of a  fiscal  approach 
(exemption from  double taxation or  income  tax,  price of transfers),  a 
social legislation approach  (labour standards,  including standards in 
foreign branches)  or a  regulatory approach  (codes of conduct)  ; 
- the  problem of the  organization and the rates of trade liberalization is 
inseparable  from  the  establishment  of adjustment  policies and  capacities 
(see  chapter II)  ; 
- commercial  policies,  insofar as they aim to correct,  diminish or compensate 
for factors of competitiveness,  are inseparable  from  those factors;  the 
same  applies to technology 
- commercial  policies,  which  relate primarily to products,  are also affected 
by  the  conditions governing the movement  of labour and capital  ; 
- insofar as  changes  in parity or exchange  rate fluctuations  affect,  some-
times to a  considerable  extent,  the relative levels of competitiveness, 
commercial  policies  cannot  ignore this important,  and in some  cases decisive, 
aspect  of the problem. -- 52-
Lastly,  it should be  noted that selectivity in the treatment  of partners 
complements,  or represents  an alternative to,  aid or cooperation measures. 
Moreover,  since  thE~  Community  sees  a  strong link between trade liberalization 
and a  "regionalized"  approach to relations with the  developing countries,  the 
last  section of this chapter  (1)  deals  with the possible  ways  in which the 
regional approach  could be  applied in trade relations with the  developing 
countries. 
I.  THE  MECHANICS  OF  FREE  TRADE 
The  fundamental  options in favour  of the liberalization of imports  from the 
developing  courr~ries are not  based on a  blind faith in the  merits  of free 
trade and do  not  therefore aim to make  industrial systems  subject  only to 
the  requirement:a  of international market  mechanisms.  Free trade,  necessary 
though it may  be,  is not  sufficient  on its own  to ensure either an optimal 
division of labour  or optimal  distribution of the profits from trade.  Above 
all, it cannot  guarantee the realization of the various  countries  1  particu--
lar economic  and social objectives. 
Now,  one  of the  main aims  of commercial  policy and the raison d 1etre of 
the fundamental  options in favour  of free trade is to make  the demands  of 
the international division of la1lour  compatible  - or less incompatible  -
with the achievement  of internal objectives  (2). 
The  liberalization of imports  from the developing countries is designed to 
facilitate their integration in the international trade system.  It is one 
of the means  of realizing those countries'  industrialization and developmEmt  . 
objectives. 
The  methods  used to liberalize trade between developing countries  and the 
Member  States of the  European Community  should therefore be  assessed in 
terms of these objectives,  but  the Member  States  1  constraints should be 
taken into account  too. 
(1)  Drawn  up by V.  Cable. 
(2) J.  De  Bandt,  Specialisation  intE~rnationale et structures d 1activite  indu~;;­
strielle,  Cujas,  Paris,  1975. -53-
a)  The  degrees  of free trade  information and transparency 
Although it has  been  decided in principle to opt  for free trade with the 
countries of the third world,  in practice there are various types  of 
barriers and restrictions.  Free trade is, in fact,  a  matter of degree. 
In this  connection,  it seems  necessary to lay stress on  the  following points 
in this  chapter dealing with the  instruments  : 
- the  choices  regarding free trade,  or more  especially,  the  degrees  and 
the mechanics  of free trade,  must  be  made  clear.  In other words,  bearing 
in mind the  diversity of the interests at  stake,  these choices  should be 
made  clear in relation to the whole  gamut  of social and economic  objectives, 
taking into account  a  reasoned assessment  of the  costs  and benefits 
involved ; 
- in view of the many  different barriers and obstacles to trade,  in 
particular non-tariff barriers,  substituting explicit  choices for sets 
of measures  and de  facto barriers stemming  from  a  variety of socio-
political and  economic  pressures would  involve the establishment  of 
information systems  enabling a  certain degree of transparency to be 
achieved,  thereby ensuring that the practical situation matches  the 
choices  based on  principle  ; 
- unless there are specific and exceptional reasons  for acting otherwise, 
such as  considerations  of security or independence,  exceptions to the 
principle of free trade for  certain products  can be  justified only as 
a  strictly transitional measure.  This  has to  do  with the problems 
involved in the organization of free trade rather than with the principle 
itself. 
b) Selectivity  differentiated preferences 
Among  the possible  approaches to free trade the question of selectivity 
or discrimination in the treatment  of the various trading partners is 
being raised at present  ;  this is diametrically opposed to the  principles 
of equal treatment  upheld previously. - 5-t-
It must  of  course  be  observed that the situations of the various trading 
partners in the third. world are extremely varied and there is every reason 
to believe that the  differences will become  ev·en  bigger in the future  (1). 
In fact,  the proposals  made  in this  connection are based on two  attitudes 
which are in total opposition to each other.  For some  it is a  matter of 
limiting access to the  markets  of the  developed countries for those 
countries  whose  ex:port  performances  are the most  significant  and which 
thus represent  the:  most  serious threat.  Others feel that  preferential 
treatment  should be  given to the  countries with the greatest  handicaps 
compared with the other trading partners  (2).  While  the first attitude is 
manifestly inspire1d by protectionism,  the  second aims to use  (preferential) 
access to the markets  as  an instrument  of development  aid (3). 
Justifying selectivity may  appear to pose  problems. 
To  take the theor•3tical  reservations first,  compared with the principle of 
free trade selectivity in accesso to markets  makes  little sense in itself ; 
it only makes  sense if we  accept that,  in practice,  there exists  a  certain 
degree  of protectionism,  by reference to which it is possible to grant 
differential advantages. 
The  practical reservations  appear to be  more  important.  First of all, 
preferential advantages  are often "nibbled at"  ;  this  can happen when the 
advantages are defined,  through the introduction of a  varying number  of 
exceptions,  or in practice,  either because of the processes of liberalization 
and regional  integration or  becausE~ of the  existence of de  facto restric-
tions of a  more  or less hidden nature  ;  secondly,  the  advantages thus 
afforded tend to be  used as  excuse::;  for getting round the  need for  more 
direct  action. 
(1)  These differences between the third world countries  (up to the year 2000) 
are brought  out  in the work  of Interfutures. 
(2)  This  second attitude is obviously the  one underlying the  demands  of the 
poorest  countries,  which are anxious to maintain or increase their 
margin of preferential treatment. 
(3)  One  often moves  imperceptibly from the second to the first, that is to 
say from the idea of selective advantages to the idea of discriminatory 
restrictions,  the  arguments in favour  of the first often being used as 
a  pretext to  justify the second. -55-
Whatever  the reservations,  the function of selectivity must  be  to integrate 
in explicit  fashion the  development  aims  of the partners affected.  It is 
however,  not  so much  a  case of trying to guarantee development  directly 
in this way  as  of increasing the degree  of  consistency between  commercial 
and  development  aid policies by endeavouring to offset the  serious 
handicaps  of certain partners.  These handicaps  adversely affect  their 
competitiveness  and are likely to aggravate their relative underdevelopment. 
Nevertheless  research  should be  conducted in order to assess better the 
real usefulness  of such preferences,  the  effectiveness of which  - given 
their volume  - is challenged by  some. 
Finally,  as  regards the selection criteria,  on the  positive side selection 
should be  based on this need to offset  specific handicaps  (for example,  the 
absence  of access  to the  sea,  the  lack of a  minimum  level - to be 
defined - of industrial structure,  the fact that the  external value  of 
remunerations is lagging)  and  on  the negative side it should not  result 
in giving preferential access solely to those  countries which  are  not  in 
a  position to profit  from  them. 
c)  Reciprocity in bilateral relations 
The  question of reciprocity is similar to that  of selectivity,  for the 
demands  in this area often stem implicitly from  protectionist  concerns 
access to the market  is used as  a  bargaining counter and is reduced where 
the partners  concerned are unable to accept  reciprocity. 
Is trying to dictate the trade policy of third world partners in this 
way  justified ? 
Certain people think,  rightly doubtless,  that  apart  from  the barriers to 
trade  justified by the need to protect  an infant  industry,  the  custom 
barriers in a  large number  of third world countries are quite  excessive, 
encourage inefficiency,  and are the source of revenue. -- 56  -
If this is so,  reciprocity - in removing the disadvantages  mentioned 
above  - should be  of benefit  primarily to third world countries. 
One  may  v1ell  ask  how  this reciprocity would benefit the  developed  countries 
since the  developing  countries tend to spend all - and indeed more than all 
their revenue  from abroad  (1),  the  developing  countries  would hardly be 
able to increase their purchases  simply as  a  result  of the liberalization 
of access to their  o~m markets. 
It is of  course  neceflsary,  in this overall line  of reasoning,  to except 
certain countries  whose  industrial export  performance  leads to an  accumul-
ation of trade surpluses.  But  generally it is not  these  countries for  which 
reciprocity is a  problem. 
vJhat  remains therefore of the  demand  for reciprocity ? 
If there is in fact  a  link between liberalization of trade,  efficiency and 
export  performance,  one  would only,  with  some  reservations,  have  to try to 
convince  countries entering the  intE~rnational trade  system of the need to 
accept  this kind of constraint.  But  this  can only  be  the  result  of a 
gradual process  during which the  countries acquire the industrial  control 
that is essential. 
It applied immediately reciprocity 1r1ould  lead to considerable,  and doubt-
less irreparable,  damage  in numerou8 third world countries. 
(l) Certain distinctions  could naturally be  made  in order to take account 
of the different  situations in the various  developed countries.  But 
the  argument  elearly applies to the  countries  of the  European  Community. -57-
The  question of reciprocity should then be  considered only when  excessive 
trade surpluses  accumulate.  Apart  from  such  cases,  which  would after all 
be  exceptional,  reciprocity appears to  be  only one  of the  dimensions  of 
long-terms  industrial  cooperation projects. 
Attention should,  however,  be  drawn to one  particular aspect  of non-
reciprocity,  or rather of the  existence of high  customs  barriers  :  since 
such barriers can produce  revenue  on the  domestic  market,  they  can also 
as  a  consequence  give rise to discriminatory prices and dumping.  They 
should be  taken into  consideration for this  reason. 
II.  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  FREE  TRADE 
a)  Transitional measures 
The  operation of free trade  (even if moderated)  in the  ever-widening 
multilateral  context,  where  trading partners with vastly differing levels 
of resources  and  development  confront  each other leads to constant,  some-
times  abrupt,  changes  in relative  competitiveness,  trade  flows  and 
specializations. 
The  harsh law of the  market  is such that it can inflict  considerable,  often 
unacceptable,  economic and social  damage. 
Moreover,  sovereign States have  preferences  as  regards the  structure of 
activity according to their own  particular economic  and social  objectives 
and they seek to put  those preferences into practice. 
But  the  power  relationships  which are  being built up  within the inter-
national system  can bar the access  of certain countries to  certain lines 
of production. ·- 58-
For these obvious  reasons,  which are  merely suggested here,  it is not 
advisable to rely exclusively on  th:Ls  market  law alone,  which  in any 
case is only instrumental in relation to the  economic  and social 
objectives,  and it  i~3  these that  must  hold  sway. 
It is essential for  any adaptations  and transitions to be  organized. 
~Vhat  is being done  must,  however,  be  clearly spelled out  from the start, 
for there is no  question of going back  on the  principle of free trade 
itself on the  pretext  of organizing transitions  and adaptations.  Too 
often,  as  well,  the  system of organization set up  degenerates into  a 
system of protection, 
The  conditions necessary to ensure that the  organization of free trade 
remains  compatiblEl  with free trade :itself lie in the  exceptional  and 
necessarily transitory nature of th;s  organiz.ational  measures.  It is not 
sufficient,  for this purpose,  that the measures  should be  taken for  a 
limited period when  these measures  can be  renewed for further  limited 
periods. 
But  these conditions,  though necessary,  are  not  sufficient.  Organization 
cannot  be  confined to defensive  or interim protective measures.  In 
addition,  or rather ·- above  all - m3asures  commensurate  with the  desired 
adaptation aims  should also be  taken. 
The  transitory natur13  of these measures  can be  guaranteed only if from 
the outset  a  clear definition is given of the  specific objective to be 
attained,  the whole  process  required to achieve it and the  means  to be 
deployed. -59-
b)  The  pace  of trade liberalization 
In present  circumstances,  \vith  strong pressure for  changes  in the inter-
national division of labour,  trade relations  with the third world  countries 
are increasingly demanding adaptation or adjustment  of industria] 
structures. 
In other words,  among  all the factors  of structural  change,  the industria.-
lization of the third world  countries  and their entry into the international 
trade flows  are  now  playing an increasing role,  and will  certainly continue 
to  do  so  in the  coming  decades,  because  of the  very extent  of the 
differences in conditions of production and  competitiveness  among  the 
various trading partners. 
Consequently,  Hhi  1f;  the  success  of the process  of industrializ,ation of the 
developing  countries  depends  on the  liberalization of access to the 
developed  countries'  markets,  it  depends  even more  on the  adjustment  of 
industrial structures in the  developed  countries,  since maintaining theBe 
structures  \vould  necessarily  jeopardize liberalization itself. 
1!Vhile  adjustment  policies are  indispensable  - they vd.ll  be  dealt  vd th in 
the  next  chapter - they must  be  backed  up  by trade policy,  which  must 
provide temporary protection thus  enabling the required adaptation 
measures to  be  taken and  seek to  ensure that the  adaptation process  does 
not,  by its extent  or  concentration,  give rise to unacceptable  damage  or 
social  costs. 
Trade policy should above  all regulate the rate of liberalization and the 
penetration of  imports  according to effective capacity to  adapt.  This 
can be  done  only  case-by-case  and having regard to the particular 
circumstances at the time. - 60-
One  can,  however,  immediately see the ambiguity of interim protective 
measures  whose  ultimate  aim is that  structures should not  be  preserved. 
Any  mechanism  of this kind ahrays runs  the risk of getting out  of hand 
and degenerating into a  protectionist  system.  Practice  shov1s  that  one 
tends  more  often than not  to undE:restimate the  capacity to adapt,  and 
as  a  result the  adaptation is effectively reduced.  There is also  a 
tendency to stres8 the  shorter-term costs  of adaptation rather than the 
longer-term advantages. 
The  risk of the_  mechanism getting out  of oontrol  can be  avoided only 
under  certain conditions.  These  have  already loeen  stated out  they must 
be  constantly repeated  : 
- the interim protective measures  must  be  exceptional  and at all costs 
of a  transitory nature 
- efficient  adjustment  policies  nru.st  be  introduced at  the  same  time,  for 
only such policies  can effectively guarantee the transitory nature of 
the protective  measures 
- there  must  also  be  a  parellel development  of clarity or transparency 
as regards the  choices in matters  of trade  and obstacles to trade in 
order to obtain in practice,  greater consistency with the basic 
options  (1 ). 
But  doubtless  one  should go  further  and take  measures  which  make  it 
possible to eliminate progressively the need to take these interim 
protective measur1as. 
In the medium-term there must  be  a  considerable  improvement  in the  systems 
of information and forecasts  on the  development  of export  capacities and 
international trade flows  so that anticipatory adjustment  policies  can 
be  introduced when required.  Such anticipatory policies should make 
interim protective measures unnecessary. 
(1)  A situation must  be  avoided where the decisions  can be  circumvented 
or the options  sidetracked by socio-political pressures seeking to 
defend particular short-term interests. - 61-
There is doubtless  a  need,  independently of the analysis  of the  markets 
and of projects and industrial investments in the  developing countries 
- taking into account  information relating to the  sale of plant  and 
machinery - to establish an information system for direct  investments 
by  European  Community  firms  in the developing countries  and the  export 
capacities thus set up. 
In the  longer term and looking,  as this report  does,  to the integration 
of trade policy in the framework  of industrial and development  aid 
policies, _it  is important  to start a  process  of cooperation and  concerted 
effort  in the matter of industrial structures,  leading eventually,  doubt-
less not  to a  replacement  but  to  a  disciplining of the  free  play of 
market  forces. 
c)  Commodity  agreements 
Pending the  achievement  of such  cooperation,  which  obviously goes  beyond 
the  scope  of trade policy,  it is being urged more  and more  pressingly by 
some  that trade cooperation should be  developed in the  context  of 
Community  agreements.  This  amounts  in fact  to extending to other products 
or groups  of products  agreements  like the Cotton or Multifibre  arrangements 
as  a  method  of organizing free trade. 
The  Cotton and Multifibre  arrangements  themselves  give rise to very 
serious reservations,  because of the principle of such agreements  them-
selves,  but  even more  so because  of the  way  they are applied. 
Withoung  going into a  systematic analysis of these agreements,  in relation 
to the objectives assigned to them,  one  can however  use them by way  of 
example  to go  into the conditions  and limitations of such  commodity 
agreements. 
As  these agreements  are by  definition exceptions to GATT  rules,  their 
extension would  inevitably entail  changes  in those rules.  But  since a 
review of the rules seems  to be  called for  anyway,  it is with this in - 62-
mind that  one  should examine  hmv  and to what  extent  commodity  agreements 
can serve as effective instrumerrts  for organizing free trade  and at  the 
same  time  adapting industrial structures. 
The  main argument  put  for>vard  in support  of such agreements  is the  need 
to organize free trade in order to avoid the  anarchy of defensive  measures 
taken by the various  countriec  according to the whim  of  circumstances. 
In other \'lOrds,  the purpose of the organization of free trade is to  save 
free trade,  which  would not  survive  a  proliferation of unilateral 
restrictions. 
In practice this  argument  obviously has  something to be  said for it, but 
it tends too easily to serve as  a  pretext  (1),  simply because it  cannot 
be  proved.  There is nothing to  shoH that,  t'lithout  such agreements,  the 
liberalization of trade in textile and  clothing products  would not  have 
gone  as far as it has  or even further  (as  some  examples tend to indicate). 
Moreover,  these agreements  have  no·t  prevented,  in particular of late,  a 
chaotic proliferation of unilateral measures  leading to serious  damage 
in a  number  of developing  countrie:a  (2). 
Briefly, the principal objections to the Cotton and Multifibre arrangements 
are  as  follows  : 
- as  regards their principle  : 
•  these agreements  do  not  involve reciprocal undertakings  with penalties 
attached ;  whereas  liberalization of trade is only a  rule  of principle 
which the  developing  countries are  incapable of having applied,  the 
developed countries are in a  position to apply restrictive measures 
to  combat  the threat of market  disruption 
(1)  In fact this is  no  more  and no  less than. a  form of institutionalized 
blackmail. 
(2)  "The  fv1ultifibre  arrangement  has turned out  to be  a  fair weather 
instrument  and has  broken down  in the situation of a  world-wide 
depression",  UNCTAD,  TD/B/C.  ::~/192,  p.  :::~4. - 63-
•  disruption, or the threat  of disruption,  is left entirely to the 
importing country to assess.  The  Surveillance Board set up under 
the  I~ltifibre arrangement  has  no  power of arbitration ; 
the undertaking given to take  advantage  of the protective measures  in 
order to apply adjustment  policies rendering the protective measures 
superfluous  was  not  accompanied by  any penalty  ; 
•  although an element  of the  arrangements  between the parties,  the 
temporary nature of the  arrangements  was  not  mandatory. 
In other words,  these are not  bilateral agreements  whose  application  can 
be  enforced by  recourse to an  independent  authority  (1). 
Apart  from these shortcomings in the way  the textile agreements  work, 
there are others which are inherent  in the very  essence  of the  commodity 
agreements  and which  we  shall return to later. 
- as  regards their application  :  the application of the textile arrangements 
has  revealed a  number·  of tendencies  v.rhi ch  one  may  rightly assume to have 
arisen,  at  least  in part,  from the logic of such a{;Teements  : 
the  constant  renewal  - since 1961  - of agreements  intended to  be 
provisional  ; 
•  the  extension of these  agreements to cover increasingly wide  fields 
of application 
•  the  absence of adjustment  policies anywhere near  systematic and 
comprehensive,  despite the undertakings  given  ; 
•  the proliferation of restrictions and exemptions  (2),  as  1vel1  as 
criteria for restraint  (minimal  viable  prodc:.ction,  cumulative  effects, 
penetration of the  market)  ; 
(1)  :Jhen the last Hultifibre arrangement  was  renewed,  the  Protocol 
included at  the  reqlJ.est  of the  EEC  went  as  far  as  getting a  principle 
of exceptions to the  provisions  of the  agreement  accepted,  in other 
'iiOrds  the  non-application of the  arrangement. 
(2)  These  are,  it must  be  remembered,  exemptions  at  one  rerr.ove,  for the 
arrangements  t..rere  themselves  exceptions to GAT'I'  rules. ·- 64-
•  increasing bilateralization - with power  relationship effects -
despite the multilateral  context  of the principle  ; 
•  the institutionalization of the tendency towards  cartelization 
among  manufactur(~rs of synthetic fibres. 
Compared 11ith these •3xamples,  any  commodity  agreement  must,  to be  acceptable~, 
comply  vJi th the  follc:lwing  conditions  : 
- for instance thEl  conditions  neces~'>ary for  a.ny  form  of organization of 
free trade  :  measures  which  muBt  be transitory and exceptional,  the 
introduction of a  system which at  a  fixHd  date  does  away  with the need 
for  such measures 
- the reciprocal undertakings  of the parties must  be  negotiated - not 
imposed by  one  of the  parties -- and clearly defined i  the  agreement 
must  be bilateral in nature  ; 
-the commodity agreement  must  make  provision for an authority,  independent 
of the parties  involved,  >vhich  is able to insist  on  and supervise its 
application (1). 
But  even if such conditions  could be  met,  the  commodity agreement,  by its 
very nature,  has  two kinds  of major  shortcoming  : 
- the first lies in the fact  that  concerted trade measures  cannot  really 
have  a  purpose  of their own  (2),  in relation to the basic principle of 
free trade,  except  to introduce  E~xemptions and protection. 
The  numerous  renewals  since 1961  of the  Cotton and Multifibre  arrangement~~ 
afford so  many  examples  of  cla.shE~s  over the  extent  of defensive measures 
rather than examples  of concerted efforts. 
(1)  Such an independent  body would at the same  time have the task of seeing 
that the agreements  were  appli•3d flexibly according to changing 
circumstanceE!  ;  for  one  must  accept  the two  principles according to 
which no-one is obliged to do  the  impossible  and the burden of events 
must  be  sharE~d. 
(2)  Apart, of  course,  from the definition and application of rules relating 
to the regulation of free trade. - (};)  -
Thi::3  ~Jitu.ation  can  be  avoided  only  'Jy  going  be;yond the  commerr~ia.l  field 
and  deve1oping  cooperation  a·':;  the  level  of  prod11ctive  CDJ12.ci tie0  aTtd 
structures.  Commodity  agreements  would  be  justified from  this point 
of  vie\v  only if they  could  serve  a.s  the  springboard for  concerted 
effort  at  that  level.  But  this is far  from  being  cert;:ci n. 
·- The  second  shortcomj.ng  lies in the  se•:::toral  nat·~re of  concerted  action, 
v-Jhich  i~'>  bound to accentuate  the  effects of the  po•·;er  reL:;._ti 
and  exacerbate  the  differences  and,  given the  exclusively  co~~er~ial 
context,  the3e  differences  can  only give  ri  ~j e  to  defcm:c; i vr::  :"e 3.bl  .  ..;T•2 f), 
':.•hid1  i'·levitably  ;=:onsolidate  them.  'The  only hope  of  finding·  11a,y::;  cf 
(1) 
reconciling  i:nmerliate  Jiv(~r0ing interests lies  :i.n  a  ·:~ulti.:;:::ctor;:>,l  ~:c:<lb-,~d, 
that  is  to  2:-:t,y  'o;y  broadening  the  rlebate  so  as  to  balance  out  a  lc-t:-ge 
:'luml::er  if not  all  of the  differences.  In  order to  avoid either  ::::omi:1,'S'  .. } 
exity of 
tru:~  pro1Jlcrn:J  c.t  the  overall  level,  the  concerting of action  ::;hould.  of 
r,ourJ~-'!  be  u.nuertaken  at  ·1arious  levels  l;vithout  losing sight  of  Lhc 
overall  consi:Jtency. 
These  t1·:o  ~'ihortco:nings  are  therefore  inherent  in  cornrnodity  agreemenL:>. 
One  can of  courf:;e  seek  to  limit  these  short  comings  by taking scrup11l  ~)IF> 
care  that  the  exceptional  and transitory nature  of the  res·~rict ive  mr.:!a;:;ures 
the,y  involve  is  observed,  but  it  may  well  be  doubted  vihether  the 
protection  thrust  of  such  a  system  can be  avoided. 
An  attempt  may  also  be  made to  remove  these  atSreement~;  from  their  commer-
cial  context  in order to  surpass it by establishing structures for 
providing information and concerting action in industry  on  a  raultisectoral 
ba::>i. s.  ];either than pleading that  cornmodi ty agreements  might  trigger off 
such  a  proc.::...:;s  of  information and cooperation,  there should be  a  deli  berate 
effort  to establish structures,  or the  beginnings  of structures,  suited 
to this type  of objectives. 
(1)  h: certain  re~=>pects,  the  sector-by-sector approach  constitutes  a  means 
of  ;r·t=.~~::erving  or  consolidating existing power  relationships.  The  same 
o~,JV'iously is true  of the  bilateral  approach,  which enables  power 
reJ  ~1t ionships  to operate to the advantage  of the developed  countries. - 66-
III.  THE  REDULA
1riON  OF  INTERNATIONAL  'TRADE 
If,  firstly,  it is accepted that  North-3outh trade relations  must  be  able 
to  develop freely,  in the  mutual  and  convergent  interest  of all the 
partners  concerned  if it is further  aecepted that the  orga.ni:,;at1on of 
trade liberalization which  may  prove  necessary  in the  short  term  in order 
to  avoid disruptions  and.  pe:r·mit  the  necessary adjustments  may  not  be  sueh 
as to call  into question free  trc:,de  itself,  vvh<?.:t  reme,ins,  eus-sntially,  j_s 
to  concentrate  on  rulr3S  for the  proper  functioning of trade  ;  and this 
involves  layin.g  Jo·...rn  the  principleB  a,nd  rules  of fair trade. 
In a  ;.;ense,  operating rules or  rut,LJ.l at  ions  are all  the  more  necessary since 
the  lillera1i;:~ation of trade is making  progress  (1)  a.nd  sincH  the  multi-
lateral trade  framework  embraces,  as  active partners,  countries  that  differ 
very  widely in respect  of their resources  a.nd  levels of development,  thf;:ir 
production conditions  and  costs. 
a)  Rules  or  sa.fet?;uard  clauses to  combat  forms  of unfair  corrmetition 
The  forms  of unfair  competition on  international  markets  arE~ infinitely 
varied and it may  seem absard to attempt  to resist  them or aspir·e  to 
eliminate them.  Doubtless the latter is impossible  :  in this  area,  more 
than in any  other,  it is  necessa::-y  to :face  up to reality. 
Nevertheless,  it is essential to establish systems  or procedures  Hhich 
permit  better protection against  dumping.  In a  sense,  the  liberalization 
of imports  from  the  deVf.lloping  countries  should be  offset  - if only for 
psychological  reasons to  assue.ge  public opinion  (2)  - by stronger gu.aranteeG 
against  dumping. 
(1)  Although the li1)eralization of trade has  made  scant  progress  in recent 
years,  this report  should be  SE~en in a  cont·~xt  of liberalization or at 
least  in terms  of a  fight  against  the  covert  or not  so  covert  proliferation. 
of barriers and restrictions. 
(2)  But  it is also necessary to prevent  cases  of  dumping  from  being used  a;:; 
an argument  against  the  libera1ization of trade. - 67-
Certc:;..in  for~s of 1;nfair  cot::~JJtJti Lion  call  for  partieula.T  a,ttcrrtion  in  Lhe 
pre3eYit  ciT·~~urnste  .. :tiC0S  : 
arc  J.o·:c:r  th;:n  thc~:e of thG  de',-elop:i.:·ls  c:ountric;:;.  In  :::'11  pr(;:)~_.t::i l it,y 
t")";;;npi"'~~·  .i.0  te:.king  p1r.J"::\)t  8!lC01J.l'~>_,:iOd  to  SOllie  IJX~Cnt  by  --.:omperV~<.
1.:ion 
j)l'Oii.lction  in  the  .:.Ieveloping  ·-::ourrtrit.:::f;  are  c<Hl~~;jdered to  be  cx,;c:~.;j_ 
na.y  aiJ!LOI'ft>':lll,y  lo·d  :  Hhat  l.S  JX.C;J:3:;i 'IiJ  -- "bJ  r•.or:1p2.r.i 30r1  of  ~;u;_,tr~-;u  1-.1  th 
the  r1or:n  in  the  developed.  ::-;ourrtrief:.>  - is  considered to be  u~rfair 
- to  tLc;_>e  thr•.:::e  ex<WI~•lcs  must  be  added  cases  of  str::di_j}~tfor~·Jard  dw!tping, 
'.Jhich  ~3ome  observers  consider to  l:e  on the  increase  on  the  inb.::rnatiuna.l 
::::cene,  as  a  ro::>ult  of'  the  very  extent  of international trade,  the 
diversity  of produt·ts  and  above  all of origin. 
Since  the  forms  of unfair  competition are  clearly many  and  varieJ they 
cannot  all be  dealt  ~  ..  -i th in the  same  way. 
In particular,  two  groups  of  problems  must  be  considered separately  : 
- the first  concerns  everything relating to  pay  and vmrking  conditions 
which are the  su-bject  of the  next  section -- 68-
- the  second group  concerns all forns  of state!  aid.  It  would be  not  only 
unrealistic but  also illogical - if it is aeknowledged that  economic 
and social objectives  must  be  attained inter alia through measures 
affecting economic structures - to  deny  any state aid for  industrial 
activity. 
It is also necessary,  however,  to specify the  limits within which state 
aid can be  accepted as  not  being ·Got ally incompatible  with the  normal 
operation of markets  (1).  Such aid can be  justified only to the  extent 
that it falls strictly vli thin the  organization of free trade.  'ro  go 
beyond  exceptional,  transitional  measures  - the  extent  and duration 
of the aids being normally  depend.ent  on the  degree  of industrial 
competence  attained by the  countr,y- of origin  (2)  - is to call the 
normal  operation of trade into question.  Importing countries should 
therefore have the right to insist  on the  production of  evidence that 
aid measures  from  part  of an organization programme. 
If such  evidence  is not  forthcoming,  then  one  is up  against  a  routine 
case  of  dumping.  ~rhis  applies to all cases  where  firms,  with or r.-Jithout 
aid from their government,  sell ·- occasionally or otherwise  - at  prices 
appreciably  lower than those required to cover normal  effective  costs  (3), 
1.vith  due  account,  however,  for the  ambigu.it;y·  and the  arbitrary element 
involved in defining and  measuri12g  such  costs. 
(1)  Only  export  aids  are  considered here,  but  obviously aid can also be 
given in order to strengthen competitiveness in relation to potentia1 
imports.  Th€~  same  reasoning :shculd  apply in that  case too. 
(2)  This  too  is one  aspect  of the  selectivity that  needs to  be~  introduced 
into the organization of reciprocal relations  with the  developing 
countries  :  measures to aid certain exporting industries  can  be 
accepted for  a  certain period in the  case~ of countries viith little or 
no  industry,  but  would be  inadmissible  in the  case  of countries under--
going rapid industrialization. 
(3)  It  does  not  matter  h01,v  such firms  manage  :  there is always  someone 
who  has to pay. - 69-
Dumping  can  in some  cases  cause  significant  injury and it  can scarcely 
be  arb'Ued that  such  injury,  i·vhich  may  go  as  far to disrupt  the  market, 
should be  accepted. 
J.Iore  guarantees  are  needed aeainst  durnpine,  but  at  the  same  time the 
countries  of origin must  be  given  a  guarantE-e that  safeguard clauses 
will  not  be  invoked  ag.s-inst  them arbitrarily.  Obviously this is possible 
only if objective criteria are laid down  for the  assessment  of  cases  of 
dumping  and if a  body  which is independent  of the  parties  concerned is 
set  up  for  deciding  such  cases.  The  application of the  rules  here  sho;1ld 
be  bsccked  up  by  sanctions.  As  for the  procedure,  it should  be  possi  blc 
to simplify it by  s:hifting,  in ·whole  or in part,  the  burden of proof. 
Rules  and  procedures  \·.rhi ch  Hould  provide greater e:,'1l&.T8.ntee.:.;  'v:hi lc:  l::>e;in0 
lesu  cunbcrsome  shm.J..ld  therefore  be  studied.  This  \JO'.J..] d  appear to  ~Je 
por3c;i'.:Jle  ::i.f  the  rulec  ,,;ere  based  on  the  folJ owing t 1.vo  principles 
- the  imrortin-:~  country  shou.ld  be  ab1e  to  tc.t..'k:e  protective  rfll.::a~sure;;:-;  r:,gainst 
dumping  l,!herc  durnpinc  iz;  presumed to  -be  takinG'  place,  such  pre:.;:J.mpt ion 
being  est;:J)li;::;hed  onl;y  on the  ba.sis  o: a  number  of  simplt.!  criteria and 
bein(,'  ~>u-bjl!c'L  to  asser:;snK.::nt  by  an  ind(:~pendent  authority 
\·.'[~ere  ;:_:u ch  presumpt .:on  is  e~;t ab1i shed,  the  country of origi  L  vioul d  be 
obliccd to  offer proof  of the  normal  character of its conditions  of 
b)  Horkinr;  condition::::  2nd  p:.;y 
There  :1.r.::  one  forr:1  of  competition to  v:hich  pulJlic  opini·:n,  and  t-3.bO'/e  all 
trade  union  oq:u,nizations,  are  particularly  sen~3itive,  nanely  any  form 
of excessive  con~petiticn in 1:,'hich  lm-J  production  costs  a:nd  prices  are 
liru:e::3.  to  instanr:es  of unacceptable  exploitation of  la.bour,  ~-vhich  1s 
forced to accept  ~-wrking conditions  and  pa,y  that  do  not  conform to 
ceTt air,  minimum  standards. -- 70  -
That  such unacceptable  conditions  of exploitation exist is beyond doubt, 
even though there may  be  disagreement  over  the~ actual extent  of such 
practices.  ~·Ihat  ltJOuld  appear to be  less  clear,  hovJever,  is the part 
played by such practices in the  export  competitiveness  of the firms  or 
countries  concern€~d,  and also the  question of what  the  appropriate 
reaction to  such practices should. be. 
The first  question therefore  concerns the  impact  of such working  condi-
tions  and pay  on  costs  and prices.  It is neceBsary to discov·er  Hhether it 
is not  only a  que~>tion of regrettable or unacceptable  practices but  of 
actual  dumping,  which  ~-w"ould  be the  ::;ase  if tht3  relative  competitiveness 
of the  countries  concerned v1as  significantly dependent  on the  practices 
in quest ion. 
In practice this  1rmuld  not  appear to be  the  case.  Compliance  with minimun1 
standards  would not  appreciably affect these  countries'  levels of relative 
competitiveness vis-a-vis that  of the  developed  countries  (1).  Their 
competitiveness is based above all on very  lo\v  Hage  levels,  coupled  v-1ith 
productivity rates which are far less  lovJ  compared \..Jith  levels in the 
developed  countries.  HovJever,  any attempt  to equate  low  wage  levels 
Hith non-compliance with minimum  standards  must  be  categorically 
rejected (2). 
Although the exploitation of labour through poor  working  conditions  and 
low  pay  cannot  1}e  equated with dumping  and treated accordingly,  it remains 
to be  decided what  the appropriate reaction to such practices of exploita--
tion should be.  Should trade arrangements  be  linked to  compliance  with 
minimum standards of pay and vwrking  conditions,  or not  ? 
(1)  This is,  moretover,  a  major  argument  in support  of the view that  such 
countries  should be  forced to  comply  with minimum  standards. 
(2)  Any  suggestion that  protection be  sought  against  low  Hage  competition 
- 1r1hich  would introduce  a  type  of inverted selectivity,  since the  lOitler 
the wages,  the higher the  degr13e  of  prot(~ction - or that  demands  be 
made  for the raising of "ages in line wi  1~h productivity levels,  must 
be  categorically rejected.  Quite  apart  from the fact that this 1rmuld 
create  intolHrable  vJage  dispar.i  ties within the  countries  concerned, 
its effect  would of course  be to neutralize the only  comparative 
advantages that the  countries  in question possess. - 71-
:::d,  -the  j  · 
.-,.L 
zero  ;  if s.  1:.:road  dc:fi nit  i or:  is  ted, 
- u.ndec::.,yinc  p:cutcc.~tionst  reactions.  ::hile it ic  true  thc:.t  the:  rr:::.,ctises 
iti>iolved  ~Jxe,  c.J;  ]_ijO.St  i:n  part,  of  E>.  protectionist kir1d.  Here  ,-:o.c:~"ir1  thor-~ 
IJcocrthelc:·~s,  it  ~-,.ro:Jld  appear that,  provided these rescrvetions  are  taken 
into  ac~-::o·J.nt,  eom>id.erationG  relating to  ~<Jerking conditions  anJ  po.J  coald 
o..nd  0hould  be  introduced into the  definition of  reciproc~1.-l  trade  relc;.tions. 
This  l•vc,t.tld  appear to  1Je  necessary if the liberalization of imports  fro:n 
the  developing  countrieG  is to be  made  acceptable to public opinion. 
Hm-vover,  ~:;uch  acceptability  cannot  be  based solely  on uorking  conditions 
and  pa,y  in the  developing  countries.  Three  other  conditions  must  be  met 
at  the  sc:.me  time.  First  1 an  information syst  ern  rrm.s-t  be  established to 
(1)  '!arious  practices in the  developing  countries hardly inspire optimism 
regarding such  a  system. -- 72-
provide public opinion with the facts  as  regards actual practices  and 
wage  levels.  In adldition,  steps  must  be taken to ensure that  consumers 
as  such may  enjoy low prices.  Lastly,  firms  from the Member  States which 
establish and operate production un:Lts  in the developing  countries  must 
be  obliged to  comply with minimum  working standards. 
The  introduction of considerations relating to working  conditions  and 
pay  "t-JOuld  also  appear to be  possibl·~ in practice. 
'.Phis  should not,  however,  be  based  on  an  appr<::>ach  in terms  of the regulation 
of trade,  but  should be  set in the  context  of improving reciprocal 
relations. 
Consequently any procedure in 1.\'hich  trade advantages  are as it 1.·1ere 
"bought"  by  compliance  -vlith  certain minimum  standards  should be  avoided. 
Apart  from the obvious usefulness of  campaigns  aimed,  by means.  of political 
pressures  where  appropriate,  at  cor:.vincing the  countries in question of 
the necessity,  in their  O'Wn  interest,  of  complying 1vith minimum  standar·d:3 11 
such  compliance with certain conditions should  concern trade only in the 
context  defined above  in connection with selectivity.  Development 
objectives,  including the  improvemE!nt  of -vmrking  conditions,  should be 
integrated in the  concerted definition and  ordering of reciprocal relations  .. 
c)  Commercial  policy as  regards  ~)orts 
Commercial  policy has usually been thought  of as  a  protective device used 
to regulate the  f'lo"Y·J  of ir.1ports  but little, if at  all,  concerned with 
exports. 
One  commercial  polich begins to be  seen no  longer  as  a  means  of controlling 
trade flow,  but  of regulating mutual relations with trading partners, 
then it ought  to  cover  exports as  ·dell. - 73-
The  need  to take  account  of exports is also  conditioned  by the inter-
d.epcmde::Lce  existing between  certain export  flm-;r;3  and  certain return  flo·,·m. 
S.
1hL3  interdependence is pe.rticularly  marked  in the  fra.nte•rwrk  of  corr:pens-
ation  s:;stem;J,  but their  EJ.re  other instances,  some  of  ~:;hich are  quanti-
t  .::~;t i vel.r  more  import  a:r~t  (c. g.  exports  of  ravJ  materials  at  d1wpinc  p:ri ces 
.,  .  ,  '  t  d  f't  .  \  -,·uncn  .::.,re  rc-lnpor  e  a  · er process1ng). 
iiCr\3  lh8rc  ;c1-re  ''-·  num-ber  of problems  ·~·Jhich,  althO'J.t;h  the,y  are  only dealt 
:d  th L1  outline,  :~_re  rlescrvi:ng cf greater attention  th.:tn  they  us1Jall,y 
receivo.  The  :"lo~;t  i:-:1po:cte.nt  of these appear to  bo  (1)  : 
- unfed. r  COFrpet t t ion, 
Let  1.1s  briefl,y t.3kc  a  loo}~ at these four types  of problems. 
U1TCTAD  has  clone  a  t;ree.t  d.eal  to  dr2.w  attention to restrictive practices 
in international  tr:::tde.  'rhe  h::.re~:d;  propriety dictates  tb.at  the  industriJ,li::~.ed 
co'J.ntrics  :3hould  not  tolerr?,te  practices in their relations '.-Jith  others that 
they  :,-JOuld  eschev,r  on their ho1ne  markets. 
All  thc~:.;e  practices  are  conceTned in one  way  or another  Hith the  ·::onJ.ition.s 
of  access  c.u:cl/ or  pri·2ing  or  :-:1embei'  countries'  products  on third 'v:orld 
marke-ts. 
Excep-t  ~:·rhcrc::  Gpecia.l  circumstances  exist  (e.g.  measures  to  prevent  nuclear 
proliferation) al1 restrictions  on access to available  products  and 
;3crviceu  on the  same  terms  as  those usually offered on the  horne  market 
should  be  1Janncd  on principle.  All  restrictions  on sales  apart  from 
fl\ 
\  I  Further problems  could pro  be,bly  be  added to this list,  in particular 
pro',JleUJ.s  relating to  exchange  and capital  moveraents,  and,  if the 
scope  of the  debate is ',videned,  those  relating to the  direct ions 
tc-Jcen  by R&D  procrammes  Hhich  could affect  relc:dive  competitiveness 
in II orti1-Jouth relations. -- 74-
dL3torting competition,  vmuld also  ·Je  totally incornpati1)1G  vdth cooperation 
i  policy,  ~1)"hich  is precisely airaed at  making·  up  for existing handicapso 
The  problem of restricti:-.re :pr2"ctice.J  could 1Je  fatal  -to  Korth-So1Jth 
rolcdions  in the technolog.J'  field.  ·iJc  ~>hall  roturn to  this  mc:dter  lcder4 
Co;:J1T1ercir-"l  polir_:y  shou.ld,  hm:e'irer,  e,lso  be  concerned  ~;pecifically vii Li1 
;Jit:ttcn.~f)  relating to export  pric.e~3  and  ..  refuse to  countenance  as  a  neces:::;ary 
evil  pre.cticm.>  leading to  monopolistic  prices  and  revenue,  dhich  a,ggrav2..!~e 
the deterioration in the  developing  countries'  terTTlS  of trade. 
s.nhis  phcnomono1:1  is parti  cularl,y  ~:aarked in relation to  C2,pi tal goods  c1.nd 
results in an artificial .inflation of investment  in countries  ;~ith li:nited 
financial  ca.paci ties. 
In contrast to those  v-Jho  advocate  ~:~tepping up  exports  at  all  costs  - to 
pay for  oil imports  - it must  be  enpha~3ized that  exports to the  d.evelopint; 
·:::ou.nt rie~3  a,re  limited by those  countries  1  capacity to  hrtport,  and  any 
i:ncrea~·3e  in priGe·s  cuts  back  on  '/o:.ume  ·by  a  corresponding ar:1ount, 
restricting activity and  jobs  in tlLJ  export  :;ector. 
1'he  .Jecond type  of  problem is  concerned Hith unfair  competition. 
~vhile it neems  desirable,  as  stated above,  to  rnake  the  anti-d·•J.mping  rules 
more  operational,,  this  impliss  in Teturn that  commercial  policy shouJ.d 
penalize the competition-distort  in:~  or  dumpi:ng  practices  eng~ged in by 
i-Iember  State firms. 
Grec.,ter transparency in this field  '/Jould doubtless  make  it possible to 
put  into perspective the accusations  levelled,  often some'r.'hat  lightly, 
at  the  countries that  penetrate  our  markets.  But,  surely the  most  obvious. ,..,_ 
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point  is that it will  be  difficult to  convince  our  partn8rs  of the  need 
for stricter regulations if firms  in the  Member  States  do  not  co11sider 
themselves  bound  by those regulations. 
The third type  of problem is  concerned  vJith  export  credits.  'fhere  are tHo 
t;ypeE>  of reason militating in favou::-- of the introduction of more 
restrictive principles  and rules governing the grant  of export  credits. 
The  fir~t is based  on the  fact  that  these  a.:re  a  form  of tied R.id,  r.Jld ch 
gener2.ll,y  h.:~3  the  effect  of influencing the  allocation of  resource~;. 
In  p:ractico,  export  CY'edits  hcJ.Ve  a  pa.rticular effect  on techno1ogicnJ 
choices.  The  second  type  of reason has to do  with the  fund~ncntal 
a.r:1bicuity  of GX]Jort  cred.its,  since it is  ;.wt  clear  ~r;he:t.her  it is the 
e.:q'~ortors  or  thE;  impo1·terc  who  are  realJ.y  hei.ng  holpod bJ  ther:~  ( 1). 
developed  countrie:_;  i:3  bor:r1c  out  by the  fact  that  t11cn·e  clTe  p1·cblc:n;:-; 
and 
:::Jell~  l;)C  fo:;..Jc)-;··:::d  t,v  tL:.;  other  developed  cou:utrjc0. 
(1)  Ur;ls~;~~,  fc:;·  ·t:Lc;  :J  :~>~c:  of  c.  cler~r·  conscie~1ce 7  ·v;e  co::rl(;J:-L  ·~:-~;-·;;:_;j vc:, 
~:or 1 !C':!-:.L  filcilul~· it nrc:.Jt  L,;:;  <:tdmit-l~c:c1,  1rith the  hJllu'LJ;c~_:i  tL·  .. t  th,_ 
t  cncf~_r::L: l  c>ffc  ~::t  (:!·~.:;  cJh~:.rod  tot  h  1J,y  i1:r;)ort  cr~~  L:~r,d  c:q,or·t cr·G  .::.2.  :iJ~ -- 76-
The  najor  plarik  of  any  such policy must  clearly be to  dL:;sociate the 
credit  from the capital good.G  as  such  and to  link it to the actual 
industrial projeet  so  as  -to  redress the  balar..ce  bet~r1een the quBstion of 
finance,  ·,rhich  i:3  at  present  too  nmch the  determining factor,  and the 
problema  of the  econowic  choices  involved. 
The  last type  of pro"blem  iG  concer:rwd  viith transfers  of technology. 
The  vr..1.riou~:J  aspects  of  Ghis  problem have  alrcn.dy  been indicated,  but, 
given the strategic role that  technology  r:1uGt  plo,y  in rria.ny  respects,  it 
is  i~aportant to  dra~·J  p~:n·ticular att·:;ntion  to  : 
the  pro1)loms  of access  to  technol·JGY 
:dthhold muDt  be  prevented 
any  ;3ystem  t,ihere  technology is 
problems  regarding the  ter:tJS  and  J.rrallgemmrts  of the transfer  : 
\.-;ithin the  framework  of -the  co1mnercial  policy,  it is necessary to  combat 
restrictive practices by  seeking to  ensu.re  a  certain minir.Tum  application 
of the  codes  of  conduct  ; 
- the  problems  of technological  choices  :  steps  should  be taken to 
counteract  the  complex  system of factors  that tend to influence the 
choices  and introduce in its place  conditions that  can  make  them fit 
in more  closely with the  development  objectives of ·the  host  countries. - 77-
IV.  FUTURE  OF  THE  "R:ElJIONALn  APPROACH  TO  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  WITH  LDCs  (1) 
The  Community's  commercial  and development  policies towards  ldcs are 
highly  complex;  partly by  design,  partly by  accident  of history.  The 
basic problem in rationalising the various policies has  been to contrive 
a  balance between global relations with ldc's on  a  general  criteria,  and 
"regional"  obligations to specific groups  of ldc's. 
The  global  elements  in Community  policy have  been its GSP,  the use  of mfn 
for tropical products,  and attempts to define  a  common  position in an 
UNCTAD  context.  A "regional"  element  has  several ingredients  : 
i) ACP;  "regional" only in the partial sense of having  "black Africa" 
as its core.  Covers  preferential market  access,  aid  (EDF)  and 
commodity  stabilisation (STABEX) 
ii) Mediterranean basin; 
a)  S.  Mediterranean;  preferential trade agreements  and aid for Maghreb 
(Algeria,  Morocco,  Tunisia) ll.asreq  (Egypt,  Syria,  Jordan)  Lebanon 
and Israel 
b)  preferential trade agreements  with Malta and Cyprus 
c)  "candidate" members,,  Greece,  Portugal  and Spain 
d)  Turkey;  Association agreement 
e) Yugoslavia;  presently under GSP. 
Through scarcely "regional"  in any meaningful  sense there are the non-
preferential trade agreements  for example  with Brazil and Argentina  (both 
eligible for GSP),  various  "commercial"  or "industrial" cooperation agree-
ments  (as  with the South Asian countries  and Mexico)  and  informal  consult-
ation with the ASEAN  and Andean groups. 
(1)  By  V.  Cable. - 78-
a)  Economic Pro's and Cons  of the  E~C "regional" policy 
Apart  from political kudos  what  else has the  EEC  gained or lost  from its 
"regional" policy ?  The  basic theory of  customs unions,  developed by 
Viner and others,  encouraged a  view,  which trade policy makers  always  find 
a  little hard to appreciate,  that gains  arise from  competition,  resulting 
in a  movement  of goods  from  high  cost to low  cost  locations,  -"trade 
creation"- In this  way  the allocation of resources is improved resulting 
in real  income  gains  which are likely to benefit the importing country 
through l01v-er  prices.  This  had to be  set  against trade "diversion",  when 
due to the external tariff trade is switched from  lower  cost  sources out-
side the area to higher  cost  producers  within.  Of  course this view of the 
world is much  simplified,  is essentially static in character and ignores 
the social costs to an importing country,  particularly in regions  or 
periods of high unemployment,  as factors  of protect  ion are displaced.  So 
it cannot  be applied mechanically to indicate gain and loss.  But  the 
concepts  of trade "creation" and trade "diversion" are  not  without  analyt-
ical importance  and do  suggest  at  least  one  source  of cost  and benefit. 
One  of the  implications of this tYJ:>e  of analysis is the prediction that 
gains  will  be realised from  economic groupings that  are competitive in 
character (i.e.  producing the  same kinds  of products but  at  different 
costs,  as  in the  EEG  itself) and that there is least  prospect  of gain from 
a  preferential "complementary"  relationship  (as between a  group of 
developing  economies)  since it is likely to  ciivert trade mainly from 
other developing countries,  to their cost  and the cost  of developed 
country  consumers. 
It is in practice extremely difficult to separate out,  ex-post,  what  the 
effects of preferential groups  have  been,  and in any event  the Mediterranean 
and Lome  agreements  are too  new  even to contemplate such an excercise. 
Market  shares  change  for a multi  tude  of reasons  of which preferences are 
but  one.  But  such work  has  been done,  for  example  on Yaounde  and Common-
wealth preference indicates that  preferential arrangements,  especially - 79-
when  supplemented by  marketing and monetary  connections,  do  influence 
trade  flows  considerably but  almost  entirely in the  direction of trade 
diversion  (1). 
Although in a  static terms  one  could expect  little competing trade  from 
Lome  and North African countries,  in the longer term the  existence of 
free market  access  for  manufactures  and agriculture on  better terms then 
GSP  will  stimulate additional trade. 
i) manufactures  :  at  present there is little competing trade. 
The  South  Mediterranean  supplies  1.5% of  the  EEC-9 1s  manu-
factured imports  (1.0%  in 1970)  and ACPs  0.7%  (0.6% in 1970).  The 
.Mediterranean basin,  as  a  whole,  supplies 10  %,  largely from the three 
candidate  members. 
However  it does  not  require  a  great  deal  of foresight  to be  able to 
predict,  on the basis of present trends and existing installed capacity, 
a  growth of imports  in the following product  areas. 
- petrochemical  products,  from  Algeriap  Nigeria  and  Masreq 
-textiles (Egypt),  and clothing generally  (Egypt,  Morocco,  Tunisia, 
Ivory Coast) 
- processed raw materials  and foodstuffs;  plywood/furniture,  tinned 
fruit  (but  problems  of sugar  content),  oil seed crushing 
- labour intensive assembly industries e.g.  electronic components 
(Lebanon). 
(1)  e.g.  C.  Young,  Association v1ith  the  EEC,Journal  of Common  Market 
Studies,  December  1970. 
D.  Wall,  The  Commonwealth  Preference System and its Effects  on the 
UK  Imports  from Latin America,  Journal  of Development  Studies,. 
January 1971. - 80-
~ost of  these  areas  are  already "sensitive"  items  under  GSP  and  are  covered  by 
temporary  tariff quotas  under  Mediterranean  agreements,  and  NTBs  (the  MFA  for 
textiles).  Yet  they  are  product  areas  where  the  Less  developed  Ldcs  have  a 
:omparative  advantage  in  labour  and/or  resource  costs.  If this  comparative  ad-
Jantage  materialises  in  substantial  trade  flows  the  EEC  will  have  a  variety  of 
jifficult options  : 
- to permit  import  growth  ;  which  will  involve  increasing  problems  with  EEC  pro-
ducer  Lobbies  notably  in  textiles/clothing,  and  also  accusations  of  ''double 
dealing"  by  other  ldcs  which  are  more  restricted 
- protection  ;  probably  by  utilising  existing  safeguard  clauses,  which,  under  Lorn~, 
permits,  after  consultation,  the  EEC  to  "prohibit" or "restrict" entry  or  any 
other  "necessary  measures"  when  confronted  by  "serious disturbance",  "deteriora-
tion"  or "financial  instability"  in  a  sector or  sectors of  the  European  economy. 
The  MFA  already  covers  Maghreb  and  Masreq  textiles and  will  probably  eventually 
be  extended  to the  ACPs.  Needless  to  say,  the  increasing  use  of  trade protection 
devices  against  actual  use of  the  Lorn~  and  Mediterranean  market  access  provisions 
would  make  a  mockery  of  the  spirit  of  the  agreements.  Within  days  of  signing  the 
Masreq  agreement  with  Egypt,  unilateral  - not  MFA  - restrictions  were  imposed  on 
its textiles by  the  EEC 
- reciprocity  ;  the  Community  might  find  it easier  to  swallow  increasing  import 
competition  if it could  demonstrate  reciprocal  benefits  in  trade or other  areas. 
It already  does  gain  reciprocally  to the  extent  that  ACP/Mediterranean  countries 
spend  their  incremental  foreign  exchange  earnings  on  mainly  European  goods,  which, 
given  the traditional  commercial  Links,  they  already  do.  EEC  exports  have  in 
fact  gained  much  more  rapidly  than  imports over  the  1970-75  period  (with  Lorn~, 
17.5%  v.  12.2%  including  oil  and  a  similar differential  for  the Mediterranean 
(South)  and  as  a  whole.  The  Community  is on  weak  ground  generally  in  demanding 
formal  reciprocity  with  the  ACPs  and  Mediterranean preference  area  It  runs  a 
large trade  surplus  with  the  Latter,  more  or  less  balances  with  Lorn~  and,  with 
both  runs  a  massive  surplus  on  manufactures. - 81-
ii) agriculture  :  the problems  with agriculture are less remote  and more 
sensitive,  especially on Mediterranean trade.  Concessions  have  been  made 
notably on fruit,  wine  and olive oil,  albeit  within the general  frame-
work  of CAP,  and with little encrochment  on  variable  levy items.  There 
are two  basic problems  : 
- how  (or if) to give  added  substance to the  existing agreements  by 
extending access  on agricultural items 
- how  to reconcile the  competing interests of potential members  (Greece, 
Spain,  Portugal)  with other Nedi t erranean producers. 
The  first  issue is difficult  since there is increasing militancy amongst 
farmers  over the alleged neglect  of Mediterranean products  by the  CAP. 
One  way  of meeting their demands  (probably the  worst,  but  politically 
the easiest to grant)  would  be  to extend guaranteed price support  and 
levy operations  on  a  bigger scale to  cover fruit  and vegetables,  olive 
oil,  wine,  tobacco  (possibly).  One  of the  main targets would  be  North 
African competition.  Unfortunately for the European farmers  the  EEC  has 
since 1970,  moved  from  substantial deficit to substantial surplus  on 
agricultural trade with the Southern Mediterranean.  It seems  unlikely 
that there  can be  meaningful  relaxation for the main  levy products 
(though these are of no  real interest to ldcs except  for Botswana)  and 
sugar.  Given the present  character of the  CAP  it is difficult to see  what 
general  advance  can be made  in trade terms.  Progress,  but  only a  very 
limited kind,  can be  made  encouraging the Mediterraneans to develop  a 
complementary trade pattern by  means  of non-competing products  (dates, 
mangues)  or seasonal  supply  (tomatoes,  grapes,  peppers). 
The  potential conflicts of interest  would  intensify with EEC  enlargement 
since a  partial way  out  of the difficulties presented by the new  members 
for European agriculture is to squeeze third country suppliers.  This 
particularly affects citrus fruit  (Morocco  and Israel v.  Spain and Greece), 
wine  (Algeria v.  all three) olive oil  (Tunisia v.  Spain).  But  given the 
current  balance  on  EEC  agricultural trade with the Southern Mediterranean 
there is not  much  room  for manoeuvre. ·- 82-
Another  set  of difficulties is presemted by preferential  zones to the 
extent that  when the  Community  wishes to reduce  access barriers multi-
laterally,  high  cost  producers  in ACPs  and the N!edi terrane  an are threat-
ened.  This  applies in two types of situation : 
i)  "pure trade" diversion occurs  v1hen  the preference is for  products  not 
produced in Europe.  F'or  example  ACP  producers  enjoy tariff margin 
advantages  on  palm oil,  cocoa,  coffee and bananas  and non tariff discrimin-
ations for bananas.  ~)tudies recently carried out  at  Antwerp  indicated good 
grounds  for believing that trade diversion was  occuring in the first two 
cases  at  least.  ACPs  are likely to  ~;eek to hang  on to these preferences 
in the face  of efforts  by  (as in the 1976  the  Community  tropical products 
offer under the Tokyo  Round)  to liberalise multilaterally or through GSP. 
ii)  Trade  diversion also occurs 1r1here  protective tariff concessions  are 
distributed unequally,  as  for  example  when  GSP  beneficiaries  compete  with 
Lome  producers under the handicap of tariff quotas.  In practice however 
ldc preference areas  may  well  benefit  most  at the  expense  of developed 
country  competition  (as  intended).  rrhus  the t 900  m of dutiable  exports 
to the EEC  covered by the :Maghreb  trade agreement  (1974)  compared directly 
with t  20  bn of exports to the EEC  from  mfn  sources, t  17  bn from  EFTA 
and the Mediterranean producers  and only ¢ 3  bn from GSP  sources.  ~ 3  bn 
of ACP  exports to the  EEC  benefitting from preference  competed with 
¢ 3  bn  from GSP  sources,  '/>  18  bn mfn  and 'fi  11  bn  from  other preference 
areas.  Whatever the  source  of competition preference areas  create  a  vested 
interest in opposition to preferenc'e  sharing,  and a  good deal  of resentment 
over differential tr1:latment  (e.g.  haggle  over different  duties  on oranges). 
From  a  developmental  point  of view some  kind of assessment  needs to be 
made  as to whether the net  effect  of this cross-discrimination favours  or 
disfavour the poorer  countries.  In general  ACPs  have  a  much  lower average 
per capita income then GSP  beneficiaries  (which include inter alia, all 
the OPEC  states,  Hong-Kong,  Singapore,  Yugoslavia,  Argentina)  and to this - 83-
extent trade discrimination in their favour is redistributive  (though there 
are several Lome  countries with a  per  capita income  over ¢ 1000  per  capita; 
e. g.  Jamaica,  Trinidad,  Gabon).  The  Mediterranean preference  zone  is at 
a  higher level of per capita income  through the richest  countries  (Israel, 
Cyprus,  :Malta,  Lebanon,  and of course the membership  candidates)  are 
expected to offer greater reciprocity.  The  most  glaring anomaly  produced 
by these arrangements is the limitation to GSP  terms  of the four South 
Asian countries  vlhich  have  a  per capita income  less than t 200.  'I
1hey have 
been accommodated  by  means  of a  frankly vacuous  set  of industrial  coopera-
tion agreements  as  vlell  as  more  useful  but  limited GSP  concessions  on 
products  of interest to them.  In practice their footwear,  textiles,  tobacco, 
etc.  compete  on  inferior trade terms  with,  often,  richer ACP  and Mediter-
ranean producers. 
b)  Basic Scenarios 
The  Community  has  reached rather a  messy  stage in its regional preference 
policy,  \vhen  generous  access terms are likely soon to start generating 
trade flows  vvhich  create adjustment  problems for European producers,  and 
when  the discrimination between various  groups  of ldcs becomes  an increas-
ing bone  of contention in the absence  of further  concessions.  There  are 
various possible approaches  : 
i)  regional  "deepening"  :  the Community  could seek to deepen the  content 
of its regional  commitments.  But  there is little more  it can offer in 
trade terms 1vithout  breaking into the  inner citadel of the  CAP  or the 
hitherto non-negotiable NTBs  such as  excise duties  on tropical products. 
It  will moreover  be under  increasing pressure to retract  what  it has al-
ready given away  (Mediterranean agriculture;  Lome  textiles).  It  could 
compensate  by  giving more  aid to ACP/Mediterranean  countries but  the  EDF 
is already  committed fully in these areas  and national governments  are 
unlikely to want  to surrender an increasing share  of their own  aid budgets 
to this end. ·- 84-
ii)  widening  :  a  good many  of the anomalies  produced by the regional 
approach  could be  eased by  extending the trade benefits to a  rather small 
number  of ldcs of low per  capita income,  essentially the South Asians. 
The  long-term prospect  of Indian competition frightens  some  Europeans  but, 
realistically, it is difficult to  SE~e  why  within the foreseeable  future it 
should present  greater problems then some  of the  countries in the Mediter-
ranean basin.  At  present ¢ 800  m approximately  (roughly one  half)  of South 
Asian exports to the  EEC  could benefit  from  duty reductions,  a  small 
amount  in relation to total trade.  There  would also be  resistance from 
existing preference beneficiaries,  and it would remove  what  remains  of 
any geographical basis to Lome.  Prospects  seem remote. 
iii)  global  approach  :  there has  always  been within the  Community  a  strong 
view that  minority preferential  zom~s are undesirable because 
- they undermine the multilateral  approach of GATT 
- they prevent  a  rational  and consistent  approach to ldcs as  a  whole 
- they are  greatl.Y·  administration-intensive. 
The  difficulty with  "globalism"  as  ilt  affects ldc trade is that it is not 
clear whether it could involve  "levolling up"  (to Lome  terms)  or  "level-
ling down"  (to GSP  or mfn  terms).  Various  global  approaches  are  currently 
being  considered with degrees  of preference and reciprocity based on per 
capita income  and not  geographical  accident.  The  problems  with such reforms 
is that they may  create  more  problems t.hen they solve  e.g. 
- per capita income  is an arbitrary and  often unsatisfactorily indicator 
for  deciding the eligibility of'  preferential trade benefits for  a  large 
group  of countries;  but 
- attempts to graduate benefits by  income  or to introduce other indicators 
or to classify at  product  level  could make  the  whole  excercise unmanageably 
complex,  which  would itself constitute  a  major barrier to trade. - 85-
A radical  new  departure in this direction seems  improbable.  A more  gradual 
approach seems  more  appropriate  and feasible  involving a  widening of 
existing preferential terms,  through GSP  (tariff quota removal;  agricul-
tural list) or mfn,  and  improved aid to a  wider  range  of countries with 
a  reasonable  claim on  developmental  grounds  for  special  consideration. 
iv)  protectionism  :  the  Community  may  wish to retract its earlier commit-
ments  in terms  of trade.  There  seems  some  evidence that it does.  One  might 
therefore consider whether,  in this eventuality,  it makes  most  sense  (or 
least nonsense),  from  political/developmental/commercial  considerations 
to seek to spread the  costs of such a  policy widely or to seek to retain 
discrimination in favour  of its preference areas. -- 86  -
CHAPTER  II - TRADE  AND  ADJUSTMENT  POLICIES  (1) 
I.  ADJUSTMENT  INSTEAD  OF  PROTECTION  THE  RATIONALE 
a)  Structural and Cyclical  ChangE~S 
Pressures are  now  building up  in a  number  of member  countries of the 
European Community to resist  further steps towards trade liberalization 
with the  developing countries  and to install,  at  least  in the  case  of a 
certain number  of "sensitive"  i t4~ms,  restrictions  on the imports  from 
such  countries.  Advocacy of protectionist  measures  against  low-cost 
imports is an almost  instinctive reaction in times  of recessions such as 
the  present  one  from  which the  d,aveloped,  market  economy  world is only 
slowly recovering.  It is of cour::>e,  true that  in times  of  cyclical  crises~, 
both healthy and weak  industd.es  come  under varying degrees  of pressure. 
But  the  accentuation of the persistent  mutation pressures faced by 
structurally weak  industries is different  from the temporary  cyclical 
difficulties which most  of thEl  units in an economy  encounter periodically  .. 
Attempts to  ward off the  former  ·with restrictions against  low  cost  import::> 
from the developing  countries are bound to be futile beca11se  the factors 
contributing to the structural adjustment  process  are  broader than the 
increase in such imports. 
b)  The  Process  of Structural  Adjustment 
Structural adjustment,  defined as  the process by  which the factors  of 
production tend to shift  from sectors which are  stagnant  or declining due 
to fundamental  reasons,  to sectors with sustainable prospects,  is a 
persistent,  but  not  necessarily smooth  phenomenon. 
(1)  By  P.K.M.  Tharakan  (except  for section III.  c)). - 87-
The  factors  contributing to this process are varied and consist  of a 
number  of elements  such as the rapidity of technological  change,  diffusion 
of  consumption patterns,  increasing interpenetration of markets through 
capital movements,  formation of regional groupings  such as the European 
Common  Market  and the liberalization of trade  (1).  Even  in cases  where 
the imports  from the  developing  countries are an important  factor,  some 
of the other  elements  (particularly technological  change)  operate in an 
interlinked manner  and tend to impart  a  cumulative  impact  on the inter-
industry shifts of the  factors  of production  (2).  Given the  apparent 
futility of protectionist  measures to safeguard the interests of the 
workers  and entrepreneurs in the structurally weak  sectors,  the crucial 
policy question is one  of developing  and implementing effective adjustment 
policy instruments  which  can  smoothen the process  of structural  change 
and  minimise the socio-economic  costs  which the process  might  entail to 
particular socio-economic groups  in the society.  Stated in more  posit·ive 
terms,  a  more  open policy in the  Community's trade with the developing 
countries,  if combined  with appropriate adjustment  policy measures,  can 
not  only be  of some  help to the  developing countries,  but  also encourage 
a  better allocation of resources within the  Community. 
II.  INSTRUMENTS  OF  STATIC  (REMEDIAL)  ADJUST!\ffitifT  POLICY 
a)  Policy Instruments in General 
Given the  broad nature of the adjustment  process  described above,  it is 
normal  that general  economic,  social and regional  legislation might  have 
also incidence  on the adjustment  process.  Adjustment  policies themselves 
could be  divided into labour  market  policies and adjustment  assistance 
to firms.  The  labour market  policies usually include unemployment  benefit 
programmes,  removal  and transfer allowances,  early retirement  provisions, 
etc.  The  adjustment  assistance to firms  usually  consists of financial 
(1)  See  OECD,  Notes  on Some  Aspects  of Industrial Adjustment  Policies in the 
Present  Economic  Context,  Paris 1974  (mimeographed). 
(2)  The  experience  of the European  jute industry during the last twenty years 
or so is an example  of this. ·- 88-
and fiscal  assistancet  including grants,  investment  subsidies and  low 
interest  loans,  various tax concessions,  liberal depreciation allowances, 
etc.  All these policies could effectively serve as adjustment  policies 
for  a  new  international division of labour,  provided they are linked to 
the liberalization of the trade  with the  developing world. 
b)  Some  Examples  of !J'rade-oriented Adjustment  Policies in Selected Countries 
There have  been some  efforts in various  industrialised countries to develop 
a  link between the trade policy and the structural adjustment  assistance 
policy.  The  Trade Expansion Act  (TEA)  of 1962  and the Automotive  Products 
Trade Act  (APTA)  of 1.965  of the US  and the Canadian law of 1971  which 
created the Textile and Confection Board and Anti-Dumping Tribunal are 
examples  of such links,  although they were  not  directly  (or positively) 
related to the trade with the  developing countries.  But  Japan's Provisional 
I'Teasures  for Smaller Enterprises which  were  introduced as  a  result  of the 
implementation of the General Tariff Preferences in 1971  and the Dutch 
Memorandum  on Restructuring of the Netherlands  Economy  and Development 
Cooperation  (1974  and 1975-76)  are  among  the precedents for  a  link between 
adjustment  policy and the liberalization of the trade with the  developing 
countries. 
c)  European Integration and Structural Adjustment  Policies 
and Precedents 
Provisions 
The  European Community  has  itself irwtituted policies to ease the process 
of structural  change  in the member  countries,  which  was  accelerated due 
to the regional  division of labour resulting from the increasingly free 
movement  of the factors  of production and goods  within the  Common  Market. 
At  the setting up of the European Coal  and Steel  Community  (ECSC),  the 
Treaty of Paris authorised  (through Articles 56  of the  Treaty and section 
23  of the transitional dispositions  annexed to the Treaty) the High 
Authority to furnish aid to miners  and steel workers  who  would become 
redundant.  Such aid was  to be  used to  compensate  partly for the  employment - 89-
loss,  professional re-education and geographic displacement  of the  workers. 
The  same  article also provided for the creation of employment  in different 
regions  which are severely affected by  economic  perturbations due  to 
economic  integration.  Article 54  of the Treaty of Paris authorised the 
High  Authority to help in the financing of the projects of investments 
in the  coal-mining and metallurgy and projects related to the construction 
of lodgings  for  workers.  All the above-mentioned provisions  have  been made 
substantial use  of,  in the efforts to ease the rapid structural adjustment 
that  has taken place in the industries  concerned. 
Further,  article 123  of the Treaty of Rome  which  set  up  the EUropean  Social 
Fund authorised measures  necessary to guarantee employment  and protect the 
revenue  of the salaried persons  from the risks arising from  the  integration 
of the national  economies.  It was  also authorized to undertake  measures  to 
promote  employment,  particularly by  preventing structural unemployment. 
The  decision of the  Council  of Ministers,  dated February 1st 1971,  modified 
the rules of the Fund to assure,  through subsidies of the  Community,  help 
in bringing about  a  better adaptation of the offer and demand  for  employment 
in the member  countries.  It also authorised the Fund to apply  complement-
ary measures  which would  permit it to intervene in an anticipatory manner 
when  the transfer of labour is foreseen. 
Thus  the precedent  for initiating, at the  Community  level,  adjustment 
policies to facilitate structural  changes  due to increased regional division 
of labour is well  established.  l.Jhat  is required now  is to extend such an 
approach to the  changes resulting from the increasing participation of the 
Community,  in the new  international division of labour. 
d)  A Possible Link between Trade Liberalization and Adjustment  Assistance 
Policies 
The  EUropean  Community's  implementation of the GSP,  as  well  as the trade 
provisions of the preferential agreements,  contained an "escape  clause" 
mechanism,  but  there exists no  link between the invocation of that - 90-
mechanism  and the process of structural adjustment.  We  propose that  in the 
forthcoming review and renewal  of the GSP,  a  duly  constituted Authority 
should be  empov;ered to decide ·- as  >'las  done  under the Trade Expansion Act 
in the United States - whether  adjustment  assistance should not  be 
provided as  an alternative to  escape  clause relief for workers  and firms 
injured or threatened to be  injured due to the application of the GSP  or 
other preferential regimes.  The  objective is to make  sure that the 
"ceilings" and "escape  clause provisions" would serve the original reason 
for which they v1ere  intended - namely,  to provide temporary respite in 
order to undertake the necessary restructuring ·- rather than becoming 
permanent  restrictive measures  which succeed only in providing  justifica-
tions for other countries  (developed or  developing) to resort to protective 
measures  for their own  weak  sectors. 
III.  TOH.ARDS  AN  ANTICIPATORY  ADJUSrrJlJENT  POLICY 
a)  Elements  of an Early Harning System 
The  above-mentioned approach  i:s  still a  static one  in the  sense that the 
industries requiring resort to "escape  clauses"  and quantitative restrictions 
are  already in considerable difficulties.  The  crux of the matter is one 
of developing anticipatory adjustment  assistance policies  so that the 
impending structural \veaknesses  of specific branches  of industries  can be 
foreseen and the necessary adjustment  measures  prescribed.  The starting 
point  of the activation of such a  policy is the  compilation of the  current 
industrial profile of the  comparative  advantages  and disadvantages of the 
member  countries  by identifying the industries and branches of industries 
for which there are structural weaknesses  or growth potential.  At  least 
part  of the information required for this purpose  is already available  in 
the  case  of most  of the  member  countries from research carried out  either 
by official or independent  agencies.  It is also possible to obtain,  in a 
rather "ad hoc"  manner,  an initial list of the products  which fall into 
the  category of potentially weak  sectors,  from the category of "semi-
sensitive" items  in the GSP. - 91-
The  second step in the process vmuld  be  the setting up  of an "Early 
~·Jarning System"  with the purpose  of monitoring,  in a  systematic way 
a  certain number  of important  indicators.  The  most  important  of these 
elements  are  : 
a) the imports  of products  from  low  cost  countries  as  a  percentage  of 
the production or  consumption in the importing country, 
b)  a  similar  check  on the  exports  as  a  percentage  of domestic production, 
c)  actual  or projected levels of unemployment  by  branches  of activities, 
d)  levels of protection,  particularly effective levels  of protection and 
non-tariff restrictions, 
e)  level and frequency  of the  subsidies  requested or obtained from  public 
agencies, 
f)  significant  changes  in the technology which  changes the factor intensity 
of a  given production process, 
g)  important  changes  or expected changes  in the prices and/or supply of 
the necessary raw  materials, 
h)  levels of investments - particularly foreign investments  - in the 
relevant  export  oriented branches in low  cost  countries, 
i) expiry of patents,  increased specification of production standards and 
the  export  of specific technology. 
The  operational part  of the system would  consist  of monitoring,  at short 
term intervals such as six months,  the pattern of the  evolution of these 
indicators for the industries and branches being covered.  Such  systematic 
monitoring should provide  ample  warning about  the  impending weaknesses  of 
particular branches.  Such  information,  in addition to being made  available 
to the firms  and the organisations of the  workers  directly concerned,  could 
become  the basis for the decision by the authority proposed to be  set up, 
as to whether the branch of the industry concerned should receive  "escape 
clause relief" or adjustment  assistance instead. ·- 92-
b)  A "Second vlindow"  Adjustment  and the Satisfaction of Social Needs 
In general,  the  view  has  been often expressed by the socio-economic groups 
directly concerned,  that if restructuring has to be  undertaken in a 
particular branch in an industry,  it has to be  done  in such  a  way  that 
the  labourers  who  become  redundant  should be  fully absorbed in another 
branch  of the  same  industry.  It is of course,  possible that  viable  and 
non-viable  branches  might  exist  cide by side in the same  industry.  And  if 
the  expansion of the viable branch could absorb all or  most  of the labour 
released from the non-viable  branche,  it would  considerably facilitate 
the  adjustment  process.  But  i1 will not  ah1ays  be the case.  The  branches 
of activities \vhich have  growth potential in the industrialised countries 
are often more  capital intensive than the  branches  which are phased out. 
Constant  increase in productivity also  implies  a  steady reduction in the 
labour  input  per unit  of output.  Some  of the  employment  lost will be  of 
course  made  up  of,  by the multiplier effects generated by the expansion 
of the adjusted sectors.  But  the general  impression remains  that  on the 
balance,  the employment  created by the growth sectors will not  be  able 
to solve,  in the short  term,  the structural unemployment  problems  being 
faced by  a  number  of industrialised countries. 
This  perspective lends  added vleight  to the occasionally mooted proposal 
that  a  serious effort  has to be  organised in the industrialised countries 
to identify and undertake the measures  necessary to meet,  the unfulfilled 
"social needs"  and that this process  could also provide alternative and 
worthwhile  avenues  for the utilisation of redundant  manpower.  The  well-
known  critiques against  such an approach are  as  follows  :  the  "social 
sector" is already overdeveloped in a  number  of European  countries;  further 
efforts in this direction would be  an additional drain on the already 
over-burdened public expenditures;  productivity in the  social sector is 
low;  and finally,  there is the problem that unemployed labour,  untrained 
in the work  in the social sector,  cannot  be  directly redeployed for such 
tasks. - 93-
It is indeed true that  certain branches  of the social sector are  already 
well  developed in some  of the member  countries of the European  Community. 
But  there is a  persistent  impression that  a  number  of unfulfilled social 
demands,  particularly in the spheres of urban renewal,  welfare  of older 
people  and minorities,  tend to  co-exist  with the  above-mentioned advance-
ments.  That  is why  their precise identification is mentioned as  one  of 
the first steps.  The  costs  involved in meeting these requirements  are 
certainly not  negligible;  but  a  persistent  backlog of unemployed would 
be  an even greater burden on  the treasury.  A similar line of reasoning 
would  also apply to the objections about  the  low  level of productivity 
in the  social sector.  Finally,  provisions for the training required for 
working effectively in the  social needs  sector should be  an integral part 
of any  such programme. 
The  investments  required to  meet  the properly identified social needs  are 
programmable  and thus  "anticipatory" as  far as  employment  creation is 
concerned.  It  could possibly be  organised within the institutional frame-
work  of the  European Social Fund and become  a  "second window"  in the 
implementation of an anticipatory adjustment  assistance policy. 
c)  A "Third Window"  Adjustment  and Regional  Policy  (1) 
To  facilitate the necessary s-t;ructural  changes  within less developed 
regions  of the  Community  that type  of regional  policy seems  to yield 
highest  rewards which is designed to remove  bottlenecks in these regions' 
ability to adapt.  For such a  strategy to be  adopted changes in regional 
policies as  presently pursued are indicated 
(1)  Part  III.).  of this chapter,  by Frank Wolter. - 94-
1) Regional  policy may  aim at  directly inducing  changes  of regional 
production structures.  For  such a  sectoral approach,  activities 
endangered by import  competition from  developing countries  could be 
systematically exempted  from  :regional aid.  The list of sensitive or 
semi-sensitive products of the GSP-scheme  can provide first  best 
candidates.  On  the other hand,  regional aid may  favour  investment  in 
activities which are tradable interregionally,  but  hardly international-
ly because  of prohibitive transport  or  communication costs,  and,  hence, 
scarcely exposed to  import  competition from  developing  countries.  A 
number  of service activities may  be  cases in point  (short-period 
tourism, conferenee sites,  mail  order trade  among  others).  Incentives 
to attract  service activities seems to be  the more  adequate  because 
many  of these activities provide  employment  opportunities for  low-
skilled labour,  particularly female  workers,  while benefitting from 
an income-elastic demand.  The  disadvantage  of such a  sectoral approach 
appears to be  that it is discretionary by nature  and subject to severe 
information problems  which may  1>e  solved at  less  cost  by the trial 
and error process:  of the market. 
2)  Alternatively,  regional policy may  concentrate  on  encouraging the 
employment  of relatively scarce  production factors.  As  in less developed 
regions the  supply of skilled labour  seems to be the relevant bottle-
neck,  the prevailing subsidies for  (physical)  capital in regional aid 
schemes  may  be  changed into systematic  subsidies for  human  capital. 
Incentives for additional  employment  of skilled labour in less developed 
regions  could be  financed by  di~lincentives for additional  employment 
of respective labour in agglomeration centres.  This  can be  effected by 
taxing the increases in rewards  for  human  capital in agglomeration 
centres and  correspondingly subsidizing increases in rewards  for human 
capital in the periphery.  The  tax could be levied (and the subsidies 
could be granted)  on incremental  changes in the difference between 
actual  wages  and salaries and fictive wages  and salaries given by the 
hourly wage  for an unskilled worker multiplied with the additional - 95-
employment  hours.  In addition,  regional  policy could take  into account 
backward regions'  generally richer  endowment  with "environment" as  a 
production factor by  regionally differentiating environmental  protection 
policies more. 
3)  I~obility of capital and,  above  all,  skilled labour from  agglomeration 
centres to the periphery can be  further raised by  systematically 
strengthening the less  developed regions'  infrastructure.  Here,  among 
others the regional  dispersion of education facilities and universities 
may  play an important  role as it is likely to attract  complementary 
economic activities.  In addition,  public administration can be 
decentralized and public participation in private business  may  be  use-
fully employed to create  nevJ  regional growth  centres. 
4)  In any event,  regional aid schemes  should be  streamlined.  In recent 
times,  regional aid has  very much  proliferated both in terms  of measures 
adopted and of area covered.  Partly,  regional aid seems  to  have  become 
a  hidden substitute for the  removal  of intra-EC trade barriers.  The 
readoption of a  more  transparent  system and the  concentration on 
marginal  cases  will  ensure regional aid to become  more  efficient  by 
directing it more  towards those  who  really need it. 
Regional aid,  as  any  public incentive  system,  has  opportunity  costs.  Hence, 
when  planning the regional  development  budget  both the real  economies  of 
agglomeration and the options  for aid among  regions  have to be  properly 
taken into  account.  For,  not  a  maximal  but  an optimal spatial dispersion 
of economic activities is needed.  This  is to say that there are  cases 
where the development  potential of individual regions is not  high enough 
to  justify active rehabilitation.  The  protectionistic defense of economic 
activities within such regions will aggravate the  employment  problem in 
the third world while  imposing a  high cost to the  Community  herself. - 96-
IV.  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  FR.AJIID"VORK 
a) Users  and Operators 
In market  economies,  the process  of structural adjustment  is carried out 
mainly by the firms  themselves.  But  in a  number  of cases,  the structural-
ly weak  firms,  especially the  small  and the medium  size ones,  have  neither 
the technical nor the financial  resources  required to undertake the 
process.  By  themse1lves  they are often unable to forecast  the  impending 
changes in the  determinants  of the  competitive positions and  some  times 
are not  even a"l"lare  of the reconversion possibilities which exist.  And 
the difficulties for structural adaptation becomes  particularly sharp 
during the recessions,  specially for those firms  which have resisted 
change  and continued to survive under protection.  The  same  problems  apply1 , 
to an even greater extent,  to the workers  >"lho  1.·10uld  be  directly affected 
by  structural  changes.  Understandably,  they react  adversely to the fact 
that the  costs  of the structural adjustment  tend to fall heavily on them. 
The  most  important  objective of the adjustment  policy proposal  as  elaboratod 
above  is to provide both groups  vfith the necessary information and help 
required for restructuring.  'rhey1  in fact,  are the  main beneficiaries or 
users of the proposed system. 
An  anticipatory adjustment  policy of the type  sketched above  has  implications 
for  various aspects of the European Community's  policy and various 
negments  of its administrative structure.  It has  also of course  implications 
for the  economic  and social poliGies of the  member  states,  although the 
proposals  we  have  made  here are those >vhich  can be  made  operational at 
the level of the Community itself.  It is  worth noting here that the 
cardinal lesson that  >vas  learned from the lack-luster performance of the 
adjustment  poliqy instruments  of the Trade  Expansion Act  of the United 
States is that the administrative responsibility for the operation of the 
system should not  be  dispersed among too  many  agents.  The  administrative 
responsibility for the  system as  we  have  proposed it at  the  Co~nunity 
level,  can be broadly allocated to a  very limited number  of units. - 97-
b)  Elements  of an Industrial Cooperation Policy 
The  process  of structural adjustment  is,  of course,  closely related to 
that  of international redeployment  of industries or the so-called new 
international division of labour.  We  shall briefly touch upon the opera-
tional part  of such redeployment,  in so far as it has  a  link with the 
adjustment  policy proposal  elaborated above. 
The  close  involvement  of the authority responsible for the regulation of 
the link between the preferential trade policy and  the adjustment  policies 
and the operation of the Early vvarning  System would  provide it with 
important  information concerning sectors and branches which  are already 
nonviable  in Europe  or likely bevome  so in the near future.  Some  of these 
activities are precisely those for which  the  developing countries are 
showing  considerable growth potential.  Hence,  the above-mentioned infor-
mation could be  of use to the "users"  of the  scheme  in so far as they 
themselves  might  be  willing to redeploy part  of such activities to the 
developing countries.  1-lore  significantly,  such information could be  of 
considerable use in the implementation of the industrial  development 
cooperation policy of the  European Community  with the third world.  In the 
context  of such cooperation - which  currently extends only to the  Lome 
Convention countries,  but  which hopefully will become  more  global - the 
information could be made  available to the developing countries.  Further, 
if particular developing countries are in fact  interested in setting up 
industrial activities for which they have  comparative  advantages  but 
which,  for structural reasons  are untenable in the member  countries of 
the European Community,  the necessary technical or financial  assistance 
could be made  available within the  framework  of the industrial development 
cooperation policy of the Community. - 98-
CHAPTER  III - INTERDEPENDENCE  AND  COOPERATION  BETWEEN  THE  EEC  AND  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES 
I.  INDUSTRIAL  INTERDEPENDENCE  AND  COOPERATION  (1) 
The  main  economic  problems  of  the  EEC  are  in  the  field of  growth  and  employment. 
The  Latter  ones  are only partially  related to the  decline  in  the  rate of  economic 
expansion.  They  are  also  due,  among  other  factors,  to  a  change  in  the  structure 
of  productive  investments  and  to  a  shift  in  the  international  division  of  labour 
between  d.c.  s  and  L.d.c.  s. 
It  is  becoming  commonly  accepted  that  the  growth- and  employment  problems  of  the 
EEC,  and  the  related  problems  in  terms  of  structures of  industry  and  of  interna-
tional  economic  relations  are  not  only  due  to  short-term frictions  in  the  econo-
mic  system,  but  have  an  important  structural  component  as  well.  They  are  also 
consequence  of  a  change  in  the  relative weight  of  the  various  driving  forces  be-
hind  the  development  model  of  the  industrialized countries during  the  last  25 
years.  In  a  way,  one  might  say  that  we  are  witnessing  the  end  of  a  specific  pe-
riod  in  the expansion  process  of  the d.c.  s  and  in  the  concomitant  international 
economic  relations.  The  new  scenario  which  is unfolding  indicates also  a  diffe-
rent  role  for  the  l.d.c.  s  in  the  world  economy. 
Employment  perspectives  for  the  productive  sector  of  the  European  economy  remain 
gloomy,  even  if there  were  to  be  a  recovery  in  the  rate  of  industrial  growth. 
There  is scope  for  pessimism  when  actual  and  future potential  of  l.d.c.  s  to pro-
duce  cheap  Labour-intensive  manufactures  for  the d.c.  markets  are  taken  into 
account.  Especially  with  regard  to the  Latter  element  it  can  be  observed  that 
push- and  pull  factors  have  been  co,nciding.  The  intensification of  competitive 
relations  among  the  industrialized  countries or  rather  among  the  various  interna-
tionally  competing  capital  groups  has  enforced  an  intensification of  the  search 
for  the  Least  expensive production  Locations  on  a  global  scale.  Technical,  fi-
nancial  and  organizational  capacities  in  corporate  business  - especially  but  not 
exclusively  in  M.N.C.s- have  been  sufficiently developed  to  make  feasible  no~ a 
further  international  relocation  of  productive activities (2).  This  tendency  has 
been  re-inforced  by  many  l.d.c.  governments,  offering  generous  incentives  for  the 
( 1)  By  Ben  Evers 
(2)  See  also  Part  I,  Chapter  II-1-b. - 99-
establishment  of  foreign  export-oriented  industries,  and  competing  among  them-
selves  to  attract Western  M.N.C.s  for  these purposes. 
Low-growth,  unemployment  and  accelerated  industrial  imports  from  Low-wage  coun-
tries make  increased pressures  for  defensive  measures  quite  understandable  ; 
pressures  not  only  from  the  trade-union  side  but  also  from  industrialists.  In 
addition,  the  claim  for  defensive  actions  has  been  strengthened  by  questioning 
the  developmental  value  for  L.d.c.s of  a  growth-strategy  basically  relying  on 
export-production  for d.c.s'  markets,  almost  completely  dependent  on  foreign  tech-
nology  and  foreign  prod~ctive and  commercial  capital. 
Thus,  trade-protectionism  - in  open  and/or  disguised  form- against  l.d.c.s'  indus-
trial exports  has  been  on  the  increase. 
Obviously,  the  importance  for  European  industry  to  control  substantially its in-
ternal  market  cannot  be  doubted,  neither  can  the  urgency  be  denied  for  elabora-
ting  a  strategy aimed  at  restoring  full-employment.  However,  this does  not  imply 
that partial  and/or predominantly  defensive policies  will  be  effective  in  this 
regard,  considering  the  economic  structure of  the  EEC. 
The  advantages  and  dangers  of  trade-protectionism  have  been  sufficiently described 
in  many  documents,  and  need  not  be  repeated  here.  For  illustrative purposes only, 
the  following  examples  will  suffice. 
The  introduction of  indiscriminate  labour-absorbing  incentives  for  the productive 
sector  may  retard the  development  of  technology- and  capital  intensive  industries, 
in  this  way  increase  the  degree  of  technological  dependence  of  the  EEC  and  endanger 
its  long-term  export  perspectives.  Ill-conceived or  badly  coordinated  policies of 
subsidizing  threatened  industries might  contribute to  a  temporary  survival  and 
keeping  intact parts of  the  industrial  structure that  nonetheless  will  prove  to  be 
unviable  in the  Long-run,  however  at  the  cost  of  a  slower  development  of  more 
promising  and  efficient  industries  ;  in  addition  these  kind  of  policies  might  in-
troduce  new  forms  of  "beggar-thy-neighbour".  Indiscriminate protection  against 
cheap-labour  imports  might  affect  real  wages  and/or  even  Lead  to  a  relative  Loss 
of  international  competitive power  of  EEC  industry vis a vis  its main  competitors,  if 
the  latter  follow  a  more  open  policy. 
Thus,  the  short-term benefits of  a  purely  defensive policy are  out-weighted  by  the 
long-term  disadvantages,  not  only  in  terms  of  growth  and  exports  but  even  in  terms 
of  employment. - 100-
The  same  type  of  reasoning  can  be  applied  to  l.d.c.s.  Practically all  l.d.c.  s 
are  heavily  dependent  on  imports  of  capital  goods  and  intermediate products  for 
accelerating  their development  process.  When  industrialized  countries  do  not 
allow  easy  access  of  manufactured  products  from  l.d.c.s, the  capitalization  and 
industrialization process  of  the  l .. d.c.s will  slow  down.  This  will  also,  how-
ever,  negatively  affect  the export  possibilities of  the d.c.s.  On  the other 
hand,  one  should  not  make  the  mistake of  underestimating  the political  will  of 
most  l.d.c.s to  speed-up  their  industrialization anyhow. 
Consequently,  a  different  strategy is necessary.  One  that takes  into  account 
the  weak  and  the  strong  elements  of  the EEC's  economic  structure,  particularly 
in  relation  to the  structures of  its main  competitors  internationally,  one  that 
emphasizes  the dynamic  instead of  the  static elements  ;  one  that  also  takes  ade-
quately  into  account  the  interests as  well  as the potentials of  the  l.d.c.s. 
It  is  in  the  framework  of  such  a  strategy that the  relationship  between  the  EEC 
and  the  l.d.c.s must  be  discussed. 
Obviously,  this is not  the place to elaborate  upon  these points.  Regarding  in 
particular the  relationship  between  the  EEC  and  the  l.d.c.s, it is useful,  however, 
to  recall  the  following  elements  (1). 
Firstly,  the  EEC  is, heavily  dependent  on  l.d.c.s for  its energy  supply.  This  is 
especially  true for  petroleum.  Petroleum  accounts  for  about  55  % of  tbtal  energy 
consumption  of  the  EEC.  The  degree  of  import-dependence  is about  95  % ;  of  this 
87%  is supplied  by  l.d.c.s. 
Secondly  the  import-dependence  of  the  EEC  for  other  primary  resources  is also  re-
latively  high.  For  example,  in  the  case of  minerals  this amounts  to  well  over 
75  %,  and  for  such  vital  minerals  as  lead,  copper,  tin, manganese,  nickel,  phos-
phate,  the  EEC  has  to  import  up  to 90-100%  of  its needs.  The  EEC  is also  a  si-
gnificant  importer  of  agricultural  raw  materials  ;  for  tropical  products  the 
import-dependence  is 100  %.  Although  the  relative  contribution of  l.d.c.s  in  the 
provision of  these products  is not  as  high  as  in  the  case of  petroleum,  they  still 
are  very  important  suppliers for  the  J:EC.  For  example,  46%  of  total extra-EEC 
imports  of  food  products  is supplied  by  l.d.c.s ;  for  agricultural  raw  materials 
(1)  See  :Michael  Noelke  :  "Dossier  sur  l'Interdependance  Europe-Tiers  Monde" 
C.C.E.,  document  de  travail,  481/X/78  Bruxelles,  1978 - 101-
this amounts  to  26  %,  for  minerals  about  40  % and  the  same  percentage  in  the 
case of  non-ferrous  minerals. 
Thirdly,  L.d.c.  markets  constitute  a  very  important  and  dynamic  outlet  for  EEC 
industry.  Between  1970  and  1973  extra-EEC  exports to  l.d.c.s grew  as  fast  as 
to d.c.s  (by  about  42  %,  expressed  in  ECU
1s)  ;  between  1973  and  1977  exports 
to d.c.s  expanded  by  72%  but  to  l.d.c.s by  169%  !  Thus,  the  share of  L.d.c.s 
in  the  EEC's  exports  increased  from  28  to  38%  between  1973  and  1977.  OPEC  coun-
tries obviously  are  by  far  the  most  dynamic  markets,  but  exports  to  ACP  countries 
are  also  very  dynamic.  Generally,  exports  to  non-petroleum  exporting  l.d.c.s 
have  grown  faster  than  to d.c.s  in  this period.  The  EEC  remains  the  most  impor-
tant  supplier  of  L.d.c.s  with  about  41%  of  total  d.c.s  imports,  followed  by 
the  USA  with  33  % and  Japan  with  20  % ;  however  the  market-share  of  the  Latter 
is on  the  increase.  With  respect  to  the  composition  of  exports  to  L.d.c.s  it  is 
worth  observing  that  about  87%  of  EEC
1s  exports  are  formed  by  manufactures,  61  % 
of  which  are  electro-mechanical  products.  Capital  goods  are  indeed  the  most  dyna-
mic  export  category  of  the  EEC
1s  exports  to  L.d.c.s.  The  composition  of  the  EEC's 
exports  does  not  compare  unfavourably  with  those of  the  USA  and  Japan.  For  exam-
ple,  13  % are  formed  by  primary  products  against  87  % for  manufactures  ;  the fi-
gures  for  the  USA  are  28  and  72  % respectively  and  for  Japan  5  and  95  %.  Regar-
ding  industrial  exports  the  EEC  and  the  USA  are  somewhat  stronger  in  electro-
mechanical  and  chemical  products,  whereas  in  Japanese  exports  iron  and  steel  and 
textiles  score  relatively  higher.  Finally,  it  may  be  observed  that  of  the total 
export  surplus  of  manufactured  products of  the  EEC  - necessary  to  compensate  for 
the  raw  materials  shortage- 60%  was  realized  by  trade  with  the  L.d.c.'s. 
Fourthly,  the  rapid  increase  of  the  EEC's  industrial  exports  to  L.d.c.s  has  been 
accompanied  by  an  even  faster  growth  of  L.d.c.s'  industrial  exports  to  the  EEC. 
In  the  period  1965-76  the  Latter  ones  quintupled.  At  a  general  Level,  the  impact 
of  L.d.c.s 1  industrial  exports  is  rather  Limited  in  view  of  the  extremely  Low 
participation of  l.d.c.  s  in  world  industrial  production.  On  the other  hand  one 
should  not  under-estimate  the  impact  either.  In  static  terms,  certain problems 
are  being  created  by  the  circumstance that  l.d.c.s'  industrial  exports are ori-
ginating  from  only  a  few  countries,  and  are  concentrated  on  relatively  few  product-
categories.  In  dynamic  terms  one  should  take  into  account  that  : - 102-
a)  re-Location possibilities for  industrial  productive activities will  increase  ; 
b)  more  L.d.c.s  will  be  reaching  a  semi-industrialized  stage  and  will  be  pres-
sing  for  increased  access  to  the  EEC's  market  ; 
c)  more  L.d.c.s  will  engage  in  higher  degrees of  Local  processing  of  raw  mate-
rial  exports  ; 
d)  L.d.c.s  will  expand  trade  in  industrial  products  among  themselves,  thus  affec-
ting  the  EEC's  future  export  possibilities  Cin  1974  already  33  % of  l.d.c.s
1 
industrial  exports  went  to  other  L.d.c.s). 
The  above  few  elements  already  provide  sufficient  indications  for  the  fact  that 
the  economic  relationship  between  the  EEC  and  L.d.c.s  may  no  Longer  be  seen  as 
one  almost  exclusively  based  on  exports of  manufactures  and  imports  of  raw  mate-
rials.  More  and  more  elements  of  industrial  interdependence  are  also  becoming 
incorporated  in  this  relationship.  One  might  even  go  a  step  further.  In  order 
to  be  able  to  continue  paying  for  its  raw  material  imports,  the  EEC  has  to  expand 
its  industrial  exports.  Since  competition  on  the  world  market  for  standard  indus-
trial products  will  become  very  intense - L.d.c.s offering  ever  better  opportuni-
ties  in  this  respect  - the  best  chances  for  the  EEC  to  continue  its dynamic  indus-
trial export  growth  to  L.d.c.s  lie precisely  in  an  accelerated  process  of  indus-
trialization of  l.d.c.s. 
This  however,  needs  some  specification.  One  of  the  most  serious  restrictions  for 
accelerating  industrial  growth  in  L.d.c.s  is the external  constraint.  In  order 
to overcome  this  constraint  a  growing  number  of  L.d.c.s  are  trying  to give  an 
export- oriented  character  to  their  industrialization processes  (apart  from  other 
considerations  such  as  employment,  technology,  size of  the  internal  market,  etc  •• ). 
This orientation gives  these processes  a  more  exogeneous  character,  because  they 
derive their  dynamics  mainly  from  d.c.s.  Export-oriented  industrialization of 
L.d.c.s,  mainly  of  labour-intensive mass-consumer  goods,  is an  extremely  dependent 
and  vulnerable f6rm  of  industrialization  in  economic,  financial,  technological, 
marketing  and  even  in  political  terms.  In  addition,  we  remain  faced  with  the 
problem  of  whether  or not  this  type  of  industrialization  is  indeed  able  to  dyna-
mize  the  international  demand  for  capital- and  intermediary  goods.  At  Least  part 
of  it is mere  substitution of  production originally taking  place  in  d.c.s.  In 
view  of  the  "concentrated"  character  of  this type  of  industrialization  and  of 
exports,  the  employment  and  regional  problems  of d.c.s will  be  seriously  aggravated. - 103-
D.C.s  then  may  be  forced  to  limit  the growth  of  this  type  of  imports,  not  only 
for  economic  but  also  for  social  and  political  motives. 
In  view  of  the  above,  we  think  it necessary  that  l.d.c.s as  well  as d.c.s  re-
consider  the  role  and  significance of  the  internal  markets  in  l.d.c.s.  There 
are  various  reasons  why  l.d.c.s  should  reconsider  the  importance of  the  domes-
tic market,  even  in  relatively  small  countries 
a)  it  is much  more  easily accessible  to  small  domestic  producers  ; 
b)  it provides  a  better  stimulus  for  the  development  of  local  industrial  entre-
preneurship,  technology  and  skills  ; 
c)  the entrance  into  export  markets  for  l.d.c.  firms  is  very  unlikely  unless 
they  have  first  acquired  experience  in  the  domestic  market  ; 
d)  it  is  less  vulnerable  to fluctuations  in  the  international  market. 
Obviously,  the  local  markets  of  most  l.d.c.s are  too  small  to  support  already  in 
an  early  stage  a  very  wide  range  of  relatively efficient  industries.  Instead of 
carrying  import-substituting  industrialization too far,  one  should  strongly  endorse 
efforts of  inter-l.d.c.  industrial  co-operation  and  inter-l.d.c.  trade  in  manufac-
tures. 
This  kind  of  industrial  development  does  also  provide  opportunities  to  the d.c.'s, 
in  particular to  the  EEC.  We  have  already  indicated  the  importance  of  the  markets 
of  the  l.d.c.s for  European  industry  ;  their potential  market  is gigantic  indeed 
taking  into  account  the  population  of  l.d.c.s and  the  low  degree  of  development  of 
their  productive  forces. 
Accepting  the  well-known  limitations of  one-sided  import-substituting  industriali-
zation  in  l.d.c.s, there  still exists sufficient  evidence that  more  inward-looking 
industrialization  in  l.d.c.s  is  not  necessarily trade-restricting,  provided  that  the 
external  constraint  can  be  overcome.  The  main  effect  in  terms  of  imports  is substi-
tution of  more  simple  industrial  products  by  imports  of  industrial  equipment  and  com-
plex  inputs.  The  trade-creating  effect  can  become  even  more  prominent  in  caseswhere 
import-substituting  industrialization  can  be  combined  with  exports of  industrial 
products,  both  to  l.d.c.s and  to d.c.s. - 104 -
Increased  mutual  trade  in  industrial  products  among  L.d.c.s  will  speed  up  their 
industrialization process,  thus  increase  the  demand  for  capital  goods  and  set 
free  more  resources  to  import  machinery  and  equipment  from  d.c.s. 
To  the degree  that additional  industrial  exports  from  d.c.s dynamize  the growth 
of  the  Latter  and  help  ease their employment  and  regional  problems,  they  will 
also  be  able  to  accept  faster  growing  industrial  imports  from  L.d.c.s.  Of  parti-
cular  relevance  in  this  context  is the possibility of  growing  towards  industrial 
complementarity  between  d.c.s  and  l.d.c.s. 
Reality  is obviously  much  more  complicated  than  indicated  in  these  few  Lines. 
Two  conclusions,  however,  emerge  already  immediately.  Firstly,  the  new  relation-
ship  EEC-l.d.c.s  needs  to  be  incorporated  as  a  vital  element  into  the  EEC's  own 
development  strategy.  Secondly,  the  EEC  should  re-think  part  of  its development 
cooperation  policy along  these  Lines  and  place greater  emphasis  on  the promotion 
of  more  autonomous  and  endogeneous  processes of  industrialization  in  l.d.c.s. 
With  regard  to the  EEC"s  development  strategy,  at  Least  the  following  elements 
merit  special  attention  : 
- a  decrease  in  raw-materials  dependency  of  the  EEC  implying  safeguarding  of  long-
term  supplies  from  producer  countries  through  various  instruments  (see  also  next 
paragraph  of  this  chapter),  exploration  and  exploitation of  alternative supplies 
(incl.  recycling),  decrease  of  raw-materials  intensity  in production  and  consump-
tion  ; 
- development  of  new  activities on  the  basis of  new  consumer  needs  Ce.q.  informa-
tion,  communication,  environment,  etc  •• )  ; 
- expansion  of  the  production of  not  directly productive  capital  goods  ; 
- expansion  of  the  social  sector  of  the economy,  relevant  in  terms  of  welfare  as 
well  as  employment. 
More  particularly  in  relation  to  industry  (1) 
C1)  B.  Evers,  G.  de  Groot,  W.  Wagenmans  :  ''Perspectives of  Industrial  Re-adjustment. 
The  EEC  and  the  Developing  Countries''.  Development  Research  Institute,  Tilburg, 
Netherlands,  Feb.  1978. - 105-
- the  development  of  new  capital-,  technology-,  and  skill  intensive  industries 
and  products.  These  industries are  very  R & D intensive.  Examples  that  may 
be  mentioned  are  telecommunication,  nuclear  technology,  aircraft, micro-pro-
cessors,  electro  chemistry,  biotechnology,  etc •••  In  many  cases their  develop-
ment  depends  on  substantial  government  support.  Not  only  are  these  industries 
important  for  the entire  EEC,  but  their  development  in  a  number  of  cases  trans-
cends  the possibilities of  individual  countries.  Thus,  a  spear-head policy 
should  be  elaborated  at  EEC  level  ; 
- the  re-adjustment  of  industrial  structures of  the  EEC,  directed  at  the  impro-
vement  of  the  competitive position of  European  industry vis-a-vis third  coun-
tries.  With  regard  to  the  restructuring  policy the objectives  may  vary,  accor-
ding  to  the position of  industries  in  the  hierarchical  structure of  production 
and  on  the  intensity of  external  competition.  For  basic  industrial  sectors 
(such  as  iron- and  steel,  heavy  metal  industry,  chemical  industry,  advanced 
machinery  and  the  like)  the  re-adjustment  process  may  not  result  in  the  break-
down  of  vital parts of  the  industry,  because this,  in  the  long  run  would  imply 
a  loss  of  control  over  technical-,  economic-,  and  social  conditions of  produc-
tion.  The  capacity  of  the  EEC  to act  upon  the  determinants  of  the  international 
division  of  labour  should  be  fully  utilized to ensure  that  this type  of  "struc-
tural  preferences"  converges  with  the  requirements  of  the  i.d.l.  This  means 
that  European  industry  should  be  capable of  supplying  the  domestic  market  at 
internationally  competitive  conditions.  It does  not  mean,  on  the other  hand, 
that  the  EEC  should  be·self-sufficient  in  the  whole  range  of  products,  nor  that 
it  should  be  an  exporter  of  the  whole  range 
For  industries that  occupy  a  Lower  place  in  the  hierarchical  structure of  produc-
tion,  such  as  textiles,  clothing,  leather- and  products,  simple  machinery,  compo-
nents of  mass-consumer  goods,  etc  ••• ,  the objectives of  a  readjustment  policy  may 
be  somewhat  different.  Next  to  maintaining  some  productive capacity for  safeguar-
ding  essential  consumption  needs,  the  basic  objective  should  be  to  realize  indus-
trial  complementarity  with  l.d.c.s, based  on  comparative  advantages.  Export  ob-
jectives,  however,  being  much  lower  than  for  the  above  mentioned  industries. 
Regarding  L.d.c.  markets,  in  particular the  readjustment  policy  should  anticipate 
future  import  requirements of  L.d.c.s  resulting  from  an  accelerated  industriali-
zation process. - 106-
Thus,  anticipatory  readjustment  has  a  twofold  meaning.  Anticipating  export  po-
tentials of  l.d.c.s  should  be  complemented  with  anticipating  import  needs  of 
l.d.c.s. 
The  above  and  other  elements  can  contribute  in  one  way  or  another  to  the  birth 
of  a  new  stage of  long-run  economic  expansion.  It  should  be  stressed  again  that 
such  a  strategy  should  be  seen  as  a  package  deal  aimed  at  the  simultaneous attain-
ment  of  various objectives  such  as  growth,  change  in  the  structure of  production 
and  trade,  employment,  development  of  l.d.c.s, etc  ••• 
With  regard  to  the  industrial  development  co-operation  policy of  the  EEC,  a  va-
riety of  instruments  can  be  put  into effect  (1),  the  main  objectives of  which  are 
to  promote  the  industrialization of  l.d.c.s, maximizing  simultaneously  industrial 
exports  from  the  EEC.  In  financial  terms  one  should  envisage  a  significant  increase 
in  the  flow  of  public  and  private  funds  especially  to  those  countries that  dispose 
of  great  potentials  for  accelerated  industrialization but  whose  industrialization 
processes  are  hampered  by  balance  of  payments  constraints.  In  industrial  terms 
one  can  think  of  extending  agreements  on  industrial  cooperation,  technical,  scien-
tific, technological  assistance,  etc  •••  to other  rapidly  industrializing  l.d.c.s 
that  offer  the  most  interesting  market  and  investment  potential  to  EEC  industry  (2). 
This,  however,  should  not  so  much  result  in  an  increase of  sub-contracting  activi-
ties of  EEC  enterprises  in  l.d.c.s, given  the generally  limited  developmental  im-
pact  of  this type  of  activities  in  l.d.c.s  and  the employment  and  regional  pro-
blems  they  create  in  d.c.s.  The  aim  is much  more  to  promote  co-production  and 
specialization  agreements  between  firms  in  d.c.s  and  l.d.c.s, to facilitate  and 
promote  co-operation  arrangements  limited  to  aspects  of  marketing  and  technology, 
and  to  stimulate  investments  by  way  of  joint  ventures. 
(1)  See  also  "Reciprocal  implications",  SEC(77)  2060,  June  1977. 
(2)  However,  industrial  cooperation  should  not  be  interpreted  in  too  narrow  a  sense, 
because  contributing  to  agricultural  development  and  infrastructure  in  l.d.c.s 
can  also  speed-up  industrialization.  In  addition,  the  above  should not  be  inter-
preted  as  a  plea  for  concentrating  development  cooperation on  the  "most  promising" 
countries,  however,  aid  to  the "least promising"  has  a  different  justification. - 107-
In  the  case of  co-production  between  industries  in  d.c.s  and  L.d.c.s  it  is agreed 
that  both  parties produce  and  trade  among  themselves  compenents  which  are  incorpo-
rated  into  the final  good  assembled  by  one  or both  of  them.  The  d.c.s'  enterpri-
ses  may  supply  (part  of)  the  production  installation,  Licences,  technical  assis-
tance,  etc  •••  Once  the  L.d.c.'s plant  is operating,  the d.c.'s  enterprise  sup-
plies the parts of  the  goods  which  incorporate  more  advanced  technology  and  the 
l.d.c.'s plant  supplies products  where  production  is  somewhat  Less  demanding  and 
incorporate  the  highest  Labour  component  (however,  the  fact  may  not  be  over-
Looked  that  in  a  growing  number  of  cases  components  with  fairly  demanding  require-
ments  are or  can  already  be  produced  competitively  in  L.d.c.s  - for  example  in  the 
metal  transforming  industries).  The  assembly  of  the  finished  good  is  carried-out 
in  the d.c.  or  the  L.d.c.  or  in  both  according  to the technological  requirements 
involved,  the  relative  Labour- and  capital  intensity  and  alike considerations. 
In  the  case of  specialization,  instead of  distributing  the production of  the  compo-
nents  among  the plants  situated  in  both  countries  a  distribution of  the  types  or 
models  is  agreed  upon. 
Cooperation  arrangements  Limited  to  certain  aspects  only arise out  of  the  tendency 
to  break  down  the  investment  package  into its main  components  :  with  technology, 
access  to  markets,  organizational  capacity,  financing,  l.d.c.  enterprises  might 
be  provided  with  the opportunity  to  export  all or part  of  their  production  abroad. 
Joint  ventures  include  capital  elements,  technology  and  management  capacity from 
d.c.s'  enterprises  to  be  combined  with  national  elements  from  the  l.d.c.  Facili-
ties for  exports  are  also  to  be  negotiated. 
This  kind  of  agreement  can  be  promoted  through  a  wide  range of  instruments  both 
at  Community  and  at  national  Level. 
Evidently,  their  successful  implementation  will  result  in  an  increased penetra-
tion of  industrial  products  of  L.d.c.s  in  the  EEC  market.  However,  the  possibly 
negative effects  in  terms  of  balance of  payments  and/or  unemployment  will  be  greatly 
reduced  if not  completely  compensated  for  by  the  accompanying  increase  in  EEC  ex-
ports  on  account  of  the growing  industrial  production  in  L.d.c.s  both  for  exports - 108-
and  for  their domestic  markets.  In  addition, this  kind  of  arrangement  can  contri-
bute to  safeguard  the position of  European  capital  in  the  world  markets  for  indus-
trial products  and  provide  additional  funds  for  technological  advance.  Finally, 
and  of  crucial  importance,  is the  fact  that  they  provide  a  vehicle for  growing 
towards  an  intra-sectoral.  i.d.L. 
The  promotion  of  industrial  expansion  in  l.d.c.s, stimulated  through  this  type  of 
cooperation  agreement,  should  have  its complement  in  EEC  trade policy.  If the ten-
dency  towards  the  creation of  an  inter-sectoral  i.d.l.  cannot  be  reversed,  employ-
ment- and  adjustment  problems  in  the  EEC  might  become  insolvabLe  and  the  EEC  might 
be  forced  into  a  position of  increasing  protectionism,  in particular  through  ex-
tending  contractual  agreements  of  the Multifibre  agreement  type  to other  sensitive 
products.  This  kind  of  agreements  possesses  many  disadvantages,  already  discussed 
in  Part  II,  Chapter  I,  one  of  the  most  important  of  them  being  that  they  confirm 
the partial  approach  in  industrial  readjustment,  which  we  think  to  be  an  incorrect 
approach. 
Anyhow,  in  the negotiations  with  l.d.c.s problems  of  development  cooperation, 
investment  and  trade  should  be  dealt  with  as  one  package. 
The  same  is true,  regarding  internal policies of  the  EEC  :  problems  of  industrial 
structure,  technology,  trade,  empoyment,  regional  development,  etc ••• ,  can  no 
longer  be  seen  as  isolated  from  the  type  of  relationship  with  L.d.c.s  the  EEC  is 
striving  for. 
In  general  terms  one  could  say  that  the  EEC  should  aspire towards  gradually  chan-
ging  its  relationship  of  dominance/dependence  vis-~-vis  L.d.c.s  into  one  based  on 
partnership,  to  be  reached  through  a  process  of  programmed  interdependence. - 109-
II.  MINERAL  DEPENDENCE  AND  SUPPLY  POLICH})  (1) 
Agriculture and industry in the  Community  are  dependent  on  imported raw 
materials.  To~, a  large proportion of these  come  from  the third world. 
However,  the policy of diversification,  which is in principle a  desirable 
one,  has led in conjunction with various other economic  and political 
factors, to neglect  of investment  and research in the third world,  with 
the result that in the long run,  the potential of these countries may  be 
seriously under-exploited.  The  member  countries of the European Community 
must  take action to reverse this economically and politically dangerous 
trend. 
a)  Europe's drJ.' ft  away  f  th  thi d  ld  ·  11  Af  ·  _  _  rom  e  r  wor  ,  especJ.a  y  rJ.ca 
The  third world's important  place among  Europe's suppliers is to a  large 
extent the result of prospecting and investment  dating from the  colonial 
era,  much  less of operations carried out  after independence. 
The  following  comments  may  therefore be  made  on the present  situation : 
- Europe  has  devoted insufficient  means  to renewing its sources of supply 
in the world as  a  whole.  The  expenditure needed to replace sources of 
the non-energy ores  consumed  annually in the  EEC  has  been estimated 
at  ~ 2,500 million ;  European mining  companies  have  been spending less 
than ~ 500  million a  year in all countries,  and under 25 %  of that has 
being going to developing countries,  a  proportion which has failed to 
increase from 1965  to 1975  despite a  growing need for raw materials. 
This situation is illustrated by  the following table,  prepared by 
Community  staff from details supplied by the fifteen main  mining companies. 
(1) This  chapter was  contributed by Mr Yves  Berthelot  and has  been based 
notably on the work  carried out  by Mr  Roland Julienne for the  committee 
of the  Commissariat  du  Plan responsible for stuqying the position of the 
French productive sector in the face  of competition from third world 
economies. - 110-
EEC  research and investment  b;y:  re~ions 
(in ~ millions,  1976) 
1966  121Q  12.12 
Research Elus  investment 
Developed  countries  342.3  464.8  443·7 
75  %  68%  78  % 
of which  : 
South Africa  (22. 0)  (35.5)  (60. 6) 
Developing countries  111.1  219.2  128.1 
25  %  32  %  22  % 
of which  :  Africa  (81.4)  (33.8)  (51. 0) 
Latin America  (  9· 2)  (23.4)  (46.1) 
453.4  684.0  571.8 
Research alone 
Developed countries  30.2  107.3  163.5 
56%  19%  85  % 
of which  : 
South Africa  (  2. 4)  (10.4)  (  6.8) 
Developing  countries  24.2  28.4  29.3 
44  %  21  %  15  % 
of which  :  Africa  (  3. 7)  (  4. 4)  (  1. 8) 
Latin America  (  0.6)  (  8.8) 
54.4  135.7  192.8 
- of this expenditure,  the amounts  devoted to research are weighted even 
more  heavily in favour  of the  developed countries,  whose  share has 
risen in 10  years  from  56  % to 85  %,  leaving the developing countries 
with a  more  or less constant  ~ 30  million a  year.  A continuation of 
this trend would  inevitably lead to increased dependence  on sources 
of supply in the developed countries of the West  or Eastern bloc 
countries. - Ill  -
There are a  number  of reasons for the trend  : 
Europe's  mining  companies  are less powerful than their North American 
competitors,  which  also have  a  much  wider mining base,  except  in the 
case of bauxite  :  the major European groups  include United Kingdom 
holding companies  based mainly in South Africa,  a  fact  which  does  not 
make  it any easier for them to set up  operations in black Africa.  As 
for the American multinationals,  they have  hitherto,  with one  or two 
exceptions  (manganese in Gabon,  bauxite in Guinea)  shown  little interest 
in Africa,  but  in the last few  years they have  shown  greater confidence 
than the European  companies  and have  extended their interests from 
manganese  and bauxite to include iron and uranium. 
Mining  concerns  have  been more  sensitive to the nationalization moves 
that  have  followed the independence  of states in Africa,  and have  shown 
greater confidence in other parts of the world. 
The  European banking system has  not  organized itself properly to put  up 
the very large  sums  of money  needed for mining operations. 
The  partitioning of Africa,  like that of Europe,  has  undoubtedly 
constituted a  handicap,  which has  not  been mitigated by  any acutely felt 
need in Europe  for African supplies,  except  in the case  of uranium. 
Given equal mining potential, it is the  countries which already possess 
the basic infrastructure and developed financial structures which  are 
likeliest to see their deposits  exploited,  particularly since  such 
development  is cumulative,  and a  potential deposit  located near a  site 
alrea~ worked thereby enjoys  a  competitive  advantage. 
The  industrialized countries of the world have  been more  thoroughly 
prospected than the  developing regions. - 112-
This  phenomenon of under-investment  in the third-world is  do..<bly 
dangerous  because  : 
the technology  used in the  USSH  and  the  'jSA  is  not  E\1ropean 
means  that there are  no  ;.;pin-offs  and  no  (·•.;ntrcl  :;::c:.L:;i:~:e 
this 
- the  need to  obtain its suppliea  on the  cpen  m<U'kt!:  v~t  ;:  E:; rope;-1-r. 
industry in  a  very difficult  position  :.'I!Ler;  ·~!J.o  :>ituatio~; is  t.H;h"t. 
(high prices,  shortages  of  suppl  ie~>). 
b)  The  need for  a  balanced  polic,·~ 
The  policy  followed  over the last  few  yea'('~-;  rn~;  been to di •:crc;i ::; 
sources  of supply.  'rhc  principle  ber:ind  su,~h  a  rolicy  h~  ~;cur:l 1  r•u:. 
it is  important  not  to underestimate  : 
- the  influence of special  produeer-com;·,~rner  rela.tion~>hip~>  1n  p..:·riods 
of crisis 
- the third world's  potential  mineral  Heal  tr,  ; 
the  importance for  international  economic  and  )>olitical  stao~lit,y ,,f 
development  in Africa based  on the  exploitation of the  contin'"nt''; 
natural  resources. 
Producers'  special relationships  ivi th certain  cuotor:·,ers  are  linked in 
the  first  place to  a  particular customer's  importance.  Europe  has  an 
advantage  here  in that it is  by  far  the  biggest  importer  of raw  materials 
from the  developing  countries. - 113-
Imports  of metals  and  raw  materials from  the  developing countries 
(in f>  millions) 
~ 
All  developing  Africa  Latin America  countries 
1969  1973  1969  1973  1969  1973 
EEC  2,811  3,685  1,975  1,925  973  1,083 
United States  1,198  1,685  69  108  778  986 
Japan  1,213  2,129  334  422  346  558 
However,  the  companies  operating the mines  should also be  taken into 
account  here.  Those  active in Latin America are US  multinationals,  and 
they are continuing to invest there.  Similarly,  US  firms  often appear 
to be  taking the initiative in Africa as  well. 
The  third world is underexploited in terms  of its potential,  but  over-
exploited in terms of its known  resources. 
This  means  that knowledge  of its geological  characteristics and ore 
deposits is still pat~, soffie  of the less accessible areas  not  having 
been properly studied until after world war  II. 
Intensity of mining production,  excluding energy-generating products, 
by  region 
(in¢ per km2) 
World average 
Developed market-economy  countries 
Developed planned-economy  countries 
Developing countries  : 
America 
Africa 
Asia 
1973 
270 
542 
324 
175 
127 
119 
Annual  growth 
1968  - 1973 
(by volume) -·  114-
Not  only is Africa running at  only 47 %  of the world average,  but it is 
losing ground because it has  the~  lowest  growth rate. 
The  situation produet-by-product  is shown in the following table 
Resources  and production (in millions of t  and as  a  %) 
Known  resources  Production 
African  African 
World  develop.  World  develop. 
countries  countries 
Miot  %  Mio  t  % 
Phosphate  84,000  81.0  98,0  26.6 
Bauxite  (Al  content)  6,310  28.6  73,4  6.4 
Iron ore  (Fe  cont ent )  215,000  11.0  493,5  6.1 
Zinc  (Zn  content)  270  5.6  5,8  5.2 
Uranium  (U  content in 'OOO  t)  1,864  5.0  28,0  5.0 
Lead  (Pb  content)  330  4.3  3,5  5.7 
Copper  ( Cu  content )  2,050  8.8  7,5  17.3 
Manganese  (Mn  content)  3,600  3.6  21,6  13.0 
Pot  ash  (K2  0  cont  en:t )  87,127  0.1  21,6  1.4 
Source  Annale  des  Mines  1975 
According to these figures,  the proportion of Africa's reserves  exceeds 
that of production in the  case of bauxite and phosphates,  and represents 
a  higher percentage than that  of the African land surface in relation to 
the world land mass  as  a  whole.  As  regards the other ores,  Africa has  a 
higher percentage of production than of reserves  ;  this reflects the 
inadequacy of research and exploration,  which has taken little account  of 
deposits  or potentj.al resources not  followed up  by exploitation,  belying - ll5-
the  optimism of experts  who  maintain that there will  be  major  discoveries 
in Africa in the next  few  years  (copper,  nickel,  lead,  zinc,  phosphates, 
etc.). 
In order to secure diversification of future supplies  and exploit  the 
potential mineral  wealth of the third world,  it is necessary to develop 
an overall policy of cooperation with these countries in the mining sector, 
bringing together African governments,  local firms  and European mining 
concerns. 
In view of the  investment  cost,  the  convergence of European interest in 
this field and the political importance of strengthening Euro-African 
solidarity,  a  Community  policy of cooperation on mining should be  proposed, 
aimed  at  securing  : 
more  relaxed relations between the host  country and m1n1ng  companies 
by  means  of tripartite  (country-company-EEC)  agreements  which  would 
improve  the  general  climate and encourage  dialogue  and cooperation 
on a  mutually profitable basis  (technology transfer,  stability of 
establishment guarantees,  etc.) 
a  thaw in the relations between mining  companies  and the traditional 
sources of finance  based on  loan guarantees linked to long-term contracts 
for the supply of raw  materials,  contributions by  a  European public 
institution to the  capital for mining projects,  and intervention by 
the European Development  Fund in the  case  of investments  which  would 
not  normally be  covered by private bank  finance  in the industrialized 
countries  (e.g.  infrastructure)  ; 
- scaling-down of the political risk by the introduction of a  scheme  for 
equitable,  rapid compensation in cases not  only of sudden nationalization 
but  also of less extensive  expropriation measures,  thus  giving European 
firms  a  chance to reinvest  in time. - 116-
These bilateral or Community  measures  should make  it possible for Europe 
to take the initiative again in Africa and in the rest  of the third world; 
particularly as  regards  : 
iron and steel,  with a  view to giving deposits there a  chance against 
Australian,  Brazilian or Canadian  developments 
- the exploitation of a  number  of non-ferrous metals,  to increase the 
share of African bauxite and copper  in our supplies 
- fertilizer production,  with a  view to developing long-term agreements 
which  would  strengthen the position of the European industry in relation 
to US  firms,  recognizing the potential of African potash,  and working 
out  an overall fertilizer strategy to meet  the world's as yet unsatisfied 
demand 
- the  search for  new  deposits,  with intensified prospecting in regions 
as yet  not  fully explored,  and for resources  which  have  been inadequately 
investigated (lead,  zinc,  nickel,  etc.),  where  production in the third 
world does  not  appear to be  in keeping with its potential resources  ; 
and in the field of technical assistance,  where  a  European effort  on 
behalf of certain newly-independent  countries such as  Angola  could, 
unlike bilateral assistance,  forge  an effective counterweight to the 
activities of the two  superpowers. - 117-
III.  COOPERATION  IN  THE  FIELD  OF  TECHNOLOGY  TRANSFER  (1) 
l.  'rho  need for intensifying technology transfer from  developed to develop-
ing countries  (DC's  and LDC's,  respectively)  is widely re,::ognized.  This 
question has  been the topic of countless  international negotiations;  the 
Lome  Convention addresses  a  substantial part  of its chapter on industrial 
cooperation to it.  Indeed,  technology transfer can be  regarded both as  a 
relevant  and a  promising field for  economic  cooperation  : 
- relevant,  because  - if properly designed- it is apt  to  promote  the 
creation of employment  opportunities  and to speed up  economic  development 
in the  developing  world while  at the  same  time  alleviating structural 
changes  and offering productive  enployment  alternatives in the  advanced 
countries  ; 
- promising,  because in its mainfold- foreign direct  investment,  trade 
Hith knowledge  (patents,  licenses,  trade marks,  etc.) and technical 
assistance - it offers  a  large variety of possibilities for  co-opera:tion. 
Nevertheless,  technology transfer has often been  a  matter of complaint  of 
LDCs.  Then,  >-vhat  went  wrong with it and why  ? 
2.  Although the precise coutri  but ion of technology transfer to economic 
development  in LDCs  is disputed and although experience certainly differs 
widely among these countries,  two general,  partly interdependent  features 
seem to stand out  : 
- first,  up to the present  technology transfer has not  hindered economic 
growth and  employment to remain at unsatisfactory levels in most  parts 
of the third world,  and in that sense,  technology transfer has not 
attained a  volume that  would have  been desirable  ; 
second,  those technologies transferred have not  been adequate in many 
cases,  either because  wrong for or because unadapted to  conditions in 
the receiving countries. 
(1)  By  Frank  Wolter. - 118-
In the following paragraphs  He  shall  address  ourselves to these bottle-
necks. 
3.  The  extent  of technology transfer has  been mainly limited due to 
shortcomings  in institutions,  in competition among  technology suppliers, 
in necessary  complementarities in LDes,  and in conducive policies both 
in Des  and LDCs  : 
a)  Institutionally,  organized markets  for technologies  suitable for  LDCs 
such as  international fairs are very much  lacking.  Also,  in most  LDes 
technology service centres to collect  and provide  systematic information 
about  the  choice of technologies  (local as  well  as  international) 
are,  if at all existent,  only in their infant  stage.  Even in Des  syste-
matic information about  alternative technologies  is scarce. 
b)  Teclmologies  are mostly supplied from private business  of DCs.  Lacking 
market  t ransparenc:y  on the part  of LDes  (compare  above)  or exclusive 
technologies  often allow suppliers to  charge  monopoly prices reducing 
the volume  of technology transfer as  compared to  competitive markets. 
Occasionally,  monopoly positions are induced by LDCs'  demands  for  most 
modern technologiels  (such  demands,  mainly rooted in prestige thinking, 
in themselves  constitute a  restriction for the extent  of technology 
transfer). 
c)  Lacking infrastructure - physical,  human  and institutional - in 
developing countries severely limit the  capacity to attract  or to 
absorb technologiElS.  This  is especially pertinent for technology 
transfer by foreign direct  investment. 
d)  Detrimental policies  can be  considered responsible for  a  substantial 
part  of technology transfer which does  not  take place.  Political invest-
ment  risks, unsufficient  property guarantees both vrith regard to 
physical  capital and to human  capital  (patents),  restrictive investment 
regulations,  restrictions for capital or profit repatriation and - ll9-
"red tape"  in LDCs  reduce  among  others the  flow of capital and knoi'r-
ledge  from  LDCs  to  LDCs  as  compared to what  it otherwise  would be. 
On  the other hand,  in a  number  of DCs  effective protection systema-
tically favours  industries under  adjustment  pressure  by  LDCs' 
competition and thereby redur::e  the outflovl of  capital and technolog;y. 
Adequate  measures to  remove these obstacles will  most  probably induce  a 
significant  increase of the volume  of technology transfer from  Des  to 
LDCs. 
4.  Further  problems  result  from the fact  that,  generally,  the technologies 
have been developed in response to factor price relations  (and their 
changes)  of DCs  and not  of LDCs.  Therefore,  if unadapted,  a  wrong type 
of technology tends to be  tra..'Yl.sferred  : 
a)  By  and large,  technological  progress  in DCs  have  been  labour- and 
natural resource-saving  ~vhilc skill-,  physical  capital- and energy-
using.  vlhen  implemented in LDCs  such technologies tend to absorb their 
scarce factors  of production relative intensively. 
b)  Environmental  protection standards  of most  technologies  developed in 
Des  seem to largely exceed present  needs  of most  LDCs.  For  one thing, 
in many  LDCs  environment  still is relatively abundant  1r1hile  scarce 
in DCs.  For another, the marginal  propensity for  environmental 
protection may  be  relatively lm·l  in cases  where  excessive unemployment 
and malnutrition prevail  (i.e.,  the sensitivity to pollution can be 
expected to be positively correlated vlith per capita income). 
c)  Technological  progress  has  been partly directed towards  increasingly 
exploiting scale economies.  Given limited markets  in many  LDCs,  such 
technologies tend to generate obligopolistic market  structures. - 120-
d)  The  quality standards of products  and hence technologies,  are often 
designed for mass  consumption of high-income  countries.  Such  standards 
may  not  meet  deman<i  of LDCs. 
e)  Climatic  conditioru3  between  DC:::  and LDCs  very  much  differ.  This fact, 
in many  cases,  may  call for  ent.irely different  technology- and product-
idiosyncrasies. 
5.  Finally,  policy measures  in LDCs  and DCs  interfere with the  market 
mechanism  and thereby hinder the transfer of adequate technologies  : 
a)  Import  substitu·t;ion policies tEmd to generate  a  too  capital- and skill-
interll3ive  production structure considering factor  endowments  of LDCs. 
Also,  such policie::>  effect  fornign direct  investment  to be  governed 
by  market  preservation motives  instead of  comparative  cost  considerations. 
b) Factor price policies in many  LDCs  are detrimental  >v-ith  regard to the 
transfer of  adequ~lie technoloeQr.  For one thing,  minimum  wage  policies, 
social security systems and other labour market  regulations tend to 
raise the price of labour well  above its scarcity value.  For another, 
capital investment is highly subsidized by soft  investment  credits, 
imports of capital goods  at  prE~ferential duties  and at  overvalued 
currencies,  and by a  host  of tax allowances.  Factor market  distortions 
resulting from  such measures  bias technology  trarll3fer towards  capital 
intensity as  well. 
c)  DC's  public development  aid is often tied to purchases  from  domestic 
sources.  In such  cases,  LDCs  at best  casually get  access to most 
adequate technologies. 
d)  Incentives to support  foreign direct  investment  are usually tied to 
the amount  of capital invested and therefore favours the relocation of 
capital-intensive rather than of (unskilled)  labour-intensive activities 
from DCs  to LDCs. - 121-
Existing open and disguised unemployment  and future  population pressure 
urgently call for  changes  towards  more  labour-intensive development 
strategies in LDCs  and,  hence,  for  changes  in such policies. 
6.  Remedial  action to raise the volume  of technology transfer and to 
change  its hitherto  n~ture may  include  (1)  measures to raise transparency 
about  the  choice of technologies  (2),  measures  to strengthen the  confidence 
of would-be  suppliers of technology,  and  (3)  measures to correct  for the 
effects of distorted market  signals. 
1) In order to raise transparency development  aid may  be  directed to1vards 
providing funds  in order  : 
- to collect local technological know-hoi·l  in LDCs  systematically; 
- to gather information about  alternative technologies in DCs; 
- to establish technology information centres in LDCs; 
- to sponsor national and international fairs  for  labour-intensive 
and  intermediate technologies; 
to train up  indigenous technicans  and engineers for the technological 
needs  of labour surplus  economies; 
- to provide technical assistance for  the  establish.-nent  of resr  .£·ch, 
development  and training centres for the adaptation of transferred 
technologies; 
- to sponsor  economic  co-operation among  small- or medium-scale  firms 
from  DCs  and LDCs  or from  various  LDCs. 
2)  A number  of measures  can be  considered in order to strengthen the 
confidence of would-be  suppliers of technology.  A relevant  proposal 
envisages the bargain of free market  entry in DCs  for free  investment 
areas in LDCs.  Also,  LDCs  should be  encouraged to  join international 
patent  conventions  and to  ~~arantee expropriation procedures  according 
to international law. - 122-
3)  Corrections for distorted mark<r3t  signals may  be  effected by the 
follovling meaoures  : 
- Development  strategies in LDGs  have to  be  oriented to;mrds  labour-
intensive activities.  A..YJ.  out~rard-looking move  will,  by itself,  induce 
such a  tendency.  Furthermore,  public incentives  in LDCs  should be 
granted taking the  employ:nerrt  effect  rather than the  arnourrt  of 
capital  invested as  the relevant  criterion for the  amount  of subsidy. 
- Factor price distortions  in LDCs  have to be gradually reduced by 
bringing real  wages  in cloner  contact  to marginal productivities  and 
by diminishing the artificial underpricing of physical  capital. 
- Public enterprises may  be  forced to adopt  labour-intensive technologies 
v1henever  there is a  choice  among  alternative technologies  1vi th 
comparable total  factor  prodt1cti  vi  ty. 
- Foreign direct  investment  in labour-intensive activities  can be 
favoured in LDCs:. 
DCs  may  give incentives in order to effect  that  only adapted techno-
logies are transferred to  LDCs. 
- DCs'  development  aid could systematically favour  labour intensive 
projects,  small-·  or medium-scale operations  and the industrial 
development  of rural areas. 
Subsidies given to DCs'  foreign direct  investment  in LDCs  may  be 
linked \vith  employment  effects. 
Incentives may  be  provided to sponsor research and development  in 
labour-intensivE~ and intermediate technologies both in DCs  and LDCs. 
- The  transfer of second hand  equipment  from  DCs  to LDCs  may  be 
subsidized. 
Proposals  along  thesE~ lines are neither new  nor exhaustive.  The  urgent 
need,  however,  is that  measures  of this kind be systematically implemented. ANNEXES j uillet  1978  - Jacques Dl  B:.  ..  uT  ~ 
PREFERENCES  ( NATIOnALES)  DE  STRUCTURE  ( 1 ) • 
En  "-choisissa.n t" so it d'  a bat  t~e les barrie  res  ctoua.nicr£.·::, 
soi  t  de  renforcer 1 'a:r-:;,r;;.t ure  pr-ot~ctionni  ste  :  c 
1 est bic·n 
e Y)  ·-l"n1·+  ie •"''D""l·x  ~'"·nest·-,..,,,..  ... .,  .....  :-..  .... ~  ... ;o,...,"'le  '""I'~•  p 1 ••3  0;1  -----v!- ._v  ..  ui.,..U.  ---~  ....  "'--~..~e  ... ·  ......  ~~  ...  ..;.J,  tiu-,  ....... u .... 
r.1oins  conscier~e:-1t, les horr:.;es  poli "iques  po'..lvaicr~t  ave~  C' 
1 a  p  ..... (--: ....  ,  .... +.; o  ....  d'  ..,...'  ,...  r  .;  <"'~  •  "'  .....,  ..  1':  ......... t  t  ·  c- ....  ~  - ~  - ... e  .. ~v  .......  ~  O,;_  .... ere  .....  .;..;$.,4."-'~C:o  .::.--Our  ..:.. ..... ..)  8..."1  en  SU.,.):p•,n~ 
la q_uestio:1  de  sa~:oir C.ans  c;_ucl::..e  r.-;.es·J..re  lE.s  gouvernement~ 
I-'0U'/8.ier.t  etre "librCSlT  de  faire  ~~ tel CbOiX. 
J.  ~~rFJL:.ER  ( 1)  p.  284. 
L' coj et  a.e  ~:e  rn.p~ort est;.  d'  CXtLininer  les  conditions  ,..~e  co~~n.tibili  te 
~~tre civerses J?olitiques affectant,  d'~~e ma~~2re ou  d'ur.e autre, les 
::.·elations  e:ntre la C.E.E.  et les Pays en Voie  de  ~eveloppc.712nt. 
Par definitton,  chacune  de  ces politiques poursuit des cbjectifs 
cific:_ue~ et s • e f'force  de  real.iser ces cbjectifs a .1  moyen  d!m1e  inst~cn­
tation s:pecifiq•.1e  :  les  incorr.p':ltibili  tes peuvcnt  se si  tue:·~~  i  chacun  de 
~ 
cc~  deu.x  niveaux  - celui  c1es  ob~iccti  fs  ct cclui  des  "vc,_~f. :.  et moyens"  -
et di ff::Srcrmnent  selon 1 •hori  zon ternporel  adopt  iS. 
Le  ter.::e  d~ "preferences de  structure':  ... ,.-ise  a expriz:r:-r le  fg_i t  que, 
d.c..~r.  1:::.  .rr.esure  { et uniquement  dans  la. me sure)  ou  des  re:l&tions, pl  u3  ou 
r1oir:s  pre~ises :selon les cas,  existent entrl: la structure  d'Lctivi·_:.e( i:!-
dus~rit:l2  e  )  et les ou cert.:.ins  des  objectifs po"!lrsuivis, l'  exist2nce  de 
ces  p~li~i~aes~ poursuiv~nt tel  ensa~ble cokplexe  et  pondere·d'objecti~s~ 
a  n~ces~a.irerren·~  des- i~~·iplica.t~.or:s  structurelleG. 
1£  .  .:::  .,r.-r.C f~rencr:-~  de  s true-::-, "Jre"  nc  fcnt  C:o:1c  qu' expriocr les implica-
-ti:~::::..  r2s-u1ta::::.t,  _,;;~ant  &.  la s-:Y""":.ctu~e  d' activit;;,  de  ln.  poursuite  d'u.."'l 
e!:St  .. :;.'c-j_e  ~j 2r.'lr(•hise  C:' objecti  ~S  cconorrJiqueS  et :;;ociaux.  C test en  d.
1 autres 
te:r.;_e;:;  le.  t:radw~tion,  en  t~rr2eS  de  structure industrielle  t d r echelles  de 
- ..  -ale  '..1!"  co  11·~  ct  l ve s. 
m-:--w-::f:i_.:i!  ·:  ProbJ.enes  d
1Eco:nC!nie  Intenla::.o~c:tle~  to~0 II, Une  :'lOUVelle 
e.xrt:r:.t~·:--:~c:  2..'orea::-~isation interr.:rcio::alc  des  eche.:1ges,  P.U.F.,1950, 
:vc  -r:-:~~+ :·_,  · c.  I!I. Les  preferences  naticr,cie£. ·a.e  s·c.ructure et la notion 
de  ,:,(::;::;::_'.~~li·.J/'e  r:.:t~t·ucturel. 
J.  ~-;_::  :_.C~~.'.iT,  2?·-:cialisatic,~r. ir.L::rnationale et structure£.d'activite  ~::­
d,_;_strie-~e  ·- C:.:j~s  - 1:)75 ,et Politiques industrie.:.les et objectif's  c.• 
i::.d.lc:t.riali:sation - Cujo.s  - 1977. Cette definition genera.le etant  c~onnee  •·  un certain ·nombre  d' indicn-
tions permettront de  faire ressortir ce q\le les  .preterences  ~de structures 
ne sont pas  e1;  ce qu'  e.Lles  son-c. 
D 
1 aboJ:-d  CE~  qu' elles ne  sont pas 
Il  ne  faut pas  confondre les preferences  de  structures avec les structures 
imposeeE&  par des  groupes d'{nterets:·particuliers. 
Il existe une hierarchie explicite ou implicite entre les divers objec-
tifs.  Ma.is,  par rapport  a une.  hierarCl)iC nO:n:lative,  resultant plus  OU 
moins  de  concerta.tionsde  type  democ:ratjque, la rea.lite connait  des hie-
ra-rchies  de  fait,  resultant en outre d"  r~pports de  force entre groupes 
sociaux et d.u  jeu de  groupes  d' int(;rets.  Ceci  concerne en fait le pro-
cessus  de  choix et de  decisions  :  le fait ·que  celui-ci puisse ne  pas 
t 
etre (assez)  democratique,  ne  met 1)as  en cause, ,.en  tant que telle, le 
principe  de la hiera.rchisation d.es  objectif's  ( 1). 
- Les  preferences  de  structure ne  pellvent  etre confondues  avec  les ins-
truments poli  tiques vis  ant a reali~~er cette structure ou les objectifs 
economiques et sociaux assienes. 
Le's  voies et moyens utilises pour 11tteindre  ces objectifs reposent evi-
demment  sur llil  ·certain nombre  d'hypotheses  quant a l~ur action et leur 
efficacite.  10utre  que  la politique peut etre insuf'f'isante ou mal appli-
quee. elle P:eut  egalement etre err<:>nee,  parce que le mod~le sur lequel 
elle repose  !~e trouve infirme  dans les fait. 
- Le  fait de  j•~tifier l'existence  d•~  preferences  (nationales)  de  structure 
n'implique a priori aucun  choix quant  a.ux  structures que  l'on prefere9 
c'est-a-J.ire au contenu de  ces preferences  dans  des  circonstanceS de 
temps et de  lieu donnees.  Les  pref,ercnces  de  structures ne  peuvent en 
aucune  m;:~.nielre  en particulier et.re assimilces. a la. conservation  de 
structur~es  e~cistantes. 
S'inscri'ITant  dans.une ;perspective  de  libre-echange, cette notion introduit 
l'idee selon  :~aquelle les structures d' activite ne peuvent  pas, sans plus 
et exclusivet1ent  ~~I etre determinee  par les forces  du  march~ international. 
(1)  De  la meme  maniere les tenants  de  l'economie  de,~arche ne mettent pas 
celle-ci e·n  cause,. du  seul fait que  dans  la. realite des  rapports  de 
force  ineg~LU.X s'y etablissent. Cela signifie plutot que  ces  dernl.ers 
doivent etre elimines. - 3-
Ensuite ce  <~u'elles sont 
- Le  choix quant ala structure d'activite sotihaitable est fonction  du 
systeme  d'  obj~ectifs et tout  changement  des  ponderations ou echelles 
de valeur se traduira par  un  nouveau choiX. 
Ce  n'est q,u'en  posant le probleme  de  cette ma.niere  explicite, qu'il est 
h 
possible d'evaluer les couts et benefices  des  diverses alternatives. 
- Les  preferences sont !'expression du souhaitable a l'interieur de la 
sphere  du  faisable,  co~pte tenu de  l'ensemble des  contraintes  existantes~ 
parmi lesquelles les contraintes exterieures sont  sans  doute determinantes. 
Les  pref€:renc;es  de  structure reposent  sur un  certain noitbre  d' hypotheses , 
QU  d I  evidenC€:  SelOn leS  CBS ,qua.nt a 18.  relation entre Cette StruCture 
et la realise.tion des objectifs poursuivis, dans le cadre  des objecti:f's 
donnes.  Les  prefer.ences  de  structure ne sent done  que l'explicitation, 
a partir de  c:es  relations  ,des implications sectorielles du  systeme 
des obj ecti  :f~~  societaux que  la.  ~ociete' s 'aasigne. SOME  RESERVATICNS  ON  THE  'STRUCTURE  FREFERENCES'APPROACH 
by  P.K.M.  THARAKAN 
1.  The  present  note  raises  some  questions at the  technical 
l e.v 2l,  about  the  use  of  st~\·:~ture  preferences  ''PPPOach 
in  formulating  proposals  in  the  field of reciprocal  lm-
pli2ations of the  trade  and  development  policies of the 
EurJpean  Conmunity  towards  the developing world.  The 
fact  that ttese questions  are raised  does  not  of course 
detract  in any  way  from  the  merits  and  the originality 
*  of  the  basic  document  to which  this note  mainly  refers 
2.  The  first problem which the  above  approach ra1ses  1s  one 
of Jercepticn and  quantification of the  so-called struc-
ture preferences.  The  document  defines at one  point 
str~cture preferences  as  what  is reflected  in  the  "sector 
com}osition of the  industrial system,  of the  socio-econo-
mic  objectives  which  the country explicitly or implicitly 
mak2s  its ov n,  1n the  framev7ork  of specific constraints  11 
(p  ~  57)..  Tl..is  of  course  amounts  to  a  "revealed  structure 
preferencen  which  is time- and  country-specific.  Since 
there are  no  explicit  formulations  of the  socio-economic 
objectives that have  led to  these  structures  (if indeed 
they are  the result of  such objectives)  the authors  pro-
ceej to quantify  a  certain number  of objectives.  The 
wei~hting  s~·stem used  is rather arbitrary.  Given  the 
varied  nature of the  uperceived
11  objectives, it can  be  of 
course  nothing else.  The  approach has  certain merits as 
a  simulation model,  particularly in confronting the  policy 
rnak2rs  with the implications  of various  options. 
*  Institut de  Recherches  en  Economie  de  la Production,  Indus-
trill Redeployment  Perspectives  in  France:  Structu~ 
Preferences  and  Optimization,  Nanterre,  July  1978. 
Thi;  is the  most  concrete  presentation of the  structure  pre-
fer2nce  approach  which  the  author of this note  has  seen, 
and  it seems  to  be  the  empirical  and  theoretical basis  of 
the  relevant  sections of the draft report. -2-
But  a  simulated  optimum of arbitrary weights cannot claim posi-
tiv~ or  nor~ative value.  The  former  (positive  relevance) 
would  emerge  if the  perception and  the quantification of 
the  structure preferences  are accurate.  But  we  would  still 
neei  a  normative  framework  to evaluate  a  given  system of 
str..1cture  preference.  Other·wise  one  would  be  confusing 
the  perceivEd  structure preference of a  given  moment  (or 
altarnative possibilities  indicated  by  a  simulation model) 
as  tantamourt  to  a  normative  or  ideal structure. 
3.  As  the  authcrs are aware,  there are numerous  technical 
pro~lems that rise in trying to obtain a  multi-criteria 
optimizatior for  even  one  country.  This  is particularly 
reflected  lL  the  text  1n  ·the  increasing transformation of 
objactive  functions  into constraints.  The  major alter-
native,  i.e., the  successive optimization of the various 
fun:!tions  wculd  amount  to the abandoning  of the  simulta-
neo~s optimization approach.  But  let us  assume  that these 
and  other technical  problems  can  be  overcome.  Further 
let us  make  the  improbable  assumptions  that:  (a)  structure 
preferences  can  be accurately perceived  and  quantified  for 
a  given courtry;  (b)  the  normative  framework  necessary for 
its evaluation can  be  developed  and  (c)  a  simultaneous, 
multi-criteria optimum  corresponding to the normative  op-
timJm can  be  estimated for the country concerned.  We  would 
be  3till far  from  solving  some  of the major  problems  in 
the use  of this approach  in an  international  setting. 
Givan  the  complex  nature of the  socio-economic objectives 
believed to  be  implied  in the  'structure preferences', 
there  is no  par~,icular reason why  a  large  number  of coun-
trizs,  both developing  and  developed,  should  not  have  the 
sam;  type  of  structure preferences.  VJhat  sort of  norm 
would  one  tlen use  to arrive at an optimal  'structure pre-
ferance  allccation'  between  countries  ?  Even  if we  forget 
abo1t  a  norvative  optimum,  the  technical problems  involved 
in  ~alculating a  multi-country,  ~ulti-criteria optimum are 
lik~ly to prove  to  be  insurmountable. -3-
4.  The3e  difficulties  should  not  necessarily deter further 
res2arch  frcm  being  undertaken  in this field.  But  to  me 
it  ~ppears unjustifiable to  use  an  idea  which  is  in  its 
inf~ncy, as  yet  not  fully  elaborated or tested,  in  making 
operational policy proposals  in the  field of reciprocal 
implications  of  the  trade  and  development  policies of  ·the 
EurJpean  Conmunity  towards  the developing world  by  putting 
it Jn  equal  footing  with the  considerations  of  a  new  inter-
national division of  labour.  The  latter approach  based 
on  the  mutual  or comparative  advantage  considerations  has 
0  •  *  h  1ts well  known  shortcom1ngs  .  Eut at least we  know  t  em 
and  can  make  some  provisions  against  them.  As  far  as  the 
str~cture preference  approach  is  concerned,  due  to its 
present  tentative nature,  it does  not  provide  a  solid basis 
for  making  policy oriented  suggestions. 
*  They  are  not  repeated here  since all of  us  are  familiar 
wit~ the  literature in this  area  and  considerable referen-
ce  to these points  were  made  in our discussions. AN  APPRAISAL  OF  THE  ROLE  OF  THE  MULTINATIONAL  COMPANIES 
IN  A NEW  INTERNATIONAL  DIVISION  OF  LABOUR  0 
P.K.M.  THARAKAN 
0  ~his note is based mainly on,  Tharakan,  P.K.M.,  Multinational 
Companies  and a  New  International DiTision of Labour 
I  Introductioa 
1.  For the purpose of this note multinational companies  (MNCs)  are 
simply defined as  "enterprises which  operate or control production 
units ia more  than one  •ountry".  Tke  term  'international diTision 
of labour'  is here defined as the  "progressiYe shift in the pattern 
of eoonomic  actiTities between regions and countries oYer  time". 
It is of course  eYide~t that tke outlook of the large international 
corporations and  the resources at their disposal dot not bear  compa-
rison with,  say,  that of a  small Belgian or Dutch  textile or foot-
wear  firm shifting part of its aetiYities to a  North African country 
and  becoming a  "multinational" in the process.  Yet  to  leaYe  out  the 
latter from  the present discussion would  be  tantamount  to ignoring 
some  of the significant recent trends in the  new  international 
diYision of labour. 
II  AlternatiYe Views: 
2.1.  Any  discussion about  the role of the MNCs  in a  new  internatio-
nal diYision of labour should logically start with  the specification 
of a  framework  of eYaluation against which  the defects and  the -2-
merits of the process  can be assessed.  One  of the reasons  for  the 
conflicting Tiew~on the topic expressed by different groups of 
economists can be traced to two  alternatiTe frameworks  of analysis 
often implicitly used.  The  neo-classical economists and the 
"reTisionists" (the latter term used here as a  label of conTenien-
ce to denote mainly  the proponents of the post  - Leontief paradox 
extensions)  hold that the optimal pattern of international trade 
and specialization would result from  the concordance of the 
pattern of the factor  endowmentaof  the trading  (producing)  coun-
tries with the factor intensities of the production processes of 
the  commodities  traded  (produced).Vnder such circumstances and  sub-
ject to a  restrictiTe set of assumptions,  not  only a  better distri-
bution of income  between countries would  be possible but there would 
be also a  tendency  towards  the equalization of the returns to  the 
factors of production, i.e., labour and capital, within the  coun-
tries concerned.  The  same  framework  of analysis holds that trade and 
capital moTements  (including priTate direct inTestments)  would 
substitute or complement  eaeh other,  proTided the potential gains 
from  the process are not  eroded b7  noa-optimal interTentions b7  the 
coTernmeat.  Subsequent  elaborations of the approaah make  a  distinc-
tion between the location specific endowments  of the countries and 
the ownership specific endowments  of the  firms.  It is the  combina-
tion of the location specific endowments  of the countries and  the 
ownership specific endowments  of the  firms which will determine  the 
pattern of priTate foreign  inTestment. 
Thus  one  would  expect  the ac.ti  Ti ties of the MNCs  in the deTeloping 
countries to be  concentrated mainly  in those industries which  com-
bine either natural resources or large amounts  of labour  - for both 
of which  the location specific endowments  of the deTeloping coun-
tries  are high  - with adYanced  technology  (in production and/or in 
marketing)  for which  most  multinationals haTe  high ownership  speci-
fic  endowments.  There is some  grudging admission here that in so 
far as technology-intensiYe products are often produced and sold in 
"imperfect" markets,  the positiTe welfare effects may  not  immediate-
ly or directly follow  but will haTe  to be gained either by  taxing -3-
the higher  gains  from  the  'technological capital'  or  through  the 
ineYitable "fallout effects". 
2.2.  The  alternatiYe approach  (Marxist and radical schoola)  take a 
completly different track.  According to tn& Yiew,  extra-economic 
institutional factors  (such as the  deYelopment  of an efficient trade 
union moYement  in the  deYeloped  countries since the  end of the  19th 
century and  the lack or suppression of it in many  of the deYeloping 
countries)  rather than market  forces  haYe  determined  the wages 
receiYed  by  the labourers.  This means  that the wages  in the  develo-
ped  countries ("centre") rise proportionally with productiYity, 
while  the wages  in the  deYeloping countries  (periphery)  do  not  • 
.lnd  the decisi  Ye  element~-in the  MNC  investments in the deyeloping 
countries is the possibility of creating and appropriating - at the 
leYel of the subsidiary as well as at the level of the multinational 
as a  whole  - additional surpluses by paying lower wages  to workers 
with a  generally comparable  leYel of productiYity. It is not  claimed 
that the wages  paid by  the multinationals are lower  than the aYerage 
wages  in that industry in the deYeloping couatry  concerned;  on  the 
contrary,  they are often somewhat  higher. 
Neither is it argued  that the produetiYity leYels in a  giyen  indus-
try in the deYeloping and  the developed countries are the same.  The 
point is that the difference between  the wage  leYels are,  in any 
case,  greater than the difference between the productiYity levels  • 
.ls for  the specific mechanism  of the  transfer of the surpluses are 
concerned,  there are considerable unresolYed  intra-mural controYer-
sies although the  trends in the  terms of trade,  use of transfer 
pricing and special proYisions proYided by  both  the  "host" and  the 
"home"  countries of the multinationals are often_mentioned. 
3·  The  neo-classical  economists and  the  "reYision~s" would  probably 
argue  that nothing in the above  scheme  should necessarily prevent 
the  goY€rnments  in the  deYeloping  countries  from  using optimal 
policy interYentions to correct the  'imperfections'  in the  factor 
market  (to remove  the institutional constraints that prevent  the 
wages  from  rising proportionally to  the increases in productivity),· -4-
eliminating the subsidies provided  to attract foreign  investment 
(which  tend to cancel out  each other anyway),  and  taxing the  extra 
benefits generated by the MNCs.  The  radicals and  the neo-Marxists 
would  retort that in real:ity neither of the  above  prescriptions seem 
to be being utilized. But  from  the neo-classical point of viev,  the 
solution to that situation is not a  return to the protectionism, 
but  the  development  and  implementation of policy instruments which 
can overcome  the above-mentioned constraints. 
III.  Evidence: 
3.1.  Out  of the total foreign private investment in developing 
countries and southern Europe,  by  the  end  of 19?2,  42  per cent vas 
in the extractive and agricultural industries,  48  per cent in the 
industries oriented towards  the penetration of the protected markets 
and  only about 10 per cent in the sectors oriented tovards the  use 
of cheap,  abundant  labour. It is interesting to note that  the  las1; 
category of investment,  vhile insignificant in the total figure, 
amounts  to 34  per cent of the total private foreign investment in 
Asia. 
i 
3 .2.  Extractive industries are generally considered to use  inten~i-
vely both capital and  technology,  but  the agricultural  industrie~ 
can,  of course,  very well be labour intensive.  Industries orienteld 
! 
towards  the penetration of protected markets are likely to be  mo~e 
! 
capital intensive than the  factor  endowment  pattern of the  develd-
ping countries might  suggest.  The  inference that thus a  substantial 
part of the private foreign investments in the  developing countri,es 
is in capital intensive industries is confirmed by more  direct 
evidence  reviewed in the study(1)• 
IV.  Elements  of trade 
4.1.  Nevertheless,  the labour-intensive export oriented investmenits 
of the MNCs  in.  the developing world have  been sharply increasing 
1 
in recent years.  There are different variants of such  investments
1
• 
{1)  See  Tharakan,  P.K.M.,  op.  cit., chapter III -5-
In certain cases,  there are genuine relocations of the entire 
process of labour intensive production activities to the develo-
ping countries,  either through a  fully owned  subsidiary or  through 
some  form  of joint ownership.  Another major variant  (found mainly 
in clothing,  some  kinds  of electrical appliances,  etc.) is where 
the MNSS  organize production in the  developing countries  (mainly 
through subcontracting)  by  local firms  or craftsmen with the pur-
pose of supplying the  international market. 
A third variant is the  one  in which multinationals establish plants 
in certain countries to manufacture  components  which represent  only 
one  stage in the vertically integrated production line of· the  firm. 
4.2. Although precise measures of the magnitude  and  trend of this 
phenomenon  are difficult to obtain,  there is considerable direct and 
indirect  evidence that has  now  become  available.  The  different 
steps of the circumstantial evidence  can be concisely summed  up  as 
follows:  The  developing countries have registered very sharp increa-
ses amounting to  20  per cent or more  per year,  in the  exports of 
their manufactures  to  the  developed market  economy  countries. 
A substantial part of these exports have  a  labour-intensive charac-
ter (for example,  particular dynamism  has  been  shown  by  product 
groups  such as clothing,  metal products,  electrical and transport 
equipment  and miscellaneous industrial products such as toys,  tape 
recorders,  furs,  travel goods,  etc.). An  important part of such 
exports to the industrial countries is accounted  for by a  limited 
number  of developing countries such as Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  Taiwan, 
South Korea  and Mexico.  These are precisely the  countries in which 
important amounts of foreign direct investment  have  taken place  (The 
estimated assets corresponding to direct DAC  investments at the  end 
of 1972 amounted  to •  670  million in Hong  Kong,  •  585  million in 
Singapore,  •  ~0 million in Taiwan and •  360  million in South  Korea). 
4·3·  More  direct evidence is also now  available concerning the 
phenomenon.  Most  of the industrial countries have  provisions by 
which  domestic  components  may  be sent  out of the  country  for pro--6-
ceasing and  for assembling and  then returned to  the  country of 
origin with the tariff liability being assessed only  on the  value 
added  in the  foreign assembling and  processing.  By  1972,  the  im-
ports under  such "off-shore assembly"  provisions accounted  for  22 
per cent and  10 per cent respectively of the u.s.  and  the West 
German  imports of manufactures  from  the de•eloping countries.  What 
is more  striking is the  fact that the annual  compound  rate of the 
increase of the  imports  from  the  de•eloping and  de•eloped  coun-
tries,  under  the off-shore assembly provisions during the period 
1966-1972 amounted  to 36 per cent  for West  Germany  and  60  per  cent 
for  the United States.  In the  case  of the Netherlands,  the  imports 
from all non-European countries under  the off-shore assembly pro•i-
sions accounted  for only about  2  per  cent of the manufactured 
imports in 1972,  but it had registered an annual  compound  rate of 
increase of 39  per cent  during  the period 1966-1972.  Most  of  the 
West  German  imports  from  developing countries under  off-shore assem-
bly provisions came  from  Yugosla•ia.  For the u.s., the main  sources 
were Taiwan,  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  South Korea  and  some  of the 
Caribbean countries. 
More  than half of the  U.S.  imports  under  the off-shore assembly 
provisions  from  the  de•eloping countries have  been  concentrated in 
electronics. Textiles came  much  further  down  in the list and  accoun-
ted for  only 8  per cent  of such  imports.  But  on  the other hand,  in 
the  case of the Netherlands and Germany,  imports of textile products 
have  been  the most  important  segment  of the total imports under  the 
off-shore assembly provisions,  accounting  for  41  and  49  per cent 
respectively.  Note  that  for  the last two  countries mentioned,  the 
statistics of "off-shore assembly  imports"  mentioned pertain not 
only to de•eloping countries.  Imports  of machinery  assembled 
abroad,  probably  from  other Western and  Eastern European countries 
amounted  to  29  per cent  each in the imports under  the off-shore 
assembly provisions in West  Germany  and  the Netherlands.  The  share 
of the imports of electronic products has been extremely  low  in 
both countries in 1972. 
4.~. Some  general remarks and bits and pieces of further e•idence 
concerning  the role of the  European multinationals in this process -7-
are worth mentioning.  Till early 1970s,  the  European multinationals 
apparently played only a  minor role in the process of setting up  sub-
sidiaries in the  developing countries with the  purpose  of exporting 
to the industrialised countries.  Thus,  for  example,  by  1971,  while 
most  of the established u.s.  semi-conductor  firms  appeared  to be 
engaged in some  "off-shore assembly",  only  three manufacturing sub-
sidiaries of the  European companies were  engaged  in export production 
in this field in South-East  Asia,  Mexico  or Caribbean countries as 
contrasted with  30  subsidiaries of American  companies.  Nevertheless, 
an increasing number  of large and  small European  firms  have been, 
more  recently,  undertaking "off-shore assembly"  or other  forms  of 
export-oriented labour-intensive investments in developing countries. 
They  vary  from  industries in electronics and motor  vehicles to tex-
tile, clothing and leather products  < 1>. 
It is interesting to  note that smaller European  firms,  particularly 
in the traditional labour intensive industries such as textiles, 
clothing,  leather products etc.  seem  to be at least as dynamic  as 
the bigger multinationals in this area.  Faced with increasing labour 
costs and  sharp competition from  the imports  from  the developing 
countries,  the Dutch,  Belgian,  German  and  French  industries in the 
textile and  clothing or leather products sectors are known  to have 
relocated part of their activities in developing countries,  particu-
larly in Africa. 
V.  Some  Policy Implications: 
5.  As  we  have  seen,  a  substantial part of the private foreign invest-
ment  in the developing world 'is either in the extractive industries 
or in the  type industries which are oriented towards  the penetration 
of protected markets.  Both  types of investments are generally capi-
tal intensive.  From  the neo-classical point of view,  the  second 
type of investment mentioned  - investments  which  in effect,  tend 
to be mainly of an import-substituting kind  - have  non-optimal wel-
fare implications.  In a  number  of cases they  tend to foster indus-
tries which  are  not  competitive but which  beca~eof the protected 
(1)  Some  concrete  examples are presented in,  Tharakan,  P.K.M., 
op.  cit., chapter III -8-
markets are able to earn substantial profits.  Employment  provided 
by  such investments in the developing countries appears to be 
considerable in absolute  numbe:rs,  but  they are certainly not  in 
proportion to the  investments  undertaken.  This is of course a 
direct result of the capital intensive nature of the investments. 
There  seems  to be also a  related and much-discussed problem of 
unadapted  technology.  Nevertheless, it should be  noted that the 
indirect  employment  effects of this type of investmenteare sub-
stantial. 
The  solutions to the  problems related to the  import-substituting 
type of  investmen~mentioned in this paragraph have,  of course, 
to come  mainly  from  the  'host•  countries themselves.  There is suf-
ficient  evidence which  indicates that certain types of import-
substituting policies,  while u:nderstandable,have  turned out  to be 
self-defeating ones in the  long run.  The  question is whether  a 
progressive relazation of some  of such policies will not  be  pos-
sible in some  of the developing countries with large internal 
markets where  foreign  (and domestic)  investments have  shown  a 
tendency  to remain  too capital intensive and  non-competitive.  The 
~estion here is one  of channeling the  foreign  investments  (assu-
ming  that  the country  concerned opts  to allow  such  investments) 
into sectors which  can produce  goods  which  can meet  the  needs  par-
ticularly of low  income  groups,  remain competitive,  generate suf-
ficient  employment  and  make  an overall positive contribution to  the 
economy. 
5.1. The  export oriented investments of the  MNOs  are apparently in 
accordance with the neo-classical exigencies of a  new  international 
division of labour.  But  the conditions under which  such  investments 
take place raise some  questions of policy relevance.The most  impor-
tant among  them  are mentioned below. 
6.2. One  point  on which  there is substantial agreement is that  the 
direct employment  creation effects of the process are considerable. 
This is,  of course,  due  to  the  labour-intensive nature of the pro--9-
duction processes involved.  But  the indirect employment  effects 
are much  less certain,  partly because of the  low  linkage effects 
(in some  cases,  the inputs themselves are imported).  But  in a 
number  of countries,  related activities appear  to  have  developed. 
Neither is there any agreement as  to the  income  distribution impact  • 
Large  scale  employment  creation is1  of  course,  a  positive element 
in this connection.  But  sustained increases in the real wages  might 
lead to the  dismantling of the  operations,  unless,  of course,  the 
MNCs  will be willing to move  up  into industries with higher skill 
intensity and higher wages  (which is what  they have  done,  for  exam-
ple,  in Singapore).  The  learning effects particularly in the  training 
of the industrial  workforcl,~\he development  of the  manage~~l capa-
city could be positive. 
5·3·  The  growth effects are generally considered to be positive. 
But  the  question raised by  the  'alternative school'  that differen-
ces in the productivity between the  developing and  the industriali-
sed countries are much  less than the  differences in the wage  rates 
between  the  tvo  and  the additional surplus thus  created is not 
retained in the developing countries,  remains.  While  in principle, 
it should be possible  for  the developing countries  to retain most 
of this surplus by  proper taxation policies,  the  large scale incen-
tives offered by  a  number  of developing countries in order to 
attract such  investments nullify that possibility.  Further it ap-
pears that the instability effects of the export-oriented invest-
ments are greater because of the  easy transmission of the  economic 
fluctuations in the  developed countries and  the  danger of the rise 
of protectionist pressures in times of economic  recessions. 
5.4. It is of course possible to analyse the  experience of a  limited 
number  of developing countries which  have  followed  the strategy of 
attracting export-oriented foreign private investments and  to draw 
some  conclusions  from  it. This is, of course,  not  a  very reliable 
procedure.  Even  if it were  possible to isolate fully  the  impact  of 
this type  of investments  from  other,  related factors, it will still 
not tell us  much  about  what  would  have been the  case in the  absence - 10-
of such  investments.  Simply  from:Cactual  point of view it could 
be  noted that the Asian countries which have  followed  this approach 
have generally done  remarkably well in terms of growth,  during  the 
period 1960-1974.  South Korea averaged an annual rate of GNP  per 
capita growth  of 7.3 per cent,  Taiwan 6.5 per cent,  Hong  Kong  6.6 
per cent and Singapore 7.6, all during  the above-mentioned period. 
These rates compare  favourably with those registered by  the indus-
trialised countries during that period. As  far as the relevant sta-
tistics show,  the  income  distribution situation in South  Korea  and 
Taiwan has  somewhat  improved during the period of this sharp 
growth.  All the countries mentioned above,  particularly the smaller 
states like Bong  Kong  and Singapore  experienced sharply,  the adverse 
effects of the world recession in 1975.  But it is also worth noting 
that most  of them  showed  a  remarkable recovery in 1976  and have  not 
fared  too badly so  far in the  current year.  (Even  the most  vulnerable 
among  them,  i.e., Hong  Kong,  appears  to have  increased its exports 
by  7 per cent during the first· 9 months  of 1977). It is indeed  true 
that most  of them  {particularly the city states) are vulnerable  to 
the rise of protectionist pressures in their main  markets.  But  the 
existence of that vulnerability is not  an  economic  rationale  for  the 
setting up  of such protectionist measures  in the industrialised 
countries or  for  developing an  inward  looking policy  (as distinct 
from  a  policy of diversification)  in the developing countries con-
cerned.  The  first part of that reasoning would  be  equal to arguing 
in a  circle. 
6.  As  the above analysis shows,  no  easy generalizations are possi-
ble about  the role of the MNCs  in a  new  international division of 
labour.  Decisionmakers,  particularly in times of economic  crises, 
need simple,  clear cut answers.  But  there are  no  simple solutions 
to  complex  problems.  The  nature of the current  involvement  of the 
multinationals in the "shift of the  economic activities across  coun-
tries and regions" raises some  pertinent questions,  whether  one 
accepts a  neo-classical or an  'alternative'  point of view.  We  have 
mentioned  some  of them  in the above  paragraphs and  indicated some 
of the policy implications. -I-
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EEC  POLICIES  AND  THE  MEDIUM-SIZED  SEMI-INDUSTRIALISED  DEVELOPING  ECONOMY: 
ALTERNATIVE  SCENARIOS 
1.  In this note  a  number of issues are raised regarding alternative 
scenarios,  broadly defined,  which  might  face  the semi-industrialised 
economies over  the  medium  and  long  term,  and  the implications of such 
developments  for  the EEC. 
2.  There is no  such thing as  a  typical LDC,  but a  rough  typology can be 
sketched for  our purposes.  Five different groups  can be  identified. 
a)  Those  economies  which have pursued a  successful strategy of export-
led growth based on manufactures.  This is a  relatively select group of 
countries  (entirely in South East Asia?). 
b)  Those  countries which  have  followed  an  import-substitution strategy 
and have  subsequently begun  to enter the manufactured product export market, 
using the capacity created for other  purpb~es  (e.g.  India and Brazil)  -
for  whom  exports still account  for  a  small part of the total market of the 
manufacturing sector,  although  they have been much  more  important at the 
margin  in recent years  and have  a  particular importance  in releasing balance 
of payments  constraints. 
(By  1973,  Hong  Kong,  South  Korea,  Yugoslavia,  Brazil,  Singapore, 
Malaysia  and Taiwan  - countries  from both  (a)  and  (b)  - accounted  for  72% 
of manufactured exports  from  the  LDCs.  This,  and  a  number of other back-
ground points are  taken  from  a  very useful  study by  G.K.  Helleiner written 
for  the  ILO,  Transnational Enterprises,  Manufactured Exports  and  Employment 
in the Less  Developed Countries,  June  1975.) 
c)  Those  economies  which have  experienced a  substantial period of import--2-
substitution industrialisation but which are still dependent on primary 
commodity exports for  foreign  exchange  earnings,  and are either now  enter-
ing or see themselves potentially,  over the medium  term,  entering category 
(b) • 
d)  Those  economies  which have virtually no  industry - although in this 
case  they may  well be  low-wage  economies which would be particularly attrac-· 
tive for certain types of labour--intensive  foot-loose  manufacturing  (e.g. 
Haiti?). 
e)  The oil-rich economies which have both the intention and  the possibility 
of moving into heavier,  more  capital-intensive industries  (steel,  petro-
chemicals),  on  the basis of which  they may  become  a  significant factor in 
world trade. 
3.  The  existing importance of 1nanufactured exports varies  tremendously 
from  country to country - countries which  are particularly dependent on  sudrt 
earning are the  'city-states'  falling into category  (a)  (Hong  Kong;  Singapore) .. 
For countries  such as Brazil manufactured exports generate  a  very small pro·· 
portion of total industrial activity.  However,  it is particularly countries 
in categories  (b)  and  (c)  which  are  faced with  complex balance of payments 
constraints on  their development,  as  they  have  created an  import dependent 
manufacturing sector and have,  in  some  instances,  incurred substantial 
externally held debt:s.  Therefore,  at the margin of expansion,  manufactured 
exports  may  well make  a  contribution to the overall expansion of manufactufing 
activity well in excess of their apparent: weight within the sector. -3-
4.  Manufactured exports  from  LDCs  form only one,  modest part of the net-
work  of interconnections between  LDCs  and Europe.  At least in the short 
term,  in relation to countries in categories  (c)  and  (d),  and even those  in 
(b),  primary  commodity trade,  private capital movements,  aid  (and  in some 
cases  labour movements)  are of more  significance than manufactured exports. 
Likewise,  the interests of the EEC  in relation to access to stable supplies 
of raw materials,  direct investments,  financial obligations,  and markets 
for  manufactured  goods,  have  to be weighed against any difficulties arising 
from  imports  from  LDCs. 
5.  To  talk of the interests of the EEC  or even of individual member  states 
is an oversimplification.  It is well  known  that an  important part of the 
recent growth of trade  in manufactured commodities is intra-firm trade, 
resulting  from  the efforts of transnational corporations to rationalise their 
productive  systems  on  a  world scale.  Also,  some  industries within EEC  coun-
tries benefit more  than others  from  the expansion of LDC  markets  and  from 
the overall expansion in world trade.  On  the other hand,  certain traditional 
labour-intensive industries,  and  the  less effective competitors with the  more 
mobile  and aggressive transnationals,  lose as  a  result of structural change. 
, 
There  is therefore  a  possible conflict of interests between  firms,  between 
regions,  and,  obviously,  also the possibility of conflict of interest 
between capital and  labour. 
6.  In  the  changingpatternof world trade the consequences  for  Europe  of 
the growth of manufactured exports  from LDCs  is likely to be  felt as much  in 
terms of competition  in third markets,  including other LDCs,  as in competi-
tion in the home  market.  In this regard,  it should be noted that trade  in -4-
manufactures between LDCs  tends to involve  somewhat  more  capital-intensive 
type activities than manufactured exports  from  LDCs  to the  industrialised 
economies.  An  important aspect of growth of trade between  LDCs  in manufac-
tured commodities  represents the extension of the process of import substi-
tution across national boundaries. 
7.  Looking at the problem  from  the  LDCs'  point of view,  and  thinking par-
ticularly of countries in categories  (b)  and  (c)  above,  we  may  note that in 
response  to  (i)  the successful experience of countries in category  (a);  and 
(ii)  highly authoritative advice  from  a  number  of sources  (e.g.  the  OECD 
sponsored studies on  trade  and industrial policy of the late  1960s)  there 
has been  a  shift in the climate of opinion in relation to industrialisation 
policy away  from  inward-looking import-substitution strategies towards  the 
potential benefits of export-led growth.  By  and  large,  the new  conventional 
wisdom projected is that an industrial strategy should emphasise  the possi-
bilities of exports,  and that as  a  result,  both a  more  rational  system of 
production on  the world scale should  emerge,  and the  individual nation  should 
optimise its development potential. 
'  8.  Economic  advice  in general,  and  advice offered to third world countries 
in particular,  involves  a  lag - the battles of the last war provide  the  ba~is 
for  the current strategy.  The  advocacy of export-led industrial growth 
derived  from  the experience of the extraordinary period of growth  in world 
trade and  the  accompanying shift in the  international division of labour,  in 
the period from  the  Second World War  to the beginning of the  1970s.  The  o~i-
gins of this expansion  and  the shift in the  international division of labour 
did not,  by and large,  originate within the LDCs,  but were based upon  the -5-
confluence of forces which  sustained the long boom  in the industrialised 
market economies.  Similarly, possibilities of renewed manufactured export 
led growth is likely to be  depen~ent upon  a  new  surge in expansion of the 
international economy. 
9.  The  problems  now  being  faced result from  the  end of the  long post-war 
boom.  The  previous experience o:f  sustained interruption of world trade in 
the  1930s  and  1940s provided  th~ context for,  if not the origins of,  the 
import-substitution experience Characteristic of third world industrialisa-
tion.  It is possible to pose,  grosso modo,  one  underlying question that 
must be  faced at the global level:  will the pursuit of defensive strategies 
by the  industrialised countries contribute further to the deceleration of 
the  long term boom,  and is this likely to result in a  response  from  third 
world countries by necessity,  which will ultimately restrict the possibili-
ties for economic  expansion in Europe? 
SCENARIO  I:  RENEWED  GLOBAL  EXPANSION 
10.  One  possible avenue  of speculation is to examine  the  implications of 
extrapolating trends characteristic of the  1960s over the  longer period.  The 
expansion of manufactured exports has  made  the pattern of world trade increa-
singly complex.  Insofar as regions of the  third world expand their exports 
of manufactures,  one  might  suppose  that their economies  would begin to more 
closely resemble  those of the  industrial centre,  and analytical distinctions 
between  LDCs  and  industrialised economies  would become  irrelevant.  However, 
for  this to become  the general case  a  very considerable extension of the 
experience of the  1960s would be required.  Even if events outside  the  LDCs -6-
had not caused an  interruption to the boom,  developments within the  LDCs 
themselves might have  undermined the prospects for emulation of the  success 
stories of manufacturing export-.·led growth. 
11.  If increasing numbers  of LDCs  take up  the new  strategy and in so doing 
begin to crowd into the more  obvious  industries,  the very real danqer exists 
that they will create within those  industries conditions not dissimilar to 
those of their  ~raditional primary commodity  exports  - that is,  the very 
success of their policies would tend to swing the terms of trade against 
them.  Indeed,  the severity of the  impact on  the declining sectors in the 
industrialised sectors reflects this tendency. 
12.  Industrial growth which results  from highly mobile  transnational corpo-
rations utilising cheap labour may  also be  vulnerable to its own  success  -
firms  which are  'mobile in',  could,  in the face of rising wages,  be  'mobile 
out'.  This would  not matter,  of course,  if in the process an industrial 
sector had been created which  le!d  logically to a  higher stage of a  product 
cycle.  While this may happen in some cases, in others industrialisation based on 
particular,  limited,  labour-intensive steps in the production process may 
well create  'industrial plantations'  which,  as with earlier plantation econo-
mies,  are subject to the dictum that they neither consume  what  they produce, 
nor produce what they  consume,  and are therefore very vulnerable to externally 
induced shifts in economic  circ~wstances and  lack an  internally induced basis 
for expansion,  characteristic of  a  fully articulated economy. 
13.  Thus,  even before  1973,  the wisdom of the widespread evangelism pro-
moting manufacturing export-led growth strategies could be questioned.  The 
changing circumstances since  1973  and the increasing caution about the  future -7-
growth of manufactured imports evidenced by the need  for this working party, 
has  created heightened short term difficulties for many  LDCs.  However, 
there is another side to this story,  in that the  new  economic  disorder may 
well  force  many  third world countries to  face  up  to the  need  for more  self-
reliant growth strategies and end certain illusions regarding the prospects 
for  trade expansion. 
14.  Alternatively,  to sketch a  plausible scenario including a  generalised 
expansion of manufactured exports,  with its effects spreading to a  much 
larger number of countries than  the relatively limited group which  currently 
provide  the bulk of such trade,  requires that the nature of the adjustments 
~n the  international economy be spelt out.  In medium  to longer term periods 
(e.g.  10-20 years),  the cumulative impact of expansion of trade under  an 
export-led scenario could be very great.  Whereas  relatively limited areas 
of the  third world have been  involved in  (a),  very large areas are  involved 
in  (c),  import substitution industrialisation,  and the available industrial 
capacity is now  considerable,  while countries already involved in manufac-
tc:~·za exporting under  (b)  have  an  enormous potential capacity  (again,  e.g. 
Brazil and Incia- in potential comparable with existing industrial giants). 
We  should note a  number of points. 
a)  If significant amounts  of labour power  from  a  much  larger group of LDCs 
were  to be  incorporated into the  international trade in manufactures,  then 
not only  wou~d the process of displacement of European industries  already 
experiencing competition  from Lpcs  have  to continue,  but the process would 
have  to extend into a  consideraple range of industries which are still 
innocent of such experience. -8-
b)  If this were  to happen  on  a  viable basis,  then the  EEC  countries would 
have  to find  some  new  source for  maintaining their balance of payments posi·-
tion vis-A-vis  the rest of the world,  including the third world. 
c)  One  way  that this could be achieved would be  through the expansion of 
new  industrial sectors in Europe  to provide  the basis for  a  new  division of 
labour.  However,  the current international crisis is characterised by the 
lack of major  investment opportunities to fuel  a  new  expansion.  The  exist-
ence of major  investment opportunities  throughout the  long post World War 
boom  made  international,  intersectoral and  inter-regional adjustments that 
much  more  easy.  Recently the balance of payments between first and third 
worlds has become  increasingly dependent  on  arms  trade,  which has  the 
'virtue'  that it does  not create competitive capacity!  There  are also 
obvious possibilities for  expansion  in more  sophisticated manufactures. 
Could we  envisage the orderly emergence of a  new  division of labour over the 
next generation through  very high rates of growth in manufactured exports 
from  the LDCs,  as  experienced during the  1960s? 
d)  The possibility also exists of a  shift in the balance of payments 
from commodity  trade to services  - the sort of shift experienced by Britain 
at a  much  earlier period.  Does  such  a  shift create a  source of vulnerabi-
lity in the  developed  countries  and lower  the possibilities of productivity 
growth  in their economies?  If t.his  is so,  may  it not be desirable,  in the 
interests of equalising world  income  levels? 
e)  A manufacturing export-led growth scenario implies an ever increasing 
role  for  transnational corporations as vehicles  for  international trade, 
probably with  an  increasing proportion of such trade being intra-firm. 
Indeed,  if the  industrialised economies  were  to specialise more  and more  in -9-
the provision of services,  this would be likely to occur as a  result of a 
shift in the location of productive activity within transnational corpora-
tions, but across national boundaries.  It is not difficult to envisage a 
world  (already familiar  in some  industries) ,  in which  research and develop-
ment,  marketing services,  financial organisation and management  in general 
is concentrated at the centre,  while manufacturing processes are transferred 
to the periphery.  We  are all familiar by now  with  the phenomena of trans-
national corporations  and it may  well be  supposed that some  of the popular 
literature has,  if anything,  tended to exaggerate their importance to date. 
Would  the manufacturing export-led growth  scenario  imply  a  massive  expansion 
in intra-firm trade activities,  resulting in an  increase in the  autonomy of 
transnational enterprises  from national policy controls? 
15.  The  necessary contribution of LDCs  to such  a  scenario would be  a  high 
degree of acceptance of both  the role of transnational corporations and of 
an  increasingly intimate set of economic  relationships with  the  industria-
lised world.  Even if such  a  scenario were plausible,  there would be  very 
considerable differences  in the_prospects  for individual countries- not 
only as  a  result of underlying economic  (dynamic)  comparative  advantage,  but 
also because of differing success  in creating policy environments  (i.e. poli-
tical regimes)  conducive  to such  a  pattern of development. 
SCENARIO  II:  THE  RETREAT  FROM  TRADE  EXPANSION 
16.  The  alternative strategy of individual or collective self-reliance or 
a  resurgence of import-substitution industrialisation and of experimentation 
with more  autarkic solutions is a  more  likely scenario given existing trends - 10-
and the likely policy choices of industrialised countries.  To  describe 
this as a  strategy,  however,  can be  a  little misleading.  Since  the  shocks 
of 1973,  combining  the effects of the end of the boom  and the oil crisis, 
many  third world governments have had  to live very much  from  day to day, 
even if the  'beverage boom'  has  eased the balance of payments  situation of 
a  number  of them  ~n the  last two years.  The  development of a  new  scenario 
is more  likely to involve the ad hoc  reactions of governments  to short-term 
crises. 
17.  The pursuit of more  inward-looking strategies may  well  involve more 
radical alternatives and  sharp conflicts over  commodity policy and the role 
of foreign  investment in particular. 
18.  We  have  already suggested  some  of the implications of such strategies 
for  the industrialised countries.  To  analyse  the real-politik of this new 
situation it is necessary to look not only at the relationships between 
Europe  and the LDCs,  but also at the relationship between Europe,  other major 
trading blocks  and the more  industrialised parts of the  LDCs,  in competition 
with each other within  the third world.  Such  a  scenario would  imply the  need 
for a  more  aggressiVE!  role by Europe  to maintain its relative position com-
pared with existing and potential major competitors within the third world; 
the  same  would be true for Europe's competitors.  In other words,  the  more 
aggressive pursuit of national interest or,  more  accurately,  collective 
national interest and  more  systematic organisational conflict with other 
groupings,  is likely to be  on  the  agenda. 
19.  In such a  situation capital is likely to move  to maintain markets  and -11-
aid and other forms of leverage are likely to be more  energetically used 
to defend trading positions. 
20.  The  renewed global expansion of trade could only be  sustained if a 
means  were  found  for payments between  LDCs  and industrial countries to be 
kept in balance  - in an overall sense it could only continue if every market 
lost to an  LDC  import was  compensated  for by an  export to the  LDC.  In the 
context of a  more  self-reliant strategy likewise any decline in the rate of 
growth of imports  from  LDCs  would be  matched by  a  decline  in the  growth of 
exports,  unless  there were  accelerated capital exports. 
THE  EFFECT  OF  POLICY 
21.  Policies geared to affect relations between the EEC  and  the  LDCs  in 
trade and  financial areas will not,  in themselves,  be  a  major  factor  in 
determining the future behaviour of international trade - this will be 
mainly determined by  the overall economic performance of the industrialised 
economies. 
22.  In  summary,  from the point of view of LDCs  themselves neither scenario 
presents a  very desirable prospect.  A further line of investigation might 
involve  an exploration of the options open  to the  governments of the  LDCs 
faced by these  apparent options,  and  economic blocs as potentially powerful 
as  the  EEC.  In our own  discussions we  need to address as honestly as 
possible  two questions: - 12-
i)  How  far is there  a  conflict of interest between  the policies the  EEC 
is likely to pursue  and third world economic  interests?  While  this question 
is not explored further here,  the preliminary notes  above  are suggestive that 
~here is a  very considerable potential conflict,  although there may  also be 
possibilities for  resolving such conflicts if economic policies in the larger 
context  (e.g.  affecting the overall growth performance of the  industrialised 
economies)  are successful. 
ii)  Where  there is a  potential conflict of interest,  what are the conse-
quences  for this study group?  Are  we  to analyse  the most effective means of 
pursuing the  EEC  interest  (or the interests of some  part of the  EEC),  or 
should we  also make  explicit an  attempt to articulate the  LDC  interest.  (To 
some  degree we  must do  the latter even if only to expose  the potential con-
f~icts which  may  arise and which might therefore have  negative consequences 
at the political as well  as  the  economic  level  for  the EEC.) Dietrich  Kebschull  Hamburg,  March  1978 
Some  Thoughts  on  the  Identification 
on  Conflict Potentials 
1.  This  is  a  revised version of  the  first part of 
the paper  submitted  to  the  group  in December,  1977. 
As  announced  in  the  discussion it was  tried in 
the  meantime  to  improve  the  data basis  for  the  iden-
tification of conflict potentials.  For  this purpose 
the  data  on preferential  trade with  developing  coun-
tries  from  1976  are  compared  now  with  the  1973  fi-
gures.  The  comparison,  however,  is difficult because 
- the  1973  figures  are  for  the  EC  of  the  six,  only, 
while  the  1976  figures  are  for  the  extended  commu-
nity, 
the  signatures  of  the  various  trade positions  are 
not  always  exact  as  they give  a  wide  range  of  inter-
pretation and  can  change  within  the  analyzed years, 
- the  role  of preferential  trade within  the  total 
trade  of  the  EC  member  countries  is  - with  about 
5  % in  1973  - not  very  important, 
- the  trade  with  ACP  countries  is not  included. 
2.  In  spite of  this  the  analysis  can  give useful  addi-
tional  information  for  the  complex  problem  of reper-
cussions  because  the  GSP  meets  the  most  competitive 
foreign  trade  countries  of the  Third World.  It can  be -2-
assumed  that structural  changes  in  connection with 
an  increasing  trade  volume  due  to  a  higher  degree 
of competitiveness  result mainly  from  the  trade re-
lations with  these  countries.  In  addition,  the  GSP 
contains  by  the  division of  the  total  trade  into 
three  groups  of more  or  less  sensitive  goods  a  first 
indicator for  repercussions  which  are  to  be  expected. 
3.  The  analysis  of  the  conflict potential starts  from 
the  hypothesis  that  the difficulties  for  the  Euro-
pean producers  grow  with  the  increasing  import  share 
of goods  under  the  GSP.  Two  indicators were  used: 
= 
= 
GSP  imports  of ¥roduct  1 ••.  n  x  100  total  imports  o  product  1 •••  n 
GSP  imports  1 •••  n  x  1oo  intra EC-imports  1 ••.  n 
The  first indicator  (IA)  considers  the  impact  of 
GSP-imports  in general while  the  second  one  (IB)  re-
flects  the  competition  between  the  intra-EC  and  GSP-
trade.  Because  in  the  second  case  GSP-imports  are  com-
pared with  goods  produced  in  the  EC  this  expression 
is more  important under  structural aspects.1 
4.  The  following  implicit assumptions  were  made: 
- The  non-sensitive  goods  do  not  create  important 
structural  repercussions.  Their effects  are negli-
gible.  They  are  not  analyzed,  therefore.  Accord-
ing  to  the  grouping  of  the  GSP  this  seems  to  be 
logical.  However,  to  avoid misinterpretations 
also  these  goods  will  be  checked  in  a  later stage 
of analysis. 
1  An  analysis of figures  including  the  total foreign trade, 
production and  consumption is not possible as  the stati-
stics are not comparable. -3-
- Potential conflicts  are  supposed if IA  >  5  % 
and  IB> 1o  %.  It is  assumed  that in all countries 
structural  adjustments  take  place  if necessary, 
without  important frictions  below  this margin.  It 
should  be  emphasized,  however,  that  these  figures 
are  roughly  estimated.  It is possible  that  the 
real  conflict margin  is  to  be  put much  higher. 
- If  GSP  imports  are  a  multiple  of  the  intra-EC-
trade it can be  presumed  that  the  European  produc-
tion is pegligible  and  structural repercussions 
will not  arise. 
5.  The  analysis  for  1973  and  1976  included all sensiti-
ve  and  quasi-sensitive  CPG-positions.  The  positions 
fulfilling  the prerequisites  of  I A> 5  % and  IB > 1  o  % 
are  listed in Annex  I.  According  to  the  last assump-
tion of no.  4  (multiple  trade)  the  following  seven 
groups  of  imports  could  be  deducted  in  1976. 
16.58o1.oo6o 
26.58o1.oo8o 
2o.42o3.o18o 
2o.46o2.o27o 
21.67o4.o27o 
23.46o3.oo1o 
43.24o1.oo1o 
44.2oo6.oo1o 
carpets  knotted 
hand-guard  (gloves) 
plaitings 
per's wig 
ware 
Virginia-tobacco,  raw 
canned pineapple,  not  in slices 
Three  of  these positions  (carpets, per's wig,  ware) 
were  also  identified for  1973.  The  increase till 
1976,  however,  cannot  be  interpreted  as  an  indicator 
for  structural  changes. - 4-
The  other positions  identified as  sub-sectors 
with  a  conflict potential are generally  in  li~e 
with  the well  known  industries  with  a  high  de-
gree  of competition  from  developing  countries.  In 
1976  these  are: 
Construction electrique et electronique 
Fabrication d'instruments  de  pr~cision, d'optique 
et similaires 
Industrie  textile 
Industrie  du  cuir 
Industrie  des  chaussures et de  l'habillement 
Industrie  du  bois  et du  meuble  en  bois 
Industrie  du  papier et fabrication d'articles  en 
papier;  mi  primerie et  ~clition 
Industrie  du  caoutchouc  - transformation des 
mati~res plastiques 
The  analysis  for  ·1973  shows  a  very similar result. 
Except  of  the  two  last positions  all other subsec-
tors  were  identified,  too.  But,  in addition,  four 
other "weak"  sub-sectors  an~ represented 
Sport articles  and  toys 
Glass  and  ceramics  industry 
Tannery 
As  a  result it can  be  stated that  there  is  a  typi-
cal group  of industries  in both years  with  only 
some  - slightly changing  - products  which  is  con-
fronted  to  important  competition of the  DCs.  Struc-
tural  changes  due  to  the  intensified relations  of -5-
the  Third World  countries with  the western  coun-
tries  may  be  concentrated  in  these  industries.  The 
following  product  groups  confronted with  a  high 
competition  are  represented in  1973  as  well  as  in 
1976. 
Articles  de  voyage  etc.  en plastiques 
Tissus  de  eaton 
Ficelles,  cordes  en  chanvre 
Huile  d'Ylang-Ylang et de  Niaouli 
Peaux  d'autres  animaux 
Plaques  pour  constructions,  en  pate  a papier, 
en  bois  defibres  ... 
Fleurs  etc.  artificiels 
Ampoules  en  verre pour  recipients  isolants 
Verrerie  d'eclairage 
Vis  a  bois 
Couteaux 
Couverts  en  acier non  corrosif 
Articles  de  jeux:  Kricket et Polo 
Parapluies  etc. 
Pastiches 
Briques  etc.,  refractaires 
Lampes  electriques portatives 
Poupees  de  tout  genre 
Mouchoirs  de  pochettes:  en  tissus 
Sacs  d'emballage,  usages,  en  eaton 
Tissus  de  soie  ou  de  bourre  de  soie 
It has  to  be  emphasized,  however,  that in no  case 
an  entire industry is "threatened"  by  this  compet1-
tion but  only  a  small  suo-sec to-r, -wh-ich  is  normally 
not  very  important  for  the  whole  economy. -6-
Therefore  sub-sectors  of  other  (highly  competitive) 
industries  are met,  too.  In  1976: 
Raffinage  de  p~trole 
Industrie  des  produits  min~raux non  m~talliques 
Industrie  chimique 
Fabrication d'ouvrages  en  m~taux 
Construction  de  machines  et de  mat~rial m~canique. 
Except  of the first position  these are  the  same 
sub-sectors  as  in  1973.  Instead of "Raffinage  de 
p~trole" two  other parts of the  petrochemical  in-
dustry have  been  identified. .ANNEX  I 
C.E.  R:F.A. 
Code  CPG  (Branche  NACE I  CLIO)  1976 
% des  \  des  % des  % des 
import.a- importa- importa- irnport::J.-
tions de  tions  tions de  tions 
toute  d'origine  toute  d'origine 
origine  corrrn.mau- origfue  corrrrnunau-
taire  taire 
1o.4lo2.oo2o  (441)  6,46  1o,25  6,8o  1o,98 
Articles de  voyage  etc. en plastiques 
1o.64o2.oo8o  (451)  4,42  11,65  5,42  14,71 
Chaussures  en plastiques 
14.55o9.oo6o I  18.55o9:oo7o  3,51  12 ,o2  5,35  16,86 
14.55o9.oo7o  (43o)  I  J8.55o9.oo8o  s,so  58,83  12,23:  155,o1 
Tissus de  coton 
14.55o9.oo8o  (43o)  I  18.55o9.oo9o  3,63_  12,76  18,28"  148,37 
Tissus de  coton 
16. sso  1  :·oo6o  (  438)  24,38  36o,28  19,4o  2o.835,o3 
Tapis  A points noues  on enroules 
16.59o4.oo7o  (439)  2o,o8  49,o3  31,41  68,o4 
Ficelles,  cordes en chanvre 
2o.271o.oo2o  (14o)  1o,55  14,37  8,78  11,3o 
Huiles legeres pour d'autres usages 
2o.281o.ooSo  (251)  4,o3  7,37  8,93  11,33 
Anhydride  et acides phosphoriques 
2o.33o1.o14o  (256)  13,29  73,76  4,59  5,39 
Huile d'Ylang-Ylang et de  Niaouli 
2o.41o4.o16o  (441)  6,oo  16,o6  4,63  6,75 
Peaux  de  caprins 
2o.41o5.o17o  (441)  18,~3  67,87  29,87  97,9S 
Peaux d' aut  res animaux 
2o.42o3.o18o  (442  et 453)  21.88  285,73  36,53  1.371,79 
Gants  de  protection en cuir 
2o.4413.o19o  (461  et 463)  6,o6  6o,38  7,37  97,23 
Bois  rabote ••• 
2o.4414.o2oo  (462  et 465)  12,75  28,73  11,81  33,68 
Bois  simplement scies longi  tudinalement 
2o.4424.o23o  (465)  12,14  38,56  23,7o  155,69 
Utensiles de  menage  en bois 
2o.4So4.o26o  (466)  4,58  23,53  16,89  44,96 
Liege  agglomere 
2o.46o2.27o  (466)  41,52  564,22  58,27  L49o,  1~ 
Matit~res a  tresser tissees !  plat 
on parallelisees 
2o.48o9.o28o  (462  et 471)  6,32  22,52  7,8o  18,76 
Plaques pour constructions ,  en pate 
A papier, en bois d6fibres ••• 
E 2o.67o2.o29o  (495)  29,o1 
Fleurs etc. artificiels 
69,12  39.,44  11o,1·1 
2o.6813.o32o  (244)  1o,6S  15,63  15,74  2~),64 
Plaques en  amiante 
2o.7o12.o36o  (247)  7  ,9o  15,22  11,13  211 ,96 
Ampoules  en verre pour  r~cipients 
.isolants 
2o.7o14.o37o  (247  et 347)  6,76 
verrerie d'eclairage 
14,o8  18,25  6S, 19 
Zo.7332.o4oo  (313)  28,76  4o,67  41,82  2o4,2'2 
Vis .. A bois 
2o.82o9.o46o  (316)  8,83  22,2o  7,7o  44,So 
Couteaux 
2o.8214.o47o  (316)  7,34  29,76  6,44  6o, 19 
Couverts  en acier non  corrosif 
2o.8441.o5oo  (323)  5,47  22,75  1  ,6o  8,32 
~1achines a couche 
2o.8So1.o52o  (342)  2,o2  2,99  5,67  1o,44 
Pieces  detach~es pour rnoteurs 
~G.8518.o5So (342,  344)  3,83  6,64  7·,81  2o ,95 
Gondensateurs  electriques 
Zo.8519.o57o  (342,  344)  3,32  5,89  5,42  14,58 
Resistances 
2o.9oo9.o62o  (373)  1,67  3,o3  8~o3  23,54 
Appareils a projection fixe 
2o.91o9.o64o  (374)  11) 77  33,21  8, 29  14,oo 
Bottes de  montres 
2o.97o6.o67o  (494)  7,87  2o, 16  8,31  22,7'4 
Articles de  jeux:  Kricket et Polo 
21.o6o1.oo8o  (453)  15,99  73,42  13,92  75,86 
Parapluies etc. 
~1.67o4.oo9o (495)  45,61  479,42  64,94  1. 314 ,~;3 
Postiches 
21.69o2.o1oo  (248)  1,22  1,86  5.38  11,7o 
Briques etc., refractaires 
21.7116.o14o  (491)  8,11  18,96  8,o7  Zo,:n 
Bijouterie de  fantaisie 
21.851o.o2oo  (347)  8_.75  18,85  12,51  29,o8 
Lampes  ~lectriques portatives 
21.97o2.o2So  (494)  8,88  39,16  15,79  128 ,o2 
Poupees  de  tout genre 
21.97o3.o26o  (494  et 481)  5,26  9,46  7,76  17,65 
Autres  jouets 
23.46o3.oo1o  (466)  1o,23  138,6o  16,49  3o6,88 
Oumages  de  vaunerie 24.5SoS.oo1o  I  28.5SoS.oo2o  2,89  5,76  7 '15  1o,96 
24. 55_o8.oo3o  C43o)  15,52  32,65  0  0 
Tissus de  coton boucles  du  genre 
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l)  Introduction 
In  this note  some  preliminary ideas  are  formulated  re-
garding  future  developments  in the  international locat-
ion of  industrial activities,  emphasizing  in particular 
the  future  relations  between  industrialized  (EEC)  and 
developing countries. 
We  start by briefly indicating  some  of the  major  charac-
teristics of the  process of international economic  deve-
lopment  during  the past three decades.  Increasing inter-
nationalization of production  and  trade,  in particular 
between  the  industrialized countries,  combined with rapid 
technological  innovation  and diffusion are  some  of the 
crucial  factors  in explaining the  dynamism of the in-
dustrialized countries.  However,  in the early seventies 
it became  apparent that this model  began  to  show  signs 
of exhaustion  and  that profound readjustments,  both on 
national  and  international  scale are  needed  to  introduce 
a  new  dynamism.  This  readjustment process will have  im-
portant implications  on  the  role of the developing  coun-
tries. 
Next,  we  sketch  a  "scenario"  of  a  possible structure of 
future  economic  growth  of  the  EEC  within  the  internation-
al context.  This  may  serve  as  a  frame  of reference  for 
analyzing the transfer process  of productive activities 
to  low-wage  countries  in which  European  industry is in-
volved. 
The  tendency  towards  relocation will not  be  equally 
strong for all kind  of  industrial activities.  The  body 
of this note consists of  a  more detailed analysis of 
the  pressure  on different kind of industrial activities 
to be  transfered to developing countries. -2-
The  position and  role  in the world  economic  system of 
part of the developing world is expected to drastically 
change  in the  future,  industrial exports  becoming  a 
realistic perspective.  However,  thE!  growth,  the struct-
ure,  the  qcographic,tl  pattern  and  the costs  and benefits 
of  these exports are  strongly  influenced by  future de-
velopments  in the  industrialized countries.  That  is why 
the  emphasis  in this note,  is on  the latter category of 
countries. -3-
2)  From mono- to multipolarity in international econo-
mic  relations 
The  international  economic  development  of the past three 
decades  can  be  characterized by  the  following  elements: 
an  accelerated growth of industrial production in 
both developed  and developing countries  (period 
1950/52  to 1967/69;  annual  compound  growth rates of 
industrial production:  USA  4.0%,  Europe  7.1%,  other 
developed countries  7.9%,  developing countries  6.8%, 
world  average  5.9%;  source  UN:  Economic  Survey of 
Europe  1971); 
a  increasing degree of homogenaty  in the structures 
of production  and  consumption  in the more  developed 
industrial countries; 
a  change  in the  economic  prominence  of the different 
industrial countries,  revealing a  tendency  from  mono-
to multipolarity in international economic  relations 
(percentage  share  in world  industrial production,  in 
1950  resp.  1969  of  USA  45  resp.  33%,  Europe  39  resp. 
48%,  other developed  countries  7  resp.  9%,  developing 
countries  9  resp.  10%;  source:  see  above); 
an  intensification of the  international division of 
labour  and  an  higher degree of interdependence be-
tween  the  economies  of the industrial countries, 
mainly  based on  intra-sectoral specialization; 
an  acceleration of the process of centralization and 
concentration of capital,  leading to  an  increasing 
superiority of  a  limited number  of large companies 
on  national economic  level as well  as  in the  field 
of international investment  and  trade.  This  trend 
can be  observed in the  areas of industrial product-
ion,  of  finance  and of trade  (for example,  intra-
firm trade within MNC's  is already estimated at  45% 
of total world trade;  source:  Michalet,  ILO); 
an  increasing participation of Western capital in 
the  industrialization process of developing coun-
tries; - 4-
the  emergence  of enclave--like export industries in  a 
number  of developing countries  almost entirely domin-
ated by Western  industrial and/or commercial  firms. 
The  utilication of  cheap  local  labour  forms  almost 
the  only  link with  the national  economy; 
an  increasing dependency  of  industrial countries on 
raw materials  imports  from developing countries. 
The  economic  problems  of  the  sevent:ies  have  revealed  a 
large measure  of inst.abili  ty in  thE!  Western  economic 
system,  specifically in the  areas of growth,  trade,  in-
vestments,  monetary relations,  etc  ...  The  recession has 
made  apparent,  that in  the  past  a  ~rreat deal of 
industrial adjustment  has  been  taking place without 
causing serious problems  (with  the  exception of regional 
imbalances,  on  the other hand it has  demonstrated  the 
unavoidance  of further  readjustmen1:.  However,  frictions 
created by  adjustments  in  a  period of  slow  economic  ex-
pansion are  much  harder to tackle. 
Part of  the  adjustment  problems  emanate  from  the  increas-
ed competition of industrial products  from developing 
countries.  However,  it would  be  incorrect to consider 
the change  in the  structure of trade between  developed 
and developing countries  as  the result of  a  more  or less 
successful  industrialization policy on  the part of the 
developing countries.  On  the contrary,  basically it is 
the  outcome  of  a  shift in emphasis  in  the  international-
ization process of Western capital. 
On  the  one  hand  MNC's  clearly display  a  tendency  to in-
crease  the  transfer of specifically their labour  intens-
ive production activities  t:o  low-wage  countries.  On  the 
other hand,  it is also closely bound-up with  a  change 
in the  structure of commerce. 
The  concentration of commercial  capital has  enabled  a 
number  of trading houses  (both wholesale  and retail 
trade}  to develop  a  global  scanning capacity.  This  means,, -5-
they  have  developed the capacity to utilize on  an  inter-
national  scale  the  cheapest  supply potentials of espec-
ially labour  intensive consumer  goods,  and  - if necessary  -
to organize  this supply.  In addition to having  ample 
marketing  experience,  they  have  the  means  to organize 
local production  in  low-wage  countries  for  export pur-
poses,  without necessarily using their own  capital for 
productive  investments.  The  resulting imports  of  indus-
trial goods  into developed countries is competetive  to 
such  a  degree  as  to  leave manufacturers  no  alternative 
but to proceed to transfer part of their productive 
activities to  low-wage  countries as well. 
Precipitating the  further analysis  somewhat,  we  would 
like to state already at this point,  that these  imports 
from developing countries  are not  the real cause of ad-
justment  problems  in industrialized countries,  notwith-
standing claims to the contrary of  some  of the  most 
affected social groups.  The  origion lies in the struct-
ure of the expansion of  the capitalist system of the 
industrialized countries,  in particular the  process of 
internationalization. -6-
3)  The  structure of  future  growth  and  trade;  elements 
of  a  "scenario" 
In as  far as  the  process of relocation of productive 
activities  from developed  to developing countries is 
strongly  influenced by  developments  originating in the 
industrialized countries,  it is necessary to indicate 
at least  some  of the major  elements  related to these 
developments.  However,  the  ideas  formulated  in this 
paragraph are very preliminar indeed.  They  are based 
upon  a  limited number  of qualitative assessment ele-
ments,  and  not  on  a  profound analysis. 
With  these  limitations in mind,  we  think  the  following 
trends  the most  relevant ones: 
industrialized countries will be  faced  by  a  consider-
able  lower  average  economic  growth  than  in the past, 
one  of the  main  reasons  being the  absence  of  new 
dynamic  industries capable of magnetizing  the rest 
of the  economy.  The  break-through of potentially 
very  dynamic  industries still encounters  serious 
barriers either of  a  technological,  a  financial or 
a  political nature.  On  the other hand,  the  consumer 
demand  for certain categories of  goods  is showing 
signs of satisfaction.  Thus,  prospects at the  medium 
term are characterized rather by  a  further expansion 
of existing industrial structures than by  a  drastic 
and  rapid change  of these structures; 
in view of the  growing  homogeneity of production 
and  consumption  structur~ of the  industrialized 
countries,  the  less spectacular technological pro-
gress  and the diminished  growth,,  it can  be  anticip-
ated that mutual  trade between  developed countries 
will be  less dynamic  than  in the past.  A  somewhat 
more  protectionist attitude can be  expected,  ex-
pressed particularly at a  sectoral level and  in the -7-
form of non-tariff bar:riers.  Direct  investments will 
continue  to be  instrumental  to  the penetration of 
each other's.markets,  in the  course of which  the in-
vestments  stream  from  Europe  and  Japan  to  the  USA 
will  increase  in significance.  On  the  other hand, 
trade  in manufactures  with developing countries  is 
expected  to accelerate; 
in the  next  10  to  15  years  unemployment  might  become 
a  structural feature  of industrialized countries as 
well  (already now,  unemployment  is considerably 
higher  than official statistics indicate).  Economic 
growth will be  relatively slow,  technological develop-
ment will remain of  a  labour-saving nature.  Industry 
is already expected to diminish its demand  for  la-
bour.  A  continuation of the  trend to expand  labour-
intensive productive activities in  low-wage  countries 
is to be  anticipated,  a  trend that will be  hard to 
curb  in view of  the  sharpened  competition between 
industrial countries. 
The  services sector will be  incapable of absorbing 
the available  labour adequately;  the private sector 
is expected to increasingly introduce  labour-saving 
methods,  the non-private sector is not  expected to 
maintain its rate of expansion of the past in view 
of governmental  budget limitations; 
limited wage  rises,  coupled with  a  drop  in the 
growth  rate of transfer allowances  distributed 
through  the public budget  appear to justify the 
assumption  that in future private consumption will 
show  only  a  modest  expansion  in industrialized coun-
tries; 
to  improve  growth prospects for  the  EEC,  emphasis 
will be  placed on  the  expansion of technology-in-
tensive capital goods  industry and  on  the promotion 
of exports,  in particular to developing countries; 
as  far  as  economic  relations between  industrialized 
and developing countries are concerned,  several 
tendencies  are apparent. -8-
The  tendency of  the  three centre areas to create and 
re-affirm their economic-geographical  sferes of in-
fluence  is on  the  increase.  Japan is pursuing  a  con-
sistent and  dynamic  policy vis-A-vis  SE  Asia,  the 
EEC  directs its efforts particularly to Africa  and 
the Mediterranean,  while  the  USA  traditionally 
claims Latin America  as its backyard.  This applies 
to trade treaties,  investment  streams,  etc.,  and  to 
a  similar extent to political and  military alliances. 
However,  this tendency  is subject to considerable 
restrictions in view of the  mounting mutual  competit-
ion between  the  industrial countries.  As  a  matter of 
fact,  neither of the  three~entres can economically 
afford to concentrate exclusively on  these areas  in 
case this would  prove  to be  detrimental  to its own 
competetive position.  In this context,  the differ-
ences  in degree  and kind of  raw material dependency 
springs to mind,  but also the variations in wage-
costs,  in particular in as  far  as  these are co-deter-
mined  by  the possibility to  import  cheap industrial 
end-products  and  intermediat:e  products  from  develop-
ing countries.  In other words,  even disregarding in-
ternational  power politics  (also  from  the socialist 
countries)  a  kind of vertical division of the world 
cannot be  envisaged,  in spite of tendencies  towards 
regionalism. 
Anyhow,  the  developing world will,  to our  view,  con-
stitute the arena par excellence in which  the  growing 
competiveness of the centra will be  exposed.  On  the 
other hand,  the necessity for  industrialized coun-
tries to safeguard its raw materials  supply might 
provide  a  number  of producer countries the  leverage 
for  following  a  more  independent  industrialization 
strategy.  Differences between  the various developing 
countries  in terms  of  economic  structures,  and  levels 
of living might,  however,  become  more  pronounced. - 9 -
4)  Perspectives  on  industrial relocation 
The  major  argument  for  the  assumption  that the  tendency 
towards  a  relocation of productive activities to develop-
ing countries will persist in  the  future,  is that present 
and  expected  competetive relations  among  the industrializ-
ed countries  or,  rather,  among  the various  internation-
ally competing capital groups  - will enforce  an  intensif-
ication of  the  search  for  the  least expensive possibilit-
ies  for  supply on  a  global  scale.  Slowing  down  this re-
location of productive activities to countries with  a 
low-wage  level would  lead to  a  disadvantage  in the  comp-
etetive position of  the non-internationalizing capital 
groups,  which  would  be  particularly detrimental  to in-
dustries which export  an  important part of their product-
ion  (but  not  only for  these). 
Technical,  financial  and  organizational capacities in 
corporate business  - especially,  but not exclusively, 
in MNC's  - have  been  sufficiently developed  to permit 
the  actual realization of  a  further  international diff-
usion of productive activities.  This  tendency is re-
inforced by  the developing countries  themselves,  which 
offer very  generous  incentives  for  the  establishment 
of  foreign  export-oriented industries.  In addition,  the 
developing countries are highly interested in an  in-
crease  in local  industrial processing of their exported 
raw materials,  and  - more  generally  - in  a  higher part-
icipation in the world  trade in industrial products. 
One  could thus  speak of  a  push  and pull effect. 
The  tendency  towards  relocation will not be  equally 
strong for all industrial activities.  The  approach  in 
this paragraph will be  primarily to  a  more  detailed 
level.  As  a  angle of view  we  choose  the nature of the 
production process,  and  we  will also pay attention to 
competetive relations  - as  far  as  this is possible on 
this level. - 10-
The  nature of  the  production process  allows  a  classificat-
ion of  industries  into  four  categories:  processing indus-
try,  semi-finals  industry,  specialized capital goods  in-
dustry  and  assembling  indust:ry. 
It must  be  observed explicit:y that this classification  rna~{ 
not necessarily  apply  to single corporations;  on  the  con-
trary, it will often run  transverse the structures of cor-
porations.  In our opinion,  a  classification such  as  this 
fits the reality of  the  relocation process better than  an 
approach based  on  a  branch or individual  firm  analysi~ One 
can observe  that in many  cases  there is no  relocation of 
corporations,  but rather of certain parts of the  production 
processes of corporations. 
The  same  is true  regarding  the transfer of branches  of  in-
dustry. 
Of  particular relevance with  respect to competitive  relat·· 
ions  is the  measure  to which  productive activities have 
been  internationalized,  as well as  the  role played  in this 
by  productive c.q. coiDmercial  capital. 
A)  Processing  industry 
In the processing industry  raw materials are transformed 
by  way  of  a  process  - into  totally different products 
that serve  as  an  input  produc~for other industries.There-
fore  these  industries are  found  mainly  in the first phases 
of  raw material processing  (extract~ion of metals  from ore, 
chemical  processes,  generation of electricity,  beer-brewing, 
coffee-roasting,  sugar-manufacturing,  etc.). 
A distinction can  be  made  between processing industries 
that use  extractive resources  and  those that use  agricultu-
ral or animal  products  for  :raw  materials.  In  the  former, 
economies  of scale play  a  very  important part.  They  gene-
rally are capital and  technology  intensive  and little la-
bour  intensive. -11-
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In order to utilize the  advantages  of  producing  on  a  large 
scale  - under  pressure of competition  - a  permanent high 
level of  investment is necessary,  which  necessity is further 
reinforced by  technological development.  As  a  result,  the 
industry is confronted regularly with problems  of over-capa-
city.  Periods of intensive competition alternate with pe-
riods of cartel-like cooperative connections.  A  continuous 
centralization process  takes place. - 12-
Production  and distribution of especially the more  heavy 
processing industry are dominated  by multinational product-
ion corporations,  and  commercial  capital hardly  plays  an 
independent  role. 
From  the  above it follows  that differences  in wage-levels 
between countries  are  not  an  important  factor  in deciding 
the  locational. pattern.  On  the  ground  of relative factor 
intensity one  would  expect this capital and  technology  in-
tensive  industry to be  pre-eminently suited  for  developed 
countries,  the  more  so as  the availability of  a  large  home 
market  may  be  an  important basis. 
In spite of this,  we  believe on  the  ground  of various ar-
guments  that in  the  future  there will be  to  a  certain ex-
tent  a  relocation towards  developing countries. 
In  the first place we  must  consider  that the  strategy of  a 
growing  number  of developing countries is aimed  at acceler-
ating the  industrialization process.  In  a  number  of 
countries that have  advanced  further  in establishing im-
port substituting industries,  an  in1portant  internal market 
begins  to develop,  which offers  eve~r more  possibilities 
for  parts of the  processing industry.  The  effect of this 
on  European  processing industry cannot yet be  calculated 
here.  For where  continuing  import  substitution will  reduce 
export possibilities,  a  beginning industrialization in 
other developing countries  may  expand  these possibilities 
again. 
In the  second  place  - and  more  directly related to the re-
location issue  - there is a  growin<J  pressure  from  raw  ma-
terials producing countries  to  have  their exports pro-
cessed  locally.  Especially when  thE~ possibilities of these 
countries  to  form cartels or use  o1:her  means  of  power  grow, 
the possibilities for establishing export-oriented pro-
cessing industries  in certain developing countries will 
increase.  In  view of  the  growing scarcity of  raw materials, - 13-
the  industrialized countries might  be  faced with  a  struct-
ural raise in relative prices.  This will afford  the pro-
ducing countries greater possibilities for  setting up  pro-
cessing industries which will be  to  a  large extent export-
oriented.  Already  do  we  observe that  a  number  of developing 
countries are  engaged  in the accelerated setting up  of in-
dustries  in the  fields  of petrochemistry,  fertilizers, 
man-made  fibres,  iron  and  steel,  etc ..  This  industrializat-
ion  takes  place  in cooperation with Western  MNCs,  as  these 
still hold  an  anormous  lead in technology  and distribution. 
We  do  not  expect  a  very rapid relocation,  in the  sense of 
a  direct termination of productive activities in the West 
in order to stimulate their expansion  in developing coun-
tries.  The  relocation process will be  confined to the 
mar~in, i.e.,  the establishing of  new  investment projects 
will be  increasingly located  in developing countries.  The 
implications of this  for  production in Europe  are  represent-
ed  graphically in Figure II. 
FIGURE  II 
Expected  production  volume  of European  processing industry 
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The  fact that the  slow-down of industrial growth  in Europe 
will increase .the existing capacity problems  and  thus  make 
it necessary to discard the  least remunerative production 
units has  been  taken  into account  in the  above.  Internatio-
nally,  this will  improve  the  competitive  position of  Europe 
somewhat.  There will also  be  a  pressure  towards  solving the 
capacity problems  through exports  and  interfering with 
competing  imports  by  way  of market--protecting  forms  of co-
operation.  In connection with this we  expect that the anti-
cartel policy of the  EEC  will not  be  too  intensive,  as  a 
number  of these products might  be  characterized as being 
of strategic significance  for  the European  economies.  Poli-
cy will  indeed be  aimed  at not  becoming  too dependent  on 
imports  for  the  provision of  these products. 
In other words,  there also are  factors  that will hinder  a 
very  fast relocation,  and  insofar as this relocation occurs, 
there will be  an  attempt  to direct it to territories which 
are within the direct economic  and political sphere of 
influence of  Europe. 
In  processing industries we  often deal with  large  invest-
ment  projects  - in view of the  importance of the  economies 
of scale.  This constitutes  an additional  argument  to be 
selective in relocation because of the great economic 
and  political risks. 
In recapitulation,  one  can  assume  that the effects of relo-
cation in terms of production and  trade will in the next 
10 to  1.5  years  emerge  only little by little,  and will mani-
fest  themselves  after that time  in  a  more  exponential way. 
The  situation in the  light processing industries  (such as 
food  processing,  paint industry,  filling-plants,  etc.)  can-
not  be  fully  compared with this.  Not  only do  economies  of 
scale play  a  less decisive  role  and  is the  technology ele-
ment  less  important,  but  a  major difference is also that 
merchant capital forms  a  more  independent  factor.  This  type 
of processing industry fits into the process of  import  sub-- 15-
stituting industrialization in developing countries,  while 
for parts there  do  also exist possibilities for  exports 
to the markets  of industrialized countries.  In  the latter, 
especially developed  countries'  merchant capital will be 
actively  involved,  for  example  in  the  field of  food  pro-
cessing. 
The  developments  for  heavy  and  light processing industries 
sketched  above  have  consequences  for  the  structure of the 
processing industries in Europe.  The  heavy  industry will 
more  and  more  take to products  and  processes of  a  higher 
complexity of both  the  technology  involved  and  the  labour 
required;  and will  further  specialize in  a  much  more  ef-
ficient  use  of  raw materials.  The  rising prices of materi-
als  and  energy,  together with higher environmental  demands, 
will necessitate  new  material-and energy  saving technologi-
cal developments  (a  higher degree of chemical  integration, 
substitution of certain  raw materials,  recycling materials, 
etc.;  among  process  improvements  we  may  mention electro-
chemistry,  combustion  technology,  membrane  technology, 
biotechnology,  powder  technology,  catalysis,  etc.}. 
For  the  lighter processi11g  industry we  expect  a  develop-
ment  towards  the production of  goods  with  a  lower  price 
and  a  higher  income elasticity,  for which  aggressive 
marketing will be  important. 
B)  Semi-finals  industry 
The  semi-finals  industry processes  elementary industrial 
outputs  into intermediate products  that serve  as  input 
for other industries.  Examples  are  fabrics,  leather,  fur, 
plywood,  synthetic  products,  etc .. This  type 
of industry covers  a  vast area,  which makes  it difficult 
to present other than  general  statements  about  the ten-
dency of relocation towards  developing countries.  As  for 
relative factor  intensity it occupies  an  intermediate - 16-
position.  It is neither markedly  labour  intensive  (like 
the  assembling  indystry),  nor capital intensive  (like the 
processing industry),  nor  technology  intensive  (like the 
specialized capital  goods  industry) . 
For  two  reasons  we  expect  in  the  future  a  relocation of 
part of this industry to developing countries.  In the first 
place,  it concerns activities which  rather quickly qualify 
for  local production  in countries which  follow  a  strategy 
of  import  substituting industrialization.  This will espec-
ially have  an  impact  on  the  export possibilities of Europe. 
In the  second place we  expect  a  relocation of those parts 
of the semi-finals industry that  - while  not  highly con-
centrated themselves  - are clenched  in between monopolistic 
input  and  output industries.  This  category will not  be 
able  to pass  on  raises  in costs originating  ~ither in the 
input side or  in the manufacturing process  to their clients. 
As  far  as  the  advantages  of  the  low  costs of  labour  in de-
veloping countries  compensate  the disadvantages  of relocat-
ion,  part of the  semi-finals  industry will begin producing 
in developing countries  for markets  in the  industrialized 
countries. 
Since  in the  full  range  of  the  semi-finals industry the 
substitution effect is probably more  important quantitativ-
ely than  the  relocation effect,  we  expect for  the  next  10 
to  15  years  a  gradual but  limited shift in the structure 
of production  and  trade. 
C)  Specialized capital  goods  industry 
In  the specialized capital goods  industries machines  are 
produced to measure  or in small  series  for other indus-
tries and  corporations.  It concerns especially the pro-
duction of  investment  goods  such  as  apparatuses  for  the 
processing  industry,  packing  and  assembly  machines,  other 
specialized machinery,  etc  ...  This  industry is not  so much - 17-
labour  intensive  as  capital  and  research  intensive  although 
specific parts  of  this  industry  may  be  also  labour  intensive 
(e.g.  the construction part).  The  branches  in which  these 
industries operate are often structured hierarchically. 
They  are  dominated  by  a  number  of  large corporations which 
in their production  make  an  intensive use  of  a  great  num-
ber of  small  to medium  large suppliers.  The  latter also 
perform  a  bufferfunction to absorb  the  trade  cycles,  which 
are  rather strong for  these  industries.  Merchant  capital 
hardly plays  an  independent  role. 
The  contribution of the developing countries to  the world 
production of capital  goods  has  up  to  now  been marginal. 
For  the  future  we  expect  a  limited  increase of their re-
lative contribution,  especially on  the  ground  of  the  pro-
spects with  regard to the  industrialization process  in 
developing countries,  an  increase which will be  realized 
through  import  substitution,  particularly in  those  coun-
tries that dispose of  a  large  internal market  and  have 
already made  progress  in the  industrialization process 
(e.g.,  textile machines).  Fundamental  changes  in the  in-
ternational structure of production  and  trade  in this 
type  of  goods  by  this  limited increase  are  not  expected 
to occur,  due  to the enormous  technological  lead of 
Western  industry.  Important exports  in this field  from 
developing  to industrialized countries are therefore not 
foreseeable  in the near  future. 
In our  opinion,  the most  important shifts will occur with-
in  Europe  itself.  The  less  favourable  growth  prospects, 
together with  the  need  for high expenses  on  research and 
development will necessitate  a  process of  increasing con-
centration.  The  pressure  for  this is raised by  the exis-
ting capacity problems.  Intensifying cooperation between 
corporations  in this industry is facilitated by  the  fact 
that there is hardly any  independent merchant capital; it 
is hindered,  however,  by  the occurrence of national  con-- 18-
tradictions within the  EEC  (e.g.,  ship-building).  These 
contradictions are  accentuated by  t.he  circumstance that 
most  national administrations of  the  EEC  have  given prio-
rity in their industrial policies to research  intensive in-
dustries.  As  a  consequence,  the  problems within this  indus-
try will have  to be  solved  on  a  supra-national  level. 
D)  Assembling  industry 
This  industry uses  intermediate products  and  components 
for  the production of finished articles,  which  are trans-
mitted  through various  trade channels  to individual con-
sumers.  This mostly concerns  consumer  goods  (like  automo.-
biles,  television sets,  radios,  refrigerators,  soft drinks, 
ready-made  clothing,  etc.),  although the  production of 
certain capital goods  (e.g.,  trucks,  simple  standardized 
machines,  etc.)  may  also be  put in this category.  The  in-
dustry often is very  labour  intensive,  relatively little 
capital intensive  and  little to moderately research inten-
sive. 
Among  the  assembling  industries we  find  branches which  are 
little concentrated,  but in which merchant capital plays 
an  important role  (e.g.,  clothing,  foot-wear,  furniture) 
along with branches which  are  dominated  by multinational 
production corporations  (e.g.,  electronics,  automobiles). 
The  first category is characterized by  a  very high degree 
of  labour intensity,  using preferably low-skilled  labour. 
Technological development is rather slow  and  so is the in-
crease  in labour productivity.  Economies  of scale are of 
limited significance as  far  as  productive activities are 
concerned.  Entry into the  sector is relatively easy.  The 
number  of  firms  is large  and  many  are  family  owned.  Manage-
ment  is often rather poor.  Wage  levels are below average 
industrial wages,  making it difficult to obtain an  ade-
quate  and  sufficient labour  supply. - 19-
In addition,  these  industries are  confronted with  an  in-
creasing degree  of monopolization  on  the output side.  The 
retail trade  has  gone  through  a  process  of concentration 
and  integration,  and  purchases  from  these  industries are 
made  by  an  ever decreasLng  number  of decision centres.  As 
consumption patterns were  becoming  more  homogenized,  re-
tail trade organizations were  able  to  introduce  a  syste-
matic  policy of merchandizing.  Once  their needs  were  de-
fined,  price became  the essential criterion in selecting 
suppliers on  an  international scale.  Through direct in-
vestments  (including  joint ventures)  or  through  commercial 
sub-contracting  (including  sometimes  technical assistance 
contracts)  an  important shift in the pattern of internat-
ional  trade  in this kind of product was  originated.  Inter-
national competition becoming  stronger,  the  surviving in-
dustries had  no  alternative but internationalize their pro-
duction also,  either by  sub-contracting work  to  firms 
abroad or by  transferring parts of their productive acti-
vities to  low-wage  countries by  means  of direct investment. 
It is particularly in this type of assembling  industries 
that  a  major  shift in the  international division of  labour 
between  industrialized and  developing countries has  occurr-
ed,  and it can  be  expected that this shift will persist 
in the  future,  in particular for  those kinds of products 
that are  not very  susceptible to  fashion  or delivery time. 
In other words,  in our opinion the developing countries 
have  a  reasonable  chance  to set up  export production with 
local capital.  It must  be  observed,  however,  that these 
industries are  very unstable due  to the  high degree  of 
dependence  on  both  the  internationally operating merchant 
capital,  and  the  trade policies of importing  industrializ-
ed countries. 
Under  present conditions,  the establishment of this kind 
of industrial activities in developing countries  can hard-
ly be  considered as  a  genuine  contribution to development. - 20-
For  assembling industries that are dominated  by multinat-
ional production corporations  the relocation process  is 
well  under  way.  The  instability is somewhat  less intense 
than  for  industries dominated  by  merchant  capital,  as  the 
MNCs  set  up  and  spread  production more  systematically. 
Pursuing ~European policy  aimed  at slowing  down  relocation 
of this  type  of  industry is very hard  if not  impossible, 
in view of the  international character and  the  power  of 
the  MNCs. 
The  above  considerations  can  be  summarized  as  follcws: 
Perspectives of relocation of  industries  to developing 
countries 
factor  intensities  relocation 
Industries 
Assembling 
Semi  finals 
Specialized 
cap.  goods 
Processing 
+  high 
o  intermediate 
low 
labour 
+ 
0 
0 
-
capital techn.  natural  expectance 
resources 
- -/o  0  + 
0  0  0  0 
o/+  +  - -
+  +  +  + - 21-
5)  Concluding  remarks 
The  above  presents  no  more  than  a  very  first approach 
of possible  changes  in the  structure of international 
production  and  trade  in industrial products.  The  main 
agents  of  change  are multinational production  firms, 
internationally operating trading firms,  and  govern-
ments  in both industrial  and  developing countries.  The 
direction of  change  is determined  by  such  factors  as 
technological  development,  competetive relations,  pol-
icies of governments,  etc .. 
In Figures III and  IV,  the  major  factors  of change  are 
presented graphically:  Firgure III applying to  an  assem-
bling industry;  Figure  IV  to  a  processing industry. - 22-
FIGURE  II  THE  RELOCATION  PROCESS  OF  THE  CLOTHING  INDUSTRY 
------
organized 
labour 
-------.;;.;;..c=-=--' 
government 
readjustment 
_________  P~~~~s 
!n1E'r~at10nal 
competetive 
pOSIII:On 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  L _____ _ 
I 
I 
I 
I  t 
DEVELOPED __j 1--- DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES  - I  COUNTRIES 
cloth1ng 
cons 
clolh1ng 
cons 
L -- -- -· -- - -- - real wages 
_____ ·{  govei·nmeni __  _ 
lnclo'nl1ves  --·-··--·------ 23-
FIGURE  II  THE  RELOCATION  PROCESS  OF  THE  CLOTHING  INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPED __j L__  UEVEL OPING 
COUNTRIES --l,- COUNli-=<1ES 
r---------------------1 
CM"N~C's  r  ------; I 
I  I 
L-------·r--_J 
I 
mat .. nul: 
1npub1 
:  /Jtechno~ 
I  I 
I 
orgrJrliZPd 
lut,our  ,  ' 
,...--..J--T......,..,.......,  rrl-++--L--.  _____ J  ~h~a  p 
~~(2~'------ -------.----' 
1ntf>rr ~.;r,onal 
competet1ve 
pOSi!~on 
I 
t 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  L _____ _ 
I 
I 
I 
I  t 
clothmg 
cons 
L  -- -- - -- - - - - real wages 
cloth1ng 
cons L'extension  de~  ichanges  PD/PVD  et  l'emploi 
industriel  dans  les  PD,  en  particulier  dans 
les  pays  de  la  C.E.E. 
V.  Van  Rompuy 
Professeur  K.U.  Leuven 
Les  sections  principales  de  cette  note  traitent  des  reper-
cussions  pour  l'emploi  industriel  dans  les  pays  diveloppis 
(PD)  de  l'extension des  ichanges  entre  ces  pays  et  les  pays 
en  voie  de  diveloppement  (PVD)  (1),  ainsi  que  de  l'orienta-
tion  de  la  politique  a  suivre  en  cette matiere  (sections  2 
et  3).  Cette  partie  est  pricedie  de  quelques  considerations 
concernant  les  consequences  generales  de  cette  evolution  du 
commerce  international  (section  I)  et  suivie  de  certaines 
observations  au  sujet  des  methodes  de  travail utilisies  dans 
la  recherche  scientifique  portant  sur  le  phenomene  en  ques-
tion  (section  4). 
I.  Consequences  generales. 
Les  COUtS  et  les  benefices  d'une  extension  des  echanges 
PD/PVD  pour  l'evolution  interne  des  PD  peuvent  etre  resu-
mes  comme  suit  : 
(I)  En  dehors  des  modifications  des  courants  commerciaux  la 
nouvelle  division  geographique  du  travail  entre  les  PVD 
et  les  PD  donne  egalement  lieu  notamment  a  des  diplace-
ments  ou  transferts  d'activites  industrielles.  Dans  les 
etudes  consulties  l'analyse  de  l'incidence  des  phenomenes 
cities  sur  l'emploi  est  limitie  aux  changements  dans  les 
importations  et  les  exportations  des  biens  industriels. -2-
- en matiere  de  benefices 
.  Avantages  en  ce  qui  concerne  l'ecoulement  des  produits 
et  !'augmentation  de  la  productivite  (economies 
d'echelle,  specialisation accrue  dans  les  branches 
d'activite  ayant  une  productivite  elevee). 
Les  PVD  disposent  de  plus  de  devises  pour  acheter  des 
biens  et  des  services  dans  les  PD  (surtout  des  biens 
de  capitaux,  technologie,  gestion,  formation). 
Les  salaires  et  les  profits  dans  certains  secteurs, 
ainsi  que  dans  !'ensemble  le  revenu  national  reel 
augmentent.  Ces  avantages  ne  sont  obtenus  qu'apres 
une  restructuration des  activites.  Apres  la  nouvelle 
affectation des  facteurs  de  production,  la  stabilite 
d'emploi  s'accroit et  les  conditions  de  travail 
peuvent  egalement  s'ameliorer  . 
.  Avantages  pour  les  consommateurs  qui  disposent  d'une 
offre  plus  diversifiee  de  produits  et  qui  peuvent 
acheter  les  m~mes produits  i  des  prix  plus  bas. 
L'~ccroissement du  revenu  reel  donne  egalement  lieu  i 
une  demande  additionnelle  pour  d'autres  produits. 
(Dans  les  PVD  !'amelioration  se  manifeste  surtout  dans 
un  premier  stade  par  l'accroissement  du  produit  inti-
rieur  reel,  l'apport  des  devises  et  l'elargissement 
d'emploi  salarie). 
- en matiere  de  couts . 
•  Dependance  accrue  pour  ce  qui  est  du  prix  et  de  la 
qualite  des  produits,  ainsi  que  pour  la securite 
d'approvisionnement. 
Pertes  d'emplois,  de  revenus  et  de  capitaux  dans  les 
branches  d'activites  qui  sont  exposees  aux  importa-
tions  en  provenance  des  PVD. -3-
Couts  de  l'aide  a  la  reconversion  sociale  et  a  la 
restructuration  economique.  La  mobilite  et  la mutation 
des  facteurs  de  production  impliques  demandent  du 
temps  et  occasionnent  des  couts.  On  doit  tenir 
compte  d'un  certain degre  de  chomage  et  prendre  en 
consideration  : 
a)  la  perte  de  salaires,  ainsi  que  la distribution 
temporaire  de  revenus  de  remplacement; 
b)  les  couts  de  formation  et  de  recyclage  et  dans  une 
eertaine mesure  des  deplacements  geographiques  de 
forces  de  t~avail et  d'usines  avec  ce  que  cela  1m-
plique  pour  !'infrastructure  technique,  sociale, 
intellectuelle; 
c)  l'octroi  d'une  pension  anticipee  a  certains  tra-
vailleurs  licencies. 
Etant  donne  que  les  travailleurs  mis  en  chomage  appar-
tiennent  dans  une  mesure  assez  considerable  a  la 
categorie  des  non  ou  peu  qualifies  la  reconversion 
sociale  sera  lente,  difficile et  parfois  impossible. 
Les  avantages  et  les  inconvenients  ne  sont  pas  repar-
tis  d'une  fa~on proportionnelle  entre  les  agents 
economiques  (consommateurs,  producteurs,  travailleurs). 
Des  lors  la  distribution  des  revenus  et  des  fortunes 
est  egalement  touchee. 
La  plupart  des  couts  peuvent  etre  reperes  d'une  fa~on 
plus  exacte.  Les  inconvenients  sont  assez  bien  locali-
ses  dans  la  population  et  ressentis  plus  vite  et  plus 
directement.  Les  personnes  touchees  sont  bien  organi-
sees  et  ont  une  influence  politique  parfois  considerable 
Dans  une  large  mesure,  les  couts  sont  plus  concentres 
dans  le  temps  et  ont  un  caractere  temporaire.  Par 
centre  les  avantages  pour  les  PD  sont  largement  dis-
perses  dans  la  population  (consommateurs)  et  sont 
assez  peu  ressentis  directement,  aussi  bien  par  les 
travailleurs  que  par  les  chefs  d'entreprises.  L'ampleur 
quantitative  ne  peut  etre  determinee  que  d'une  fa~on 
tres  approximative.  On  a  cependant  !'impression qu'en -4-
longue  p€riode  ils  ont  un  caract~re substantiel  et  plus 
durable  que  les  inconvenients. 
2.  Commentaire  sur  certains  etudes  concernant  !'incidence  des 
echanges  accrus  avec  les  PVD  sur  l'emploi  dans  l'industrie 
des  PD. 
- L'emploi  dans  l'industrie  manufacturi~re des  PD  depend  d'un 
certain  nombre  de  variables  parmi  lesquelles  !'importation 
provenant  des  PVD  est  loin d'itre  le  plus  important. 
Les  modifications  de  la  demande  interieure  et  exterieure, 
le  progr~s  technique  ainsi  que  1'€volution de  la  producti-
viti  economique,  des  importations  provenant  des  autres  PD 
ainsi  que  des  pays  de  l'Est et  de  la  politique  economique 
sont  les  facteurs  les  plus  d€terminants. 
- L'extension  des  €changes  avec  les  PVD  ne  resulte  pas  exclusi-
vement  de  la  liberalisation des  importations  dans  l1:s  PD. 
Bien  qu'a  cet  €gard  la  politique  poursuivie  par  les  PD  en 
mati~re  du  commerce  exterieur  revite  une  importance  tr~s 
grande,  d'autres  facteurs  comme  par  exemple  !'industrialisa-
tion  autonome  des  PVD,  due  aux  initiatives  int€rieures  ou 
exterieures,  ont  un  impact  considerable  et  definitif. 
Le  nombre  d'etudes  concernant  les  problimes  en  question 
publiees  dans  les  pays  membres  de  la  C.E.  n'est  pas  tres 
eleve  (v.  Bibliographie- section  5).  11  est  probable  que 
dans  certains  pays  existent  des  travaux  non-publies  ou  que 
des  recherches  sont  encore  en  cours  d'execution.  Il  serait 
intiressant  d'encourager  les  contacts  entre  les  chercheurs 
nationaux  afin  de  confronter  les  vues  sur  les  methodes, 
les  statistiques  et  les  risultats. 
Une  recherche  au  niveau  de  la  C.E.  s'indique. -5-
- Etant  donne  la  complexite  des  problemes  traites  les  travaux 
de  recherche  sont  effectues  dans  le  cadre  d'un  grand  nombre 
d'hypotheses  simplificatrices.  En  outre  le  materiel  statis-
tique  disponible  est  parfois  deficient  ou  se  rapporte  a  des 
periodes  trop  lointaines.  Des  lors  certains  commentateurs 
arrivent  a  la  conclusion  que  les  resultats  obtenus  sont  peu 
ou  meme  pas  fiables. 
Quoi  qu'il  en  soit  la diversite  des  methodes  utilisees 
empeche  ou  rend  en  tous  cas  difficile  la  comparaison  des 
resultats  obtenus  pour  les  divers  pays  et  meme  pour  un  pays 
determine. 
D'ailleurs  tous  les  auteurs  sont  d'avis  qu'il  ne  faut  pas 
accorder  une  importance  trop  grande  au  niveau  absolu  des 
resultats  obtenus.  La  signification reside  surtout  dans  le 
fait qu'ils  donnent  une  idee  de  !'orientation generale 
des  changements  impliques,  ainsi  qu'un  ordre  de  grandeur 
tres  approximatif  permettant  de  mieux  saisir !'importance 
relative. 
Entre  1970  et  1976  la  repercussion  nette  et  globale  n'a 
pas  ete  considerable. 
Pendant  cette  periode  en  France  le  nombre  d'emplois  indus-
triels  affectes  a  la  production  de  !'exportation destinee 
aux  PVD  a  cru  plus  rapidement  que  celui  des  emplois  repre-
sentatifs  des  importations  en  provenance  des  PVD. 
Dans  les  autres  pays  de  la  C.E.E.  pour  lesquels  des  donnees 
sont  disponibles  (e.a.  R.F.  Allem.,  Belgique,  Pays-Bas) 
le  solde  a  ete  legerement  negatif.  Dans  tous  les  pays,  y 
compris  la  France,  certains  secteurs  industriels,  notamment 
cuir,  chaussures,  textile,  vetement,  bois,  meubles  ont 
enregsitre  une  perte  nette  d'emplois  parfois  assez  consi-
derable. 
En  ce  qui  concerne  l'avenir  certains  auteurs  font  la  renar-
que  que  la division  internationale  du  travail  avec  les  PVD -6-
ne  se  trouve  que  dans  un  stade  initial.  La  lib~ralisation 
du  commerce,  ainsi  que  !'industrialisation des  PVD  ont 
a  peine  commence. 
-La plupart  des  ~tudes arrivent ala conclusion  que  !'inci-
dence  nette  et  globale  de  l'extension des  ~changes  PD/PVD 
sur  l'emploi  sera  probablement  n~gative pour  les  PD,  tout 
au  moins  dans  un  premier  stade  et  dans  !'hypothese  que  la 
dur~e  du  travail  reste  constante.  Les  calculs  au  sujet  de 
la  r~percussion globale  nette,  comparant  la  cr~ation d'emplois 
qui  resulte  d'un  accroissement  des  exportations  avec  l'effet 
inverse  provoque  par  les  importations  additionnelles,  :partent 
de  l'hypothese  qu'une  mobilit~ suffisante  des  facteurs  de 
production  aussi  bien  inter- et  extrasectorielle,  qu'entre 
les  regions,  existe  ou  a  eu  lieu  (moyenne  ~cheance). 
Dans  la  Republique  Federale  Allemande  la  perte  nette 
d'emplois  industriels  serait  pendant  la  periode  de  projec-
tion  1973-85  de  l'ordre  de  5,7%  du  nombre  d'emplois 
enregistr~s  en  1974  (environ  0,4%  par  an). 
En  France  les  echanges  de  produits  industriels  avec  les 
PVD  pourraient  inflechir entre  1976  et  1985  l'emploi  indus-
triel  dans  une  fourchette  de  -5  et  +5%  (environ~ 0,4%  par 
an)  selon  que  l'on  pr~voit une  evolution  tres  defavorable 
ou  favorable. 
Cependant  le  besoin  de  reconversion  sociale  se  mesure  :plut6t 
par  le  nombre  d'emplois  supprimes  suite  a  !'augmentation 
des  importations  provenant  des  PVD.  En  France  ce  montant 
s'evalue  entre  3  et  7%  des  effectifs  1976,  ce  qui  represente 
une  pression  annuelle  de  reclassement  d'environ  0,3  a  0,6% 
des  effectifs  de  l'industrie.  Le  chiffre  correspondant  pour 
la  R.F.A.  s'eleve  a  10.7%  (environ  0,7%  par  an).  En  compa-
raison  avec  la  periode  1962-75  la  perte  pendant  la  periode 
1975-85  serait  six  fois  plus  elevee. -7-
- Tous  les  auteurs  des  etudes  consultes  soulignent  qu'en 
matiere  d'emploi  les  problemes  reels  proviennent  avant 
tout  de  la  concentration  des  repercussions  negatives 
sur  certaines  categories  de  travailleurs,  d'entreprises 
ou  de  regions. 
- L'information  statistique disponible  est  insuffisamment 
affinee  pour  atteindre  le  niveau  qu'exigerait  une  compre-
hension  detaillee  du  probleme  pose,  ainsi  qu'une  approche 
concrete  des  problemes  de  restructuration. 
Plus  precisement,  cela  signifie  qu'une  branche  d'industrie 
qui  selon  les  etudes  realises  sur  la  base  des  donnees 
statistiques  disponibles  se  trouve  dans  une  situation  de 
pression  sous  l'effet  des  importations  provenant  des  PD, 
n'est  pas  necessairement  en  difficulte  dans  tous  ses  sous-
secteurs  ou  produits.  Inversement,  une  evolution  positive 
dans  un  secteur  ne  veut  pas  dire  que  certains  problemes  ne 
se  posent  pas  pour  certaines  entreprises  a  l'interieur 
meme  de  cette  branche  d'activite. 
Il est  evident  que  les  effets  sont  et  seront  differents 
selon  les  structures  ex{stantes. 
En  general  l'effet neghtif  de  !'importation accrue  provenant 
des  PVD  est  plus  reduit  dans  les  pays,  les  regions  ou  les 
entreprises  ayant  une  valeur  ajoutee  par  unite  de  travail 
relativement  elevee. 
Au  fur  et  a  mesure  que  l'eventail  des  importations  s'etend 
a  des  produits  d'intensite  de  travail  moins  elevee  -ce  qui 
est  deja  le  cas  pendant  les  dernieres  annees- des  effets 
negatifs  sur  l'emploi  seront  relativement  plus  reduits  et 
du  point  de  vue  geographique  moins  concentres. 
- Les  caracteristiques  des  travailleurs,  susceptibles  de 
perdre  en  premier  lieu  leur  emploi  actuel,  sont  les 
suivantes  :  main  d'oeuvre  peu  qualifiee,  salaire  relative-
ment  bas,  main  d'oeuvre  feminine  et  manuelle  dans  l'industrie -8-
manufacturiire  r~alisant une  valeur  ajout~e par  unit~  de 
travail  assez  basse,  main  d'oeuvre  ig~e,  certains  immigrants 
et  jeunes. 
- Egalement  sous  r~serve de  ce  qui  a  it~ dit  ci-haut  le 
ch8mage  affectera  en  ordre  principal  certains  groupes  de 
produits  d~termin~s,  dont  la  fabrication  est  parfois  concen-
tr~e  dans  certaines  r~gions  I  faible  d~veloppement  ~conomi­
que  et  souffrant  d~jl d'un  ch8mage  elev~. 
- En  ce  qui  concerne  les  secteurs  les  plus  vuln~rables 
mentionn~s dans  les  ~tudes  sur  la  base  des  degr~s  d'agr~ga­
tion  conformes  I  la  convention  statistique  les  m&mes  dino-
minations  reviennent  pour  chaque  pays  :  p.ex.  chaussure, 
cuir,  textile,  v&tement. 
Souvent  sont  mentionn~s  ~galement  :  bois  et meubles,  jouets 
et  parfois  (notamment  pour  la  R.F.A.)  certains  branches 
d'activit~s fabriquant  des  biens  d'iquipement  comme  l'indus-
trie  ~lectrotechnique,  l'optique,  la  m~canique fine,  ainsi 
que  les  instruments  de  musique,  la  c~ramique fine,  la  fibre 
artificielle,  le  verre ..  Pour  les  branches  d'activit~ les 
plus  sensibles  dont  les  emplois  menac~s  sont  le  plus  nombreux, 
la  contrainte  annuelle  au  reclassement  se  pose  en  R.F.A. 
pour  1  I  5%  de  l'emploi  1974.  Les  chiffres  correspondant 
pour  la  France  s'~livent  I  0,7  I  3%  des  effectifs  1975 
si  l'on  admet  l'hypothise  d'une  ivolution  tris  d~favorable 
et  atteignent  un  niveau  insignifiant  dans  une  hypothise 
d'~volution tris  favorable. 
Comme  l'~tude  fran~aise le  constate  le  d~veloppement des 
~changes  commerciaux  entre  les  PVD  et  les  PD  de  la  C.E. 
ne  constitue  pas  une  grave  menace  globale  sur  l'emploi 
industriel,  mais  ils  se  posent  ni~anmoins  d'ardus  problemes 
d'adaptation  aux  travailleurs,  aux  chefs  d'entreprises  et 
aux  pouvoirs  publics. -9-
- Le  climat  general  depressif  actuel  ainsi  que  !'intensifi-
cation  de  la  concurrence  sur  le  marche  mondial,  aussi  entre 
pays  industrialises,  rend  chaque  effort  supplementaire  en 
matiere  de  restructuration  economique  et  de  reconversion 
sociale  particulierement difficile.  L'ampleur  du  chomage 
actuel  reduit  considerablement  la mobilite  professionnelle 
et  regionale,  ceci  renforce  la  resistance  contre  de  nouvel-
les  liberalisations  du  commerce  et  conduit  a  des  exigences 
de  nature  protectionniste. 
3.  Quelques  conclusions  pour  la  politique  a  suivre. 
- La  resistance  contre  des  mesures  tendant  a  !'extension des 
echanges  avec  les  PD  provient  de  la  concentration sectoriel-
le  et  geographique  des  repercussions  negatives  notamment 
sur  l'emploi,  ainsi  que  du  climat  economique  general  depres-
sif.  Ces  deux  facteurs  constituent  des  obstacles  importants 
pour  le  developpement  des  relations  economiques  entre  les 
PVD  et  les  pays-membres  de  la  CEE. 
- Dans  chaque  pays  un  certain  nombre  d'organisations  profes-
sionnelles  d'employeurs  et  de  travailleurs  et  de  certaines 
autorites  regionales  craignent  des  importations  accrues; 
les  partisans  se  trouvent  dans  les  milieux  des  industries 
nationales  exportatrices  et  d'importateurs  et  d'entreprises 
multinationales. 
- Etant  donne  que  le  solde  en  termes  de  croissance  du 
revenu  reel  dans  les  PD  sera  positif il est  equitable  et 
indique  que  la  communaute  aide  les  personnes  et  les  entre-
prises  desavantagees  en  soutenant  leurs  efforts  d'adaptation 
et  en  procurant  aux  travailleurs  licencies  un  revenu  de 
remplacement  adequat. - 10-
- Un  climat  economique  et  social  facilitant  l'ouverture  des 
marches  des  PD  aux  produits  provenant  des  PVD  necessite 
un  retablissement  d'un  taux  convenable  de  croissance  du 
PNB  dans  les  PD  et  une  nette  amelioration  de  la  situation 
en  matiere  d'emploi. 
En  outre,  il est  indispensable  de  mettre  en  place,  tant  au 
niveau  national,  qu'au  niveau  de  la  C.E. 
a)  un  systeme  d'indicateurs  signalant  i  temps  aux  autorites 
responsables  du  monde  politique,  industriel  et  syndical, 
les  changements  structurels  dejl  en  cours  et  en  perspec-
tives; 
b)  les  instruments  d'une  politique  de  restructuration  ~cono­
mique  et  de  reconversion  sociale. 
- Selon  les  cas,  la politique  d'adaptation  doit  concerner  les 
groupes  de  travailleurs,  les  entreprises,  les  secteurs  et 
les  regions. 
- Cette  politique  d'ajustement  ne  doit  pas  necessairement 
gtre  con~ue exclusivement  en  fonction  des  problemes  causes 
par  les  relations  avec  les  p·vo,  mais  dans  son  elaboration 
et  son  application il faut  explicitement  tenir  compte  de 
cette  dimension  nouvelle. 
- Dans  le  cadre  d'une  politique  de  restructuration et  de 
reconversion  le  facteur  temps  revgt  une  importance  capitale. 
Ces  adaptations  structurelles  et  fondamentales  se  font 
de  par  leur  nature  d'une  fa~on difficile et  progressive. 
Le  rythme  d'adaptation  impose,  p.ex.  par  la  liberalisat:ion 
des  ichanges,  doit  gtre  ferme,  mais  raisonnable  et  i  la 
mesure  des  personnes  et  institutions  concernees.  C'est  i  ce 
prix  qu'une  telle  politique  peut  gtre  acceptable  et 
acceptie,  et  des  lors  gtre  efficace  et  possible. -II-
4.  Quelques  observations  au  sujet  des  methodes  de  travail 
utilisees  par  les  chercheurs. 
I.  Plusieurs  methodes  ont  ete utilisees. 
Exemples  : 
a.  Analyse  ex  post  de  l'evolution des  echanges  entre 
PD  et  PVD  pendant  une  periode  allant  de  5  a  10  annees 
(France  1970-76,  R.F.A.  1968-74,  Pays-Bas  1970-74) 
(Bibl.  (1),  (2),  (9)). 
Calcul  du  trend  en  fonction  du  temps  et  extrapolation 
de  ce  trend  dans  diverses  hypotheses  (mecanique, 
favorable,  defavorable).  Estimations  d'interval  (France 
1978-85,  R.F.A.  1973-85). 
Application  de  coefficients  d'emploi.  Resultats  au 
niveau  national,  sectoriel  et  regional.  Bibl.  (2), 
(3),  (9). 
b.  Pour  une  annee  determinee  l'hypothese  d'une  augmentation 
equivalente  des  importations  et  des  exportations  concur-
rentielles  de  produits  industriels  des  PD  en  rapport 
avec  les  PVD.  Calcul  des  effets  (directs  et  indirects) 
sur  la  production  interieure  a  l'aide d'un  tableau 
input-output.  Application  de  coefficients  d'emploi. 
Bibl.  (1),  (8),  (5)  a  (7),  (13),  (14). 
c.  La  methode  b.  est  appliquee  aux  secteurs  sensibles 
et  est  completee  par  une  estimation  de  l'augmentation 
probable  des  importations  et  des  exportations  (R.F.A., 
1976-80)  a  l'aide  d'une  projection  du  trend  pour  un 
passe  adequat  (1972-75)  Bibl.  (5)  et  (6). 
d.  Apres  reduction  d'un  modele  assez  simple,  les  change-
ments  dans  l'emploi  industriel  sont  supposes  etre  une 
fonction  de  quatre  variables  dont  deux  exercent  une - 12-
influence  positive  :  les  changements  dans  la  consomma-
tion  apparente  et  interieure  et  dans  les  exportations 
(destinies  aux  PVD)  et  deux  autres  ont  une  incidence 
negative  :  les  importations  (provenant  des  PVD)  et  la 
productivite  du  travail.  Le  calcul  a  ete  effectue  pour 
la  Grande-Bretagne  se  rapportant  i  la  periode  1970-75. 
Bibl.  (10),  ainsi  que  (12)  pour  les  Etats-Unis. 
D'autres  methodes  sont  possibles,  p.ex.  concernant  la 
methode  c.  prevision  des  importations  et  des  exportations, 
pas  i  l'aide  d'un  trend  en  fonction  du  temps,  mais  i 
l'aide  de  fonctions  econometriques  d'importations  et 
d'exportations. 
2.  Il est  inherent  i  n'importe  quelle  methode  scientifique 
de  reposer  sur  des  hypothises  de  travail  simplifiant  le 
problime. 
En  l'occurence  il s'agit  selon  les  techniques  employees 
(a)  .  absence  d'une  theorie explicite;  les  extrapolations 
partent  de  l'hypothise  que  dans  le  futur  tout  se 
passera  comme  dans  le  passe; 
les  coefficients  d'emploi  se  rapportant  aux  produits 
exportes  vers  les  PVD  sont  identiques  i  ceux  appli-
cables  aux  produits  importes  provenant  des  PVD; 
.  les  importations  accrues  provenant  des  PVD  remplacent 
automatiquement  une  production  interieure  equivalente 
et  les  emplois  correspondants;  on  fait  abstraction 
de  l'importation d'autres  pays,de  l'adaptation  de  la 
production  interieure,  de  la modification  des  prix 
relatifs,  de  la  difference  entre  les  prix  unitaires; - 13-
difficultes  en  rapport  avec  !'expression a  prix 
constants  (deflation adequate  de  tous  les  variables 
concernes  ,  la  determination  des  consequences  dyna-
miques  resultant  des  changements  dans  les  prix 
relatifs); 
•  fixite  de  la  duree  de  travail. 
(b)  •  hypoyheses  statiques  de  la methode  J/0 
- prix  relatifs; 
- coefficients  de  production; 
structure  des  importations  et  des  exportations; 
-coefficient d'emplois  (parfois  corriges) . 
•  dans  une  economie  ouverte  !'importation provenant 
des  PVD  ne  remplace  pas  toujours  la  production 
interieure; 
•  l'interdependance  intra- et  intersectorielle dis-
parait.  Interrelation entre  prix,  demande-consomma-
tion,  production. 
Une  unite  de  valeur  additionnelle  des  PVD  supprime 
une  unite  de  valeur  de  production  du  meme  produit 
ainsi  que  l'emploi  correspondant  dans  les  PD. 
Par  cette hypothese  il est  fait  abstraction  de  la 
difference  entre  le  prix  a  !'importation et  le  prix 
interieur,  ainsi  que  de  !'incidence  de  !'importation 
a  des  prix  plus  bas  sur  les  prix  interieurs  et  la 
demande; 
•  les  coefficients  d'emplois  sont  identiques  pour 
les  produits  importes  et  exportes; 
.  les  resultats  nets  font  abstraction  du  probleme  de 
reajustement  (mobilite  sectorielle et  regionale  des 
facteurs  de  production); - 14-
•  absence  de  projections  r~alistes des  importations 
et  des  exportations. 
(c)  V.  (a)  et  (b). 
(d)  •  les  variables  explicatifs  ne  d~pendent pas  l'une 
de  l'autre; 
.  on  n'a  pas  pris  en  consid€ration  des  facteurs  comme 
le  changement  des  prix relatifs,  les  effets  indirects 
et  la politique  ~conomique; 
.  les  stocks  sont  constants; 
la  productivit~ du  travail  est  exprim~e par  la  rela-
tion entre  la  production  (exprimie  en  valeur  l  prix 
constants)  et  le  nombre  d'hommes-ann~es; 
.  l'incidence  de  !'importation et  de  !'exportation  a 
~t~  trait~e par  !'incidence nette; 
une  unit~ de  valeur  additionnelle  d'importations 
et  d'exportations  ont  avec  un  signe  oppos~,  la  m~me 
r~percussion sur  l'emploi  et  le  reclassement  est 
termin~. 
3.  Taus  les  travaux  font  mention  des  difficult~s suivantes 
- donn~es statistiques  parfois  d~pass~es,  surtout  les 
tableaux  input-output  et  les  coefficients  d'emploi; 
- statistiques  sectorielles  trop  globales; 
- manque  de  coordination  au  sujet  de  la  subdivision  sec-
torielle  p.ex.  entre  les  statistiques  de  la  production 
(ev.  input-output),  du  commerce  international  et 
l'emploi. - 15-
5.  Bibliographie. 
(I)  J.  KOL  et  L.  MENNES,  Herstructurering,  herstructure-
ringsbeleid  en  ontwikkelingssamenwerking,  Deelrapport 
6,  Penetratie  door  ontwikkelingslanden  op  de  Neder-
landse  markt  voor  industrieprodukten.  Gevolgen  voor 
inkomen  en  werkgelegenheid,  Rotterdam,  Stichting  het 
Nederlands  Economisch  Instituut,  1978.  (polycop.). 
(2)  F.  WOLTER,  Note  on  estimates  of  employment  effects 
of  an  increasing  division  of  labour  with  developing 
countries,  Kiel,  febr.  1978  (polycop.). 
(3)  H.  DICKE,  H.H.  GLISMANN,  E.-J.  HORN,  A.D.  NEU, 
Beschaftigungswirkungen  einer verstarkten Arbeitstei-
lung  zwischen  der  Bundsrepublik  und  den  Entwicklungs-
landern.  "Kieler  Studien",  Nr.  137,  Tubingen  1976. 
(4)  F.  WOLTER,  Adjusting  to  Imports  from  Developing 
Countries.  In  :H.  GIERSCH  (ed.),  Reshaping  the 
World  Economic  Order.  Tubingen  1977. 
(5)  D.  SCHUMACHER,  Verstarkter  Handel  mit  der  Dritten 
Welt  :  Eher  Umsetzung  als  Freisetzung  deutscher 
Arbeitskrafte.  "DIW-Wochenbericht",  5/1977. 
Berlin,  1977. 
(6)  D.  SCHUMACHER,  Beschaftigungswirkungen  von  Importen 
aus  Entwicklungslandern  nicht  dramatisieren. 
"DIW-Wochenbericht",  1/78,  Berlin,  1978. 
(7)  D.  SCHUMACHER,  800  000  Beschaftigte  f~r  den  Export 
in  Entwicklungslandern beschaftigt.  "DIW-Wochen-
bericht",  5/78.  Berlin  1978. - 16 -
(8)  P.  DE  GRAUWE,  W.  KENNES,  T.  PE:ETERS,  R.  VAN  STRAELEN, 
Trade  liberalization with  less  developed  countries. 
A  case  study  of  Belgium,  Leuven,  Centrum  Economische 
Studiin  (K.U.L.),  1977  (polycop.). 
(9)  L'industrialisation des  PVD  :  caract~ristiques, 
~volution· des  ~changes,  hypoth~ses sur  les  cons~­
quences  en  France,  SETEF,  Paris,  1978,  p.24-34. 
(10)  V.  CABLE,  Source  of  employment  displacement  in  UK 
industries  competing  with  ldc  imports,  London,  1978 
(polycop.). 
(II)  V.  CABLE,  British Protectionism  and  ldc  imports, 
ODI  Review,  1977,  2,  29-47. 
(12)  C.R.  FRANK,  Foreign  Trade  and  Domestic  Aid, 
Washington,  Brookings  Institution,  1977. 
(13)  C.  SECCHI,  Some  approximate  and  preliminary  calcu-
lations  on  the  employment  effect  of  increased  com-
petitive  imports  from  LDC's,  1978  (polycop.). 
(14)  H.F.  LYDALL,  Trade  and  employment.  A  study  of  the 
effects  of  trade  expansion  on  employment  in  deve-
loping  and  developed  countries,  Gen~ve,  I.L.O.,  1975. 
L'auteur  remercie  les  services  de  la  World  Bank,  de  l'ILO, 
de  la  CNUCED  et  de  l'OCDE,  pour  !'information bibliogra-
phique  qu'il  a  re~ue  de  leur  part. Vincent  CABLE 
Source  of EmploYffl!nt  Displacement in UK  Indust~ies Competing  with  = 
ldc Imports  -
Objectives 
The  exercise below is an  elaboration of work  earlier done  in the 
ODI  Review  2 article seeking to apply the same  methodology  to a  wider range 
of industries,  Essentially it seeks  to define the separate contribution 
to job displacement at industry level,of trade  (and,  within that,  trade with 
ldcs)  technological change and  demand  changes.  It would  not be correct to 
infer that these influences are separate"causes"of  etr.~::.~ yment  loss since 
they are inter•related and,  moreover,  industries are inter-related through 
input-output linkages,  but  they do  give some  indication of the immediate 
source of job displacement,  Even with this limitation,  and  with the 
further limitation that there are major  inconsistencies in UK  published data 
on  employment,  output and  trade at industry level,  the results give us  some-
thing more  to work  on  than the casual  empiric~ and  hasty logic often used 
in publk debate  (employment  is falling,  cheap  imports are "flooding in" 
ergo cheap  imports  a~e responsible for employment  loss,  ergo  trade protection 
will restore employment),  The  author has subsequently received  some  reassur-
ance  from  seeing the  same  aethodology used  in a  Brookings  study  (Charles 
Frank:  Foreisa Trade and  Domestic Aid).  The  attached figures are,  however, 
very provisional,  there having been no  time to check for computational let 
alone published data error,  and  should be treated with reserve. 
Methodology 
The  essence of the methodology  is the use of  two  identity relation-
ships: 
0  •  C+  X- H 
p  - 0 
i 
(i) 
(ii) 
t~ere 0  is output,  C is apparent domestic  consumption,  X and  M are exports 
and  imports,  P is labour productivity and  E is employment.  By  transformation and  differentiation 
dE  •  a 
when  changes 
are small 
1  dC 
p  dt 
+ 
-2-
1  dX  - 1  dM  - O.  dP 
p dt  p  dt  dt 
These  four  terms represent  the emple>yment  changes whose  source is 
respectively,  (real)  consumption,  e~orts, unports and productivity. 
Over  and  above  straightforward data error problems  certain  genE~ral 
assumptions are made  in the analysis which need  to be remembered: 
(i)  For the purpose of analysis the four  sources are assumed  u1dependent 
of each other.  Clearly this is not  always  t:rue  in practice.  Increases in 
"cheap"  imports will, by lowering the domestic price and if the price elasticity 
of demand  is positive,increase total domestic demand  and,  to some  degree, 
domestic  employment.  On  the other hand,  an  increase in productivity  (dis-
placing labour)  could improve  export and  import-competing performance  (c:reating, 
employment) • 
(ii)  Indirect effeets are ignored on  supplier industries.  This  does, 
however,  show  up  in reduced/increased demand  in intermediate industries. 
However,  to separate out this effect would  require,as part of this exerciaa, 
a  grouping of industrial categories to the level of aggregation of the UK  input: 
output tables and  making deductions  from  there.  This can be done with additional 
effort. 
(iii) Productivity is defined in terms of  output per man  year;  this 
may  disguise changes  in ou~put per man  hour ,offset by  partttme/overtime working. 
(iv)  Output is assumed  to be consumed,  exported or imported.  Changes 
in inventories are therefore ignored. -3-
Data 
An  attempt was  made  to calculate the above effects for the period 
1970-75,  for three digit  (SI~ industrial categories in the range  211-499. 
Analysis is presented for  32  categories which were the only ones  to satisfy 
a  rather undemanding criterion of "sensitivity" that ldc imports should be 
and  greater than  2%  of ill<  consumption  (plus  two  others, man-made  fibres/ woollens, 
added  to give a  comprehensive picture of textiles). 
Data used was: 
(i)  Report of  the Census  of Production,  for output . at current 
prices,  and  employment.(! have discovered subsequently that there are some 
quite alarming discrepancies between census/Dept.  of Employment  data and  some 
of the calculations need  to be reworked.) 
(ii) MlO,  for overseas trade ar.alysed in terms of industries. 
(iii) unpublished Department of Industry data for separating out ldcs 
on  an MlO  basis.  Unfortunately the ldc category is not broken down  by  the 
DOl  into components.  It is defined in a  way  which is both too broad  (to 
include OPEC  oil exporters)  and  too naOiTw  (it excludes Eastern Europe, 
South Africa,  and  Southern Europe)  for a  comprehensive picture of "low cost" 
suppliers.  But  coverage does  correspond closely to the GSP  (except  for 
Yugoslavia and  Rumania  which are excluded here). 
(iv)  wholesale price indlcea;  were obtained from  Trade and  Industry, 
for  the purpose of expressing output and  apparent consumption in real terms. 
This  introduces  some  unavoidable error.  The  index refers to domestic production 
only and where  imports are a  large percentage of consumption this could distort 
the deflation of consumption.  There is no  obvious way  of separately deflating 
imports without  enormous  extra effort.  For this reason,  consumption was 
treated as a  residual of the various factors and  this residual value compared 
with the directly calculated figures.  Only in a  few  cases were  there sub-
stantial discrepanices. -4-
In terms of data analysis the following additional points should 
be made: 
(i)  The  whole exercise required  to be  .. ·  carried out in terms of values 
rather than quantities.  This could have resulted in the underestimations of 
the employment  loss from  lo~1 cost imports where unit values are much  lo~irer  than 
for competing  domestic substitutes.  However,  in practice,  the results (at 
least for the import displacing effect)  tall:led •VTith  calculations in the .Q.!ll. 
Review  article for cotton yam,  fabrics and  shoes which were  there calculated 
in terms  of quantities rather than values. 
(ii)  Imports and  exports were  treated  together for the purpose c•f 
this calculation;  thus  the results present  the net effect of trade  (overall 
and  for ldcs). 
(iii) Comparison on  a  simple comparat:lve static basis clearly leaves 
much  to be desired.  Hmvever,  MlO  data does  1:10t  go  back beyond  1970  (at least 
separating out groups  of suppliers).  1976  data is now  available and  cart  be 
used  to cross-check.  The  additional labour :involved  seemed  not  to justify com-
puting a  5/6yr.  continuous  time trend, which  would,be~·,~eof its shortness 
not have very reassuring statistical properties. 
(iv)  Since we  are dealing with a  discrete time period rather than an 
instantaneous  change we  have a  practical problem of specifying the base-·year 
for the purpose of calculating the constant  terms  in the equation.  lo1e  t:tsed 
1970 but it would  be better to use an  average of 1970  and  1975.  A few  trial 
runs  suggest that this did not make  a  great deal of difference. 
Results 
{i)  For the 34  categories considered only two  - hosiery and  mens  shirts/ 
urtdergarments  - show  evidence that employment  displacement attributable to ldc 
imports  (net)  was  a  significant factor in relation to productivity changes or 
overall trade.  Even  in these two  cases,  productivity growth in the mens  shirts/ 
underwear  sector seems  to have displaced labour ·more  effectively than ldc 
import competition and falling domestic demand  has apparently been more  import-
ant in the case .Zf  hosiery products.  For leather goods  and  cutlery, merts  and -5-
women&  ta~1orad outerwear, cotton fabrics aa4 ebildrans' draeses there ware  lde 
job losses of over 1000 but the influence was  in each case les&  than both non-
ldc trade and  productivity,  usually substantially so.  Non-ldc  trade seemed 
to have  significant job displacing effects absolutely or relative to product-
ivity factors,  for man-made  fibres,  toys,  woollens  and  worsteds,  footwear. 
:u~  the case of footwear,  Southem and East Europeam  "low cost" suppliers 
probably accounted for some  part of this. 
(ii)  ID  over half of the cases considered.  the employment  effect 
of ldc trade was  positive because of reduced  (net)  import penetration.  This 
was  particularly true of processed foodstuffs.  but also of cotton yarn and  jute 
(reflecting,  presumably domestic  import substitution and  diversion of  trade to 
de  suppliers following earlier selective protection). 
(iii) Although  the consumption measure is the least reliable,  falling 
home  demand  seems  to have been a  decisive factor  in explaining job loss in the 
cases of  woollen and worsted,  hosiery and  cotton yarn  (the last possibly 
as a  result of weakening derived demand  from  clothing;  more  p1  bably because 
of mmf  substitution).  In the other sectors any net job loss is attributable 
primarily to a  failure of domestic demand  to rise as  r~pidly as labour displacing 
productivity. 
There are some  large discrepancies in the data which need  sorting 
out before it is published or more  widely distributed•  In particular: 
(i)  the often large discrepancies in Census/DOE  employment  data need 
to be accommodated.  This is especially serious for  fo~twear and  shirts. 
(ii)  there are large gaps between "residual" and  calculated consumption 
which need  explaining for hosiery, watches and childrens'  clothing. 
(iii)  estimates made  originally in ODI  Review  2  and here,  by a  different 
~ethod, correspond broadly in terms of trade effects.  But  the relative magnitudes 
of productivity/consumption effects are greatly divergent for  footwear  and 
cotton fabrics.  Clearly - a  need  for  reworking with various data. -6-
Interpretation 
Not  a  great deal is claimed  for  the results.  The  assumptions and 
data limitations preclude that.  But  a  few  conclusions can be tentatively dt·awn: 
(i)  any  significant contribution by ldc imports  to the overall 
'adjustment problem'  of UK  industry is extremely difficult to detect.  Only 
in 32  out of 120 industrial items was  there a  priori evidence of a  "problem' 
(in terms of "import penetration").  Out  of  t:hese,  for only two  could ldc 
imports be seriously represented as a  dominant  cause of adjustment d:ifficult:y. 
This suggests at very least a  change in vocabulary,  as does  similar work in 
Germany,  from  metaphors based on  "floods" and  "torrents" to  those 
based on  'straws on  camels'  backs'.  Further l-Ie  have  ignored  the other 90 
or so  sectors where by  and  large ldc trade has had  a  positive employment  impact. 
(ii)  even in the  few  highly  sensi.ti~e categories where  ldc  import 
competition clearly is important,  the analysis suggests a  need  for  caution jln 
treating protection as an antidote in te:t'tils  C>f  employment  stability since 
the other sets of influences are still operating.  In pra·ctice,  the effect  c>f 
trade protection which raises domestic prices is probably unhelpful for 
employment  both in its indirect effects c•n  depressing consumption growth 
(because of  the price elasticity of demand  for final products and  substitut:ion 
elasticities for  intermediate goods)  and  by  accelerating  job displacing 
productivity growth·  .. in these industries ·(by encouraging,  as a  result of higher 
profits,  investment in more  capital intensive techniques).  Thus  'the industry' 
is helped but not necessarily workers'  job prospects.  This appears  to have 
been part of  the story of jute and  Lancashire cotton spinning,  and  my  own 
estimates are consistent with it, for  these :industries. 
one  line of criticism levelled at the original article  (by textile 
companies,  understandably)  was  that it was  s:imply  not right to treat  produc·-
tivity as comparable to trade as a  source  of  redundancy.  Put at its simplest 
the argument  lo~as  that one  should not mix  up  productivity which is "a.  good 
thing" with trade which is not "a good  thingn  in itself, only if there is a 
trade surplus.  This crude mercantilism,  while representing wi(cU.y  held views -7-
is of highly questionable merit.  Trade i& merely one ~  of productivity 
growth,  realised as resources  mo~e from less to more  productive uses else-
where  in the economy,  just as  internal productivity changes within industries 
(reducing  'overmanning')  also release resources for more  productive use 
elsewhere.  When  there is widespread  unemployment  or inefficient labour 
markets  this  r~e~oyment may  not  take place,  but this is as much  an argument 
against  (or qualifying)  reducing'overmanning'  within firms  and  industries as 
it is for  reducing  'overmanning'  in the economy  as a  whole  by  reducing in the 
UK  the relative importance  of  labour  intensive industries through  trade 
specialisation with !des. 
Further Work 
Discussion might  indicate  the utility or otherwise of  extending 
this work: 
(i)  to cover the 1970-76 period; 
(ii)  to trace indirect effects via national  input output tables; 
(iii)  to cover all 120  industrial categories 
- or in other directions. 
4th April 1978  Vincent Cable 
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·- ;_ c)1) EFFEI'S  IXJ  COli.IMl!RCE  AVEC  LES  P. V.D.  SUR  L'EMPLOI  EN  FRANCE 
Extrait  du  rapport  sur l'evolution du  tiers-monde 
et l'appareil productif fran9ais 
Commissariat  general  du  Plan 
b)  Les  echanges  de  produits industriels ont conduit a la creation nette 
de  100  000  emplois  de  1970  a  1976 
L'accroissement des  debouches  offerts par les PVD  a  constitue  dans  les 
dernieres  annees  un  terrain d'expansion pour l'industrie  fran~aise. Une 
estimation  theorique  des  emplois  concernes  evalue la creation nette d'em-
plois  correspondant  aux  echanges  de  produits industriels  avec  les  pays  en 
developpement a 100  000  emplois  de  1970  a 1976  (1). 
TABLEAU  12  - Emplois  industrie1s 
Emp1ois  11theorigues11  correspondant 
Emp1ois  dans  1'industrie  aux echanges  avec 1e Tiers-Monde 
Exportations  Importations 
1970  5  445  000  234  000  4,3 %  74  000  1,3 
1976  5  462  000  363  000  6,6 %  93  000  1,7 
Ecart  +  17  000  t- 129  000  + 19  000  197"6-1970 
Source  Etude SETEF 
% 
% 
(1) Cette etude a  ete realisee par la S.E.T.E.F.  (Societe  d 1Etude Economique 
et Financiere)  - Les  echanges  fran~ais de  produits  industrie1s avec  1es 
pays  en  deve1oppement  - novembre  1977.  (annexe 9). - 23-
Il faut  replacer cette €volution dans  le  cadre  g€n~ral de  l'~volution de 
l'emploi  industriel en  France.  En  1976,  l'emploi industriel est revenu a 
son  niveau  de  1971.  Alors  que  l'emploi  dans  les  secteurs  de  biens  d 1fiqui-
pement  a  cru d'environ  100  000  de  1971  a  1976  (correspondant  largement a 
des  ventes  aux  pays  en  developpement),  l'emploi  dans  les biens  de  consom-
mation  courante  connait  une  baissE~ accel€ree  imputable  pour  1' essen tiel a 
la branche  textile et habillement  (pour  lesquels  l'importation en  provenance 
des  pays  en  developpement  ne  repri~sente que  5  % du  total des  importations). 
Effectifs  par 
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(en milliers) 
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Quatre  elements  corrigent  ces  constatations 
Les  echanges  avec  les pays  en  developpement  ant  conduit a des  recon~ersions 
inter-sectorielles  importantes.  Les  echanges  avec  les  pays  en  developpement 
ont ete createurs nets  d'emplois  principalement  dans  la construction 
mecanique  et electrique  (+  13  000),  la construction navale,  aeronautique, 
armement  (+  33  000),  la chimie  (+  30  000),  la premiere  transformation 
des  metaux  (+  25  000)  mais  ces  echanges  ont  exerce  des  pressions a 
reduction  des  emplois  sur  les branches  textile,  habillement  (- 8  000), 
cuirs,  chaussures  (- 4  000),  bois,  meubles,  industries  diverses  (- 6  500). 
- La  specialisation industrielle des  regions  aggrave  en  France le probleme 
de  la concurrence  des  pays  du  Tiers-Monde  ou  plus  generalement  le probleme 
de  la regression des  activites traditionnelles.(l) 
Si  l 1on  confronte les pourcentages  d'emploi industriel regional  impliques 
a !'importation et a !'exportation,  on  constate  que  la regression d'activites 
traditionnelles,  meme  relayee par le developpement  d'exportations 
d'equipement,  entratne  des  desequilibres  regionaux importants. 
Facteur aggravant  dans  le cas  de  la concurrence  des  importations,  les 
departements  sensibles ont  en general  une  activite tres  concentree sur 
un petit nombre  de  produits.  Dans  une  dizaine de  departements,  les 
activites menacees,  si aucune  mesure n'est prise,  representent pres  de 
40%  de  l'emploi  industriel. 
En  sens  inverse,  les activites dent une  part importante  de  la production 
est exportee vers  les pays  en  developpement  sont  generalement  plus 
disperse$ geographiquement. 
(1) Etude  INSEE.  Developpement  des  echanges  avec le Tiers-Monde et 
problemes  regionaux  d'emploi.  (annexe 8). - 25-
- Le  niveau  de  qualification  mo~en et de  salaire des  industries menacees 
est inferieur a celui  des  industries exportant vers  le Tiers-Monde. 
Les  branches les plus menacees  par la concurrence  du  Tiers-Honde 
sont  caracterisees par un  fort  pourcentage  d'emploi  feminin.  En  revanche 
la main  d'oeuvre  immigree  est relativement peu  representee  (1). 
TABLEAU  13  - Caracteristigues  des  salaires  dans  certaines branches  menacee~! 
/).  salaires 
(2) 
%  % 
de  femmes  salaries 
etrangers 
Textiles habillement  70  %  66  %  8,5  % 
Cuirs  chaussures  67  %  53  %  7,5  % 
bois meubles  75  %  20  %  12  % 
moyenne  toutes  indust.  :~6  %  11 '5  % 
L'evolution  des  salaires  de  1967-1973  marque  une  reduction  de  la disparite 
des  salaires entre  ces  trois branches  et le reste  des  branches  industrielles 
due  notamment a la politique  continue  de  relE~vement des  bas  salaires:. 
Cette  constatation pose  un  probleme  delicat  de  choix entre objectifs:  en 
partie contradictoires a court  terme  :  la.  revalorisation du  travail manuel  et 
des  bas  salaires,  la reduction  des  disparites salariales entre branches, 
le maintien  de  l'emploi,  l'ouverture  commerciale. 
(1)  L'essentiel  de  la main  d'oeuvre  immigree  se  trouve  dans  des  secteurs 
non  concurrences  :  batiments  et  travaux publics  :  30  % des  salaries, 
hygiene  :  40% des  salaries.  Dans  l'industrie  elle est concentree  dans 
les  industries  lourdes  de  biens  inter:mediaires  :  metallurgie  (16  %), 
verre  (15  %),  automobiles. 
(2)  b.  Salaires =  Salaire moyen  de  la branche,_-=----,=----~-.,.-
Salaire moyen  des  3  branches  les  mieux  placees  : 
armement,  aeronautique,  instruction navale/construction 
mecanique  et electrique/materiel  de  transports  terrestres  ,, - 26-
L'Italie donne  un  exemple  d'ajustement  "sauvage"  par la flexibilite des 
salaires et le non  paiement  des  charges  sociales.  Dans  le textile-habillement 
on  compterait  250  000  travailleurs  au noir. 
Compte-tenu  du  constat  fait  sur les  desequilibres  regionaux,  la localisation 
dans  des  regions  differentes  des  emplois  menaces  par la concurrence  du 
Tiers-Monde  et des  emplois  crees  par  les marches  qu'il offre,on pourrait 
envisager en  France  dffisubventions  temporaires a l'emploi  auSS1  bien pour 
ralentir la  chute  des  effectifs  dans  les  secteurs  exposes  que  le develop-
pement  des  activites exportatrices. 
- Le  secteur  des  services  rendus  aux entreprises,  des  organismes  financiers 
et  de  la formation  a  cree  en  France  600  000  emplois  de  1970 a  1976. 
Bien qu'il soit  tres difficile de  mesurer  la part des  relations  avec  le 
Tiers-Monde  dans  ces  activites,  celle-ci devient certainement  importante, 
notamment  en matiere  de  formation  technique  ou  de  gestion,  en France  ou 
sur place. 
Les  projets  industriels  en  Afrique  sub-Saharienne  sont  realises  avec  le 
concours  de  cadres  expatries,  representant en moyenne  2  % des  effectifs 
tot  aux. 
Une  evaluation portant sur  les principales entreprises  fran~aises concernees 
par  le  transfert  de  "maitrise industrielle" dans  le Tiers-Monde  (Total, 
Berliet,  Peugeot,  Creusot-Loire ••.  )  aboutit a  10  000  techniciens  ou  inge-
nieurs  fran~ais expatries,  employes  actuellement  dans  ces  activites. - 27-
Quatre effets  sur  l'emploi  industriel  en  Franee  doivent etre pris  en  compte 
- les  perte~ d'emploi  qui  resulteraient  de  la penetration des  produits 
du  Tiers-Monde  sur le marche  national.(Des  importations  en  provenance 
du  Tiers-Monde  qui  se substituerait  a  des  produits  deja  importes  seraient 
sans  effet sur  1 'emploi  (2)) ; 
les  creations  d'emplois  liees  aux  exportations  fran<;aises  vers  le Tiers 
Monde  ; 
- les pertes  d'emploi  qui  resulteraient de  la fermeture  d'un certain nombre 
de  marches  du  Tiers-Monde; 
- les effets de  substitution sur  les marches  ihrangers  de  produits  du 
'I'iers-Monde  aux produits  fran<;ais. 
Seuls  les  trois  premiers effets directs  on.t  ete  evalues  (3)  a partir d'un 
jeu de  quatre hypotheses  :  deux  pour les  e~xportations,  deux  pour  les 
importations. 
a)  croissance rapide  des  exportations  frans:aises  vers  les  PVD.  Le~s 
exportations  de  chaque  secteur croitront dl'ici  1985  au  rythme  1970-1976 
avec un  plafonnement  a  +  10  %,  hypothese  dont  la realisation ne  devrait 
pas  etre impossible  eu egard  aux faibles parts  que  detient  actuelleme~nt 
1
1industrie fran<;aise  dans  nombre  de  marche  des  PVD  les  plus  dynamiques. 
(I)  Etude  SETEF  :  les echanges  frans;ais  de  produits  industriels  avec les 
pays  en  developpement  - novembre  1977. 
(2)  Ces  effets peuvent etre importants  qua:nd  on  considere  les  differemces 
de  prix.  Ex  :  chaussettes  fabriquees  en Italie  I ,24  F  la paire,  Goree 
du  Sud  0,  90  (reference  du  meme  article: fabrique  en  France  2  Franes). 
(3) Le  quatrieme effet aggraverait les resul tats obtenus,. mais  sans  E~n 
changer  significativement 1 1ordre  de  grandeur~ a  condition que  lE!S 
autres pays industrialises n'adoptent pas  de  regles  discriminatoi.res. - 28-
b)  ~ute ou stagnation des  exportations  fran)aises  vers  les  PVD,  sous 
la pression  de  la substitution aux  importations et  de  la concurrence inter-
nationale. 
Les  industries  actuellement menacees  perdent  totalement  leurs  debouches  d'ici 
I985.  Les  exportations  de  biens  d'equipement  croissent  faiblement  ou stagnent 
a partir de  I980  ce  qui  suppose  une  relative perte  des  marches  par la France 
face  a d'autre  concurrents  industriels. 
c)  ~'ouverture du  marche  fran~ais aux  importations  en  provenance  des 
PVD  s'accroit.  Les  importations  de  chaque  secteur augmentent d'ici  I985  au 
rythme  I970/I976  avec  un  taux minimum  de  5  %par an. 
d)  Limitation  de  la croissance  des  importations  en provenance  des  PVD 
dans  les  secteurs  sensibles.  Les  importations  du  textile-habillement,  cuirs-
chaussures,  bois-meubles,  imprimerie-edition voient  leur  taux  de  croissance 
limite a 6%  par  an  (I),  celles  des  autres  secteurs  au  rythme  I970/76. 
TABLEAU  I4- Evolution  de  l'emploi  industriel  en  France  suivant  les  4  hypotheses 
Lie a l'exportation  Lie  aux  importations 
II a  II  +  205  000  II cll  - 344  000 
lib  II  +  86  200  II d"  ..  I  54  000 
11  n'est pas  possible  de  relier de  maniere  assuree  les hypotheses  d'impor-
tations et d'exportations bien qu'il faille souligner la position vulnerable 
de  la France  face  au  souhait  d'un nombre  croissant  de  pays  en  developpement, 
d'equilibrer leurs  echanges  (2).  Un  lien entre  les hypotheses "a"  et 
11
C
11 
ou.  "b" et "d" est probable. 
(I)  Le  taux  de  6  % est celui  retenu par  la Commission  Europeenne  pour  les 
negociations  concernant  les  produits textiles. 
(2)  Le  commerce  exterieur  fran~ais en  1975  a  I976  est excedentaire  avec  30  des 
36  pays  en  developpement  non  petroliers les  plus  importants  du  Tiers-Monde. 
Vis  a vis  des  pays  dits  "d'exportation sauvage"  (Coree  du  Sud,  Hong-Kong, 
Tunisie,  Maroc)  notre  solde  commercial est regulierement positif. - 29-
En  combinant  les  hypotheses  extremes,  il apparait  que  le  developpement  des 
echanges  avec  les  PVD  pourrait  inflechir .1 'emploi  indus triel en  France  d' ici 
1985  dans  une  fourchette  de  +  I  % a - 5  % (soit +  50  000 a - 250  000).  Ce 
resultat  peu,t  paraitre moins  grave  que  les  conclusions  d'un  certain nombre 
d'etudes disponibles  sur le  cas  de  1 'Allemagne  Federale.  La  difference provient 
de  ce qu'ici,  meme  dans  le  cas  d'ouverture  croissante du  marche  frant;:ais, 
hypothese  "c",  on  ne  se place  pas  dans  le  cadre  d'une  liberalisation totale 
et incontrolee  des  echanges. 
Mais  ce  qu1  importe  le plus,c'est  le nombre  total d'emplois  eventuellement 
menaces  qu1  seront  contraints a un  reclassement,soit  dans  leur branc:he,soit 
hors  de  celle-ci.  Ces  emplois  s 'evaluent entre  3  et  7  % des  effectifs  1976_, 
soit des  effectifs variant entre 25  000  et 55  000  emplois  par an,  dont  deux 
tiers a un  tiers hors  de  la branche  d'origine. 
La  pression  ne  concernera pas  uniformement  tous  les  secteurs  industriels. 
Dans  le  cas  d'une evolution  tres  defavora.ble,elle serait tres  import:ante 
dans  le  "textile-habillement" ou elle pourrait  concerner d'ici a  1985  30  % 
des  effectifs  1976,  so it porter en  8  ans  sur  200  000  emplois.  Les  pe~rtes 
d'emploi  pourraient egalement etre  importantes  dans  les  secteurs  "cuirs-
chaussures",  "bois-meubles",  "industries  diverses","verre" •.. 
L'examen  systematique  des  potentialites  die  creation d'emplois  qui  decouleront 
du  developpement  des  exportations  de  prodluits  industriels vers  les  pays  du 
Tiers-Monde  montre  que  ces creations  pourraient representer d I ici a  11985  de 
2  a 8% des  effectifs  de  l'industrie de  1976,  soit un  rythme  de  creations 
d'emplois  de  15  000 a 60  000  emplois  par  an. - 30-
3- Ces  mouvements  en  sens  contraire s'appliqueront a  l'industrie  fran~aise 
pendant  une  periode ou elle ne  devrait plus  guere  accroitre le niveau 
global  des  emplois  offerts et ou  meme  s'amorcera peut etre un  "exode  indus-
triel". 
Ils se  cumuleront  avec  les  press~ons dues  a  la concurrence  des  pays  du 
Sud,  candi~ats a  l'entree dans  la C.E.E.,  a  celle des  pays  de  l'Europe 
de  l'Est eta celle des  autres  pays  industriels. 
Un  contexte  de  croissance  economique  lente et de  situation critique des 
relations  financieres  et economiques  internationales aggraverait  conside-
rablement  l'ampleur du  probleme 
- par une  intensification de  la concurrence  y  compris  entre pays  indus-
trialises, 
-par un  risque  accru d'insolvabilite  des  pays  en  vo~e de  developpement, 
-par l'asymetrie qui  en  resulterait pour  les  economies  des  pays  indus-
trialises  :  ceux-ci  subiraient  le  contrecoup  d'une  concurrence  accrue 
(perte  d'emplois)  sans  pouvoir esperer  developper  des  emplois  a  !'expor-
tation. NOTE  SUR  L'INCIDENCE  POUR  L'ECONOMIE  BELGE  D'UNE  AUGMENTATION  DU  COMMERCE 
EXTERIEUR  AVEC  LES  PVD 
1.  Methode  de  travail  utilisee 
V.  VAN  ROMPUY 
Professeur  K.U.  LEUVEN 
On  a  recherche  une  reponse  approximative a  La  question  suivante  :  quelle est 
L'incidence directe et  indirecte  sur  le  PNB  et  sur  l'emploi  en  Belgique d'un 
accroissement  simultane  d'un  milliard de  FB  des  exportations  vers  les  PVD  et 
des  importations  provenant  des  PVD. -2-
Lors  de !'application de !'analyse input-output on  a  fait usage des donnees 
statistiques suivantes  : 
a.  le tableau input-output pour la Belgique de  l'annee  1970; 
b.  la structure du  connnerce  exterieur de la :Belgique  pour  1 'annee  1970;  le 
commerce  a  ete limite aux  produits concur:rentiels; 
c.  les coefficients d'emploi  pour  1970. 
La  valeur ajoutee brute par honnne-annee  a  et'e utilisee comme  une grandeur ap-
proximative pour  le capital materiel et intellectuel des  secteurs. 
2.  Connnentaire  des resultats obtenus 
Calcule en prix de  1970,  et avec  la structure de  production et de  commerce  de 
cette meme  annee,  un acroissement  des  importations concurrentielles provenant 
des  PVD  pour  un  montant  de  1 milliard FB  pro·~roque une  perte d'emplois  dt:!  2.084 
unites  par an pour  1' ensemble  de  1'  economie  'belge  (Tableau  1). 
Si 1'  on  considere alors  que  1 milliard de  re·~renus d' exportations est depense  par 
les  PVD  pour  acheter des  produits belges, il en resulte,  en maintenant  '~onstant: 
la structure d'exportations de  1970,  une  creation de  1.750 emplois  par an  en  .., 
Belgique. 
Par consequent,  une  expansion equilibree du  commerce  de  produits concurrentiels 
avec  les  PVD  pour un montant  de  1 milliard FB  (prix 1970)  provoquera  (s:i  la 
duree  du  travail reste constante),  une  perte nette de  334  unites d' emplt,is 
pour  !'ensemble de  l'economie belge  (1). 
En  realite,  ce resultat net masque  le fait que,  sous  les hypotheses de  develop-
pement  equilibre du  connnerce,  les branc'hes  de  l'economie ou  se concentre prin-
cipalement !'expansion des  exportations et de  l'emploi different fondamentale-
ment  des  secteurs qui  souffrent de  l'accroissemene de  la concurrence des  im-
portations et de  la diminution d' emploi!  (Tableau 3).  Au  total,  si 1 'on assist:e 
a une  augmentation equilibree du  commerC'e  avec  les  PVD  pour  J  milliard  FB  (pri~: 
(I)  En  1970  les exportations concurrentielles de  la Belgique avec  les PVD  s'ele!-
verent a un  montant  de  30  milliards de  FB;  le montant  correspondant  pour 
les  importations etait de  l'ordre de  2.9 milliards de  FB.  La  population 
salariee s'eleva a 2,9 millions de  travailleurs et employes. -3-
1970),  le resultat est une  perte d'un millier d'emplois,  surtout dans  les in-
dustries textiles et de vetement  (-560)  la fabrication de  chaussures  (-119), 
les autres  industries parmi  lesquelles celle des  jouets  (-112),  le traitement 
dubois  (-39).  Les machines  de  bureau  (-25)  et l'industrie chimique  (-20)  sont 
aussi parmi  les domaines  qui  subissent une  diminution de l'emploi.  Par contre, 
quelques  secteurs connaissent une  augmentation du  nombre  d'emplois  c'est le 
cas  surtout pour  la construction de machines  (+172),  l'industrie des  fabrica-
tions metalliques  (+108),  les fabrications  electro-techniques  (+101). 
Les  effets macro-economiques  sur l'emploi,  qui resultent d'un accroissement  cu 
commerce  reciproque entre la Belgique et .les PVD,  s'appuient sur !'hypothese 
d'une mobilite suffisante du  travail,  aussi bien entre les secteurs qu'entre 
les regions. 
L'accroissement du  commerce  reciproque entre la Belgique et les PVD  pour un 
montant  de  I  milliard  (prix de  1970)  conduit,  malgre le solde negatif du  n~mbre 
d'emplois,  a une modification positive du  PNB  de  36  millions FB  (PNB  au  coCt 
des  facteurs)  (Tableau  1){1).  La  perte d'emplois est plus  que  compensee  par 
un  transfert de  forces  de  travail et d'autres facteurs  de  production de  sec-
teurs d'activite a salaires et productivite faibles,  vers des  secteurs a sa-
~laires et productivite eleves.  En  1970,  les remunerations et les composantes 
salariales d'un employe,  par unite d'exportations competitives vers les PVD, 
etaient de  20  % superieures aux  remunerations d'un employe  et par unite de 
production dans  les activites en concurrence avec  les importations en  provenance 
des  PVD  (Tableau 2). 
Remarque  generate.  Il ne  faut  pas accorder une  importance exageree aux  valeurs 
absolues des  resultats obtenus.  La  signification reside surtout dans  le fait 
qu'ils donnent  une  orientation generate des changements  impliques,  ainsi qu'un 
ordre de  grandeur relatif. 
{1)  En  1970  le PNB  de  la Belgique etait de  l'ordre de  1.300 milliards de  FB. -4-
3.0bservations 
- Caractere statique de 1'  etude.  La  structurE~ des  exportations et des  impor·-
tations de  1970,  ainsi  que  les  coefficie~nts techniques du  tableau input-out-
put,  de  1970,  ont ete  supposes  constants. 
L' evolution survenue depuis  1974  donne  1 'impression que  notarmnent  la struc·-
ture des  importations s'est modifiee  dans  le  sens d'un developpement  acce-
lere de  certains produits manufactures  incorporant beaucoup  de main d'oeuvre 
a bon marche.  Les  coefficient  technique~s  dE~  1970  se sont  egalement  modifii~s 
sous  !'influence du  progres  technique. 
L' incidence du  developpement  du  cormnerce  ext:erieur  sur les prix a  ete negl:i.-
gee.  Des  lors les consequences  pour  la structure de  la consormnation,  le 
VOlUme  deS  importatiOnS  et 1 I emploi  peuv·ent etre differenteS  de  CelleS  pre·• 
sentees ci-dessus. 
- L'avantage pour  le consormnateur  appartenant  au  PD  qui resulte d'une  diminu·· 
tion des  prix est parfois largement reduit il cause des benefices accrus rea-
lises par les entreprises de  production dans  les  PVD  et les intermediaires 
commerciaux  • 
..,- L' amp leur du  chomage  actuel reduit considerablement la mobilite profession·· 
nelle et regionale. 
- L' information statistique disponible est insuffisamment affinee pour  en ar·· 
river au niveau  qu' exigerait une  approche concrete des  problemes  de  restruc~­
turation.  Plus  precisement,  cela signifie qu'une  branche d'industrie qui, 
sur base  de  1' analyse faite dans  cette  etude~,  se  trouve dans  une  situation 
de pression sous l'effet du  commerce  international,  n'est pas necessairement 
en difficult€ dans  taus  ses  domaines.  Inversement,  une  evolution positive 
dans  un  secteur ne veut  pas  dire  que  certains problemes ne  se posent  pas  pour 
diverses entreprises a l'interieur meme  de  ce  secteur. ~ 
-5-
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Hypothese  de  travail  :  dans  les PVD  !'utilisation des facteurs  de  production 
disponibles,  dont  principalement le travail, est limitee par la penurie de 
devises  internationaux.  Un  accroissement des exportations vers les PD  per-
mettra  les  PVD  de  financer des  importations provenant de ces derniers  pays 
d'un meme  montant  (I). 
Cette hypothese de  travail est peut-etre valable pour !'ensemble des  PVD  com-
pare a !'ensemble des  PD,  mais pas necessairement pour chaque  PD  pris indi-
viduellement. 
L'evolution du  commerce  exterieur de la Belgique avec  les PVD  entre  1965  et 
I975  permet  cependant  de  conclure a un  developpement  assez parallele des  expor-
tations et des  importations. 
Part des  PVD  dans  le commerce  exterieur de la Belgique 
Importations  PVD  Exportations  PVD 
Total  Imo.  %  --------·--- !2!~1-~~E~-~ 
1965  15.3  8.6 
1970  I4.8  7.6 
I974  I5.5  9.I 
1975  I3.8  10.8 
I976  I4.7  9.6 
(I)  En  I970  une  augmentation des exportations concurrentielles belges vers les 
pays  PVD  aurait represent€ 3  % des exportations existantes;  du  cote de 
!'importation concurrentielle un  changement  de  la meme  importance aurait 
constitue 34  % des  importations provenant des  PVD  a ce moment. -6-
4.Conclusions  generales 
J.  L'elargissement du  cotmnerce  exterieur d'un.  PD  avec  les  PVD  presen.te un 
certain nombre  d'avantages et d'inconvenients.  Certains consequences  se 
pretent mieux a une  expression quantitative .que  d'autres.  Dans  cette not:e 
se  trouvent  exposes brievement  les premiers resultats d'un travail concer-
nant  l'incidence sur les revenus et sur l'emploi d'un accroissement  equi~· 
valent des  importations et des exportations. 
2.  Il ne  faut  pas  accorder une  importance exageree aux valeurs absolues  des 
resultats obtenus.  La  signification reside surtout dans  le fait qu'ils 
donnent une  orientation gener.de des  changements  impliques,  ainsi qu'un 
ordre de  grandeur relatif. 
3.  Au  total 1'  incidence nette sur 1'  emploi  sera probablement  negativt~ tout 
au moins  dans  un  premier  stade et dans  l'hypothese que  la duree du  travail 
reste constante. 
Les  salaires et les revenus reels et des  lors  le PNB  seront favor<!blement 
affectes. 
Dans  l'ensemble les modifications ne  seront pas considerables. 
Ces  conclusions  sont dans  la ligne des resultats obtenus dans  des  etudes 
similaires effectuees dans  d'autres PD. 
4.  Le  resultat net masque  cependant  le fait  qr,ue  les branches de  1
1 eCt::!nomie 
ou  se  concentre principalement  l'expansion des  exportations et de  l'emplc1i 
different fondamentallement  des  secteurs qui  souffrent de  l'accroissement 
de  la concurrence accrue des  importations  et de  la  diminat~on d'emplois. 
De  plus,  les travailleurs mis  en chomage  appartiennent  dans  une mesure 
assez  considerable a la categorie des  non  ou  plus qualifies.  Des  lors la 
reconversion sociale sera lente,  difficile et parfois  impossible.  En 
outre le climat general  depress if actuel et 1'  ampleur  du  chomage  ~existant: 
rendent  chaque  effort suppH!mentaire a la restructuration economique  et a 
la reconversion sociale particulierement difficile. -7-
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Tableau  I  Effets globaux d'un accroissement  simultane des  im~ortatio~ 
des  exportations concurrentielles de  la Belgique d'un Milliard de 
FB  avec  les  pays  en  developp·~~ 
1965  1970 
A.  Importations 
Ernploi  (honnne-annees)  - 2991  - 2t>84 
Valeur  ajoutee  (millions FB)  528  559 
dont  salaires  373  377 
B.  Exportations 
Emploi  (honnne-annees)  +  2467  +  1750 
Valeur ajoutee  (millions FB)  +  603  +  595 
dont  salaires  +  417  +  379 
c.  Solde net  (B-A) 
Emploi  (honnne-annees)  524  334 
Valeur ajoutee  (millions FB)  +  75  +  36 
dont  salaires  +  44  +  2 
Tableau 2  Intensite des facteurs  des  importations et des  exportations concur-
tielles de  la Belgique  avec  les  PVD  (en milliars de  FB) 
1965 
Importations 
Exportations 
Importations/Exportations 
1970 
Importations 
Exportations 
Importations/Exportations 
Val.  ajoute par 
pers.  empl. 
148 
205 
0,72 
268 
340 
0.74 
dont salaires 
lOS 
142 
0,74 
J81 
217 
0.83 -9-
Tableau  3  Effets  sur  l'emploi et  stir  la valeur ajoutee d'un accroissement 
des  importations et des  exportations- de  la Belgique  avec  les  PVD. 
1970 
Secteurs 
Agriculture 
Charbon 
Cokes 
Petroleum 
Electr.  eau,  gaz 
siderurgie 
Verre 
Mater.  constr. 
Autres miner. 
Chimie 
Fabr.  metal. 
Machines 
El.  techn. 
Au tom. 
autr. moy.  transp. 
Alim.,  boiss.,  tab. 
Confection 
Autre Text. 
Ch::mssures 
Bois 
Papier 
Caoutchouc 
Mat.  plast. 
Autr.  indus. 
Serv.  incl.constr. 
Total 
Imp. 
7 
I I 
2 
6 
13 
45 
7 
2 
8 
183 
61 
82 
48 
2 
285 
2 
270 
439 
124 
51) 
64 
12 
9 
118 
224 
2084 
Emploi 
Exp. 
3 
32 
7 
6 
19 
203 
46 
16 
13 
164 
169 
254 
149 
22 
155 
30 
119 
55 
17 
55 
15 
7 
6 
234 
1750 
Solde 
- 4 
21 
5 
0 
6 
158 
39 
14 
5 
-19 
108 
172 
101 
20 
-130 
- 1 
-240 
-320 
-1 19 
-39 
- 9 
3 
2 
-112 
10 
-334 
Valeur ajoutee  (en mln.FB) 
Imp. 
23 
21 
16 
12 
15 
82 
44 
97 
21 
19 
559 
Exp. 
102 
14 
45 
79 
46 
44 
5 
26 
559 
Sol  de 
79 
12 
-29 
67 
31 
-38 
-39 
-71 
-20 
-18 
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ITALY  Regional  Impact  on Employment  of increased competitive  imports 
from  LDC 
To  my  knowledge,  no  detailed study has  been carried out  on the regional 
impact  on employment  of increased competitive imports  of manufactures  from 
LDC's  with reference to the  case  of Italy.  As  a  matter of fact,  apart  from 
my  calculations previously submitted and  from  considerations  of a  general 
nature,  such  a  study  does  not  exist  even for  Italy as  a  whole. 
From  Census  data,  it is possible to have  detailed regional  and provincial 
quantitative  information on manufacturing employment  in various  industries. 
A good  comparison for the  20  Italian regions  l1etween the results  of the 
two  industrial  censuses  of 1961  and 1971  1.vas  published about  a  year ago  in 
the  Italian weekly  economic  review  "Mondo  Economi.co"  (1).  From  it, it is 
possible to notice tha.t  in the  period 1961-1971  a  higher spatial dispersion 
in some  industrial sectors has  occurred  (chemical  fibres,  plastics),  while 
other sectors  (most  of light  mechanical  industries) still have  a  high spatial 
concentration.  The  first  sectors  have  been moving more  towards  the southern 
regions,  while  the  second group  has  been moving  more  towards  the north-east, 
with  some  new  locations also in Campania  and Puglia  (south).  It is also 
possible to notice that  a  re-equilibrium process  has taken place  between the 
north-west  (Lombardy,  Piedmont,  Liguria)  and the north-east.  On  the  contrary, 
within the  south,  regional  unbalances have  increased from the point  of view 
of manufacturing employment.  Campania.  and Puglia have  recorded a  slight 
increase in labour-intensive manufacturing activities  (like light  mechanical 
industries),  while in the other southern regions the  decreasing importance 
of traditional activities  (food,  clothing,  wood,  etc.) has  favoured an 
increase in more  capital-intensive industries  (plastics,  fibres,  petroleum 
refinery).  Central  and north-eastern regions,  on the other hand,  have in-
creased their share in "traditional" more  labour-intensive activities.  Thus, 
the dualistic structure of Italian regional industrial  employment  has  been 
in a  sense replaced by a  new  situation characterized by three areas  with 
(1)  Mr.  Grillo,  Mr.  Silvani,  "Concentrazione territoria1e dell'industria 
manifatturiera  (1961-1971)",  Mondo  Economico,  n.  25,  2  luglio  1977, 
pp.  39-49. -2-
quite  different  features:  the north-west  (highly industri;;,,lized),  the  centre 
and north-east  (from Tuscany upwards)  and the  3outh. 
This  implies  also that  the  impact  of increased competition from  manufactures 
from  LDC' s  will be  differently felt  in the three areas  and in their region•-:>. 
',1a_ny  sectors  candidate for  competition are highly located in the  centre  and 
north-east.  Here,  however,  they  seem to be  able  to  adapt  quickly to  changing 
situations,  thanks to the flexibility of  firms:  (mostly small  and  medium  size), 
to  a  high degree  of entrepreneurship,  the  rapid introduction of innovations, 
etc.  (although with some  exceptions),  •rhe  same  applies for  some  sectors  in 
the  north-west.  At  a  su.b-regional  level,  however,  some  problems  might  occur 
(and in some  cases  are there)  t  as  a  consequence  of the  high share in employmEmt 
that  some  activities  (like traditional textile)  have  in some  to1rms  and in 
their immediate  surroundings. 
The  situation is much  worse  in the southern regions,  where  in many  cases 
whole  areas  see their manufacturing employment  in just  one  large plant. 
Some  of these  (chemical  fibres,  other  chemical  activities,  petroleum  refiner~r, 
steel,  etc.) are at  present  in very bad economic  conditions,  and on the  basif> 
of economic criteria should be  simply closed down,  with disastrous  consequences 
on manufacturing employment  of the  areas they are  located in. 
Consequently,  the  adjustment  problem will be  much  more  difficult to tackle in 
these areas,  and it will require  massive  intervention in the fields  of 
industrial  and regional policy. Carlo  SECCHI 
February  28,  1978 
SOME  (APPROXIMATE  AND  PRELIMINARY)  CALCULATIONS  ON  THE  EMPLOYMENT  EFFECTS  IN  ITALY 
OF  INCREASED  COMPETITIVE  IMPORTS  FROM  LDC's 
In  this note,  some  calculations  (1)  are presented  and  briefly discussed,  with  reference 
to the probable  negative  impact  on  employment  caused  by  increased  imports  of  competitive 
manufactured  products  coming  from  LDC's. 
To  my  knowledge,  contrary  to  what  has  been  done  for  other  EEC  countries,  no  detailed 
quantitative study  has  been  so  far  carried out  for  the  Italian economy.  Thus,  I  thought 
it might  have  been  interesting  for  the group  to  have  some  (rough)  calculations also 
about  Italy. 
The  results given  in  tables  1 & 2, are based  on 
the  Italian  input-output  table of  1972  (the  16  sector version,  for  simplicity),  exclu-
ding  services  not  on  sale  (sector  16  :  public  administration,  etc  ••• )  for  obvious 
reasons  ; 
- the  Italian  industrial  census  data  on  employment,  with  reference to  25  October  1971 
(last  census),  plus other  data  on  employment  referring  to  1972  ; 
- the  composition  of  Italian  imports  from  LDC's  of  competitive  manufactures  products 
in  1972  (source  :  OECD). 
The  use  of  the  1972  input-output  table  <latest  available)  already points out  some  limits 
of  the  results,  since this  table does  not  take  into account  the  changes  in  the  structure 
of  the  Italian  economy  which  occurred  after the  1973  oil  crisis and  in  the  more  recent 
years  of  depression.  This  table,  furthermore,  is an  up-dating  of  the  1970  table,  and 
no  new  table  based  on  direct data  has  so  far  been  announced. 
(1)  Although  the  responsibility for  the  results  is mine,  help  in  the  calculations  was 
provided  by  Miss  Giovanna  Tagliabue,  Associated prof.  in  the  University of  Trento 
and  in  the State  University of  Milan,  Italy. -2-
Moreover,  input-output  analysis  implies "linearit)'" for  the  results  which  are  obtained, 
which  seems  quite  unrealistic  for  examining  negative effects on  employment,  particularly 
taking  into  account  the  many  features  of "rigidity"  which  affect the  Italian  labour  market. 
Thus,  the  results  should  be  interpreted  with  great  care,  taking  these  (and  other  remarks 
which  will  be  presented  later)  well  in  mind. 
Contrary  to  what  has  been  done  in  other  exercises  for  other  EEC  countries,  only  imports 
are  considered.  The  reason  is that  it was  not  felt  realistic enough  to  assume  that  an 
increase of  imports  from  LDC's  would  be  followed  by  an  expansion  of  Italian  exports  to 
LDC's.  Taking  into account  the  huge  balance of  payments  deficit  of  non-OPEC  LDC's  on 
the one  hand,  and  the possibility for  these  countr·ies  anyhow  to  use  their  export  receipts 
to buy  goods  and  services  in  industrialized  countries different  from  Italy,  no  assumption 
about  an  increase of  Italian exports  was  introduced. 
It  is possible,  obviously,  to  introduce  also  assumptions  about  an  increase of  Italian 
exports  in  a  later  stage,  but  perhaps  this  could  be  better done  at  a  higher  level  (e.g. 
considering  the  EEC  as  a  whole). 
Two  sets of  calculations  are  presented.  The  first  one  refers  to  an  increase of  Italian 
imports  in  "textiles, clothing,  leather  and  shoes",  while  the  second  refers  to  a  general 
expansion  of  Italian  imports  of  competitive manufactured  products  coming  from  LDC's. 
i) Employment  effects of  an  increase of  Italian  competitive  imports  of  "textiles, 
clothing,  leather  and  shoes" 
The  results presented  in  table 1  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  an  increase of 
!tali  an  imports  of  "textiles, clothing,  leather·  and  shoes"  equal  to  100  bill  ion  l i ras 
(in  1972  prices)  would  displace  interhal  production  in  satisfying  internal  demand  by 
an  equal  amount.  Input-output  analysis  allows  then  a  calculation of  the direct  and 
indirect effects on  internal production  (not  pr~sented here)  and  on  employment,  which 
are  given  in  table 1.  (Subject,  of  course,  to the  restrictive assumptions  briefly 
discussed  before). 
Italian  imports  of  these products  in  1972  from  LDC's  amounted  to  154,9 million dol-
lars.  Thus  (taking  into  account  the  1972  exchange  rate),  100  billion  liras means 
more  or  less  a  doubling  of  !tali  an  imports  of  "textiles,  clothing,  leather·  and  shoes" 
from  LDC's,  with  reference to the  1972  situation. -3-
<Alternatively,  the  results of  table  1  could  be  the positive employment  effects  for 
the  Italian  economy  deriving  from  cutting  to  zero all Italian  competitive  imports 
from  LDC's  of  the products  under  consideration.  Looking  at  the problem  from  this 
point  of  view,  however,  the  exclusion of  any  consideration about  Italian exports  to 
LDC's  becomes  more  crucial,  with  respect  to what  was  said  before). -4-
Table  1 
Employment  effects of  an  increase of  competitive  imports  of  ''textiles,  clothing,  leather 
and  shoes"  equal  to  100  billion  liras. 
Sectors 
1.  Agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing 
2.  Energy  products 
3.  Iron,  steel  and  non-ferrous  metals & minerals 
4.  Non-metallic  minerals  and  manufactures 
5.  Chemicals 
6.  Machinery  and  mechanical  products 
7.  Transport  equipment 
8.  Food,  beverages  and  tobacco 
9.  Textiles,  clothing,  leather  and  shoes 
10.  Wood,  paper,  rubber  and  other  manufactures 
11.  Constructions  and  public  works 
12.  Hotels  and  commerce 
13.  Transport  and  communications 
14.  Insurances  and  banking 
15.  Other  services 
16.  Services  not  on  sale  (public  administration, 
etc ••• ) 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  DISPLACED 
For  explanations,  see  the text. 
Number  of  workers 
125 
172 
42 
50 
472 
183 
13 
57 
22.587 
545 
66 
272 
492 
327 
121 
25.524 -5-
ii)  Employment  effects of  an  increase of  Italian  comptetitive  imports  from  LDC's 
equal  to  500  billion  liras 
The  results  presented  in  table  2  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  Italian  imports 
from  LDC's  of  competitive  manufactured  products  would  increase  by  500  billion  liras 
(at  1972  prices). 
Following  the  Italian  input-output  classification,  imports  of  competitive  manufactured 
products  (SITC  5,  6,  7,  8  excluding  67  (iron  and  steel)  and  68  (non-ferrous  metals) 
in  1972  were  as  follows 
s.  Chemicals  35  mill ion dollars 
6.  Machinery  and  mechanical  products  46.3 
II  II 
7.  Transport  equipment  23.5 
II  II 
9.  Textiles,  clothing,  leather  and  shoes  154.9 
II  " 
10.  Woord,  paper,  rubber  and  other  manuf.  41.7 
II  II 
thus  totalling  301.4  mill ion dollars 
which  is 6.6%  of  total  Italian  imports  from  LDC's  in  that  same  year  (4,601  million 
do l l a r s)  <  2) • 
SOD  billion  liras extra  imports  of  competitive manufactured  products  from  LDC's 
(at  1972  prices),  would  mean  an  increase with  respect  to the  situation of  that  year 
of  250  %,  approximately  (taking  into  account  the  exchange  rate  lira-dollar of  1972). 
This  might  be  considered  as  exaggerated,  but  one  should  also  take  into  account  how 
little "open"  was  the  Italian  economy  in  1972  to  competitive  imports  of  manufactured 
products  from  LDC's.  In  1975  imports  of  SITC  products  5,  6  (excluding  67  & 68),  7 
and  8  amounted  to  574  million dollars,  and  in  1976  and  1977  they  constantly  increased 
(in part,  of  course,  as  a  consequence  of  inflation and  of  the devaluation  of  the  lira 
with  respect  to the  1972  situation ~is-a-vis the dollar). 
(2)  For  a  more  up-to  date picture of  Italian  imports  from  LDC's  see  : 
C.  Sec chi,  "Le  Importazioni  ital  iana  dai  Paesi  sottosviluppati  con  particolare 
riferimento  ai  prodotti  manufatti",  L'Industria,  n.  2-3,  1977  <available  c/o 
Mr  J.L.  Lacroix). -6-
Table  i~ 
Employment  effects of  an  increase of  competitiv1~  imports  from  LDC's  egual  to  500  billion 
Liras 
Sectors 
1.  Agriculture,  foresty  and  fishing 
2.  Energy  products 
3.  Iron,  steel  and  non-ferrous  metals & minerals 
4.  Non-metallic  minerals  and  manufactures 
5.  Chemicals 
6.  Machinery  and  mechanical  products 
7.  Transport  equipment 
8.  Food,  beverages  and  tobacco 
9.  Textiles,  clothing,  Leather  and  shoes 
10.  Woord,  paper,  rubber  and  other  manufactures 
11.  Constructions  and  public  works 
12.  Hotels  and  commerce 
13.  Transport  and  communications 
14.  Insurances  and  banking 
15.  Other  services 
16.  Services  not  on  sale  (public  administration,  etc ••• ) 
TOTAL  EMPLOYMENT  DISPLACED 
For  explanations,  see  the text. 
Number  of  workers 
676 
1,214 
2,659 
593 
7,162 
15,859 
3,578 
259 
58,498 
13,190 
409 
1,103 
2,989 
1,477 
701 
110,367 -7-
The  results given  in  table  2  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  500  billion  liras 
extra  imports  of  competitive  manufactured  products  from  LDC's  would  have  the  same 
structure per  sector  as  in  the  1972  actual  case presented  above,  and  that  they  would 
displace  internal  production  by  an  equal  amount  (similarly  to  what  was  done  ad  i). 
A comparison  with  the  results obtained  by  prof.  V.  Van  Rompuy  (3)  is quite  interesting. 
In  the  case of  Belgium,  for  1  billion belgian  francs  (at  1970  prices)  extra  competitive 
imports  from  LDC's,  there  would  result  a  Loss  of  2,084  jobs.  At  the exchange  rate 
Lira/f.b.  of  1970,  the  case  of  500  billion  liras would  mean  40  times  as  much,  that  is 
83,360  jobs.  This  is quite  Less  than  the  figure  given  for  Italy  (with  reference,  how-
ever,  to  1972)  of  110,367  jobs  (table 2).  The  difference  (27,007  jobs)  is almost  fully 
explained  by  heavier  employment  consequences  in  the  case of  Italy on  the "textile,  clo-
thing,  Leather  and  shoes"  sector  (25,178  jobs  more  in  Italy  would  be  Lost  than  in  Belgium 
under  the assumption  of  500  billion  liras extra  imports).  There  are differences  also 
for  other  sectors  <e.g.  agriculture,  etc ••• ,  Machinery  and  mechanical  products,  trans-
port  equipment),  while  for  others  (e.g.  chemicals)  the  results are  quite  similar. 
Such  a  comparison  is anyhow  quite  interesting,  notwithstanding  the different  structure of 
the two  countries  <i.e.  input-output  tables)  and  the different  composition  of  their 
foreign  trade with  LDC's  for  the products  considered.  Perhaps,  a  general  comparison 
at  the  EEC  Level  could give - apart  from  inevitable variations  from  Country  to  Country  -
some  constant  trends,  well  deserving  some  further  analysis. 
(3)  Note  sur  L'incidence pour  L'economie  belge d'une  augmentation  du  commerce 
exterieur  avec  Les  PVD. Frank  Wolter  Kiel,  February  1978 
Note  on  Estimates  of  Employment  Effects  of'  an  Increasing 
Di.vi~i.on  oJ'  L;<l.>our  with  Dcvnlopinr;  Countries,  FHG 
T;1  Gr:rrn:n1y,  estim:ttcs  of  employmnnt  e.f:fects  duo  to  ad.justment 
.f,n- tr;1.de  ''i  th  developing  countries  have  been  carr  i cd  out  by 
tlw  :!ns citut  fiir  Hel b,;irtschaft,  Kiel  and  the  Deutsche 
Ins c i tu  t  fiir  \{irts  cha:ft s:forschung,  Berlin.  The  relevan  -c 
references  are: 
( 1 )  G.  Fcl s,  E •  ..J.  Horn,  Dc~r  Wandel  der  Indus trios truk tur  im 
Zuge  der  wclth'irt:=:;chaftlichon  Intoc;ration  der. Ent\vicklungs-
Li.nder.  "Die  Hel b,;irtscha:ft",  Ti.ibingen  1972,  I!o:ft  1. 
(2)  H.ll.  Glismann,  Die  gcsamt"'irtschaftlichen  Kosten  dor 
Protoktion.  "Kieler  Diskussionsbe.itr~ige",  Kiel  1971~. 
(J)  II.  Diclce,  H.H.  Glisrn:1nn,  E.-J.  Horn,  A.D.  Neu,  Beschiif'tigun{';.S-
wirkunt>:en  (Liner  verstLi.rk.ten  Arbeitsteilung  zwisclwn  der 
Dundesrepublik  und  ·ion  Entwickl_ungsLinder-1  .•  "Kieler 
Studien",  Xr.  137,  Tlibingen  1°76. 
(4)  G.  Fels,  E.-J.  Horn,  K.-1v.  Schatz,  F.  ~volter,  An<llyse  und 
Erfordernisse  einer  Aussparungsstrate~ie im  ~ergleich zu 
einer Universalstrategie.  Opinion  submitted  to  the 
Federal  Ministry for  Research  and  Technology.  Kiel  1976 
(mimeo.). 
(5)  F.  lo/olt0r,  Adjustin;~ to  Imports  from  DevQlo;Jing  Countries. 
In:  II.  Giersch  (ed.),  Reshaping  the  \vorld  Economic  Order. 
Tiibingen  1977. 
( 6)  D.  Schumacher,  Verstiirkt•~r llandol  mit  dor  Dri tten  Hel t: 
Eher  TJmsotzung  als  Freisetzun~ deutscher Arbeitskr:i.fte. 
" D  r,o/- lo/ o c 11 en  be  r  i  c h t  " ,  5 /  1 9 7 7 •  Be  r  1 in  ,  1 9 7 7 • 
(7)  D.  Schumacher,  Beschii.ftigunrrswirkuncen  von  Importen  aus 
En twi ckl  ungs Lindern  ni  ch  t  drama tis  i er,en.  11 DI1o/- \o/o chenberi  ch t", 
1/78,  Berlin,  1978. 
(8)  D.  Schwn:1ch0r,  ROO  000  DoAclJLi.ftir;to  nir  den  Export  .in  Enc-
"Dl'':·'-·I.;,.)Cllot1l>G.·t·l·.cl•t",  _~;;·.-:~.  \-Jickluni~sli\nclcrn  hesch:i.t'tigt.  •  .  •  ·' 
Berlin  1978. -2-
The  Kiel  projections  of nat  displacement  effects  range  until 
1985  and  cover  West  Germany's  manufacturing sector split up 
into  about  JO  branches  1 •  Jvl<~thodolc1gic:ally,  these  estimates 
are  in  principle  based  on  Hxtrapolations  of  rH,c~ionalizod 
import  and  export  as  well  as  industryspecific  productivity 
tr<~nds,  subject  to  vnr:i.ous  assumptions  (for det<tils  see 
pp.  A·'~- ,\(i  and  (J)  pp.  00  s<.~q.). 
Tho  DPv-proj ections  of displacement  effects range until  1980 
and  cover  four  industrial sectors  (precision  and  optical 
goods,  leather produ
1cts,  textiles  and  clothing).  The  estimates 
by  means  of input-output  techniques  are based  on  trend 
extrapolations  of  imports,  the  price  and  commodity  structure 
of  1972  and  the productivity structure  ot~  1976  (for details 
see  (6),  p.  36).  In  addition,  DIW  has  published  ex-post 
c;llCnl;ttions  of'  omployrnont  oi'i'octfl  or  GPrmnny's  tr.:ulo  w:i.th 
developing  countries  according  to  economic  sectors  and 
(7)  ('8).  occupation  ~ 
Obviously,  the  Kiel .8.nd  Dl1  .  .J'  <~stima  tes  are difficult  to  comparH. 
However,  the  calcul~tions of both  Institutes  indic: te 
substantial inter-industrial  migration  caused  by  :in 
increasing division of labour between  Germany  and  the 
developing countries. 
In  depth  estimates  are  avnilnblo  :for  precision and  optical 
goods,  textiles  and  clothing in  (J). A1 
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, 1J75,  II  '"'\l  ..  c:  "'h.bour prO\.!'J~~n·:tv of  lndus~ry i  in 1962 {1975\  a~ rneasured ty V>lume or net production per holu·s  wo~ked;  E. 75  •  t>rr:ployers o! tndua  .. 
'  .  .  l!J~  I .,r}  •  d  1 
try 1  10  l'J75o;  Ht1S  •  hllurs "•urko:J  in  1ndus~ry i  in 1:175.  •  J(I!Ve3.le~ t:ompar&tl'-'t' advantage in t1·cade  wnn deve!opil~S: C.:>Lwtrit"s.  Fvr n-.easurtolnttnt 5ee 
p;Jra.  16.  - eExcept  mlnlt'r~i. 01l  :n.:!ustry. 
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):> 
eN Method  used  for  projecting  employment  eff!£!! 
In  order  to  be  able  to forecast  the  future  structure of the  Federal 
Republic's  external  trade  and  determine  the  number  of  workers  who  will 
be  displaced  in  the  course of  the structural  changes,  trend estimates 
were  produced  for the  Federal  Republic's  industry-specific  imports  and 
exports  in  its trade  with  industrialized  and  developing  countries  and 
for  the  labour  productivity  of  the  individual  sectors.  In these  trend 
extrapolations  time  is  an  exogenous  variable;  it  is anticipated that 
the overall pattern  will  be  the  same  as  in  the past,  this  applying  in 
particular to  the  future  economic  policy measures  of the  Federal  Republic 
and  its trading partners. 
The  employment  effects that  will  accompany  the  structural  changes  up  to 
1985  were  broken  down  into two  components  :  the first  shows  what 
employment  changes  will  be  due  to the  anticipated  increases  in  imports 
and  the  second  shows  what  increa~ there  will  be  1n  employment  as  a  result 
of  the trend of  exports.  The  balance of  these  two  components  is  seen  as 
the  structural  change  due  to external  trade.  The  employment  effects  ~re 
calculated according  to the  following  formulae  : 
(1) 
M  M  - M 
B  =  ilt  ilt~ 
i  AP 
i  t 
,  X  X  - xi,t - 1 
e,  1  = 
i,t  (2) 
AP1 ,t 
where 
e1  =  the  change  in the number  of  llersons  employed  1n  sector 1 
M  =  imports 
X  =  exports 
AP  = Labour  productivity 
t  =  forecast  year 
t-1  = last  year  of  observation 
Source  C4> -2-
It  is  assumed  in this method  of  calculation that  a  given  value  of  additional 
imports_displaces  a  given  value of  domestic  production.  The  forescast 
values  for  1985  were  calculated  separately  for  imports  from  developing 
and  from  industrialized  countries.  The  same  procedure  was  followed 
for  exports.  An  exponential  trend  function  was  employed: 
bt 
y  = ae  , 
where  y  represents  imports  or  exports  as  appropriate,  a  is  a  constant,  e  is  the 
base  figure  of  the natural  logarithms,  b  is  the  regression  coefficient  and  t 
represents  time. 
The  labour  productivity  of  the  individual  sectors  of  German  industry  was  measured 
as  sales  per  employee.  The  values  for  1985  were  obtained by  extrapolating  the 
1974  values  using  the  average  annual  rate  of  change  per  man-hour  between  1962 
and  1974;  the  values  for  (the  recession year)  1974  were  adjusted first  to 
allow  for  the under-utilization of  plant  capacity.  The  index  of  Labour  produc-
tivity per  man-hour  was  preferred to the  corresponding  index  per  person  employed 
since the  latter  is  comparatively  fluctuation  - reactive.  Possible  cuts  in 
working  hours  over  the projection period  were  disregarded. 
A number  of  problems  had  to  be  allowed  for.  These  concern  (1)  the  length  of 
the  period of  observation of  trade  with  industrialized and  developing 
countries;  (2)  the  productivity  or margin~ labour;  (3)  extraordinariLy 
large  increases  in  imports;  (4)  calculation using  nominal  values,  and 
(5)  the  choice  of  industrial  sectors. 
(1)  While  1985  trade  with  industrialized  countries  was  estimated 
using  the  Longest  possible observation period,  namely 
1962-74,  the  shorter  period of  1968-74  was  used  for  the 
developing  countries. 
Source  <4> -3-
This  was  done  because  the developing  countries  have  been  exporting  industrial 
goods  <to  the  Federal  Republic>  in  appreciable quantities only  since the  end 
of  the  sixties.  It was  also feared  that  rapidly  increasing  imports  with 
a  low  base  Level  (base effect)  might  Lead  to  an  over-estimation of  the 
employment  effects. 
<2>  It  was  assumed  that  the  Labour  productivity  of  displaced  Labour  is  Cone-third) 
Less  than  the  average  productivity of  the  Labour  force  in the  sector  in question. 
This  seems  plausible because  one  can  assume  below-average  Labour  productivity 
for  shrinking  firms  and  .displaced  Labour. 
(3)  In  some  sectors  imports  from  developing  countries  grew  extraordinarily 
rapidly  between  1968  and  1974.  As  a  restriction on  the  forecast 
to  1985  an  average  annual  increase of  50  % was  incorporated.  This  is plausible 
for  two  reasons.  fi~ly, experience  shows  that  the  gra.~thof  imports  slows 
down  in  relative  terms  whe~ they  reach  a  fairly  high  level  (and  the  s~me 
applies  to exports).  Secondly,  it  is to  be  expected that  domestic  producers 
will demand  import  barriers  on  grounds  of  market  disruption if imports  do 
increase to  a  high  level  very  rapidly. 
(4)  The  calculations  were  carried out  with  nominal  values  since  in the 
industrial  nomenclature  that  was  used  there  are  no  price indices  for  German 
external  trade broken  down  according  to  industria(iied and  developing  countries. 
With  this method  it  is  assumed  that  th~ relative prices for  imports,  exports 
and  sales  will  follow  the  same  trend  as  in the past.  The  general  inflation 
component  cancels  itself out  as  both  the denominator  and  the numerator  contain 
nominal  values. 
(5)  Aircraft  construction  and  shipbuilding  and  the  manufacture  of  office 
machiner)  and data  processing  equipment  were  not  taken  into  consideration 
in this  calculation.  In  the  latter  case  the empirical  data  available  covered 
too  short  a  period,  and  in the  case  of  aircraft  construction and  shipbutlding 
it was  not  pos~ible to  calculate  the necessary  labour  productivity figures. 
Source  C4> l 
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Consumer  Benefits and  Trade Liberalisation 
Consumer  benefits  from  freer  trade and  consl.l!ller  costs  from  protection 
are not  incidE~tal side effect of  such policies but  central to any 
measure of  econo~;1ic welfare.  Lower  (or higher) prices,  greater  (or 
lesser) availability of  goods  are after all amongst  the most  obvious 
ways  of  transmitting changes  in real  incomes.  The  various  effects  of  freer 
trade on  consumet·s  can be  summarised  as  follows: 
1 
(i) consumer  "surplusa;  much  economic  analysis  tends  to  focus 
on the  gains  to society as  a  whole  from  an  expansion of  con~n.u:~ption 
opportunities  and  greater productive efficiency,  both  se~~  i~ 
purely  s t<J.tic  terms  (consumer  and  producer  "surplus'').  1':-'.cse 
gains are likely to be small  in relation to the distributional 
effects of  tariff  (or  NTB)  changes  as  long  as  the tariff rate, 
or tariff equivalent,  is small.,  as  is  the case not¥  for most 
1  tariff pre tected manufactures.  This  arises  from  the mathen:at ical 
relationships  involved which determine  that  cor.~umer - and  pro::h:cer  -
''surplus" is a  function of  the square of relative price  cha::-:t;e:s. 
Consumer  ''surplus 11  considerations are  therefore only  sit;nifi.::<"mt 
for highly protected items  like clothing and  agriculture  wherE~ 
domestic  prices,. 
(ii) dynamic  factors;  consumers  benefit to the extent that 
economies  of scale generated  through trade are passed on  in lower 
This is also a  gross,  rather  than a  net benefit to society since it is 
necessary  to deduct  the costs  involved as  producers  move  to !:lOre  efficient 
activities,  though  these are also likely to be  snall if tariffs are  sc~ll. -2-
prices.  Economies  of scale also lead to concentrati.on of ownership 
which  is now  very advanced in many  European industries.  In the 
absence of  competition from  trade,  or effective anti monopoly  policy, 
there will follow  the abuses  and  inefficiencies one would  expect 
from  monopoly  power.  This is not a  consideration which  applies 
with particular force  to "labour intensive" processes in which ldcs 
have  developed  a  comparative advantage,  making  shoes  and clothing 
for  example,  since here  small  firms  predominate.  But  it is still 
relevant especially where  restrictive practices exist.  It also 
provides  a  source of  (very unwelcome!)  price competition for  the 
monopolitistic manmade  fibre producers  through competition in the 
end  product market. 
(iii) price stability;  to the extent that inflation  :~s  not purely 
a  monetary  phenomenon,  increases in  importe~final or intermediate 
product,prices  can influence the  rate of inflation.  The 
effects are  likP~v to be small in relation to other influences  on 
overall inflation  (but not necessarily small in relation to the 
costs of trade liberalisation).  However  if one adheres to a 
boradly  'cost-push'  view of inflation small initial changes 
originating in higher import  (or import competing)  prices  can 
have  a  powerful  'ripple effect'  as mark-ups  are added  and product 
price increases are incorporated in wage  demands. 
(iv) distribution effects;  trade  libe~alisation also entails a 
straight transfer from  producers  to consumers.  Lower  consumer 
prices have  their counterpart in lower profits and wages  in the -3-
import  competing  industry.  This  could be regressive or progressive 
(in a  fiscal  sense)  depending upon  the product concerned.  In the 
case of agriculture the effects of  trade liberalisation are usually 
progressive since protection represents  a  form  of consumption 
tax on  a  basic necessity to subsidise agricultural landowners (and  worker~ 
Trade  liberalisation of clothing and  shoes is also probably 
progressive because  consumption of these items  tends  to be relatively 
high in low  income  groups.  It is also important to remember  that 
we  are not only dealing with final products but also intermediate 
inputs.  Part of the cost  (i.e.  that which  cannot be fully passed 
on)  of protecting steel makers  has  to be borne by  steel-using 
of 
industries:/yarn makers  by  clothing manufacturers.  This  effect 
can be  ~easured in terms  of changes  in effective protection. 
There  are two  basic lines of criticism normally levelled at those 
who  wish to give consumer  interests central importance in any  consideration 
of  trade policy.  Crit1cs say, 
(A)  consumer  benefits are absorbed by  importers  and  other 
intermediaries. 
(B)  these benefits are largely "irrelevant" under conditions of 
large scale unemployment. 
(C)  even if A or B are false,  ''political: reality" dictates that 
producer interests have  to be given greater weight. -4-
A)  r~~orters  ~argins:  there is quite  a  lot of evidence,  based  on  anecdote 
and  also  on  serious  research  (at Tilburg for  example)  that  import 
margins 
rr..:lrk-ups 
are  t-igher  than1on donestically produced goods.  This,  it is 
argued,  leads  to  the  ga~ns from  trade being absorbed not  by  final 
cor-sumers  but  by  specialist importers,  owners  of retail chains,  insurers, 
shippers  and  eKport merchanting  houses  in the  ldc's.  Gi"en genuinely 
greater uncertainty in international trade their margins  are doubtless 
his  hEr  than for domestically  produced goods.  There are several reasons 
for  d::mbting  that  anything more  serious is  involved: 
~i)  there must  be  a  significant discernable advantage  to consumers 
h1  buying  'cheap'  imports,  otherwise  they would not buy  them in 
in increased quantities  - and  trade protection issues only arise 
when  they  do; 
(ii) much  of  the evidence  of  higher  importer margins  relates to 
clothing yet  these are possibly explained by  restrictions on  trade 
not  the  absence  of  them.  The  GSP  system,  with its highly restrictive 
tariff quotas  on  "sensith•e11  items effectively ensures  that the 
gains  accruing in the first weeks  of every year do  so as windfall 
profits  to  importers.  Also  the opE!ration of  'voluntary export 
re~.trictions'  and  i:nport restrictions effectively creates a  semi-
mor.opoly  position for holders  ; of  licences.  High  importers'  utargins 
in  these cases are  an  argument  for  less trade restriction not more. -5-
(iii) even if importers pocket high margins  on  "cheap" imports 
in the short  run~ this cannot persist.  New  importers will get 
into the act and undercut  the previous  importers.  Domestic 
prcducers,  under competition from  increased import volumes, will 
have  to cut their prices  and in turn force  down  import prices. 
That  this happens  in practice is well illustrated by  the effects 
of a  substantial growth  of  ldc garments  imports  in 1975/76 on 
clothing prices  (and profit ma.rgins)  in the Community.  The  effect 
may  be blcnted by  powerful  S£>.mi~  .. ,nopolistic interests in importing 
and  Letailing but this is an argument  for more  active anti-monopoly 
policy not  for giving importers  the o:::lportunities  for higher mark-ups 
which  they would  derive from  a  system from  import restriction. 
B)  Unel!lployment 
Any  dis.cussion of consumer benefits  (costs)  and  producer costs 
(b  f .  )  f.  ;Jet  .  ene 1ts  needs  to be  lrmlyfut a  l'l<tcro  rco:-.crac  context.  The  existence 
of  unemployment  at  cur-::-.~t  levels  ::~1.d  the. need  to rtmo·,e it, is sometimes 
used  as  an argument  for giving lower weight  to consumer -;..relfa::e 
considerations.  However  trade restrictic:1s  a"t"e  ah1ays  inflationary and 
why 
the main  reason/we currently have  excessive overall  unemploym~nt is because 
of the inflation problem.  Se~~ral major Western  European countries, 
Germany,  Britain within the  n·~  ceiling~. and  France under  the Barre 
austerity plan,  have  established monetary  gr~-~~ r.eilings designed to 
curb  inflation,  but  creating as  a  direct consequence unemployment  in 
excess  of  that which  is  'struct.ural'  (due  to immobility).  If unemployment 
is created as  an intentional biproduct of anti inflationary monetary and 
fiscal policy it would  be  totally illogical to use  inflationary trade -6-
protection as  a  means  of countering it, unless  there is overwhelming 
evidence  that  the  unemplo}~ent produced in the industry concerned is of 
a  svecial character.  Some  of  us  may  feel  that our  governments  have  got 
their general priorities wrong but  then our job is change  their priorities 
not  to pretend th3t  these priorities don't exist. 
There  is one  school  of  thought which would  reject the  above 
ar£u~ent on  the  grounds  that it is not  inflation but  the balance of 
pay::c-:-,ts  t.rhich  is the  constraining factor preventing an expansion of 
Euro?ean  economies.  This viewpoint  is being pressed in the  UK  by  the 
Ca:::brid.se  school of  economists.  It is highly doubtful if in fact  the 
balance of  payoents  is  the main  constraint.  The  British government  for 
exr.p le, largely for  reasons  of anti-inflationary policy, recently allowed 
the  pcund  to float  upwards  against  the weighted  exchange rate of/ tasket 
cf r:Jajor  cu1·rencies, in effect subsidising  imports  and  taxing exports,  and 
th.::re':::y  creating  u:1enplo:;~ent  in  traded  goods  and  service  industries. 
s~ssessive rr.ar;.,  revalw•t:ions  have  had  a  similar and greater effect  i11 
Cer:.a:cy.  Neither  countryi s  authorities,  nor  those  of moft other  governments 
in  t:-.e  E.~ can  therefore  legitimately use  the balance of payments  as  an 
alibi for  u:1er::ploy1:1cnt. 
If they did,  the  correct  response,  other than devaluation,  would 
be  a  z,cr:eral  but  temporary  import  curb,  like  the  Italian import deposit 
scl-,er:le  in  1975,  or  tht:!  British import  surcharge  in the mid  1960's.  The 
:X:<iin  tar.set wo•jld  be  imbalaaces  on  inter OECD,  including Cormnunity, trade, 
mind 
not  'low cost'  im?orts.  With  this i~/  Lord  Kaldor,  one of  the main -7-
approach 
exponents  of  the Canbridge  has  recently set out  the details of  a 
syste::c of  'ordered  trade'  designed  to preserve  a  balance in trade in 
ca~ufactures between  the  13  ~ain OECD  econonies  including  rner::bers 
of  t::e  Co::.::1mnty.  He  ignores  "low cost11  impo:cts,  presu:nably  for  the 
reason  t~1at  they  are  of  trivial  i~~ortancc in terms  of  international 
tr.o::(.tary  im:~alaGce - wost  such  cour.tries  anyway  spend their earnings 
fairly quickly  in Western carkets. 
C)  Pcli tics 
If it 1!i  true  that  trade restrictions directly contradict and 
u~'  .. :.:e_rml.ne  sovere:·::ent  ~rr:acro'  econcrr  .. ic policy,  why  do  go\.7ernments  introdpro 
t~2~~  l~re we  are  in  the  realms  of politics rather  than  econo~i~~ 
LiLing  their cl.:ctors  in  the  mass  governments  are  more  conscious  of  the 
gri.eva::,ccs  of  the  95~~ \:ho  are  e:n;Jloyed  and  are  concerned  about  rising 
price.:;  than  th<!  s;;~  1.-.'h·:)  are  unc~rrploycd.  Taking  a  particular  jmicro' 
~ccisic~ hcwevcr  the  line-up of  forces  is quite different.  A  decision 
..:·\·e:·  ,-~~::::.:.2r  or  not  t::J  keep  open  a  shirt factory  and/or  to restrict &hirt 
i~  -·~·ts  •:i:l be  prect... _ cd  by  lobbying  by  the  ::ettional  Union of Shirt 
O;:<:r.H.lV•_s  (ii  t'.c·c is one)  and  the National  Federation of  Sr.irt N.s.kers 
:..:: :.h  of ,.-::.:esc  ::- .:::· ;,c ::-s  stand  to  r,ain  or  lose  a  good  deal.  B"Jt  there  l.S 
n:-:J  .:.1tion~1l  Ac;,-~JCiation of  Sh:irt  Cunsur:1ers.  Consunoer  interests are  likely 
t·'  be  ig::ort•J  ~,it~ce  the  ir:pact  of  the  decision on  the  consm::<:r  price  index 
.>,  at  the  :-:::.1r;_;1n,  q._:ite  .sr':.:.tll.  But  this is not  always  the  case. 
hcs  i~ ta.:~c2  to  food  price  u~cre::J.ses  1s particularly stror.g  and  urban-bz.sed 
pa-rties  c:.re  very conscicus  of  the political costs of giving too much  to 
the  far::1ers,  at  the  expense  of  urban  consumers. -8-
~:2~~cvcr tne  be~e£its  fro~ protectionist lobbying are affected by 
di:::ir.isl-:Lz  returns  the  more  lobbies  seek to obtain protection.  Producer 
lo~~ies can  only  be  truly effective  in protectionist  and  price raising 
b.:::-.Tr:.:,ur  ·,.;hen  t:-,ey  represent  a  sc2.ll  part of n;arketed output.  Hhen  the 
sh1re  beco:::es  large and  is grmnng- as it is now  with agriculture,  tex-ciles, 
clcthi~g and  shoes,  steel,  cars  etc.  - their activities are ultimately 
lar~elJ self  ca~cclling.  There  are possible analogies  developing with 
~c;2 b2r:ai~in~ bLhaviour,  where  any  disturbance  of differentials  is 
lia'Jle  to  tri;::,z·.:r  off  a  w1:ole  chain of  claims,  which  evc:·ttually wipe  out 
r.:·.~ch  of  the  initial ;jain  in real  ter:ns.  In such  a  circurr:stances 
gover~~ents begin  to  find  that it runs  counter  to  their overall policy 
obj 2:::tivcs to  mJ.~-ze  signific2nt allowances  for  too many  'special cases'. 
In  order  to  try  to make  consumer benefits  somewhat  more  concrete. 
n.:t~:odo  lot:ies  h:::.ve  b2en  developed  to  try to quantify  the  costs  and  L .:1efits 
of  tra~e policy  decisi~~s at  an  industry level  though  these are,  so  far, 
' 
pnmltlve.  The  be::1.efits  of  liberalisation are  calculated in terms  of 
co.::su=:er  surplus  l•thich,  as  we  have  seen,  is  a  static concept,  understating 
the  full rr:agnitude  of  consurr:er  gains.  Costs  are  seen in  terms  of  the  outpu; 
and  tr~crefore  incone, losses  1n  a  transitional period until resources  can 
be  rel0pl~yed.Arisi~g  tram these  calculations  is 
.  f 
1~ 
that/ tr  .  .a  benefits  of  liberalisation substantially 
the 
I  policy implication  • 
outweigh costs  thQ.n 
the  losers  can be  cor:;pensated  leaving a  nE~t gain to  the  community.  This 
is not ::erely a  theoretical welfare  issue - ir1  practice many  workers  do 
voluntarily accept  cash  redundanc:y  payments  tvhen  offered,  as  in recent 
cases  of  'rationalisation'  in the  UK  steel and  car industries  (thou&h -· 9-
tLe:-e  are  hidd.:::~1  social problems  - the  younger,  more mobile  workers  take 
t:he  money  even  in a  difficult job  market~ older more  imrJobile.  workers 
te:~.d  to  clir.g  to  their  jobs,  knowing  that  redundancy  could mean  permanent 
cr.e:-:.ployr.2~1t). 
Tryin:s  to  put  fiGures  to  these costs  and benefits  does  hm-:ever 
prese:1t  ccmsidc:rablc  difficulty.  Predictions  of  the effects  of  commercial 
p(d i~y ueci si,,as  rely l!t:avily  on  price elasticity me.:.surc·s  (of  deJ::~and  <l!ld 
S\..~:;:·ly)  ~.:·;ic:1  2::c  ;-;,;t:or~ously  unrclic;.ble.  ~·mere quantitative rer;ulation 
cf  i:-::·:":rts  is  i:-._vo}·,·cJ  it is  Lc::::essary  to  have  some  idea of  the  ir.1plicit 
tari::, Phich is difficult  to  estimate  from direct  co::::parison  of  inpcrt 
a~-.:2  C.t:;=-:_:~stic  prices  \-.~hen  quality differences  are  i~port3r"..t,  and  next  to 
\'  L~' s) .  ~. ,.  csti::•:;ti.on  o[  'transitional'  costs  bccor.:t:'S  difficult  since 
re,.;:.c::,_a:lcy  i::evit&~~ly  creates  a  cert:1in fraction of  pen:~anent uncL?loyed, 
a:hi  tl".e  extent  to 1:tich  one  stops  regarding  th<~  costs of this  permanent 
e::-:.,  ':>lc::rc::e:-:t  a.s  <~~0.  to  the  trade  policy decision and  due  instead  to other 
It is  clc1r  that  3ny  cstit:l<ltes  must  be  rL'g:1rded  with  a  hit;h  dq;rec 
ci  res<O:\'E:,  2:..:t  for  \.:LJt  they  .:-tre  worth  the various  studies which  have 
(i)  treated  a.s  a:r.  invest:::•.nt  decision with costs  and  oenefits 
ciisccc:;-:ted  over  tin,e,  tl:e  benefits of  trade  liberalisation 
ir:v,:ri.·,:-.J:;r  ceo:.:  o~1t  <~s  treater  than  the  social costs  even on - 10-
(ii)  t~e r.et  bendits from  liberalisation are greatest for  highly 
protected  ite=s.  and  for  industries where  protected workers  are in 
lm,·  w;:;ge  e:;:ployc::ent  - eg.  textiles.  The  costs are more  likely  to 
out,;eigh  th2  benefits  \::1cre  protection is relatively  low  and workers 
are hithly  ~aid - eg.  steel and  cars. 
r.et 
/benefits of  liberalisation tend  (except  fer very 
hizhly protected  itc~s)  to  be scall in relation to  the straisht 
transfer effects  as  bct\oleen  consumers~ producers  and  ;;overnl:!ent 
and  this no  doubt  accounts  in part for  producer  resistance to 
libcralisation. 
Since  issues  have  been raised ,.,hich are of a  theoretical character 
t:":e  arguments  are spelt out  in more  detail, with examples,  in an attached 
note. -11-
I:-.  .::  ~::;:;tl-:;:d;)lcgy  for  cal~ulating the  L:npact  on society of  trade 
bcrriers  a~d  t~eir resaval  is well  establisheJ,  end  has  been  set out  in 
Attempts  have  been  r::ac!!.:!  to  co:-rr.1re  this 
in the  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic 
,  .  ...  :~ t  l·7orld  3aQk  1974) 
OEC~ Developcent  Centre 
l':l:':),  c:.i in  a  1:r..::lLnin.:1ry  papers  produced at Autw(!rp  (eg.  H.  ::t!m:issen 
'i.'c.::::::.::i.on  ;:iu~c:<.;t  Adjustr.:ent- the  Belgian Foot>;<::ar  Industry). 
Tl~cse studies  all use  t1'1e  concept  of  consumer  and  producer  surplus. 
It 1s  ~;.;orth recalling  the basic  assurr~.~)tiuns  that unJerlie this  l~ind static 
partial  e~uilibriun aualysis;  an  efficient price mechanism;  ter~s of  tra~c 
are  g1ven,  no  ecooom1es  of  scalei  one  final  good  only  is considered,  no 
elasticities, 
substitutes a:fl'cted by  cross- or  intermediate products;  indirect 
effects  are  ig~ored,  the  demand  curve is a  'constant utility curve'  which 
o.ssu.-::1es  a•.;ay  inco:::e  distribution problems.  Modifications  can be made  to 
atltl  realis::1.  elasticities of  demand  which  change  through  time;  discou:1ting 
o£  benefits  and  costs  over  time;  incorporation of  indirect, multiplier 
effects.  Ho-w·ever  the  analysis still rests on highly restrictive 
assur:1ptions. 
The  two  main  elements  of  consumer welfare  involved in  the  remcval 
of a  trade barrier are,  first,  the  "deadweight" gains  and,  second,  the - 12-
C:i.stri·:o:.ttion  effects.  The  11deadHeight" gains  relate to  the  total  g::1in 
to  t::e  ccm::·:·..;nl.ty  fro·;n  ;;consumer  surplus"  (i),  and  from  increased efficiency 
1n  the no',:  less protected industries  (ii) and  can be calculated fro:n  the 
st::n  of 
•) 
(1)  .S"t-.D.ed. 
a!'.d  (ii) 
') 
.5.t-.S.es 
~,::-: :::;:  t  is  the  price  chan[;e  consequ.:nt  upon  the  trade  liberalisation, 
8  is  total initial 2crnand  in  the  importing country  S  is total initial  , 
sc.;:'ply  1n  the  ir:~porting country.  The  price elasticities are of donestic 
Jc::;;md  (eJ)  and  :lomestic  supply  (es). 
There is,  1n addition,  a  straight  transfer of welfare  from  producers 
to  consuc:1ers  (iii)  and  from  the  government:  to consumers  in the  case of  a 
tariff renoval. 
(iii) t.S. (1- .. St  ed) 
(iv)  t  (D-S) 
In  the  case  of  non-tariff barriers - say quotas  - the  revenue  equivalent 
(iv),  is not  a  transfer  from  the  government but  from  importers  and  exporters 
to  consua;2rs. 
To  be  set against  ~he total 13ain  from  liberalisation to  the 
coc:r:unity  (i) plus  (ii)  (the distribution effects are irrelevant to  a 
calculation total net:  welfare)  is the  loss  resulting from displacement 
of  labour.  The  loss  in production can be calculated from, - 13-
(v)  t.es.S 
Th~  s  ca.:-1  be  e:.:~r~ssed  ~n  emplcy~rn.ent  terms,  assu:n:tng  a  constant  relationsl1ip 
l;c~·.;·c:e::  out?ut  ;::;:;.d  er.:~~oy:nc.nt  in  the  industry  (though  this  assurr.ption  c2.n 
'be  v:::::ieJ  to  aUo·:,r  for  differences  betv1een u;arginal  and  average  productivity). 
1b~s  the  e~?loy:~nt effect  (vi) 
(·;i_)  t.es.E 
of  laJo~r is  not  pernanent  (though it may  be  for  sorr.e 
~c~k2~s.  a~J  for  most  u~dcr conditions  of mass  une:2ploy~cnt).  Labour  is 
~:r_,  .. :-_z:ly  rc-c:UiJloyed  c-.:r•cnJiEi;  on  labour market  conditions,  and  the 
ccc:}.::l  c::>l't  tz,  tLe  co:c.Ln:ity  is  the  loss  of  earnints  in  tl1at  transitioral 
' "  ~  ..  t~e  i~dustry  th~y left.  In  an  efficient  labaur market  trH:y  -_,yill 
:c~~  ~~:1  2~~~  ~~ry  fr0:J  re~ion to  region  and  time  to  time  and  depend  also 
_ .•  ~ .:o  1  ~~  LY.:ever  :110re:!.y  the  b<J.re  out line  1he  problens  really 
t.:  .. ·:.r:.  :':-:c·e  , :·.e  trL'S  to  q'..::ir:ti.fy  particul2r cases.  In  order  to illustrate 
t3ke  two  exa~:ples of  the  costs  and 
cc:-:<:L ts  ;::;£  rr-21:ectio:1  as  .::;;plied  to ;?<Hticular  casu;  in  the  UKc,  drawic,g 
(i)  clot~ine:,  vhich is protected by  selective non--tariff 
q;_;<i:-ttitative:  ceilings under  the  MFA. - 14-
(i.i)  sr:;JeS  ,.,.~ich  are protected  al1:1ost  entirely by  tariffs. 
The  main  data inputs  required  to malr..e  estimates  ,'lre  the  following. 
(i)  elasticities,  there  is·no need  to belabour the difficulties of 
obtai~ic; and  usinc elasticities but  the most  obvious  in this  case 
are  the  po.ucity  of r;'caningful  estimates of elasticity of  supply  and 
the  variability of elasticities over  time  (in relation to  trade 
libcralisation  ~2nefits it is  the  long  run elasticity  which  is 
relevdnt:  for  costs it is th2  short  tern, 
problem vrhich  is rr:orc  rclevilnt).  The  difficulties  are  cased 
somewhat  by making  use  of  the  following  relationship \llhich lnlds 
when  iu:.ports  and  proJuction are perfectly  substitutable~  and  r:1aki:l:; 
further,  arbitrary,  assut':lptions  ab,)ut  the magnitude of the  do~::~stic 
elasticity of  denand) 
em=S 
a 
(ed-es)  +  es 
Hc~:ever fur  manufactured  goods  perfect substitut2Jility is  a  dubious 
.!,. 
assumption  since  there is in practice a  good;fieal  product  differentiation, 
such  tilat  the  same  broadly defined product  is both imported  and  exported. 
In practice whe::e  specific  '·low  cost" suppliers are separated out  for 
discri~i:-:.a.tory protective treatment  one  should make  alloHance  for 
elasticities of substitution between particular suppliers  and  cross-
elasticities between  related subproducts,  but for  this,  information is 
simply not  available. - 15-
Fer  the  products  considered  the  following  represent  some  reasona~ly 
authorative  esdmates of  import  elasticity of  deLand: 
So:.1rce 
US  ir:1ports  1964-70 
I~o~c~ic Journal  1973) 
::;i::.s:·..l:g  (:::;rr:·1  i~olla::d  LTS  intcr~ar 
l9(Si) 
:c~:.:_;.l.:~r  ':1,~;  A> .c::  US  ir,;po:-L  data 
U--c:-ie-,:1  S::2tistical  (time;  periol not 
~~:.·:;:::.:-i.:1tiu::)  quote-d) 
l';  ~::,L~  ..  :ticr~:1l  Tr:lde  US  (19Cl5-·77--
C  ..: :  . > :  :;  ~-::  l j: 7 5  q  u :n  t c r l y ) 
Gc rn·,ny  run-Ei:C 
i:::;:,)·t:_;  (period 
n;·t  Livc:r:.) 
Bcl~i.  t ·"'  1960-71 
non-EEC  imports 
us 
Germany 
Est  ir.!a te 
-.79 
-.97 
-4.0 
-4.3 
-1.71 
-1.1 
-1.7  to -1.9 
-3.77 
-.  75 
Note 
no  lagged  functLon 
lagsed 
no  lags 
no  lags 
no  lags 
unlas~ed 
-~·.s  cc.:,  be  see:1  t11e  range  1s \vide.  Short  term elasticities for  both 
~rc~ircs  stc~ to  b2  around  1  but  the  marg1n  of error is wide.  Only  oae 
esti~ate kro~~ tc  Lrc.ce  lcng  run effects is considered which  su2gcsts  a 
.  . 
~or  cc·:_:~:::-~L 
l 
~.:;:.~··- cf  tb:  v:.:ly  l.T  j: ,;ort statistics are  co:,:piled before  1970 it 
. ~~  ~.  ~[i~l~ to  s2rJr~te out  nGn-ESC  shoe  unit values.  Conscs~~~tly 
t:.2  c~.:~;:::_o';s  related.  to all  i1:1ports. - 16-
st~tistically  si;~ificant price coefficient  (the regression equation 
su~z~sted an elJsticity of  .1).  This  reinforced our feeling  t~at 
o;:ven  takins into  account  substitution bet>Jeen  EEC  and  non-EEC  i:::po:::ts 
t>-:c  cL!sticity is  on  the  lo>l  side.  T~1erefore a  figure  of  1  for 
r:o::-E:.:C  i:.:ports  t.Jas  taken  but Hith  the knm.Jle:l.;e  that  this  possibly 
u::dc:cest:imates  the  lon~ term  response.  Fro:-:1  the  transfornation 
t.  .~1.:.:t::.on  one  therefore has  (using  1976  non-EEC  ir.:oport  dor::estic 
de:::ar"d  ratios  for  tile  t•.vo  U.K,  industries:-
(shoes)  (i)  -1  ·- 9  { ci - cs)  +  es  .? ~ 
(clothing)  (ii)  -1  =  7.5  (cd  - cs)  +es 
To  ser,arate out  cs  and  c:l  requires  a  furth•~r simpli.fication.  So.nc 
studies  (eJ.  Magee)sinply  assumed  ed  ==  0  for  the  purpose of 
calcelating es  which  ~vould give  cs  approxi:::-.atc:ly  .125  and  .16  in  the 
tuo  cases.  The  Glisr::arm/  Ant,...,erp  studies  assune  that  cd  =  • 5  es 
;.;hicl-,  gi·.-es  cs  of  . 3  and  . 37,  T!1ese  do  seera very  lor.v  but  the  la.t ter 
set \-ii :1  i..1e  used  for  the purpose of obtaining sone  form of initial 
( ..  '  .  l.  .  . 
1.!.;  1r:p  1. n  t  pr?.!~~ 
1.'".;.:;re  tariff reduction is  concerned it is straightforward to  esti.:n.ate 
the  relative price  change  ~11hich results.  \·;ith  shoes  there are 
h,)zr.inal  tariffs of  8%  and  20%  and  gj_ven  the weighting of  the  1:\lO 
catesories  Ul  non ·E:EC  import  der.:and  the  average  tariff is around 
17%.  The  relative price  c~ange  • 17  is approximately  15% • 
1+.17 - 17-
'..  .  .  c1:  l~7ort pr1ces,  eve~ for 
.;:re  :.::c  J.  ::-...:lly  c:.ccc.~·~: .. 2  r:-.c:::..sure  of  r:he  de,;ree  of  ic~Ecit p::o:ectio;:-;.. 
con~e1ve of  any be:ter.  For  u12  Lost 
,....,,,.  t--
"l ,_,_. '"'- ,__.  !lon-kaitt:ed 
.ts)tl:e  i ::p  h  c i t  u.  r i f :·  by 
I£ it ;;<Ore  felt worth\::.ile  to  pers'-"2  this  ki.;-:.-..i 
e~~iv&:ent fer  J.ll  clothing  categories  afiecced  ~y a  g1ven 
li~c!"'~lisettion,  b:...rc  here \Je  ta~,~c  SOZ  as  a  very  crude  approxi=.2.tic:1 
o::  esti~J.t:io~  pr~poses.  deliberately chosen  on  the  low  side  to  allcw 
:!:cr  zec.uir:c  (,'l"li ty  a_;_fference3  ;'ithin C..lte:.ories,  Su..::\  a  tar::..if 
after 
(11i)  tf:e  cos c  1;:,  len.s  Oi  displaced  :!.a';) our  can  only be  prc-:1::rly 
crc:.: .  .cst  p  ssi-~.:.le  L•<:.:isure  is  to  Li~'-e  the  .:1verage  nation.:ll  pcr:.JJ 
ci  une:r..ploy:~.::nt  and  :-c:ulti~)ly  by  the  average  wa;;e  i:O  meast1re  the 
cost  to  la~our  (n~,c  ~11 of wnich will be  borne  by  labour if tr.ere 
1s  t.mc:?loy:::-.ent  benefit).  B.aldwir.  &  'i1utti  who  carried cut  o::e 
0f  th~  e~rly  stu~ies in  t~is field,  assu~eci alternatively ll and 
2,~  \;'<:~~;.S  for  t 1lC  2V<:race  period  Of  uner:cploymcnt  uy  displaceJ 
la:.•c.'-lr,  and  th-::11  \-:eit:hted  the  cost  by  an  index  incorpor.:1Lin6 
factors  of  re5ion/s.::x/skill/race knmvn  to  be  appropria_fe_ to  the - 18-
lz;our force of the  industry in question.  In the  exaople below 
a  si.::1ilar  procedure  is adopted v:ith  a  less arbitrary average 
u:1e~ploy:nen.t period - using  a  time  profile of  t:1e  period w!lich 
an  unemploy::.'d  uorlwr  can ex")ect  to  remain  unemployed  1.n  the  UK. 
!l:ere are several im?licit assu!!:ptions  made  in this  type of 
ca:culation that are  ~vorth mentioning.  One  1.s  that the  labour 
narket is  large  so  that  redundancies  in one product  area - clothing 
say  - do  not  in  themselves  affect the  pa::tern of job  search or 
period of  avcra~e  unemplo)~cnt.  Clearly,  where  closures  are 
ge:c;raphically hir;l1ly  concentrated,  this will not hold.  In  the 
ca.ses  we  are considering, the  clothing industry is widely  dispersed 
c~rresponding,on a  regional basis,roughly to the national average. 
Fcot'I:JC2r  is more  concentrated but  in areas  currently wit;r  a  below 
3ver2~2  ~ate of  enc~·loyment.  Second,  costs  to  capital are  iznored, 
0n  the  g1:ou:--~:s  that  tr.:de  liber<:~lisation is one  of  tl1e  ree;sor..:J.bl.e 
ris:~s  a  ~>usiness~an ca:1  be  expected to anticipate.  Third,  \1te 
c:s~>-..::::;c  tha~ uo:::~ers will obtain neu  employment  at an  average  v.·age 
cc:::;:J.r:.bL:  to  t~:at  in  tLe  incustry they have  left.  This  is 
,.,,,  have  so  far  ignored  l.:::bour  displacen:ent  in the supplying  i::::'Jstrics. 
T:-:is  is quite  ai!  i";pcrtar..t  factor  in both shoes  and  clotl::in;.  Fro:::t 
:3.  rc;.:gl-1  chec:,  fn;:n  ::~.:c:tional  input-output  tables it see::J.ecl  pla~.:.sa?le 
to  ;:,~d  a  furt:-rer  30Z  to  the  labour displacement cost for both 
ind::.stries. - 19-
?inally there  is the  problc:n of  the  long  term  unemploye~.  l-Ie 
'-.;;:e::-::rloye::i  beyonc  l  ye~:r(22% currently  in  t:1c  UF)  the  costs  em 
no  lc::,;cr be  Clttribut.::i.b1e  to  the initial  displace:~ent, but  L:nre 
d;::e[!er  scci:1l  causes.  Hith  these  assux;:ptions  and  takiat; preseat 
::Ca".::c'..!r  D2r:-L·~et  conditions  the  cost of displacinz 1000  vtorke::-:s  ir. 
:oott.rcar  i:l  the first year  .follouing recundancy is  .?.?proxi:;:ate1y 
£L,650,0JO  2;1d  £1,350,0:)0  for  clothin8 - where  there  is  an  cxtre::;,•ly 
high  i·)crcc:ltage  o£  lmrer ?aic women  1n  the  labour  force . 
.:'utt::..r.g  to2;cther  t"!-1e  var::.ous  eler.2cnts  of  gain  and  loss,  one  can 
sc:::  out  ~he  =~:.:'.;.  features  as  follows: 
··  t  ~-on 
:~:  equal  average 
Cost  :.c  l.::bour of  eDployr:cent 
lOSS 
LOS 
L  73 
7"  -,  V  •  I 
10.50 
23.85 
3,310  (employees) 
5.46 
55.1 
108.3 
163.9 
1628.5 
264.0 
621.6 
57.3 - 20-
L:e  results  Mc'rit  th~ [oll.m.Jing  conclusions.  First  dendwcicht 
;2::..~~s  are  as  1.:-.  prevS.o:..:s  s rudies,  small  in  rela~ion to overall  co:1suu::ption 
In  the  clothing case  they  are much 
l&r;2r because  o~  the suet  &~eater degree  of  protection.  This  else 
e):plains  ~<hy,  for  clothi.:15,  the  gains  from  libera::.isati on are  so  m"'..lch 
gr-e<lter  than  the  costs.  Even  if t"he  costs  are modified  ~n various ''.:::ys, 
to  allow  for cargin3l  prod~ctivity being  lower  than  the average  and  to 
::;.ai:e  so:::::~  allo\-l2nce  for  i:::;:>hct  in local  labour markets,  the benefits 
("·:·;ic:c  are  a  co,·tti:mous  permanent:  strean) would  far outweight  the  costs 
ev~n in  the !ir3t year.  For  footwear  the results  are  less striking 
i.E  t:-,e  decisio:-ts  were  co:-tceived  of as  an  investment over  time it 
T.-..,culd  rc~u1.re extr8.ordinarily  high discount  rates  or  lo1:v  discount  periods 
to  ?r0ducc  a  neg~tive net present value  from  trade  liber3lisation.  Ths=e 
:s  a  L::·t:-:er  "national"  £;C:in  in the  case of  clothir,g in that  sor::e  of  t:-.e 
tc.:-::·C::.::;:r  effect  lS  a  distribution from  foreign  exporters. 
=::.2  .::.:::?lication  is  tr1.:1t,  JLn  static terms,  freer  trade  is rr:ost  ea::;ily 
r  -=·  ~·- Lvely tigt and  w~cn  L~a ~ages of  displaced workers  are  relati~0ly 
E.::.·-· ..  ""e\.· cr· 
::.-·..:::  c:::.so~;.;te  nar:nitud2s  of  lal:lour  displaced ia a  labour-intensive industry 
~i:2 c:o::1i::g  u:;  lo.e;:-g2  (4C:,CJG--50~000 on  these estimates)  and it is 
'vC  I:-· j Implications  of the  Community's  regional policy  (and related policies) 
Carlo Secchi 
15  November  1977 
The  existence  of problems  of regional unbalances  and regional  economic 
backlvardness  in the  member  States has  stimulated both a  variety of national 
policies for regional  development  and  a  Community policy ad hoc. 
At  a  general  level,  here  I  would like to point  out  that  vm  would  judge 
regional  development  policies in their interrelations  with the structural 
adjustment  problems  necessarily  connected with any  Community's  development 
co-operation policy with LDC's basically from three points  of vievJ. 
fJe  can find  a  negative situation,  where the regional  development  policy 
becomes  an obstacle to structural adjustment,  if it promotes  economic acti-
vities or gives  contributions to their survival  when  they are  against  the 
sponteneous  or desired trends  of a  new  international divison of labour  (IDL). 
E.g.,  many  "industrial rescues"  carried out  in Italy in some  regions  in 
recent  years  ~<rould fall under this heading. 
~Ie  can also have  neutral  situ·1tions,  '.vhere  a  regional  development  policy 
neither promotes  nor  impedes  structural adjustment. 
Finally,  1t:e  can have  positive situations,  Hhere  a  regional  development 
policy not  only tries to solve the socio-economic  problems  of a  bacb·Jard 
region,  but  combines  this effort  with a  re-structuring of its productive 
system towards  a  better  IDL. 
l.  National regional  development  policies  wi. thin the  EEC 
The  approaches  in the  EEC  member  States  var;; to quite  an  e},.'i;ent  (1).  In some 
countries,  firms  establishing an;yv1here  in development  regions  qualify  for 
assistance  :  e. g. ,  the  whole  of Southern Italy. 
(l)  The  Economist,  1  April  1978,  Europe  1 s  re~:;"ional  policies,  pp.  92-93. -2-
Great  Britain's assisted areas are divided into three categories,  of 
which  each receives a  different treatment.  Other  countries now  feel  a.  more 
selective approach achieves better results.  The  aim is to concentrate 
regional assistance  on  a  limited number  of centres, to ensure they offer 
all the requirements  of industrial development  - good  communications, 
factory sites,  services like banking,  schools  and housing,  etc. 
France has  eight  growth poles,  some  centered on already large cities like 
Bordeaux,  to which the bulk of regional aid is channeled. 
The  Federal Republic of Germany  favours  an even finer regional tuning 
the Government's  assistance is directed to 300  growth point. 
However,  although all the member  States of the  EEC  attach high importance 
to the problem of their ovm  regional unbalances  and try to solve it with 
various active measures,  at the level of the whole  Community  there seems 
to be  a  much  lower  degree  of awareness  by  those  same  member  States,  and 
particularly by  the  strongest  ones. -:1-
2.  The  Community's  regional development  policy and  the  ERDF 
The  Commission  - on  the 3rd of June  1977  - submitted to the  Council 
a  set of  proposals and  guidelines  concerning the  Community's  regional 
policy and  the  ERDF  (1  ) •  .Most  of this section is base  on that document. 
Let us first consider the  socio-economic  context  of the  Community's 
regional policy. 
It is acknowledged  that the  Common  Market has  not  caused  a  better 
distribution of  economic activities within the  Community.  On  the  cont~ 
ry,  regional unbalances  have  increased,  as pointed  out  earlier. Moreover, 
from 1973  on,  the  slower rates of growth in general and  of increase  of 
productive capacities have  seriously threatened the weakest  regions. 
Nowadays,  the  existence  of  regional unbalances  seems  to  be  threatening 
the very functioning  of  the  Common  Market. 
On  the  other hand,  it seems  possible to appeoach  more  efficiently 
the  most  important inequalities only within a  Community's  context. 
The  new  IDL  causes  the  Community's  economy  a  process of  deep  re-
structuring,  which in turn might  cause  new  forms  of regional unbalances. 
The  Community's  regional policy- in the  opinion of  the  Commission-
needs  consequently to be  re-framed in order to face  these  new  tasks. 
It becomes  necessary to widen and  strengthen it, both for the histori 
cally backwards  regions and  for those  which in perspective  might 
encounter difficult problems  of re-structuring. 
In the  Commission's  opinion,  the  main features  of  a  new  Community's 
regional  policy  should  be: 
- a.  general  policy to  support  the  .member  States'  initiatives to 
overcome  regional inequalities; 
- a  specific action by  the  Community  to tackle  the  new  problems  which 
result from the  EEC  economic  ana  social situation. 
(l)  Community  regional policy.  New  b~idelines  (Communication and  propo-
sals submitted  by  the  Commission  to the  Council  on  3  June  1977), 
Bulletin o1'  the  European  Communj_ties,  Supplement  2/77. -4-
Its  t~rgets should be: 
to  reduce  existing regional unbalances both in today' s  backl·sa.rds  re5io~s 
a.!ld  in  tho~e affected by a  process of re-structuring; 
- to  implement  a  system of anticipatory measures  in order to avoid  new  regf0nal 
unbalances  lorhich  might  result  from  the  evolution of the world  economy  or 
1 frorr 
specific Community's policies. 
All this reouires strict co-operation with the  member  States,  with  me~sure~ 
of co-ordin11tion between national  and  Community's  policies,  a  support  by  thr? 
EEC  of  na.tion~l efforts and  autonomous  intervention measures  by the  Community. 
The  crit.eria to  be  followed  - always  in the  Commission's  opinion - sho,,_ld 
be: 
- an  ~.ctive manpol'rer  policy; 
- the  a.rmoniouR  d(lvelopment  of economic  activities to:i thout  he"".vy  Mif,'ration 
nhenomena,  but,  on  the contrary,  through  a  better spatial allocation of 
productive resources; 
- a  global  land use  policy at the  EEC  level. 
The  onerational instruments  should  be: 
- the forwulation of a  global  framework  for  th~egional policy {1); 
- the  evalua.tion of the  reeional  impact  of the  Community's  policies,  to  be 
introduced  ancl  taken  into account  in the  formulation  and  implementation  f 
the  m~in Community's  policies; 
- the  co-ordination between national  regional policies,  also  on  the ba.ds  f 
reeional  development  plans; 
- the  Regional Policy Committee,  to be  consulted for the biennal report,  r  d 
to  be  emlarged associating to it in some  way  representatives of regional 
Authorities. 
As  for the  ERDF,  in 1976  it had credits for 500  million u.a., used thro  ~h 
307  decisions  for contributions  concerning 1,545  projects,  whose  total  a~o1nt 
( 1)  Starting in 19?9,  the  Commission  tdll have  to  present  every other ye!:l..r  a 
"Report  on  the  socio-economic situation and  evolution in the  Community's 
regions". -5-
re;:;ched  4,636 million u.a.  25  io  t.vere  ir11  the field  of industr*nd services 
(creatine or maintaining 55,000  jobs)  and  75  %  were  in the field of infrastructu 
re  ( 1). 
For the year  1978,  750  million u.a.  are  planned for  the  ERDF,  to  be  allocated 
up  to  650  million u.a.  according to  "national quotas",  and  up  to  100  willian u.a. 
~or specific initiatives of interest to  the  Community. 
T~us,  the  ERDF  should  evolve  and  be  used both for  sup}lortine; ini  tie_tives  of 
the  member  States and for  autonomous  initiatives of the  Community.  Its interven 
tions  should: 
help  in solving the  backwardness  of  some  regions; 
- support  measures  connected with recent  changes  in the  agricultural  and 
indu~trial structure; 
fece  problems  at  present or foreseeable  in connection with  the  new  IDL  or with 
specific  EEC  policies; 
help in solving problems  of border regions. 
In  the  Commission's  opinion,  among  the  problems  to  be  solved,  there  is  the 
need to  establish  re~lar consultations with regional Authorities,  to  define 
cle:=trly priorities  (which will  be  done  starting in 1979  by  the  Council,  after 
proposals  by  the  Commission)  and  to  co-ordina.te  regional  anf.  national  nolicies 
on  the  basis of the  f,llidelincs  admpted  by  the  Council  and  on  the  basis of 
n::tional  development  plans.  Co-ordination  should  concern  particula.rl~r: 
- the  use of disincentives  in~he advanced  regions; 
- infrastructure projects; 
- the  complementary use of Community's  and  national  financial  resources. 
(1)  See  the  1976  Report  of the  ERDF,  footnote  1. -6-
3.  Co-ordination between the  ERDF  and other Community's  financial  instrument+ 
The  1976  Report  of the  ERDF  in the field of co-ordination of Fund's  interv~~~ 
tions  vii th other  Community's  policies and  financial  instruments,  suggests  mecitsures 
to  increase the  impact  of the Guidance  section of the  EAGGF  in the  regions  'l<rhich 
are  more  in need. 
Other policies and  financial  instruments  are also  taken  into  account  in that 
same  Report. 
As  for  investment'  projects  financed  by  the  EIB,  it is etcknowledged  that  ~n 
1976  75  %  of all loans  went  to projects of regional interest. 
The  ESF  - always  in 1976  increased its efforts for  the  backwards  :ref'ions, 
~ri th  o~er 50  %  of its budget  in their favour. 
The  c·:estion of}'o-ordination betNeen the  ERDF  a.nd  the Regional  Policy  on  one 
~:ide,  and.  other Cor111uni ty'  s  policies  "'nd  fimmcial  instruments of  reciona  1  i~terest 
on the  other,  is anyho't-t  very  importrmt  and  much  can be  done  in this  ~~. r~ct.i~n. 
4.  The  European Social Fund.  (ETft') 
It is drrni  fic::mt  that the ESF  is the  only in.strument  r;uoter'!  l1y  2  reo0.,...t 
UKC'T'AD  Clacument  (1)  as  "an important  e lP.ment  of th8  Comrnuni ties'  social  an.-~  ·~h·:mr, 
~ s  Nell  as  industrial re-adaptation policies",  Nhile  no  mention is  mad~'>  of  tl'"l 
European Regional  Policy and.  the  ERDF.  I 
Recently,  the  Commission  submitted to the  Council  proposals for  r1rkin~ the 
ESF  bett~=>r adapted to the  present  situntion in the  labour mnrket  anCI  for  incr~::sine 
the  pffectiveness of its interventions  (2).  I 
The  Co!l'mi !Osion  also  intends  to  revie'I-J  the various  implement  in,<:  reeulations 
conc0rning the  ESF  with a  view to  making  pro:posals for their improvement  i,..,  jhe 
lif'ht  of the  exnPrir:mce  offthe  past five  years.  It \·:ill  consider other pos  i bili  ties 
(1)  Adjustment  assistance  measures,  TD/B/C.2/171,  27  nay  1977,  PP•  5-6.  I 
(2)  Review of the Social Fund  (Im3rprovement  Proposed),  Commission of the  EO, 
:'•larch  1977. -7-
of  interventio~y the  ESF,  beyond vocational training and  geographical  mobility 
of •,JorkPrs.  FolloHine their approval  by  the  Council,  th~arious amendments 
should  enter into force  on  1st January 1978. 
A1,,o  the  :·~uropea.n Parliament has  taken  an  active  interest in the  ESF.  In  a 
resolution adopted  on  12  May  1977,  it is stated that the  reform  of  the  ESF  should 
complete  an:l  encourag·e  national  policies in the  fmeld  of  employment  a.nd{tha.t  the 
ES~ can  become  an  efficient contribution to  solv~nemployment problems  only if 
it 'iJill  b1strengthened and  transfor::~ed into  an  instrument  of global  policy. 
The  :rain activity of the  ESF  has  been to  improve  employment  opportunities for 
>Vorkers  in the  Community  by subsididng 50  %  of the  cost of vocational  training 
schemes  in  the  member  6ountries  in order to  make  the  employment  of  t•rorkers  ePcsier 
and  to  increase their occupational  and.  eeog·raphical mobility \vi thin the  Communi t;v. 
Since  the  ESF  was  reformed,  its annual  credits have  increr1sed  from  235  million 
u.a.  in 1973  to  617  million u.a.  in 1977.  fhe  ESF  has been progressively  enl2.r~ed 
and  various  groups  of workers  have  become  eligible for assistance. 
T~e  Corn~ission's proposals  earlier mentioned  aim  at resolving the difficulties 
encountered in the  operation of the ESF  and fall into  two  main  categories: 
- a  better adjustment  of Fund  intervention to  employment  requirements  and 
concentration of action in the  most  pressing Community's  problems; 
- increased  effectiveness of the ESF  assistance. 
The  Commission  aims  to•.  put  more  emphasis  in the future  on  interventions 
under Article 4  than  on  those under Article 5,  because  they  enable  the  ESF 
aid to  be  directed more  preciseihy to those  sectors of the  economy  and  reP·ions 
h"hich  need it most.  The  Commission  nroposes  to  delete  the  clause  •,,rhich  provides 
that  at  least 50  %  of the  ESF  resources  should be  spent uncer Article 5 
interventions  (1). 
Fin8.lly,  the  Commission's  proposals  include measures  to  remove  or diminuish 
(1)  Article 4  intervention can  take  place  when  the  employment  situation in 
specific areas,  vrhich  the  Council  has  to  define,  is affected or in danger 
of beine affected by  Com~unity policies.  Article  5 interventions  can  take 
place,  'I'Iithout  prior Council decision,to help in solvinc unemployment  and 
long-term  under-employ~ent of a  structural character,  especialJy or a 
ren:ional  nature. -8-
restrictions which at present affect the assistance which certain  c~tegories 
of  •·~orkers  can receive  from  the ESF,  to  ensure greater scope  from  the  ESF  to help 
'·'omen  find new  jobs and  self-employed persons to  be  trained to  run  small  cr;;~'t 
undertakings.  The  proposals  also  aim  to  make  the  ESF  aids more  effective  and
1 the 
i 
possibility of new aids extending beyond the field of vocational  tr~::i.nin.cr,  an~ 
:nobility. 
It  m~y be  noted that the objectives of the  ESF  do  not  specifically  includ~ 
;;O,justment  asdstance to  industries or sectors affected by intern"!tional 
competition nor measures.  to facilitate the re-location of industries or r>ctivi ties 
into  more  viable  sectors  {including those  favourable  to  LDC's),  even  thou0h  the 
activities of the  ESF'  enhance  1:-obour  :"!ability  ~lithin the  Com~:unity.  T'hus,  ~"';!  jLs 
to  be  h0:;')ed  - in lJNCTAD's  opinion  - that  in making further proposals  conc?r!!inc: 
! 
the  ob,jsctives  and  operations of the  ESF,  "the  Go:nmission  ,_;ould  takep.nto  t'lCC!r.,mt 
thP  need  for measures  to  promote  the·  trade of developinp;  countrieR  Fi th  mE>"'11b~~r 
States  and  the  Community  RS  a  l-Jhole,  a.s  ~rell  as  the re-location. of  cer·t~.i  !1 
in0·u1-!:ries  or sectors to  the  developinp:- countries"  (1). 
I~ ten yearP,  from  1964  to  1974,  the  EAGGF  financed  about  4~8~0 prnjects.
1
_ 
for  n  total  ~mount of almost  1.  3  billi0n u.a.  The  ~reate::;  rece~~~n..,.  Countr~· r-:r. 
th~t  ~nriod was  Italy,  with other 400  million u.a.  on  l,Sco proJects,  follo1ed 
by  Gcrmr-tny  (330  r!!illion u.a.  and  1,000 projects)  and  by France  (264  r!!illion u.a. 
::J.nrl  8CO  projects).  In  1975  the  r!uidance  section of  the  EAGGF  h:1d  at its  dif1JP:SG 1 
I 
325  million u.a.,  used  to  finance  692  projects  (212.6 million u.a.), to  Pupnort 
producers'  associations  a.nd  for various purposes  (49.9  million u.a.)  ,,  and  partly 
c:.n-1  exc~ptionally trasferred to  the  "Guarantee"  section  ( 62.5 million u. a.)  I(~ )  ~ 
(1)  Tine.  cit.  (footnote  5),  para~raph ??,  p.  6. 
(2)  Source:  The_2-ericultural_J_?olicv  oJ"  thP_]~C.,  Euro:ne~.n  Dor:-;1~,.,,.,t::> 4:ion,  1~P/)J5. 
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Thus,  we  see  that also  the  "Guidance"  section of the  EAGGF  he.s  at its dis:Posal 
sizeable annual  credits  which  can  finance  projects in the field of  arricultur~ 
2nd  rela.terl  sectors.  As  it was  mentioned  in section 2  ,  the  choice  of the  pro jectB 
to  be  financed  has  of course also  regional  implications.  In other  \l:ords,  the 
~llocation of these  financial  resources  can ae  done  also  taking into account 
s?ecific reo:ionr·.l  realities naturally in the  agricul  tur~.l sector,  but  obviously 
interrRlated also  with the general  socio-economic  conditions  of the  regions 
Consem1e!1tly,  a  better co-ordination  between~nterventions of the  ERDF  an"l  of 
the Guidance  section of the  EAGGF  could prove  quite useful  in the  general 
frame·,rork  of  a  Community's  re,r:ional  policy  ~,ri th more  emphasis  on  r.tructural 
adju0tment  uroblems. 
6.  Tl,e  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB)  and  other Community's  policies  ar.d 
fin?~cial instruments 
A  similar reasoning applies  also  - as it was  anticipated  in section 2  - to 
the  ouer~ion of the  EIB  and  - in general  - to all other policies  an~ financinl 
in:c;+.ru!'llents  at the:  disposal  of the  Community. 
Not  only  we  have  the  problem  of reciprocal  implications between various 
polici  cs  - which  vri lJ.\be  investigated by  the  Group  - but  also,  from  the  s0ecific 
point  of viPW  of this paper,  it may  be  realized that  most  of  the  Com~unity's 
other intervention possibilitiPs and financial  instruments  h<Jve,  in one  wr>.y  or 
the  other, regional  implications,  and  thus  a  better co-orcination  couB  prove 
useful  for  purposes  of intervention ·on  the  regional  economic  realities.  bnd,  at 
thif'  level,  a.s  it t.,ras  mentioned  at  the  beginning and  as it is Kell  kno,m,  rr"any 
times  problems  of structural adjustment  come  up  with  a  v1eir,ht  a.no  a  0:i:~Pnsio!'. 
that  cannot  find  a  solution within the  region  concerned  itself. - 10-
7.  _  Concl_ud.i_n;;  rem<'rks 
A rer;ional  development  policy at the  EEC  level - in drict co-orcinP-4:inn 
···i th  ea.ch  member  St"!.te  policy in thel  field  - is clearly a  con~i  tio sine .  .':.+~-.E.~ 
for  'lny  serious  and  positive apf)roach  to the structural  a.djustmen-t  pro"tllPt:'l$ 
I 
I 
.,>-ich  }ilevi  ta.bly derive  from  .q,ny  (serious  and  positive)  Conmuni ty'  s  dev~lOT''"en  t 
/ 
nolic~ in favour of LDC's. 
This  means  that the  pres~nt set-up should  be  strengthened  and  endot..:rPd  •d. th 
much  larzer resources,  also  in strict co-ordin:'ltion with all operat i1:>m1l 
instruments  available at the  Community's  level. 
Ava.i lable  finar.cia.l  resources  are by definition  "sc<1.ree",  ~nd  thi:s  renui "'er; 
£>'!'eat  efforts of selecting priori  ties within  a  global  strateGY,  of e:fficiency 1 
::mr'l  of co-ordination and  co-operation with member States and  their re.csions  ~ 
A  fe>-r  fundamental  principles  shouldt0e  clearly adopted  and  eaually clearl;r 
:precise  instructions  should be  gb.ren  to the  member States and  their regions  .• 
The  :oroblems  of structural  adjustment  are  sometimes  misunderstood  by  pullic 
opinion,  as  we~l as  by  trade unions,  political parties,  etc.  AlAo  in this  fiel~ 
initiatives undertaken. 
efforts  seem  necessary,  at all  levels,  in order to  stirPulate  con;.;ensu:s  in  tb,1 
I -11-
8.  Addendum  :  Recent  developments  of the European regional policy  (and related 
policies)  (April 1978) 
During  the  European  summit  of 5-6  December  1977,  the  agreement  reached 
on  the  renewal  of the  ERDF  for the  coming  three years  (1B78-1980)  accep-
ted only partially the  requests put  forward.  in particular by  the  weakest 
members  of  the  EEC.  This  does not allow - for sure  - any  hope  of a  rapid, 
overcoming of the  present situation of regional  unbalances  and of an 
accelerated economic  progress in the  most  backwards  regions.  Against  the 
3  billion u.a.  proposed  by  the  Commission,  the  Council  agr~ed upon  1,850 
million u.a.  for  the  three years.  This is more  than the  past  three years 
of operation of the  ERDF,  but  due  account  should  be  taken of  the  inflatio-
nary process  which will  inevitably continue  also  in the  coming  years 
(thus  reducing  the  amounts  in real tErms).  Moreover,  this  seems  r.mch  less 
than  what  is required by  a  regional policy with  the  purpose  of  a  real 
re-equilibrium within the  Community  (and  thus  the  possibility of,  tacklin.s; 
more  ambitious  projects,  like  the  monetary union). 
The  hopes  of more  effective intervention in the  field of regional 
problems  are  connected with  th~possibility that the  European  Parliament 
- v.:hich  has  already criticized many  times  the  Council's  behaviou$" in the 
field  of reg,ional  policy - could put  pressure  for an  increase of  the 
credits of the  ERDF.  Some  hopes  are  also  connected with the  so-called 
"medi terranem. package"  (1),  already approved  by  the  Commission  but still 
waiting for its final  approval  and  implementation.  It should  provide  1.3 
billion u.a.  in five  years for Italian and  French  regional  (asricultural) 
projects in the  southern  regions of the  two  countries.Other possibilities 
are  connected ,,lith intervention  schemes  for financing  restructurinc. 
(1)  La  Communaut~  Europ~enne pour le  d~v~loppement de  ses  r~sions m~diter­
ran~ebnes,  Nouvelles  de  la poli  tique agricole  commune,  n.  11,  decer.;bre 
1977. - 12-
Finally,  during the  s-ummit  of 7-8 April  1978·,  within the possible  ni tia-
tives to promote  emp'loyment,  it was  agreed that all member States sho ld 
do  an effort to achieve  much  hi,gher rates of growth,  also the weak  on s. 
Italy,  e.g.,  has been promised ·higher financial assistance for the pr blems 
(balance of payments,  e.tc.}  it will encounter.  Nothing more  specific  /-
judging from  the  ne\'rpapers' reports - has been agreed upon for what  co~cerns 
i 
in particular the  problem of regional unbalances within the  Communi tyj. 
I 
It emerges  from·  this :t>rief analysis that there is still little wi~ling-
ness to tackle effectively the  regional  problem at the  Community  levelt. 
Re-equilibrium can be  achieved only through a  ~ubstantial transfer of[ 
resources ·from the  rich regions to  the  poor ones.  In the  absence  of t  .:ls, 
any_  adjustment of re-structuring problem will be  much  more  difficult· .o 
tackle.  In other \'lords,  an effective regional policy could prepare th . 
"ground"· for an adjustment  policy,  and it becomes  the  necessary condi  ion 
for the. latter to \•rork  in practice.  Thus,  in dealing \'lith  the  intebrelations 
between  the.  Community's  development  policy  (with its probable internal 
consequences}  and its other policies,  in my  opinion the  Group  should stress 
that the  EEC  must  prepare itself internally so  that an effective  developmen-t;; 
policy - once it starts to produce its effects - does not  become  the  tar,qet 
for counter-manouvres  by  those parts of the  Community  \'Jhich  are  more  suffer-
ing from it, also as  a  consequence  of the fact  that they have  been very 
little prepared to face  the  new·situation,  or of the  fact that  they 
have  substantial internal problems  to  be  solved  (and  thus are not w·i 
to  have  any extra complication}. 